Sorry, but that is complete coprolite. Hitler had never hidden his intentions, and had been talking about them for well over a decade.
You seem to forget that Der Paper Hanger was also the author of a best selling book.
In Germany, and that's ignoring that most Germans didn't read it cover to cover. It sold just 20,400 copies in Great Britain. Furthermore, a lot of the early translations left out a lot of the anti-Semitic comments.
That is pretty plain and simple, back in 1924. Yet you claim that "nobody knew who he was"? This is even more clear:
Right, 1924, written 13 years before the Munich Crisis unfolded.
Not to mention Hitler's justification for the situation in Sudetenland wasn't Lebensraum, It was about ethnic Germans being able to rejoin with Germany; a believable cause given the ethno-nationalist sentiments commonly found in post WWI Eastern European countries.
With anyone except Hitler, appeasement would've worked, you know. And yes, Hitler was largely an unknown, since Mein Kampf could be quite easily dismissed as prison ranting. Sure, there were internal purges (and purging the SA actually won Hitler points, as it was perceived as a move away from extremist stances) and antisemitism, but most of Europe had the problem, not just Germany. Hitler wasn't a rational actor, but he didn't come off as a warmonger or even irrational in fact he was very, very good at projecting the image he wanted, at least until all the drugs started eating away at what little sanity was left. He guaranteed the borders and the neutrality of Belgium, signed a non-aggression pact with Poland, which is something that Wiemar parties shied away from, up to and including waging a trade war with Poland. Sure, he had no intention to abide by those promises, but that's hindsight speaking. What you saw at the time was a nationalist, which a lot of people were at the time, especially in central and eastern Europe, who had set about restoring Germany to a position of power and was pursuing relatively peaceful means of doing it.
Need I point out that public opinion about the Anschluss and the Sudetenland in Britain was largely in favor of Germany? After all, those territories were settled with Germans, only natural that Germany get them. The British public was largely in favor of easing the Versailles restrictions, as they were perceived as unjust. It was only after the annexation of Czechoslovakia that Hitler's true face was revealed, which led Chamberlain to lead the push for rearmament and guaranteed Poland, then declared war on Germany when it actually attacked.
No, it was well known what he wanted, the appeasement individuals simply hoped that he could be bought off.
Just because you write a book doesn't mean people will read it.
Tell you what, go and read Mein Kampf. It will give you an amazing insight into his thoughts and intentions. How anybody can even try to claim that they were not known even back in 1938, it shows that they know nothing of the man, the era, or the others involved.
I have. And if you have as well, then surely you know the main point of Mein Kampf wasn't Hitler ranting, he was trying to sell his political philosophy to drum up support for national socialism.
You're also missing my point entirely. Even if the British and French governments had all read Mein Kampf, taken it to heart as Hitler's pure intentions, there still have no chance of success in fighting Hitler in 1938, not unless the Soviet Union decided to join in alongside, which was very questionable given the poor relations between Stalin and the West. Czechoslovakia was doomed; it's doctrine relied on French intervention, which was never going to happen. The Czechs were also facing disputes from the Hungarians, Romanians, and Poles. Even if their defenses had held against the Germans (Which they wouldn't have, but that's besides the point), they would've likely been facing incursions from multiple other directions. Not to mention significant portions of the Czech army relied on conscripts from ethnic minorities, whose loyalty was questionable at best.
Finally, Chamberlain was the Prime Minister of the British Empire. His first and foremost priority was the preservation of the Empire. Chamberlain's actions showed a fundamental misinterpretation of Hitler, but a sound understanding of the nature (and weakness) of British power. Churchill was the inverse - a sound understanding of Hitler's nature, but a complete misunderstanding of what the war was likely to cost the British. Britian and France could not fight Germany in 1938 and guarantee a win. The British army was obsolete and the French did not have any significant offensive capability.
