Financial Instrument of U.S. National Power and Unconventional Warfare:
2-44. The agent controlling the creation, flow, and access to “stores of value” wields power. Although finance is generally an operation of real and virtual currency, anything that can serve as a “medium of exchange” provides those who accept the medium with a method of financial transaction. For both reasons, ARSOF understand that they can and should exploit the active and analytical capabilities existing in the financial instrument of U.S. power in the conduct of UW.
2-45. Like the economic activity, which all nation-states, human groups, and individuals respond to, ARSOF can use financial power as a weapon in times of conflict up to and including large-scale general war. Like the economic activity that it is related to, most financial power is unmanaged, routine, and peaceful. However, manipulation of U.S. financial strength can leverage the policies and cooperation of state governments. Financial incentives and disincentives can build and sustain international coalitions waging or supporting U.S. UW campaigns. As part of an interagency effort, the U.S. Treasury can recommend changes to U.S. policy that can provide such incentives to state governments and others at the national strategic policy level. Participation in international financial organizations, such as the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), offers the U.S. diplomatic-financial venues to accomplish such coalitions.
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2-47. If properly authorized and coordinated, ARSOF can use—or coordinate for other agencies to use— measured and focused financial incentives or disincentives to persuade adversaries, allies, and surrogates to modify their behavior at the theater strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Such application of financial power must be part of a circumspect, integrated, and consistent UW plan.
2-48. Like all other instruments of U.S. national power, the use and effects of financial weapons are interrelated and they must be coordinated carefully. Once again, ARSOF must work with the DOS and IC to determine which elements of the human terrain in the UWOA are most susceptible to financial engagement and what second- and third-order effects are likely from such engagement. The Treasury’s Office of International Affairs and Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) (and its components), together with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), provide financially mission-focused channels for identifying opportunities to employ the financial weapon. In addition to intelligence and policy changes that may provide active incentive or disincentive leverage, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has a long history of conducting economic warfare valuable to any ARSOF UW campaign.
