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U.S. blocks Turkey's F-35 equipment over S-400 deal with Russia

How was the Avenger used by the US military



and if it ever became operational M247 Sergeant York

First of all., the M247 was never adopted.

The AN/TWQ-1 AVENGER is simply 8 STINGER missiles on a vehicle. They are more mobile and can fire faster than a MANPAD STINGER, but they are still just STINGER missiles, with all of the drawbacks of that system (including shorter range, lack of any kind of interactive RADAR, and are purely line of sight).

They are assigned to either one of the SHORAD Battalions and may be attached to other units as needed, or are integrated into a PATRIOT Battalion to upgrade it from an Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Battalion to an Air Missile Defense (AMD) Battalion. For many years, 5-52 was an AMD battalion because they had AVENGER, while 1-43 was ADA because it did not have AVENGER.

And in operation, an ADA Battalion is normally placed to protect a specific asset, like a Corps level command post or theater medical facilities. AMD is more often given split missions, where part of it (PATRIOT) defends the main body and rear detachments of a larger unit, and the AVENGERS are tasked with protecting more forward units.

But in the end, it is really just STINGER on wheels.
 
I knew and worked with some who were involved in that fiasco.

There is a reason most call ADA "Another Damned Army", or "Alcoholics Defending America". It is the least "Combat Arms" of all the Combat Arms branches.

And yea, it is a complete and utter mess. In essence they are expected to be able to do the same kinds of things as Infantry, but your average 14X series MOS holder has about as much Infantry training as your standard admin clerk. In other words, only what they learned in boot camp.

There is a reason why I spent most of my time in Air Defense as Force Protection. In every Battery I was in, I was the only individual who had actual Infantry experience, and as the saying goes they put the "round peg in the round hole". Things that are second nature to any grunt (Range cards, planned defensive positions, reading terrain for dead spaces, and where to properly place pre-planned areas for indirect fire.

Watching for ambushes, planning counter-ambushes, things like this and more that is second nature to us is all foreign to most in the Army that never did it. And PATRIOT equipment moves damned slow. Even on a well paved freeway, the top speed is only around 45 MPH. A Battalion sized convoy from El Paso to Yuma (550 miles) is literally a full 2 days on the freeway.

And one of the things that really caused problems with the 507th was simple lack of proper PMCS on their personal weapons, and lack of training and PMCS on their crew served weapons. I was the only one when I got to my unit and was put in FP who knew how to use a T&E on the crew served weapons, as well as the only one who knew how to do headspace and timing on the M2. And my weapon was always clean and ready to go.

In the AA reports, the 507th reported almost total failure on both crew served and personal weapons.


Battle heroes of Fort Bliss maintenance company remembered - Army - Stripes

The only reason that would have happened is poor maintenance. 3 different weapons all failing at the same time, that was typical in that entire fiasco, and it was criminal that it was allowed to happen. In talking to both survivors and other senior leadership afterwards, the general consensus was that the CO and First Sergeant of that Company were almost criminally negligent in ensuring their soldiers were maintaining their weapons.

This is why the 5 years I spent with PATRIOT, most of it I was in Force Protection. I was fully trained and certified in using my launcher, as well as other equipment. But each First Sergeant when they realized I had an Infantry background put me where they thought I could do the most good. And that was generally behind the Ma Deuce, either at the main entry point when emplaced, or in the trailing vehicle of the recon element.

My platoon's 6 trucks had 4 50s, 2 19s, 4 Tows and 2 saws. A company with one 50 seems absurd.
 
My platoon's 6 trucks had 4 50s, 2 19s, 4 Tows and 2 saws. A company with one 50 seems absurd.

Most vehicles in an ADA unit are not armed. None of the HMMWVs have weapon mounts, none of the HEMTTs, and maybe 1 or 2 5 ton or LMTVs in a Battery will have a weapon mount.

And no TOW, the weapons assigned to such a Battery are generally 3 M2 and 3 MK19.

Remember, this is really "Combat Arms Light". They are intended to be well behind the forward units, where the only time such weapons might be used is in case a helo penetrated all the outer layers of defense, or if the mane position is being overrun. 5-52 had elements of the 3rd ID assigned as security, but the 507th got separated from the main body.
 
Most vehicles in an ADA unit are not armed. None of the HMMWVs have weapon mounts, none of the HEMTTs, and maybe 1 or 2 5 ton or LMTVs in a Battery will have a weapon mount.

And no TOW, the weapons assigned to such a Battery are generally 3 M2 and 3 MK19.

Remember, this is really "Combat Arms Light". They are intended to be well behind the forward units, where the only time such weapons might be used is in case a helo penetrated all the outer layers of defense, or if the mane position is being overrun. 5-52 had elements of the 3rd ID assigned as security, but the 507th got separated from the main body.

To me that's almost like being in a sub or boat. Kinda helpless. I'd rather dig holes and have my own 50.
 
I see where they're coming from, but if one looks past all the huffing and puffing, this really is just a supply and demand thing. Turkey wants what the U.S. will not give it, but Russia will. To me this looks more about $$$ than geopolitics.

U.S. blocks Turkey's F-35 equipment over S-400 deal with Russia

Vice President Mike Pence recently warned that the U.S. "will not stand idly by while NATO allies purchase weapons from our adversaries."



I rarely agree with the Trump administration on anything, but I do agree here, albeit for probably differing reasons. I believe that transferring sophisticated US military technology to a nation openly embracing Moscow and Iran is just asking for trouble. I tend to believe the Trump administration here is acting principally for MIC reasons. They would much rather the Turks purchase the US Patriot anti-air system rather than Russia's S-400 system.

IMO, Turkey stopped being a bona-fide trustworthy NATO nation after Erdogan's Gülen-Putsch of 2016. More journalists are imprisoned in Turkey than anywhere else on the planet. I also haven't forgotten that Erdogan's security goons attacked protesters in the US during a May 2017 visit by Erdogan to Washington. The assault charges were quietly dropped by US prosecutors in March of 2018.
 
There is only one of two things they are afraid of, either the f-35 is a paper tiger and a joke the s-400 will easily see and when it gets out it will cripple sales, or the f-35 is all that and that turkey will use the s-400 to assist russia in targeting computers.

I say targeting because russia already can track the f-35 and the f-22 quite easily, they have even been tracking israels use of them from syria, L band can track stealth quite easily. What is unknown is how well their other bands work, all radar bands can track and target stealth aircraft, but the issue is range it can target since L band is useless for guiding missiles it is assumes the other bands would be used to guide the missile. how well they worked to make other bands better at targeting stealth at longer ranges is unknown, and the main tracking radar against stealth L band is usually unable to guide due to clutter.

It would take a pretty large conspiracy for it to end up being a paper tiger. Not being optimum in areas, sure. But I think there are just too many separate teams working on so many things that would have raised a red flag that counts the get swept under the rug.
 
It would take a pretty large conspiracy for it to end up being a paper tiger. Not being optimum in areas, sure. But I think there are just too many separate teams working on so many things that would have raised a red flag that counts the get swept under the rug.

It was too ambitious a project, trying to stuff too much into a single series of airframes. To make it worse lockheed is the primary contractor, and since numerous contractors have left the industry or limited their scope, lockheed has almost no competition anywhere for defense contracts, leaving them producing much more half assed products in recent years.

The f-111 was a vietnam era attempt of doing the same thing as the the f-35 project where they used a single airframe for all branches as a one aircraft to do it all platform. The f-111 failed horribly not because it was a bad aircraft, but rather because the military tried to make it everything for everyone, the aircraft itself did quite well when geared towards the aircrafts strengths when used by the airforce, but never got to see carrier interceptor roles or cas roles or any other of the many roles originally dreamed except a few.

Thecurrent f-35 suffers from very poor stealth coating that loses it's stealth very quickly(likely lockheed cutting corners as the f-22 did not suffer such short life for coatings except in harsh desert environments) frames cracking well below expected flight hours, an internal cannon that can not hit the broadside of a barn yet the external cannon which is the same gun can hit accurate pointing to frame and mounting issues, air delivery issues etc etc. These issues are from poor quality contractors cutting corners and trying to stuff too much into a single platform.
 
The question really becomes "Do we need one"?

At the time that HAWK was developed and during most of it's lifespan (1960-1980) there was not much in the range of short to medium range air defense.

The MIM-72 CHAPPARAL came out in 1969, and it was basically just 4 SIDEWINDER missiles thrown onto a M113. And other than the large and largely stationary systems like NIKE, that was it.

With a 100-160km range, there was thought to be no more need for HAWK which only had a range of 40km. PATRIOT could sit far behind the FEBA and still provide the same air coverage that HAWK did.

That is another reason why the tactics experimented with in 2003 simply made no sense. The idea of hopping PATRIOT did not actually come from the Air Defense Brigade, but from the Commander of the Ground element. They were used to HAWK being able to move constantly with the forward elements, and thought that PATRIOT could do the same thing.

They did not understand the larger logistical footprint needed. When a HAWK Battery was on the move, it literally all fit into a handful of HMMWVs, and a 5 ton truck. When a PATRIOT Battery moves, you are looking at a minimum 13 M983 HEMTT trucks, 5-8 5 ton or LMTVs trucks, and around 10 HMMWVs. When we did Brigade sized movements from Fort Bliss to Yuma it literally turned into a series of multiple-mile long convoys. A Battalion is going to be well over 100 vehicles, each Battery taking roughly 1-2 miles of roadway.

A HAWK Battery was maybe 50 people, closer in size to a platoon than a company. But a PATRIOT Battery is easily 120+ people. Each battery has it's own mess unit and mobile kitchen to feed everybody, and takes up a footprint of almost a square mile when emplaced.

Hopping the patriot does not sound like too bad an idea unless they moved directly at the same pace as the infantry, the patriot has a good range and can follow a safer distance behind and given the range not need to hop around as much. As you pointed out the setup times are terrible so hopping location to location in a quick matter is counterproductive. The other issue aswell being that systems like the patriot benefit more from being part of an iads than a standalone system, so being to far to link to early detection radar, anti aircraft gun systems, aircraft control networs and other systems like thaad greatly diminishes it's capabilities by making it less effective than being part of a full scope defense.


Systems like the hawk though were designed to be very effective as a standalone system, with modern tech making a fast moving system with better range than the hawk would not be too challenging.
 
Again, you're showing little knowledge of how the war actually took place.

The Georgian advance into South Ossettia was incredibly weak and they never even controlled most of the country. Russian aircraft shot down were all within the vicinity of the front line.

The vicinity was in south ossetia though, even moving to the georgia border was moving past front lines, the siege on south ossetia started before russia started it's military campaign. The first 3 days of the war were in taking areas in ossetia and around the georgia border before the russians went mon a much larger offensive, which only lasted another 5 days.
 
Not only is this an anecdote, it completely's wrong. PGMs fired from jets still have visual confirmation; given to them by the troops on the ground.



This is demonstrably false.

If it is by troops on the ground how in the hell on any plain of existence in any known universe is the pilot getting visual confirmation? By a guy with radio describing what he sees to a guy so far away he can not see anything?

No it is not demonstratably false, the cannon can hit with high precision with minimal collateral damage, avoiding collateral damage with a pgm is next to impossible unless it is hitting an isolated target. The gau cannon can hit targets that are with 20-50 feet of friendly troops with high precisiohn while a pgm would still kill friendly troops, there is a reason the dod blocked the retirement of the a-10, because people like you justify it's removal with the weakest arguments around, and used arguments that have failed constantly for 5 decaces or better like somehow what has always failed will magically work this time brought to you by the airforce which has fought every day since they split from the army to eliminate the cas role and aircraft.
 
The vicinity was in south ossetia though, even moving to the georgia border was moving past front lines, the siege on south ossetia started before russia started it's military campaign. The first 3 days of the war were in taking areas in ossetia and around the georgia border before the russians went mon a much larger offensive, which only lasted another 5 days.

Which has nothing to do with Russia's airpower during the war, and how it was shot down.
 
If it is by troops on the ground how in the hell on any plain of existence in any known universe is the pilot getting visual confirmation? By a guy with radio describing what he sees to a guy so far away he can not see anything?

Are you really so deluded as believing every action requires visual confirmation? When someone calls in fire support, does the battery commander make them wait until he can go down and personally verify the situation, or does he trust his forward observer?

No it is not demonstratably false, the cannon can hit with high precision with minimal collateral damage, avoiding collateral damage with a pgm is next to impossible unless it is hitting an isolated target. The gau cannon can hit targets that are with 20-50 feet of friendly troops with high precisiohn while a pgm would still kill friendly troops, there is a reason the dod blocked the retirement of the a-10, because people like you justify it's removal with the weakest arguments around, and used arguments that have failed constantly for 5 decaces or better like somehow what has always failed will magically work this time brought to you by the airforce which has fought every day since they split from the army to eliminate the cas role and aircraft.

Your ranting delusions don't change reality.
 
Systems like the hawk though were designed to be very effective as a standalone system, with modern tech making a fast moving system with better range than the hawk would not be too challenging.

I knew some guys that started in HAWK, and they all told me they were kinda shocked when it was just cancelled. They had just finished a series of upgrades on the system a few years before, and were already working on a new series of upgrades when it was shelved.

I always thought it was a shame it was cancelled, because it added yet another layer of defense, that we no longer have. And there are still a lot of the old systems still sitting in storage. Some countries like Egypt and Jordan are still ordering new ones (technically upgraded and refurbished retired US systems). The newest systems have some rather impressive capabilities for their age, including integration with more modern air defense systems, and a limited Anti-Ballistic Missile capability.

Some of us have speculated that it would be brought back, but I doubt now that will ever happen. Is funny how often the government alternated between almost killing our ABM systems, then turning right around and dumping a lot of money into them for a few years before ignoring them again. 13 years ago THAAD was thought to be the way of the future, and that within 5 years would be integrated into every PATRIOT Battalion.

The first Battery was activated in 2008, the second in 2009. And none have been activated since then. One of them remains in Texas, alternating between quick deployments to hot spots and more testing and upgrades. The other has been permanently located in South Korea since 2017.

And from what I am hearing, there are no plans to activate a third Battery. During the last administration our Missile Defense Agency remained on average $10 billion below requested amounts every year, and the new administration has yet to make any real changes to defense spending. And all of those I knew who were assigned to THAAD Batteries have all gotten out or moved to PATRIOT, they said the pace of activations and deployments over and over was hell on them and their families.

Poland, Guam, South Korea, Hawaii, back to Guam, Turkey, then back to Texas and New Mexico for another round of range testing. They said it was like they hardly knew from month to month where they would be next.

IN 2007-2008, the concept of the "ADA Battalion of the Future" was announced, and a lot of us were really stoked about it. It would consist of a Battalion of 5 firing Batteries. 1 of AVENGER, 2 or 3 of PATRIOT, and 1 of THAAD. These Battalions would practice in operating in many different configurations, from the entire Battalion operating together, to just 2 or 3 Batteries operating on their own. And here we are 12 years later, and none of that has happened at all.

Yea, a returned and upgraded HAWK would be a great idea, even if it was only activated as a Corps-Brigade level asset and not integrated back into traditional Air Defense units. But I can't see that happening until after another war, one where we take a licking because of our more limited air defense capabilities.
 
Are you really so deluded as believing every action requires visual confirmation? When someone calls in fire support, does the battery commander make them wait until he can go down and personally verify the situation, or does he trust his forward observer?



Your ranting delusions don't change reality.

Visual confirmation is very required, even with visual confirmation we have lost to friendly fire, but situations like with the b1 where we bomb our own troops or with the british where a tiny error in coordinates misheard through the headset led to friendly fire that visual confirmation could easily avoid.

Heck the green berets thought the airforces cas was a joke, as did the navy seals, which is why they pushed for a dedicated cas in afghanistan since the airforce bent over backwards to keep the a-10 number there as tiny as possible. They ended up with the a-29 which congress blocked, but it shows the ground troops widely disagree with the airforce, who is looking to eliminate any and all dedicated cas role aircraft so their budget could be used elsewhere.
 
Which has nothing to do with Russia's airpower during the war, and how it was shot down.

It quite literally does, because again you are trying to force cas into forward ground attack roles to eliminate a cas aircraft, might as well eliminate fire trucks because a chevy camaro is better at going fast. You just fail to grasp what cas is and how it differs from ground assault, and wish to use ground assault as justification for cas rather than cas as justification for cas.
 
It quite literally does, because again you are trying to force cas into forward ground attack roles to eliminate a cas aircraft, might as well eliminate fire trucks because a chevy camaro is better at going fast. You just fail to grasp what cas is and how it differs from ground assault, and wish to use ground assault as justification for cas rather than cas as justification for cas.

No it doesn't, you're just trying to invent scenarios to explain why aircraft got shot down instead of just accepting the reality that fixed wing gunships are very vulnerable to ground fire and SAMs.
 
Visual confirmation is very required, even with visual confirmation we have lost to friendly fire, but situations like with the b1 where we bomb our own troops or with the british where a tiny error in coordinates misheard through the headset led to friendly fire that visual confirmation could easily avoid.

Heck the green berets thought the airforces cas was a joke, as did the navy seals, which is why they pushed for a dedicated cas in afghanistan since the airforce bent over backwards to keep the a-10 number there as tiny as possible. They ended up with the a-29 which congress blocked, but it shows the ground troops widely disagree with the airforce, who is looking to eliminate any and all dedicated cas role aircraft so their budget could be used elsewhere.

You're not even addressing points anymore, all you're doing is complaining about the Air Force not conforming to how you think war and air power works.
 
No it doesn't, you're just trying to invent scenarios to explain why aircraft got shot down instead of just accepting the reality that fixed wing gunships are very vulnerable to ground fire and SAMs.

Fixed wing aircraft were always vulnerable to ground and sam fire, what you are trying to do is move the bar away from cas to justify eliminating cas aircraft.
 
You're not even addressing points anymore, all you're doing is complaining about the Air Force not conforming to how you think war and air power works.

The airforce failed on cas going back to the 60's, how many decades in a row do they have to be proven wrong for you to accept the air force never liked the cas role and never took it serious while ground troops who rely on it and the sole purpose of cas roles ecistence took it very serious.
 
Fixed wing aircraft were always vulnerable to ground and sam fire, what you are trying to do is move the bar away from cas to justify eliminating cas aircraft.

No I'm not, which you would know if you actually bothered to read. Fixed wing gunships are a bad idea. CAS is not.
 
The airforce failed on cas going back to the 60's, how many decades in a row do they have to be proven wrong for you to accept the air force never liked the cas role and never took it serious while ground troops who rely on it and the sole purpose of cas roles ecistence took it very serious.

:roll:

Your hate boner for the Air Force is noted.
 
No I'm not, which you would know if you actually bothered to read. Fixed wing gunships are a bad idea. CAS is not.

Fixed wing gunships are not a bad idea, experience from ww2 to now has shown them very valuable, from using fixed wing aircraft in ww2 to the ww2 era a-1 as cas in korea and vientam to the a-10 and the ac-130 have shown the fixed wing aircraft are quite good at cas, what you are backing is the airforces constantly proven wrong for decades idea that fast is the only way to go and putting ground troops as lowest priority.


The airforce thought as well as people like you are why the airforce needs to be stripped of the cas role as well as all funds devoted to it, and the army and marines should be dedicated those funds and recources.
 
:roll:

Your hate boner for the Air Force is noted.

Oh I am sorry how many times have they been wrong? They believed dogfights were dead in vietnam only to have to create top gun program to train on dogfighting, they had to put cannons back in jets. They also believed cas was to be done by fast moving bombers long before the a-10 was even a scribble on paper, only to be proven wrong time and time again and having to bring in the a-1 skyraider and attack helicopters to fill the role the f-4 could never do.

Even now they are trying policies that failed in vietnam, desert storm, iraq and afghanistan, they are completely oblivious to ground troops and consider their own interests as top priority while considering ground troops as low priority. The airforce never wanted cas, thus they should never have been allowed to have it, they want the money for cas but they sure as hell never wanted to actually perform it.
 
Oh I am sorry how many times have they been wrong? They believed dogfights were dead in vietnam only to have to create top gun program to train on dogfighting, they had to put cannons back in jets. They also believed cas was to be done by fast moving bombers long before the a-10 was even a scribble on paper, only to be proven wrong time and time again and having to bring in the a-1 skyraider and attack helicopters to fill the role the f-4 could never do.

Even now they are trying policies that failed in vietnam, desert storm, iraq and afghanistan, they are completely oblivious to ground troops and consider their own interests as top priority while considering ground troops as low priority. The airforce never wanted cas, thus they should never have been allowed to have it, they want the money for cas but they sure as hell never wanted to actually perform it.

Every single branch has their stupid moments, from the US Army and their cult of the rifleman, or not creating a squad centered on a machine gun, or the Navy and their transformative battlespace, and so on and so forth. Your points about Iraq and Afghanistan are null.
 
Fixed wing gunships are not a bad idea, experience from ww2 to now has shown them very valuable,

Tank hunters never even came close to achieving the success they claimed.

The airforce thought as well as people like you are why the airforce needs to be stripped of the cas role as well as all funds devoted to it, and the army and marines should be dedicated those funds and recources.

It's the air force who had their fixed wing gunships shot down and realized how vulnerable they are.
 
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