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What is knowledge

Why so species centric? We are not the only animals who know things. All mammals - for example -depend on knowledge for the survival of their species. I could give countless examples and so could anyone who gave the subject a few minutes thought.
Hi Swede; haven't seen you much lately.

Anyway; I agree we do indeed share the world with some pretty smart animals, some more so than others.

But I believe survival for most species is by far 'instinctual' with a lessor degree of accumulated "knowledge" acquired according to varying environments.

For instance; Rocky-Racoon runs wild in Yellowstone Park, while Ricky-Racoon is a trash bandit in Central Park.

See ya Swede, don't be stranger~
 
The map may be wrong.

She may have looked at the map the wrong way up.

She may have mystaken her position on the map.

The road may have been built since the map was printed.

That she has a higher degree of confidence to the point that you say she knows is fine. As long as the word know is only a description of a high state of confidence in the information.

Why in the world would any of that be relevant? Of course things can go wrong with maps, but usually, professionally-made maps that are up-to-date are trustworthy. People use them to navigate and get where they intend to go all the time. Compared to coin flipping, maps are incalculably more reliable.

But of course we can change up the example. Suppose I am traveling with my friend, whom I know has traveled this route before and who knows how to get to Barcelona. But of course I could also flip a coin, rather than listen to my friend. Which should I do? One of them is a good epistemic procedure, and one is not. Or, think of the surgery example: if you need an operation, are you going to pick the person who's been through medical school and has all the pertinent training and experience, or someone who is going to flip a coin to determine whether what they're looking at is your liver, or your pancreas? Even if such a surgery had a good result, there's something of value that the person who studies and gets the experience has, that the person who just flips a coin does not.
 
First, it seems to me this thread should be moved to the philosophy sub-section.

Second, the part I quoted is something I disagree with completely.
Maybe it depends on how loosely one defines "belief".

Is math a belief system?

The idea is that it's prima facie absurd to claim that you know that P, but you do not believe that P (except, perhaps, in certain very limited and extreme circumstances).

Imagine, for example, that you went to the movies last night. Now you know that you went to the movies, so it's natural for you to say to someone that you went to the movies last night. Now imagine that you say something like "I went to the movies last night, but I don't believe I went to the movies last night." While the two claims are not logically inconsistent, there's still something very odd about this kind of utterance. it seems like no one could make that kind of utterance sincerely.

Or we can think of other examples: I know I'm drinking tea, but I don't believe I'm drinking tea. I know that the earth is round, but I don't believe that the earth is round. I know that 2 is less than 7, but I don't believe that 2 is less than 7. And so on.

One temptation might be to interpret the person saying "I don't believe that..." whatever it is they just claimed to know in a kind of loose way, in the same sense that someone might say "I just can't believe it's rained for five straight days!" But in that situation, the person actually does believe that it's rained for five straight days. If you ask them if it's rained for five days, as long as they're being sincere, they will answer in the affirmative. The utterances above are to be interpreted in the most sober and serious way as someone stating that they know that P, but they don't believe that P.

It really seems as if no one could ever sincerely make that kind of claim, and so it seems that belief is necessary as part of the analysis of knowledge. If S knows that P, then S believes that P.

Now, nothing about this kind of analysis licenses the opposite--if one believes that P, then one knows that P. it's obvious that people have all kinds of beliefs that don't amount to knowledge. I may believe that jellyfish are from another planet--but clearly I don't know that they are.
 
I'm not sure why you're posting this paper, in particular (though perhaps it's because it comes up in the first page of a google search on "solution to gettier problem"). There are dozens--if not hundreds--of papers out there in the journals with subtitles like "A Solution to Gettier Problems." None are generally accepted to have solved the set of problems that proliferated after Gettier published. I don't know Keota Fields personally, though the name rings a bell (I may have met him at a conference or something). But this paper doesn't appear to be published, and it seems to me there may be a reason for that. He claims that his statement 5) entails both P and not-P, but it clearly does not, and so the problem he's trying to establish isn't really a problem. I haven't read the paper beyond a perusal, but usually, a mistake like that is enough to demotivate me on doing any further reading.

The point is that almost no one believes in the JTB theory of knowledge any longer, and if you want to go with it, you'll need a pretty hefty argument to support your view. You just started out with the JTB thesis and then seemed to use that as a basis for your further views.
So, what is your alternative theory of what constitutes knowledge, or do you claim no such thing exists?
 
Why in the world would any of that be relevant? Of course things can go wrong with maps, but usually, professionally-made maps that are up-to-date are trustworthy. People use them to navigate and get where they intend to go all the time. Compared to coin flipping, maps are incalculably more reliable.

But of course we can change up the example. Suppose I am traveling with my friend, whom I know has traveled this route before and who knows how to get to Barcelona. But of course I could also flip a coin, rather than listen to my friend. Which should I do? One of them is a good epistemic procedure, and one is not. Or, think of the surgery example: if you need an operation, are you going to pick the person who's been through medical school and has all the pertinent training and experience, or someone who is going to flip a coin to determine whether what they're looking at is your liver, or your pancreas? Even if such a surgery had a good result, there's something of value that the person who studies and gets the experience has, that the person who just flips a coin does not.

Your friend might just take the wrong rout either because he wishes to mess you around or by mystake.

That you have the word know as; believe with a high confidence is my point.

Just because you know something does not make it right. Humanity knew the laws of mechanics were universal, right everwhere. Then we found out they were not complete. They are wrong in places.
 
Hi Swede; haven't seen you much lately.

Anyway; I agree we do indeed share the world with some pretty smart animals, some more so than others.

But I believe survival for most species is by far 'instinctual' with a lessor degree of accumulated "knowledge" acquired according to varying environments.

For instance; Rocky-Racoon runs wild in Yellowstone Park, while Ricky-Racoon is a trash bandit in Central Park.

See ya Swede, don't be stranger~

If more DPers were as interesting as you Empirica I would spend more time here. But too many comments are repetitive, ill-informed or downright stupid to make the DP experience unfailingly rewarding.

To the subject in hand: genetic inheritance - instinct - plays a large part in determining the behaviour of ourselves and other animals. But so does learning - accumulated knowledge. Imo it was the latter which gave the edge to physically puny Homo Sapiens and allowed us to survive when all the other numerous homonid species did not.

I would guess that Ricky Racoon and his fellow Central Park dwellers learned to survive there.
 
So, what is your alternative theory of what constitutes knowledge, or do you claim no such thing exists?

I have no theory of knowledge. Most epistemologists think that knowledge is JTB+, where the "+" is some as yet not-agreed condition, probably to be found in some virtue epistemic theory. Others (and I find more promise in this view) wonder whether knowledge can be analyzed at all, and have begun to think about its relationship to other epistemic goods like understanding.

We know that truth is a necessary condition for knowledge--you cannot know what is false. We know that justification (or something like it) is also required; the Meno problem tells us that. We also know that knowledge is a belief--it makes no sense to say that S knows that P, but S does not believe that P. But the decades lost to Gettier problems tell us that some kind of anti-luck condition is also needed--but what that condition is (or conditions are) is anyone's guess, and theorizing has taken us down some very interesting avenues. The discussion in the past two decades has been about as exciting as philosophy ever gets. This article seems to be a fairly good intro:

Virtue Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
 
Your friend might just take the wrong rout either because he wishes to mess you around or by mystake.

That you have the word know as; believe with a high confidence is my point.

Just because you know something does not make it right. Humanity knew the laws of mechanics were universal, right everwhere. Then we found out they were not complete. They are wrong in places.

And my point in return is that certainty cannot be identical with knowledge, because if so, knowledge isn't valuable, and there's no way to account for a situation in which we think we know something, but it turns out that we didn't know. That happens to me with some frequency, and seems to be a common-enough situation.

If certainty is all that is required for knowledge, there's nothing to distinguish a real expert from an arrogant fool--which also doesn't seem right. Actually, it's worse than that--experts tend to be less certain than arrogant fools, so on your account, we'd have to say that arrogant fools know more than experts do--which certainly doesn't seem right, but that's a consequence of your view (ergo, by modus tollens, your view isn't correct). There does seem to be a difference between someone who spends a long time acquiring knowledge of a subject from someone who doesn't, but who has an overweening belief in their own legend and happens to get lucky one time. If certainty is knowledge, there's no accounting for the process of education, which seems like a pretty big omission for a theory of knowledge (not to beat around the bush--it actually seems like a downright fatal problem).

Your counter-examples are all easily accommodated by saying that we thought we knew something, but were just mistaken. Rather than saying that human beings actually knew the laws of (Newtonian?) mechanics were universal, why not say that we thought we knew as much, but we in fact did not know? The mere fact that we spoke of knowing those laws is no reason to say that we actually knew them.
 
And my point in return is that certainty cannot be identical with knowledge, because if so, knowledge isn't valuable, and there's no way to account for a situation in which we think we know something, but it turns out that we didn't know. That happens to me with some frequency, and seems to be a common-enough situation.

Yes. You have got the idea that knowing is not the same as it being true.

If certainty is all that is required for knowledge, there's nothing to distinguish a real expert from an arrogant fool--which also doesn't seem right.

That's 'cos it's not right. There are clear things which distinguish a fool from somebody who's predictions are more likely to become true. If they can explain why they predict it and the track record of doing so.


Actually, it's worse than that--experts tend to be less certain than arrogant fools, so on your account, we'd have to say that arrogant fools know more than experts do--which certainly doesn't seem right, but that's a consequence of your view (ergo, by modus tollens, your view isn't correct).

Fools often do know more than experts, they just know wrong stuff. Look at Angel here. Prime example. Knows everything.

There does seem to be a difference between someone who spends a long time acquiring knowledge of a subject from someone who doesn't, but who has an overweening belief in their own legend and happens to get lucky one time. If certainty is knowledge, there's no accounting for the process of education, which seems like a pretty big omission for a theory of knowledge (not to beat around the bush--it actually seems like a downright fatal problem).

Eh? The point of knowledge is that you have to test it or your are talking out of your backside even if you happen to be right.

Your counter-examples are all easily accommodated by saying that we thought we knew something, but were just mistaken. Rather than saying that human beings actually knew the laws of (Newtonian?) mechanics were universal, why not say that we thought we knew as much, but we in fact did not know? The mere fact that we spoke of knowing those laws is no reason to say that we actually knew them.

Then we can never use the word know.

The level of confidence in the laws of Newtonian mechanics was 100% for very good reasons. They had not been shown to wrong at all in any circumstance. They sucessfully predicted many not obvious things, allowing us to build very good steam turbines etc. Humanity knew the laws of physics. Still it turns out not to be all the picture.
 
That's 'cos it's not right. There are clear things which distinguish a fool from somebody who's predictions are more likely to become true. If they can explain why they predict it and the track record of doing so.

Knowledge is not just about making predictions (though predictions are often a test of knowledge). I know that I was just putting on some socks. That's not a prediction, and it doesn't seem to hold any predictive value.

Fools often do know more than experts, they just know wrong stuff. Look at Angel here. Prime example. Knows everything.

Well, then let's clean up the language a little. I meant that, relative to some epistemic domain (some subject about which we humans can know stuff), experts know more than fools.

Eh? The point of knowledge is that you have to test it or your are talking out of your backside even if you happen to be right.

I'm not sure I understand your response here. I was pointing to the difference between an expert and a fool, and also pointing out the value of education.

Then we can never use the word know.

The level of confidence in the laws of Newtonian mechanics was 100% for very good reasons. They had not been shown to wrong at all in any circumstance. They sucessfully predicted many not obvious things, allowing us to build very good steam turbines etc. Humanity knew the laws of physics. Still it turns out not to be all the picture.

I'm not sure why any of that means we cannot use the word "know." Again, I know that I was just putting on some socks. One way that epistemologists have tended to cash this point out is to say that epistemic responsibilities differ in different situations. The stakes aren't very high with respect to my knowing that I was just putting on some socks. If, by some strange set of circumstances, I'm wrong about that, it's probably no big deal.

On the other hand, the stakes are quite high for a final theory of physics. But for the applications to which Newtonian mechanics was put, in the times that we've used it, it met the stakes in question. So, for example, we needed to know how much weight would be needed to counterbalance an elevator using a motor capable of producing x amount of force, and while the calculations we used end up being off by a few ten thousandths of a gram (presumably the elevator is running at speeds far below the speed of light), that level of error is negligible. So, understood as a final physical theory, Newtonian mechanics is indeed false, and hence cannot be knowledge. But understood as a useful set of mathematical relations that will almost always tell us how to engineer something to accomplish what we need to accomplish, it's true enough.

That is, we cannot say, taking Newtonian Mechanics as our referent, that we know the ultimate nature of the universe. But we can say that we know how to build a proper functioning elevator using Newtonian mechanics.
 
There are varying degrees in which something may constitute as being proven scientifically. Something that can be repeatedly reproduced in present time say like the freezing/melting point of water would be one example. Views by scientists about the origin of the universe on the other hand would be something that in a strict sense outside the realm of testable science. At least in the sense of a testable proof.
 
If more DPers were as interesting as you Empirica I would spend more time here. But too many comments are repetitive, ill-informed or downright stupid to make the DP experience unfailingly rewarding.

To the subject in hand: genetic inheritance - instinct - plays a large part in determining the behaviour of ourselves and other animals. But so does learning - accumulated knowledge. Imo it was the latter which gave the edge to physically puny Homo Sapiens and allowed us to survive when all the other numerous homonid species did not.

I would guess that Ricky Racoon and his fellow Central Park dwellers learned to survive there.
Thank you so very much Swede...You made my day.

As to the discussion;
Imo; people are unique in their ability to rethink natural instincts rather than act on them.
 
I have no theory of knowledge. Most epistemologists think that knowledge is JTB+, where the "+" is some as yet not-agreed condition, probably to be found in some virtue epistemic theory. Others (and I find more promise in this view) wonder whether knowledge can be analyzed at all, and have begun to think about its relationship to other epistemic goods like understanding.

We know that truth is a necessary condition for knowledge--you cannot know what is false. We know that justification (or something like it) is also required; the Meno problem tells us that. We also know that knowledge is a belief--it makes no sense to say that S knows that P, but S does not believe that P. But the decades lost to Gettier problems tell us that some kind of anti-luck condition is also needed--but what that condition is (or conditions are) is anyone's guess, and theorizing has taken us down some very interesting avenues. The discussion in the past two decades has been about as exciting as philosophy ever gets. This article seems to be a fairly good intro:

Virtue Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
I have been aware of the Gettier problem for a few decades and addressed it in the OP. There is no guarantee.

When a theory, in epistemology or Science has problems it causes changes.
Sometimes the problem is so large, everything is scraped, and a new theory replaces it.
Sometimes the problems are merely holes, deficits. Attempts are made to repair. That is what we have here. Failed attempts to repair.

No line of approach has replaced JTB.

Attempts have been made to find a patch. Another condition, some factor, luck and other things have been unsuccessful to plug the hole. All unsuccessful.

Of all possible meanings for knowledge, JTB remains the most hopeful. Nothing else comes close, except of course divine factors, for those so inclined.

There are other nonrational approaches to gaining knowledge, that have had support from some corners, such as intuition (Bergson and many others). This is no solution, merely kicks the can down the road. Validation is expected.

So, here we are. JTB is the most favorable theory of knowledge, yet it had obvious holes.
So what shall we say? Knowledge is not a characteristic of Science?

JTB gives us a start, but stops short.
Knowledge must require beliefs. Justification is also an imperative. Truth is necessary, but beyond our grasp, by rational means.

There is no shortage of fans of Science who are confident it provides undisputed knowledge, not available from any other source. Such false beliefs are no benefit. A discussion of JTB reveals the limitations of any knowledge claims. Science makes no claims of undisputed knowledge, yet the sheeple fail to see this, and deny the simple fact when it is presented to them.

Your interest in the subject seems to be academic, where mine is pragmatic.

For future reference, if you do a search using the title of a paper, do not be surprised if it is at the top of your search list.
Also, if you meet someone at point B, do not assume they arrived by the same path that brought you there.

Cheers
 
Knowledge is a justified, true, belief.

If someone has no beliefs, they have no knowledge.

The belief must be justified. Who decided justification?

The believer decides justification. What is sufficient justification for one person, may not be sufficient for another person. Justification is often not universal, therefore knowledge is not universal. The fact is universal, but awareness often is not. Even if awareness is universal, knowledge may not be.

I
Sue and Mary are driving, looking for a museum, that neither one has ever visited. They stop and ask for directions. Sue is very familiar with the area, spent most of her life, over thirty years in the area, but that was before they built the museum. The night before she studied her old maps of the region. She did not have an address for the museum, but knew the approximate location.
Mary was new to the country, and had no knowledge of any roads or landmarks.
They ask a passerby about the museum, and how to get there. The person is a tour guide for the museum, and he still has his uniform and name badge on. He gives directions to the pair. They are very helpful to Sue, only slightly helpful to Mary. Sue asks some questions about other landmarks she remembers. The passerby answers many questions Sue has about the exact location. Every detail the passerby gives rings true, and fills in many blanks Sue had.

When the conversation is finished, Sue says she knows the location of the museum, and can drive them there. Mary has a good idea where it is, a weak belief she could guide them there. Sue had knowledge, Mary does not.


Sometimes in Science, Scientists have a belief. Using all the latest scientific techniques, they justify their beliefs. Multiple groups work independently, and arrive at the same conclusion. They all share their beliefs, by a process called peer review.

Scientists never have proof for anything. There is never sufficient justification to have final proof, but often beliefs have a scientific certainty of being factual. The evidence is overwhelming. There is no scientific evidence the fact is not true, there is ample justified scientific evidence it is true. They have knowledge. They report this knowledge to all interested parties. They share their knowledge with others, and the report from all of these scientists is sufficient justification for all interested persons to also have knowledge about the same facts. All is well.

One day scientific evidence demonstrates the fact is false. It is not true. It turns out the belief was a justified false belief. So, scientists report the new findings, the new facts, the new justified, true, beliefs.

This is how Science works. The process identifies beliefs, that are sufficiently justified, and pronounced as knowledge, only to turn out years later, to be false.

Science offers no final proof that any statement is factual, an actual occurrence. It does offer many beliefs that have been justified, and have a high probability of being factual, congruent with reality.

Science plays the odds, and has a fairly good track record. They have been on the winning side much more than the losing side.

Scientists have also had some major failures, that cost hundreds of lives, and millions of dollars. They had false beliefs, that they believed were true. Scientific truths, that turn out false, is a fact of life. This is no reason to say Scientists cannot have knowledge, simply because there is no absolute proof the beliefs are true.
In Science, justified true beliefs are knowledge, until they are demonstrated as being false. At that point, they are simply false beliefs.


In our daily lives we have knowledge, that had no scientific evidence.
Justification is not limited to Scientific evidence.

Sue had hearsay evidence, that raised her beliefs to knowledge. Mary did not share this knowledge. She may have had faith that Sue knew the exact location of the museum, a high level of confidence, but it could easily fall short of knowledge.

One a daily basis, our experiences, provide us with sufficient justification to raise our beliefs to the level of knowledge. Whether others accept our knowledge, as true, has less to do with the facts, the actual occurrences congruent with reality, and more to do with the beliefs of the other person.

How can you say science has a good track record, if at the end we could find out everything was wrong and gets overturned?

Upon what basis do we judge the track record if there is no final proof of anything?
 
How can you say science has a good track record, if at the end we could find out everything was wrong and gets overturned?

Upon what basis do we judge the track record if there is no final proof of anything?

"Could find out..."
In other words, "what is possible".
All things are possible, few things are probable.

Track record refers to outcomes, results.
We do not make track record judgements about the future. We make them about the past.

You may have heard the disclaimer, "past performance is no guarantee of future outcomes."
We always hope so of course, but are often disappointed.
 
"Could find out..."
In other words, "what is possible".
All things are possible, few things are probable.

Track record refers to outcomes, results.
We do not make track record judgements about the future. We make them about the past.

You may have heard the disclaimer, "past performance is no guarantee of future outcomes."
We always hope so of course, but are often disappointed.

But you claimed that any of those past performances could be overturned. So the past track record might be all wrong.
 
But you claimed that any of those past performances could be overturned. So the past track record might be all wrong.
You go from "any (one) of those past performances could be overturned".
To
"track record might all be wrong" (my emphasis).

That is a huge leap, from one, to all.

Based on the historical track record of Science, it is a sure bet that some important aspect, of some branch of Science is dead wrong. That likelihood is extremely probable.

Based on the historical track record of Science, it is a sure bet that most disciplines of Science are right on the money for all of the important stuff, but most of them do have some very minor, mostly insignificant, errors.

Both of these claims are true, not contradictory. Even so, what remains is that there could be some really earth shattering correction to the Scientific community, that just stops everyone in their tracks, and makes them reevaluate the whole system.

Or
We could go another 200 years before there are any significant paradigm shift.

Reality is probably between the two extremes.

A paradigm shift will come. There is little doubt of that.
 
I have been aware of the Gettier problem for a few decades and addressed it in the OP.

Not explicitly...and not implicitly, as far as I can tell.

No line of approach has replaced JTB.

Attempts have been made to find a patch. Another condition, some factor, luck and other things have been unsuccessful to plug the hole. All unsuccessful.

That remains to be seen.

Of all possible meanings for knowledge, JTB remains the most hopeful.

If you think that, you've misunderstood the history of the analysis of knowledge. While nothing is ever totally off limits in philosophy, there is as good as no hope for JTB.

So, here we are. JTB is the most favorable theory of knowledge, yet it had obvious holes.

JTB gives us a start, but stops short.

Then, uhh...JTB isn't a good analysis of knowledge, and knowledge isn't JTB.

There are other nonrational approaches to gaining knowledge, that have had support from some corners, such as intuition (Bergson and many others). This is no solution, merely kicks the can down the road.

Knowledge must require beliefs. Justification is also an imperative. Truth is necessary, but beyond our grasp, by rational means.

Wait...what? Non-rational approaches merely "kick the can down the road," but truth is beyond rational grasp while still being necessary to knowledge. That sounds pretty...weird. Prima facie, if there is an (intrinsically?) non-rational but necessary factor in theory of knowledge, then it seems plausible that some non-rational approach may be required as part of any final such theory.

Science makes no claims of undisputed knowledge, yet the sheeple fail to see this, and deny the simple fact when it is presented to them.

So, your thesis is that science makes no claims of undisputed knowledge because there is no accepted theory of knowledge? Seems you could have said that plainly and in a few words, rather than starting out with the claim that knowledge is JTB. But anyway, taken strictly, the thesis is obviously false.

Even if we change the claim up to say that science cannot make claims to undisputed knowledge because there is no accepted theory of knowledge, it's still obviously false. Look: there's no fully accepted theory of cancer. Does that mean cancer doesn't exist? There can be claims to knowledge--even undisputed ones--without there being a theory of knowledge. I would agree that the claims of science are always provisional and subject to revision, but the reason for that has nothing to do, as far as I can tell, with theory of knowledge, and everything to do with the nature and process of science.

For future reference, if you do a search using the title of a paper, do not be surprised if it is at the top of your search list.

The title of that paper being a natural phrase one would search if one were trying to discover if there were a solution to the Gettier problem. If you had been aware of "the Gettier problem" for decades, based on your posts, it seems unlikely you'd have posted a link to an unpublished and flawed paper. Heck, the article to which I first referred you mentioned Roderick Chisholm's attempt at solving Gettier problems and defend JTB--and if a philosopher of Chisholm's caliber couldn't do it, you should be suspicious of the Fields paper--and in any case, you'd be aware that merely posting a paper that is called "a solution to the Gettier problem" wouldn't be an adequate response.
 
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You go from "any (one) of those past performances could be overturned".
To
"track record might all be wrong" (my emphasis).

That is a huge leap, from one, to all.

Based on the historical track record of Science, it is a sure bet that some important aspect, of some branch of Science is dead wrong. That likelihood is extremely probable.

Based on the historical track record of Science, it is a sure bet that most disciplines of Science are right on the money for all of the important stuff, but most of them do have some very minor, mostly insignificant, errors.

Both of these claims are true, not contradictory. Even so, what remains is that there could be some really earth shattering correction to the Scientific community, that just stops everyone in their tracks, and makes them reevaluate the whole system.

Or
We could go another 200 years before there are any significant paradigm shift.

Reality is probably between the two extremes.

A paradigm shift will come. There is little doubt of that.

You are posting here because of science.
 
You go from "any (one) of those past performances could be overturned".
To
"track record might all be wrong" (my emphasis).

That is a huge leap, from one, to all.

Based on the historical track record of Science, it is a sure bet that some important aspect, of some branch of Science is dead wrong. That likelihood is extremely probable.

Based on the historical track record of Science, it is a sure bet that most disciplines of Science are right on the money for all of the important stuff, but most of them do have some very minor, mostly insignificant, errors.

Both of these claims are true, not contradictory. Even so, what remains is that there could be some really earth shattering correction to the Scientific community, that just stops everyone in their tracks, and makes them reevaluate the whole system.

Or
We could go another 200 years before there are any significant paradigm shift.

Reality is probably between the two extremes.

A paradigm shift will come. There is little doubt of that.


You are basing your assumption of probability on the assumption that the future will be like the past.

Upon what do you justify this belief?
 
Which branch of science could be dead wrong?
 
Which branch of science could be dead wrong?

Well...surely all of them could be spectacularly wrong. That doesn't mean any are, merely that such is possible.
 
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