Gettysburg[W:176]

[southwest88]

Logistics, logistics, logistics

Artillery, and everything else, is in support of infantry. Artillery can advance itself behind friendly lines. Maybe infantry will loan arty a couple scouts so no one steps in a hole.

At Gettysburg, both sides lost enough artillery men that volunteers had to fill in from the regular forces. The Union forces took casualties in the opening cannonade before Pickett's Charge - some of the CSA guns were very well served. The US artillery officer - Gen. Henry Hunt - in charge had a supply of powder & shot off the books - enough for 20 rounds per gun.

Gen. Hunt did a much better job than his counterpart, CSA Brig. Gen. William Pendleton, in coordinating fires & moving cannon & replacements/reinforcements into position or into ready positions, as reserves. His logistics were much better, & Hunt simply kept better track of ammo & powder on hand, & running supplies up to the gunline.

From Gettysburg, S. Sears

Sears quotes Richard Rollins, "The Failure of Confederate Artillery at Gettysburg: Ordnance and Logistics", North & South 3:2 (2000) "Throughout the Pennsylvania campaign some of the most skilled artillerists of the Civil War (of the CSA) would find themselves loading often inferior guns with frequently shoddy ammunition."

 

[danielpalos]

Re: Logistics, logistics, logistics

On June 26, elements of Maj. Gen. Jubal Early's division of Ewell's Corps occupied the town of Gettysburg after chasing off newly raised Pennsylvania militia in a series of minor skirmishes.

In my opinion, the militias of the North should have engaged in disrupting Southern communications and supply lines. The South, should have felt, the Power of each northern County.

 

[southwest88]

Union militias existed mostly on paper

In my opinion, the militias of the North should have engaged in disrupting Southern communications and supply lines. The South, should have felt, the Power of each northern County.

Neither side was prepared for the Civil War. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Militia_(United_States)#American_Civil_War

"American Civil War[edit]

"At the beginning of the American Civil War, neither the North or the South was nearly well enough prepared for war, and few people imagined the demands and hardships the war would bring. Just prior to the war the total peacetime army consisted of a paltry 16,000 men. Both sides issued an immediate call to forces from the militia, followed by the immediate awareness of an acute shortage of weapons, uniforms and trained officers. Among the available States' militia regiments there existed an uneven quality, and none had anything resembling combat training. The typical militia drilling at the time amounted to, at best, parade-ground marching. The militia units, from local communities, had never drilled together as a larger regiment. Thereby lacking in the extremely important skill, critically necessary for the war style of the time, to maneuver from a marching line into a fighting line. Yet, both sides were equally unready, and rushed to prepare.[37]

"This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (June 2008)

"Confederate militia[edit]
The most important:
Arkansas Militia
Missouri State Guard

"This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (January 2014)

"Union militia[edit]

"Following the Confederate taking of Fort Sumter, which marked the beginning of the Civil War, President Lincoln called up 75,000 States' militiamen to retake the seized Federal property and found that the militia "strength was far short of what the Congressional statute provided and required".[38]

"In the summer of 1861, military camps circled around Washington, D.C. composed of new three-year army volunteers and 90-day militia units. The generals in charge of this gathering had never handled large bodies of men before, and the men were simply inexperienced civilians with arms having little discipline and less understanding of the importance of discipline.[39]"

(My emphasis - more detail @ the URL - especially the Western contributions to Union forces)

The Union militias weren't ready for combat. & they weren't expeditionary forces anyway - they needed logistics support to be effective (& that took time, training, better officers). & the Union militias initially tended to short-term enlistments - as 90 days above - too short for a protracted campaign, & probably timed to the agricultural cycle. The notion of Union raiding in depth didn't really happen until Sherman's march to the sea, I believe. CSA forces did raid, but they were raids only. Hit & run tactics, which was what they could do best - & took advantage of their cavalry & sharper tactical command.

 

[danielpalos]

Re: Union militias existed mostly on paper

Neither side was prepared for the Civil War. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Militia_(United_States)#American_Civil_War

"American Civil War[edit]

"At the beginning of the American Civil War, neither the North or the South was nearly well enough prepared for war, and few people imagined the demands and hardships the war would bring. Just prior to the war the total peacetime army consisted of a paltry 16,000 men. Both sides issued an immediate call to forces from the militia, followed by the immediate awareness of an acute shortage of weapons, uniforms and trained officers. Among the available States' militia regiments there existed an uneven quality, and none had anything resembling combat training. The typical militia drilling at the time amounted to, at best, parade-ground marching. The militia units, from local communities, had never drilled together as a larger regiment. Thereby lacking in the extremely important skill, critically necessary for the war style of the time, to maneuver from a marching line into a fighting line. Yet, both sides were equally unready, and rushed to prepare.[37]

"This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (June 2008)

"Confederate militia[edit]
The most important:
Arkansas Militia
Missouri State Guard

"This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (January 2014)

"Union militia[edit]

"Following the Confederate taking of Fort Sumter, which marked the beginning of the Civil War, President Lincoln called up 75,000 States' militiamen to retake the seized Federal property and found that the militia "strength was far short of what the Congressional statute provided and required".[38]

"In the summer of 1861, military camps circled around Washington, D.C. composed of new three-year army volunteers and 90-day militia units. The generals in charge of this gathering had never handled large bodies of men before, and the men were simply inexperienced civilians with arms having little discipline and less understanding of the importance of discipline.[39]"

(My emphasis - more detail @ the URL - especially the Western contributions to Union forces)

The Union militias weren't ready for combat. & they weren't expeditionary forces anyway - they needed logistics support to be effective (& that took time, training, better officers). & the Union militias initially tended to short-term enlistments - as 90 days above - too short for a protracted campaign, & probably timed to the agricultural cycle. The notion of Union raiding in depth didn't really happen until Sherman's march to the sea, I believe. CSA forces did raid, but they were raids only. Hit & run tactics, which was what they could do best - & took advantage of their cavalry & sharper tactical command.

it is about organization and tactics. newly raised militia will never be a match for regulars. disrupting communications and supply, would be a "best use of resources".

 

[southwest88]

The early Union militias & officers needed a lot of seasoning

it is about organization and tactics. newly raised militia will never be a match for regulars. disrupting communications and supply, would be a "best use of resources".

Apparently the new Union militias & their officers were very green, & were innocent of any strategic & tactical maneuvers. I think raiding by Union militia would have been a disaster - it takes more discipline to hit & run, I think, than to stand & fight in a conventional battle. Any tactical raids by the Union would have been better carried out by cavalry. & Union militia raids would have been ridden down by CSA cavalry in any event, which was outstanding (as compared to the early Union efforts). The Union units - regulars & militias - got much better with experience. The CSA had to make do with their initial mobilization, & they never could properly sustain their armies in the field, nor replace losses man for man.

& of course, CSA hardly had logistics supply points of concentration to raid in the first place. Warehouses & such tended to be on the rivers & estuaries - where cotton trade was mostly shipped out.

 

[danielpalos]

Re: The early Union militias & officers needed a lot of seasoning

Apparently the new Union militias & their officers were very green, & were innocent of any strategic & tactical maneuvers. I think raiding by Union militia would have been a disaster - it takes more discipline to hit & run, I think, than to stand & fight in a conventional battle. Any tactical raids by the Union would have been better carried out by cavalry. & Union militia raids would have been ridden down by CSA cavalry in any event, which was outstanding (as compared to the early Union efforts). The Union units - regulars & militias - got much better with experience. The CSA had to make do with their initial mobilization, & they never could properly sustain their armies in the field, nor replace losses man for man.

& of course, CSA hardly had logistics supply points of concentration to raid in the first place. Warehouses & such tended to be on the rivers & estuaries - where cotton trade was mostly shipped out.

I agree to disagree with your assessment. Most men in the militia would probably know how to use them and how to hunt.

Regardless, the South would need a communications and supply line to advance.

 

[danielpalos]

Re: The early Union militias & officers needed a lot of seasoning

Local county based militia could harass opposing lines of communication and supply.

the objective is, to help out regular Union forces by requiring the invading force to leave behind more personnel for security operations instead of combat operations.

Invading "battalion square" formations could be attrited into "battalion triangle" formations, with no serious casualties; for advancing, Union "battalion square formations".

 

[Cordelier]

The Confederates didn't have bad artillery. They didn't have enough of it and too little ammunition.

The arty prep prior to Pickett's Charge was ended too soon before the troops stepped off, giving the Federals more time to reorganize. Why that happened is still open to debate. Some have gone as far to claim that General Longstreet ordered the artillery to cease fire to sabotage the attack.

Longstreet wouldn't have done that. Anyone who makes such a claim has no idea about the man. In my estimation, Longstreet was about the finest defensive general of the entire war...he was a master of the counter-punch. I think Jefferson Davis' crowning mistake was in not replacing Bragg with Longstreet in the Western Theater. Had he done so, the war might have taken a very different course.

 

[apdst]

Longstreet wouldn't have done that. Anyone who makes such a claim has no idea about the man. In my estimation, Longstreet was about the finest defensive general of the entire war...he was a master of the counter-punch. I think Jefferson Davis' crowning mistake was in not replacing Bragg with Longstreet in the Western Theater. Had he done so, the war might have taken a very different course.

I agree, but there are some Longstreet haters out there in Civil War nerd land...lol

 

[Cordelier]

I agree, but there are some Longstreet haters out there in Civil War nerd land...lol

I've always wondered how much of that Longstreet hate had to do with his actions after the Civil War.

You know what strikes me about the Civil War... it's how much talent the Confederacy squandered. Beauregard, Magruder, Longstreet... the list goes on and on - immensely talented generals who ended up being assigned to backwater postings or in subservient roles, just because Jefferson Davis didn't want to relieve one of his unqualified toadies.

 

[apdst]

I've always wondered how much of that Longstreet hate had to do with his actions after the Civil War.

You know what strikes me about the Civil War... it's how much talent the Confederacy squandered. Beauregard, Magruder, Longstreet... the list goes on and on - immensely talented generals who ended up being assigned to backwater postings or in subservient roles, just because Jefferson Davis didn't want to relieve one of his unqualified toadies.

The Confederate Army was riddled with factional and regional politics.

 

[Cordelier]

The Confederate Army was riddled with factional and regional politics.

I agree... but how much of that was a product of the decentralized nature of their Government? It seems to me that in addition to their superior industrial and manpower base, the North also benefited from a strong and centralized command structure. The North may not have had the same degree of military talent as the South, but what they did have, they seemed to use more efficiently.

 

[danielpalos]

The Union had every right to expect the conflict to be, short lived.

The general staff of the Commander in Chief, already had a giant anaconda plan. It was a simple management error to omit, a midget anaconda plan, wherever practicable.

 

[danielpalos]

What if,

General Burford knew the midget anaconda orders,

and,

was willing to practice an orderly retreat, at the Expense of the confederates.

Orders for strategic withdrawal require a tactical withdrawal at some point.

 

[PoS]

I agree... but how much of that was a product of the decentralized nature of their Government? It seems to me that in addition to their superior industrial and manpower base, the North also benefited from a strong and centralized command structure. The North may not have had the same degree of military talent as the South, but what they did have, they seemed to use more efficiently.

The South had their share of bad generals. Leonidas Polk comes to mind. The Confederates sort of lucked into Lee when Joseph E Johnston got hurt. Lincoln on the other hand, was terrible at picking his generals and only ended up with Grant due to trial and error.

 

[danielpalos]

What if Lee had informed Longstreet to, "do what you have to do before Picket gets here".

 

[Cordelier]

The South had their share of bad generals. Leonidas Polk comes to mind. The Confederates sort of lucked into Lee when Joseph E Johnston got hurt. Lincoln on the other hand, was terrible at picking his generals and only ended up with Grant due to trial and error.

I wouldn't be so harsh on Lincoln... when I look down the list of the Corps Commanders of the Army of the Potomac prior to Gettysburg, the only one that strikes me as worth a damn was Reynolds, and Lincoln did offer him the command before he gave it to Meade, just not under the terms Reynolds demanded. For all their numbers, the Federals just didn't seem to have much of a talent for war... which is why they had to come up with a new way to wage war... but I give Sherman more credit for that than Grant.

 

[Jack Hays]

The South had their share of bad generals. Leonidas Polk comes to mind. The Confederates sort of lucked into Lee when Joseph E Johnston got hurt. Lincoln on the other hand, was terrible at picking his generals and only ended up with Grant due to trial and error.

I wouldn't be so harsh on Lincoln... when I look down the list of the Corps Commanders of the Army of the Potomac prior to Gettysburg, the only one that strikes me as worth a damn was Reynolds, and Lincoln did offer him the command before he gave it to Meade, just not under the terms Reynolds demanded. For all their numbers, the Federals just didn't seem to have much of a talent for war... which is why they had to come up with a new way to wage war... but I give Sherman more credit for that than Grant.

Rather than talk about good generals or bad, I find it more useful to think of generals who reflected the past and the future. Lee was the last great general of the Napoleonic tradition. Grant and Sherman both prefigured the great generals of the 20th century. Grant's Vicksburg campaign was the tactical masterpiece of the war, and combined amphibious operations, speed and maneuver in a stunning onslaught. Sherman was, if anything, even more visionary; his 1864-65 campaigns point to the deep penetration armored operations of some legendary 20th century commanders.

As for Lincoln, his sifting, evaluation and selecting of commanders evolved as the war hardened and war aims became increasingly harsh. By the end, when the North unleashed virtual total war on the South, the Union top ranks included Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and Thomas, a truly fearsome foursome.

 

[PoS]

I wouldn't be so harsh on Lincoln... when I look down the list of the Corps Commanders of the Army of the Potomac prior to Gettysburg, the only one that strikes me as worth a damn was Reynolds, and Lincoln did offer him the command before he gave it to Meade, just not under the terms Reynolds demanded. For all their numbers, the Federals just didn't seem to have much of a talent for war... which is why they had to come up with a new way to wage war... but I give Sherman more credit for that than Grant.

I thought Meade was an adequate commander, despite his shortcomings. He took over during the first day at Gettysburg and kept the Army of the Potomac together whereas the previous Union generals would have probably retreated. What many people dont know is that Grant retained Meade after he was made supreme commander (though the major strategic decisions were done by Grant afterwards) and Meade remained in command of that army until the end of the war.

Going back to Lincoln, I think he placed too much faith in generals like McClellan in the early part of the war and it was this decision that ended up prolonging the whole conflict because the latter was not a good general- he was too timid (which was a common characteristic of many Union generals during that time). If McClellan had kept his nerve during the Peninsular Campaign, the war might have ended right then and there. Then again, if I was Lincoln (and based on what he knew during that period) I would have made Hancock the commander for the Army of the Potomac right after the first Bull Run (and speaking of that battle, I have no idea why Lincoln placed McDowell in command of the army either, since he was a supply clerk with no battle experience and it showed).

 

[Jack Hays]

I thought Meade was an adequate commander, despite his shortcomings. He took over during the first day at Gettysburg and kept the Army of the Potomac together whereas the previous Union generals would have probably retreated. What many people dont know is that Grant retained Meade after he was made supreme commander (though the major strategic decisions were done by Grant afterwards) and Meade remained in command of that army until the end of the war.

Going back to Lincoln, I think he placed too much faith in generals like McClellan in the early part of the war and it was this decision that ended up prolonging the whole conflict because the latter was not a good general- he was too timid (which was a common characteristic of many Union generals during that time). If McClellan had kept his nerve during the Peninsular Campaign, the war might have ended right then and there. Then again, if I was Lincoln (and based on what he knew during that period) I would have made Hancock the commander for the Army of the Potomac right after the first Bull Run (and speaking of that battle, I have no idea why Lincoln placed McDowell in command of the army either, since he was a supply clerk with no battle experience and it showed).

Grant retained Meade, but also colocated his own Hqs with the Army of the Potomac. there was never any doubt who was in charge.
I believe McDowell commanded at Bull Run simply because he was on the scene and no one else was.

 

[danielpalos]

I wouldn't be so harsh on Lincoln... when I look down the list of the Corps Commanders of the Army of the Potomac prior to Gettysburg, the only one that strikes me as worth a damn was Reynolds, and Lincoln did offer him the command before he gave it to Meade, just not under the terms Reynolds demanded. For all their numbers, the Federals just didn't seem to have much of a talent for war... which is why they had to come up with a new way to wage war... but I give Sherman more credit for that than Grant.

A management error and omission.

Lincoln's general staff had a giant anaconda plan overall; but no theatre level midget anaconda strategy. The general staff of the commander in chief should have issued strategic withdrawal orders to isolate, surround, and eliminate the confederate effort to wage war; at any practicable opportunity.

With that in mind, any Union cavalry contact could look over the terrain and prepare to implement a strategic withdrawal directive, with a tactical withdrawal at the most favorable opportunity. General Buford could have implemented a tactical withdrawal, ceding the high ground to the confederates. Demonstrations could have ensured the confederates were motivated to "dig in".

Getting separated from his supply lines was Always, Lee's offensive problem.

 

[Fledermaus]

A management error and omission.

Lincoln's general staff had a giant anaconda plan overall; but no theatre level midget anaconda strategy. The general staff of the commander in chief should have issued strategic withdrawal orders to isolate, surround, and eliminate the confederate effort to wage war; at any practicable opportunity.

With that in mind, any Union cavalry contact could look over the terrain and prepare to implement a strategic withdrawal directive, with a tactical withdrawal at the most favorable opportunity. General Buford could have implemented a tactical withdrawal, ceding the high ground to the confederates. Demonstrations could have ensured the confederates were motivated to "dig in".

Getting separated from his supply lines was Always, Lee's offensive problem.

So much wrong with this.

"strategic withdrawal orders to isolate, surround, and eliminate the confederate effort to wage war"

How does one isolate, surround, and eliminate anything if one is issued withdraw orders?

Do you even understand the word "withdraw"?

 

[danielpalos]

So much wrong with this.

"strategic withdrawal orders to isolate, surround, and eliminate the confederate effort to wage war"

How does one isolate, surround, and eliminate anything if one is issued withdraw orders?

Do you even understand the word "withdraw"?

strategic withdrawal may require a tactical withdrawal, at some point. Gettysburg is an example. Lee should have been allowed to take the high ground and dig in; a tactical withdrawal within the context of Strategic withdrawal, to accomplish the Objective.

 

[PoS]

Grant retained Meade, but also colocated his own Hqs with the Army of the Potomac. there was never any doubt who was in charge.

You just repeated what I already said...

 

[Fledermaus]

strategic withdrawal may require a tactical withdrawal, at some point. Gettysburg is an example. Lee should have been allowed to take the high ground and dig in; a tactical withdrawal within the context of Strategic withdrawal, to accomplish the Objective.

The strategic objective was to STOP Lee and drive him back.....

Why in heavens name would you want Lee to take the high ground? You are making no sense.