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Adagio said:diallelus. If you would prefer the diallelus term fine. The definition of the word is "a reasoning in a circle". I'm not going to quibble over a Greek word that means the same thing as what we're talking about.
Well, the diallelus is not exactly the same as the regress problem, though they are related. You keep on talking about circular reasoning, so diallelus seems a more accurate term.
Adagio said:However, in the Wiki explanations which I think you may be drawing, it goes on to say that a way of escaping the Diallelus (Infinite Regress) is through Critical Philosophy.
Wiki?
I suggest a short article by Roderic Chisholm called "The Problem of the Criterion" for a pretty decent intro to the topic. Chisholm thinks of himself as a particularist (that essay is the origin of the term, actually), which is one way to get off the diallelus. Being a particularist is sort-of similar to disregarding the recursive process that leads to the diallelus.
Adagio said:Because you don't have a "belief" about the theory of special relativity and it's predictions.
Of course I do. Consider the absurdity of the corresponding Moorean assertion:
I know that Special Relativity is true, but I don't believe Special Relativity is true.
So long as I'm rational, and in ordinary circumstances, I believe what I know. I would say this is partially what defines a rational person.
We call this the entailment thesis in epistemology. Knowledge entails belief.
Adagio said:You have a demonstration that the theory holds up factually to severe testing.
Well, I don't know about the severe part, but the fact that it holds up to testing is what convinces me that it's right. That I'm convinced it's right is another way of saying I believe it.
Adagio said:Beliefs are unsupported. We believe things despite any factual evidence that supports the belief.
Not all beliefs are unsupported. You seem to be confusing antecedent and consequent. That knowledge entails belief, it doesn't follow that belief entails knowledge. Most people have a pretty powerful intuition that we can't claim to know something that isn't true. But this doesn't mean that there aren't true beliefs.
Adagio said:Religions are closed systems requiring belief. They require the suspension of disbelief. They don't require justification and are all authoritarian. The belief is based on itself as it's own authority. So religions are examples of circular reasoning.
You seem to have a very odd view of religion as well. I would say this is pretty obviously false. But feel free to argue for it.
Adagio said:A guy makes a wild guess...and we're supposed to assume that it's correct? Why would we assume that?
It's a simple thought experiment. Being able to entertain counterfactual situations, and drawing inferences about what would obtain, is a primary tool of abstract reasoning. In this case, it's simply stipulated that he's correct. It doesn't matter whether this can be demonstrated or not, because we're evaluating a conditional: if he is correct, does he have knowledge?
Consider that I might say something like "If Chamberlin hadn't followed a path of appeasement, World War II might have been averted." There's nothing wrong with saying that. I know Chamberlin followed a path of appeasement. Presumably, anyone to whom I would say such a thing also knows it. But it's foolish to say "Ah, but Chamberlin did follow a course of appeasement, so why are we supposed to assume otherwise?"
It seems pretty plausible that this sort of counterfactual reasoning is vital to understanding the world. For instance, I might think: If I get up now and go to the sink, I could get some water. But I'm not getting up now. So, does the fact I'm not getting up now mean I have some basic flaw in understanding sinks and water? Does it mean that when I say "If I get up now and go to the sink, I could get some water," I'm making some wild and crazy assertion that no one in their right mind could possibly credit? Am I saying something that could only make any sense if we test it a few thousand times under laboratory conditions? Of course not...
I grant that those sorts of counterfactuals probably arise out of prior experience. But this doesn't stop us from using them in abstract cases to see what shakes out.
Adagio said:But upon seeing that there are indeed five balls, most philosophers, and most people generally, think the man comes to actually know that there are five balls in the urn. No they don't. I have no idea where you come up with that assumption.
Earlier in the conversation, you acknowledged that observation statements need no further justification. The man is just making an observation. He looks in the urn, and sees there are five balls there. Upon doing so, he gains the knowledge that there are five balls in the urn.
Who said anything about that? I never claimed that there would always be five balls in the urn.Adagio said:It's ridiculously easy to test. Have the man do the same test 10 times and fill the urn with any random number of balls. Lets see how he fares then.
It seems as if you tend to overcomplicate things and assume I'm saying much more than I am. I'm talking about a very simple case. Let me see if I can describe it as clearly as possible. Please focus on these words, and don't go thinking I mean anything about further iterations of the situation, because I do not mean any such thing. The point concerns only the first iteration. Here's the situation:
A man is alone in a room with an urn before him. Prior to looking in the urn, he forms the belief that there are five balls in the urn. NOw, it is actually the case that, at the time he forms that belief, there really are five balls in the urn. He just happens to make a very lucky guess. Nothing more, except that he comes to believe, irrationally, and prior to doing anything to see whether he's really correct or not, that his guess is correct. Again, this is just a matter of luck, and his irrational belief.
At this point, does he have knowledge about the balls in the urn? Most people say no, but note: he has a true belief.
Now, he gets up to look in the urn. He sees that, indeed, there are five balls in the urn.
At this point, does he have knowledge about the number of balls in the urn? Most people say yes--because he did what any of us would do to actually get that kind of knowledge. He got up and looked.
And this is where the example stops. These are the only claims to be made here (by me, anyway). I'm saying nothing about filling the urn again, nothing about how would the rest of the world determine or test or whatever the number of balls in the urn.
Nevertheless, the example is instructive, because it tells us that knowledge cannot be merely true belief. Knowledge must be true belief plus something else.
Adagio said:If you think that this example offers a good reason for a belief being justified, then I have to say that your critical thinking skills are being taxed. It's very easy to show why they aren't. If he can do it once, he can do it every time.
I said nothing about doing it many times. I did not say anything about the man's guesses being reliable. He had one lucky guess. I think we are agreed that this is not knowledge, even though he did happen to have a true belief. It's a belief, because he believed it. It's true, because there really were five balls in the urn.
Once he observes the number of balls, he then has good reason to believe there are five balls. Now, he has knowledge.
The important question is what changed between the time that he merely had a true belief, and when he had knoweldge. It can't be his true belief--he still had that. He still believes there are five balls in the urn. But he also knows there are five balls in the urn.
If you are tempted to think "no, he doesn't believe any longer--he knows!" just consider the corresponding Moorean assertion. What sense could we make of him saying,
after he observed how many balls there are, something like:
"Now I know that there are five balls in the urn, but dad gummit, I just don't believe it!"
The reason this seems irrational is because a belief is, or implies, a dispositional state. Both before and after observing the number of balls, he is disposed to assent to the proposition "there are five balls in the urn."
But back to the main question: what changed between the time before and after he made the observation? Most philosophers think that he now has something like justification for his belief. In ordinary circumstances (Gettier examples aside), this makes the difference between knowledge and true belief.
Adagio said:A deductive syllogism doesn't just give us a good reason or the best reason to accept a conclusion. It gives us an infallible conclusion.
Well, maybe. Let's say for now that I agree.
As for the rest of what you wrote, as I've mentioned before, philosophy is my profession. I don't need a lesson in basic logic.
Adagio said:In justificationism
Wait a minute--we're not talking about justificationism. we're talking about justification. Deduction is a kind of justification. Based on the stuff you wrote about deduction it seems you could be forced to agree.
If justification--not justificationism, but justification--is to be cut out, then we may as well all hang up our hats and go home.
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