Read again. That "putting out of action" was not the result of the DF-21D. it was the result of an undeveloped cluster type munition that used multiple long rod penetrators. Think of it as the DF being a single .32 caliber pistol shot, and the fictional weapon that was similar was a double barrel shotgun firing both barrels with 00 buckshot.
In other words, a single Harpoon missile, the carrier shrugs it off. A dozen Harpoon missiles all hitting at once, bad day for the carrier.
1. Ooze, I'm going to highlight a couple of words here for you:
In the event of a hit, analysts have often looked at the potential for a hypersonic missile to cause damage with kinetic energy alone. Andrew Davies of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute is skeptical, calculating that the energy of an inert object of a 500 kg RV at an impact velocity of Mach 6 would be comparable to the kinetic and explosive energy of a subsonic Boeing AGM-84 Harpoon, and only a quarter of Russia's supersonic Tactical Missiles Corp./Raduga P-270 Moskit. Raduga's Cold War “carrier-killer,” the Kh-22, is a 12,800-lb. weapon that hits at a speed above Mach 4 with a 2,200-lb.-class, shaped-charge warhead. However, classified studies carried out by McDonnell Douglas in the 1980s also showed that much smaller warheads—for instance, dispenser weapons with long-rod penetrators—would cause enough damage to a warship to put it out of commission, pending major repairs.
Now,
the warhead on a Dong Feng by itself is already larger than that 500kg, and the launch weight is about another 25
times that, though agreeably a lot of that is fuel. And - and, this is sort of important - it's a warhead. The Harpoon's warhead is
less than half, and closer to a third of the DF-21's. So, as it is both bigger, and explosive, the DF-21 is more like being shot with a 45 caliber
grenade than a single 32 caliber round.
2. Deployment numbers vary, but take the low estimates (say, 50), assume half of them don't work (which I would be highly skeptical of without supporting evidence), and assume the CCP wants to keep half in reserve. So now you are shooting 12. At two, maybe three carriers.
So, - and let's spread it out and assume three - let's say that we manage to intercept 50% of these bad boys.
That means we just lost three carriers (note: this doesn't mean they are blown sky high, like the movies. It means they are out of comission) to two DF-21D's apiece. So, it cost them 12 missiles in flight, and 12 missiles back for repairs, in return for which they have wrecked the U.S. Navy in a way we haven't suffered since Pearl Harbor, greatly restricting the U.S. ability to project power into strategic areas for
years.
Odd's that a U.S. president sends another carrier group in
under any circumstances save an actual existential threat to CONUS? so long as that other half of the 2nd Arty Core's stores remain a threat? Approximately nil.
3. SO, that's the DF-21. Then you have the
DF 26. Now Guam faces the threat Okinawa has long been under. Huzzah.
Now that's not to paint the Chinese as some kind of 100-foot-tall monster; they're not. I would argue (and have argued) that the claim that "the 21st Century is China's Century", or that they will supplant the U.S., or even that they will continue to be able to grow at their recent rates, are bunk. Much about China
is more bark than bite, and the Navy (and Airforce, and others) are investing quite a lot in trying to defeat China's A2AD capability. But they are taking it deadly seriously, and with good reason. Assessments of relative strength that don't take China's A2AD capability into account are like assessments of relative power-projection capability that don't take Carrier Groups into account : flawed.