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I don't recall using either term.
You're acting like the Ukrainians and Russians were on equal footing. They were not.
No it doesn't. Pollack rather clearly illustrates this in "Arabs at War";
"At a tactical level, the Iraqis exhibited the same problems that had plagued them throughout the war... In particular, the same old problems could be seen when, for one reason or another, the situation did not develop as anticipated by Baghdad's plan..., on numerous occasions when Iraqi tactical units were caught off-guard by an Iranian ambush or an unexpected defensive position, this cooperation disintegrated, leading to losses in infantry and tanks. Unforeseen Iranian counterattacks continued to take a disproportionate toll on Iraqi forces: the Iraqis were slow to react, and in every case their only response was to try to beat back the Iranians with overwhelming firepower. Fortunately for them, their advantage in this area was so enormous (and the Iranian forces were so weak) that it usually worked. Overall, Iraqi tanks continued to rely on massed firepower and the shock effect of frontal assaults rather than maneuver... In those few instances when the Iraqis faced Iranian mobile reserves, they generally reverted to their previous practice of charging the Iranians with guns blazing and tended to defeat the Iranians through sheer weight of numbers rather than any skill in handling a tank or tank formations.
Commanders of Iraqi armored and mechanized platoons, companies, and battalions demonstrated little ability to organize and employ their forces as teams. Similarly, Iraqi artillery fire was devastating primarily because of its volume and heavy reliance on chemical warfare. Iraqi artillery batteries only fired preregistered, preplanned fire missions - even in support of the exploitation operations - and as a result, they rarely could contribute if the armored columns took a wrong turn or encountered Iranian resistance where it was not expected. For this reason, Iraqi artillery generally had little effect after the initial breakthrough battle. "
Kenneth M. Pollack. Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Studies in War, Society, and the Militar) (Kindle Locations 3252-3258). Kindle Edition.
Their performance does not contradict anything; Iraqi forces were at poor at tactical execution in 1988 as they were in 1980. The difference was in 1988 the Iraqis had amassed overwhelming advantages in artillery and armor, and when coupled with poison gas this was enough to overwhelm Irans' badly depleted forces.
What?
That was a political decision, not a military one.
Once again, “but not me personally” doesn’t actually change the narrative that has been throughly established, especially since you haven’t actually said anything against said narrative.
According to the West the Ukrainians are far superior to the Russians, yes. Yet the Ukrainians are the ones who keep losing major battles.
Is that discussing the same operations I already pointed out? Because A) the source I provided displays a very different picture and B) there’s no dates in the quote you provided, leaving it open that it could be any one of the numerous Iraqi offensives in the previous seven years.
It also doesn’t contradict my statement that the Iraqis demonstrated skill in the use of chemical weapons.
The US engaged in large scale anti-partisan operations in both northern Mexico and across much of the Caribbean and Central America, and struggled immensely.
Political and military will are inherently connected.