We find generals throughout history distributed in the classic bell shaped curve because your average general wins some and he loses some. The average general is of course the rule and he populates each side. Grant who is an authority on the average general said after the war Lee was an "average general."
Central to Grant's evaluation of Lee was his significant lesson from his command in the West when Grant recognized quickly that when you've turned away the enemy, and when he chooses to run rather than surrender, you drive on after him and you plug his yellow backside full of hot lead. That is of course you defeat him or you reduce his force significantly enough to make the enemy general and his force insignificant for a significant period. It remains obscure to armchair military history buffs that disabling 40% of the opponent's offensive force typically renders it insignificant as a major offensive force or as a significant forward force. Lee and several major Union commanders knew this acutely hence Grant's disparaging barb against the CSA's Saint Robert that he never strayed far from from his defenses in a given offensive battle.
Meade at Gettysburg is a favorite of the Saint Robert crowd who criticize Meade for not taking after the tattered remains of Lee's retreating troops. Yet Lincoln himself accepted that, at that point, the Union forces were spent from the three days of fierce fighting while no fresh troops were available from reserves or otherwise to take pursuit, not until later at which point Lee had pulled up to establish formidable defenses along a river as recognized by Union Engineers, while no significant Union supporting Naval force was available either.
Indeed, professional military historians connect only two generals of the war to past commanders who stand at the pinnacle of warfare and each of 'em are Union commanders: Grant whose Napoleonic fire, maneuver and pursuit led to the kill, and Sherman whose largely self sustaining March to the Sea invoked Caesar in Gaul. Yet while Grant began the war as an average general he grew into an exceptional general with each battle, and while Sherman was, well, an average general on average, Sherman found his niche as a marching general of troops who believed in him without knowing he was drawing on Caesar, Hannibal, Alexander et al. Grant and Sherman conceived of the grand strategy of victory in spring 1864 at the grand Burnet House hotel in Cincinnati as the two Ohio boys used the old axiom two heads are better than one -- indeed one year later the South was fragmented into piles of ashes and Saint Robert had to surrender his sword of treason. This grates the Putin Trump Rowers to no end as they seek determinedly and relentlessly to realize what the post WW II Germans and Japanese know they cannot do morally, ie, glorify their military commanders.
Grant and Sherman alike knew well Washington drew on his lifelong study of Alexander and Hannibal, ie, Alexander as a marching general and Hannibal as the general of the unexpected and of the factor of the hard hitting surprise. Washington's exposed flank as it were was that neither Alexander nor Hannibal was a defensive general, so Washington -- who was pre Napoleon's great feats -- relied for advice on Lafayette, L'Enfant among other French nobles who were familiar with the doctrines of French fortification and defenses.
Yet Saint Robert was and remained unsuccessfully impelled to adapt Alexander the marching general and Caesar the conqueror only to end up as Hannibal did at the hands General Publius Cippio and his Roman armies that leveled Carthage and sent Hannibal on the run and to his fatal demise at the hands of the Romans. As we see today with the cultural and ideological descendants of Saint Robert and the CSA -- the Putin Trump Rowers -- the crushed Lee and his miserable defeated cohorts were treated erroneously by the victorious Union. The United States must never repeat this most costly error that bedevils us in the present as existential yet again.