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One of the last Battle of Britain fighter pilots Paul Farnes dies at 101

I disagree Fighter Command was said to be pretty close to collapse and it wasn't because of aircraft it was the loss of experienced pilots.

But the Luftwaffe was under the same strain too; even worse, because their replenishment rates for their pilots were even lower than the British. By November the British had increased their number of pilots by 40%, but the German numbers had decreased by 30%. German pilots may have been good, but they weren't enough to make up for that sheer deficiency of manpower.

This was a difference of training; the RAF explicitly kept some of their best pilots and crew in reserve to train new ones, while the Germans threw their best ones right into the lead. The German pilots who survived racked up huge kill tallies, but at the cost of their comrades almost always being green recruits with limited training. Hence Galland commenting that the Luftwaffe never recovered from Britain; it had lost too many of its best pilots and their replacements weren't of the same quality.

11 Group might have to pull back north of London taking it beyond effective range of the Luftwaffe’s Me-109 fighters which were needed to escort the bombers on daylight raids. Withdrawing 11 Group north of London would have meant the Germans could have achieved air superiority over the invasion beaches which was their goal. It would have also exposed London to the full fury of the Luftwaffe.

But 11 Group didn't break. Park acknowledged their situation was critical, but in the same breath mentioned that his squadrons could hold unless the Germans suddenly increased their attacks. "I've been looking at our casualty figures, and I've come to the conclusion that at our present rate of loss we can just afford it. And I'm damned certain the Boche can't. If we can hang in as we're going, I'm sure we'll win in the end."

But the Germans couldn't match it. By late Fall 1940 the Germans were deficient in both pilots and planes. Had they kept pressing, they *might* have broken 11 Group, but at that point the Luftwaffe wouldn't have anything left to exploit it. In July the Germans had 906 pilots ready; by September they were down to 735.

Had they fought the Battle of Britain smarter, go after the RADAR stations, the command and control centers, they might have been able to win; but the course of action they took was never going to achieve victory.
 
But the Luftwaffe was under the same strain too; even worse, because their replenishment rates for their pilots were even lower than the British. By November the British had increased their number of pilots by 40%, but the German numbers had decreased by 30%. German pilots may have been good, but they weren't enough to make up for that sheer deficiency of manpower.

This was a difference of training; the RAF explicitly kept some of their best pilots and crew in reserve to train new ones, while the Germans threw their best ones right into the lead. The German pilots who survived racked up huge kill tallies, but at the cost of their comrades almost always being green recruits with limited training. Hence Galland commenting that the Luftwaffe never recovered from Britain; it had lost too many of its best pilots and their replacements weren't of the same quality.



But 11 Group didn't break. Park acknowledged their situation was critical, but in the same breath mentioned that his squadrons could hold unless the Germans suddenly increased their attacks. "I've been looking at our casualty figures, and I've come to the conclusion that at our present rate of loss we can just afford it. And I'm damned certain the Boche can't. If we can hang in as we're going, I'm sure we'll win in the end."

But the Germans couldn't match it. By late Fall 1940 the Germans were deficient in both pilots and planes. Had they kept pressing, they *might* have broken 11 Group, but at that point the Luftwaffe wouldn't have anything left to exploit it. In July the Germans had 906 pilots ready; by September they were down to 735.

Had they fought the Battle of Britain smarter, go after the RADAR stations, the command and control centers, they might have been able to win; but the course of action they took was never going to achieve victory.



But that is the point though isn't it? You are saying that Operation Sea Lion was never in play and never a possibility however it really was. If the Luftwaffe had like you said concentrated on Radar and 11 group's infrastructure they would of probably won the day. Hitler changed the focus to civilians because he incorrectly thought that they could break British resolve.
 
Its all academic since even if the Germans were able to somehow conquer the UK, they would have eventually lost once they fought the USSR.
 
But that is the point though isn't it? You are saying that Operation Sea Lion was never in play and never a possibility however it really was. If the Luftwaffe had like you said concentrated on Radar and 11 group's infrastructure they would of probably won the day.

But that would be enough for Sealion to succeed; the Germans needed surface control the Kriegsmarine couldn't supply and transportation Germany simply didn't have. Knocking out 11 Group alone wasn't enough for Sealion to be workable; they needed control of the air and sea, and the logistical capacity to actually exploited. The very best they could have done was win a victory in the air, but even that wasn't guaranteed.

Hitler changed the focus to civilians because he incorrectly thought that they could break British resolve.

There were a lot of reasons the Germans switched to bombing cities, but by far the biggest reason (to the Luftwaffe) was because they were losing pilots and planes it made continuing the battle against the RAF untenable. That's why they had to switch to cities; it was easier to protect big raids than a bunch of smaller ones.

And finally, the Germans knew the RADAR's importance. They didn't target it because their goal was to defeat the RAF in battle; they wanted the RAF to see them coming so they'd fly out and meet them. German expectations for their kill ratios were just fantastically overconfident.
 
But that would be enough for Sealion to succeed; the Germans needed surface control the Kriegsmarine couldn't supply and transportation Germany simply didn't have. Knocking out 11 Group alone wasn't enough for Sealion to be workable; they needed control of the air and sea, and the logistical capacity to actually exploited. The very best they could have done was win a victory in the air, but even that wasn't guaranteed.



There were a lot of reasons the Germans switched to bombing cities, but by far the biggest reason (to the Luftwaffe) was because they were losing pilots and planes it made continuing the battle against the RAF untenable. That's why they had to switch to cities; it was easier to protect big raids than a bunch of smaller ones.

And finally, the Germans knew the RADAR's importance. They didn't target it because their goal was to defeat the RAF in battle; they wanted the RAF to see them coming so they'd fly out and meet them. German expectations for their kill ratios were just fantastically overconfident.

Well their intelligence services were a joke as well.
 
Well their intelligence services were a joke as well.

The Germans? Oh yeah. Hence why despite their constant bombing British industrial production actually increased during the Battle of Britain.
 
The RAF was on the ropes in Aug-Sep 1940. When the Luftwaffe changed from military only targets, they gave much needed relief to the RAF to refit and repair airfields and equipment.

No it wasn't

Aircraft production exceeded losses throughout the battle - and the RAF finished the battle with more aircraft than it started the battle with.

The same cannot be said for the Luftwaffe


The only "military" targets the Luftwaffe attacked were Fighter Command airfields South of London. The airfields North of London were untouched, as were the Bomber Command airfields. And it was BC that would've been the RAF assets to have stopped the invasion.
 
That is not accurate. His campaign of bombing RAF infrastructure had the RAF on its knees. The mistake it made was changing its focus to night raids with a focus on disrupting food stocks and manufacturing infrastructure.

What RAF "infrastructure" ?

You mean the Fighter Command airfields in the SE of England. That was just a part of FC and Bomber Command airfields weren't touched.
 
I disagree Fighter Command was said to be pretty close to collapse...

By who ?
And when ?

Do you have any quotes ?


What the Luftwaffe needed to do was to keep hitting 11 Group air fields. Bomb craters were a problem, but could be filled in, but the hangers, fuel depots, repair workshops, and other support facilities could not be as easily repaired. And without these facilities, 11 Group could not keep flying.

So what ?
Ground damage was always repairable and any damage caused could be replaced with a day.

The absolute most the Luftwaffe could achieve is force the temporary re-location of 11 Group's fighters to 12 Group's airfields.

But that would take a phenomenal effort and drain resources.


...withdrawing 11 Group north of London would have meant the Germans could have achieved air superiority over the invasion beaches which was their goal. It would have also exposed London to the full fury of the Luftwaffe.

No they couldn't

Most invasion beaches would have been still closer to RAF fighters than German fighters in Northern France

And you haven't even mentioned Bomber Command, whose airfields were never attacked and had any invasion been launched, it was BC who would've opposed it.

Coupled with the fact that Germany didn't have an invasion fleet (unless you count flat bottomed river barges, most of which were unpowered) and were facing the world's largest navy at the time.

Btw, any river barge that was to land on British beaches, stays there. How would you propose the Germans got them back ?
 
...you are saying that Operation Sea Lion was never in play and never a possibility however it really was....

No it wasn't, it was a bluff

The only way Sea Lion is launched is against a passive shoreline.
ie: if the British had already surrendered


If the Luftwaffe had like you said concentrated on Radar and 11 group's infrastructure they would of probably won the day....

LOL

Absolutely no chance

And actually Sea Lion was no threat even if there had been no Royal Air Force

The Germans had no way to get an invading force across the English channel under fire.
Everybody knew it
It might interest you to know that Gerd von Rundstedt, who commanded the Germany army slated to actually do the invading, placed himself on leave for the Summer as did his Chief of Staff.
Can you imagine someone like Bernard Montgomery doing the same thing in the Spring of 1944 ?


Sea Lion was just a bluff.

Hitler changed the focus to civilians because he incorrectly thought that they could break British resolve.


That was all the battle was.


Are you not aware of the phases ?
It started wit the Channel attacks, what the Germans called the "Kanal Kampf"
Then ports were hit - certainly not something you'd do if you were planning to invade
Then factories - the Supermarine factory was bombed near Southampton - that's a strategic target, not something you'd attack for tactical reasons - allied bombing in 1944 forgot all about German factories and focused on tactical targets like railways and bridges etc
Then RAF assets like SE Airfield and RADAR stations
Then urban areas - chiefly London but other cities too, famously Coventry

It was all a turning of the screw...not to pave the way for invasion, but to destroy British morale and force a surrender. It didn't work.
 
No it wasn't, it was a bluff

The only way Sea Lion is launched is against a passive shoreline.
ie: if the British had already surrendered




LOL

Absolutely no chance

And actually Sea Lion was no threat even if there had been no Royal Air Force

The Germans had no way to get an invading force across the English channel under fire.
Everybody knew it
It might interest you to know that Gerd von Rundstedt, who commanded the Germany army slated to actually do the invading, placed himself on leave for the Summer as did his Chief of Staff.
Can you imagine someone like Bernard Montgomery doing the same thing in the Spring of 1944 ?


Sea Lion was just a bluff.




That was all the battle was.


Are you not aware of the phases ?
It started wit the Channel attacks, what the Germans called the "Kanal Kampf"
Then ports were hit - certainly not something you'd do if you were planning to invade
Then factories - the Supermarine factory was bombed near Southampton - that's a strategic target, not something you'd attack for tactical reasons - allied bombing in 1944 forgot all about German factories and focused on tactical targets like railways and bridges etc
Then RAF assets like SE Airfield and RADAR stations
Then urban areas - chiefly London but other cities too, famously Coventry

It was all a turning of the screw...not to pave the way for invasion, but to destroy British morale and force a surrender. It didn't work.


I’ll respond in more depth tomorrow as it’s late here but the Luftwaffe only moved on to the latter phases because they incorrectly thought the RAF was broken not bruised. Their intelligence services completely failed them. Look at the battle on August 22nd. German High command believed they had taken down 99 planes where as in fact it was 34. All their attacks on the airfields failed to halt production as the damage was superficial.
They relied heavily on the Stuka due to its success in Poland and France however it was outmatched in speed by the Spitfire and extremely vulnerable when diving.
August 24th to Sept 6th though the “scales had shifted” to quote Churchill. We were no longer keeping up with losses and RAF crews were scrambling 6 times a day. What happened after that was sheer luck. Two German bombers flying off course bombed London in error. The RAF in revenge targeted the Berlin suburbs causing outrage in Berlin at Which point an enraged Hitler ordered a change in tactics on sept 5th and shifted their focus to London itself. This took the pressure off fighter command and losses fell below the output of new fighters.

The Germans made clear errors and underestimated the RAF due to their own arrogance and failed intelligence.
 
August 24th to Sept 6th though the “scales had shifted” to quote Churchill. We were no longer keeping up with losses and RAF crews were scrambling 6 times a day.

And the Germans were running *even* lower dude. At the end of the day the British were replacing lost pilots and planes faster than the Germans was.

What happened after that was sheer luck. Two German bombers flying off course bombed London in error. The RAF in revenge targeted the Berlin suburbs causing outrage in Berlin at Which point an enraged Hitler ordered a change in tactics on sept 5th and shifted their focus to London itself. This took the pressure off fighter command and losses fell below the output of new fighters.

But that's not what happened.

Kesselring, and much of the Luftwaffe, had been begging Hitler to let them strike against London. In the two weeks prior they repeatedly asked him for permission, and he didn't give it until after Berlin was bombed.

The Luftwaffe wanted the switch *precisely* because they were losing so many pilots and planes and couldn't sustain the raids against the airfields. They wanted to bomb London under the hope it would draw the bulk of the RAF into a major battle where they could be defeated.

It didn't work. Although German losses dropped off to an acceptable level, allowing them to continue the blitz, it also failed to destroy the RAF as a fighting force.
 
Well their intelligence services were a joke as well.

One of the big reasons is because German military intelligence was actively conspiring against Hitler.
 
I’ll respond in more depth tomorrow as it’s late here but the Luftwaffe only moved on to the latter phases because they incorrectly thought the RAF was broken not bruised. Their intelligence services completely failed them. Look at the battle on August 22nd. German High command believed they had taken down 99 planes where as in fact it was 34....

So what ?

The Luftwaffe never stuck to tactical targets. RAF bases in the SE were repaired and RAF continued to fly sorties against the enemy
That should have given the Luftwaffe a clue thar 11 Group's airfields were still a valid target
Why weren't bridges attacked or railway yards?

Why wasn't 12 Group attacked ?
Why weren't Bomber Command airfields attacked ?


The answer is Germany wasn't preparing to invade, it was executing an escalation of attacks that culminated in the London Blitz.
It was all an attempt to get the British to ask for a cease fire.
It failed

But there was no way an invasion could ever be contemplated by the Germans unless Britain had already surrendered


All their attacks on the airfields failed to halt production as the damage was superficial.

There was no production being done at 11 Group's airfields


They relied heavily on the Stuka due to its success in Poland and France however it was outmatched in speed by the Spitfire and extremely vulnerable when diving.

So what ?


August 24th to Sept 6th though the “scales had shifted” to quote Churchill. We were no longer keeping up with losses and RAF crews were scrambling 6 times a day. What happened after that was sheer luck. Two German bombers flying off course bombed London in error. The RAF in revenge targeted the Berlin suburbs causing outrage in Berlin at Which point an enraged Hitler ordered a change in tactics on sept 5th and shifted their focus to London itself. This took the pressure off fighter command and losses fell below the output of new fighters.

That is the myth yes

The London Blitz was just the top rung on the escalation ladder...and NOT something you'd do if you planned an invasion


The Germans made clear errors and underestimated the RAF due to their own arrogance and failed intelligence.


And the RAF over-estimated the strength of the Luftwaffe. One possible reason is both air forces might have assumed the other used their tactical organization:
The RAF may have felt a Luftwaffe "staffel" was the same size as an RAF squadron and vice versa

In terms of aerial combat, the Germans tended to divide the losses in half when publicly reporting them
The British tended to multiply their victories x 2

You should read Len Deighton's excellent book "Fighter" for more details and explanations.
 
One of the big reasons is because German military intelligence was actively conspiring against Hitler.

The Heer and the Kriegsmarine also had zero faith that Sea Lion was feasible as well.
 
So what ?

The Luftwaffe never stuck to tactical targets. RAF bases in the SE were repaired and RAF continued to fly sorties against the enemy
That should have given the Luftwaffe a clue thar 11 Group's airfields were still a valid target
Why weren't bridges attacked or railway yards?

Why wasn't 12 Group attacked ?
Why weren't Bomber Command airfields attacked ?


The answer is Germany wasn't preparing to invade, it was executing an escalation of attacks that culminated in the London Blitz.
It was all an attempt to get the British to ask for a cease fire.
It failed

But there was no way an invasion could ever be contemplated by the Germans unless Britain had already surrendered




There was no production being done at 11 Group's airfields




So what ?




That is the myth yes

The London Blitz was just the top rung on the escalation ladder...and NOT something you'd do if you planned an invasion





And the RAF over-estimated the strength of the Luftwaffe. One possible reason is both air forces might have assumed the other used their tactical organization:
The RAF may have felt a Luftwaffe "staffel" was the same size as an RAF squadron and vice versa

In terms of aerial combat, the Germans tended to divide the losses in half when publicly reporting them
The British tended to multiply their victories x 2

You should read Len Deighton's excellent book "Fighter" for more details and explanations.


I will check it out.

I think you raise some good points but I’ve yet to see direct quotes or intel from the Nazis that Sea lion was a smoke screen. Do you have any?
 
I will check it out.

I think you raise some good points but I’ve yet to see direct quotes or intel from the Nazis that Sea lion was a smoke screen. Do you have any?

Hitler gave a formal directive for the invasion of Britain to be prepared, no official German document was going to call it a bluff. We do have evidence it was though plus post war testimonies.

At the first planning meeting for Barbaross in July 1940, Hitler stated that the defeat of the USSR (planned for the end of 1941) would finally make Britain agree a peace as its last ally was beaten
This meeting was BEFORE the plans for Sea Lion had even been presented to him
It is clear from this statement that Hitler expected the Britain to be still in the war at the end of 1941...and thus Hitler had no intention of launching an invasion against a hostile shore
Field Marshall Keitel, C-in-C of OKW, stated that Sea Lion would never be executed unless success was guaranteed


Hitler ordering OKW to draw up a plan is one thing...draw up a plan in a month is another
It's frankly ridiculous...as to why would the German command go ahead and draw up the plan, if it was a bluff, is covered in the Cassell Military Paperback :

Robot Check


Preface: "...there is not a single clue that Hitler ever really did intend to occupy the British islands....did the many German pilots and British civilians therefore die only for the sake of a bluff?

In the face of all existing evidence, this must be assumed to be the case....



...were the German generals and admirals so naive not to have seen through Hitler's directives?

The documents that have become available since the end of the war, particularly in recent times provide the answer.

In the Summer of 1940 there was no reason for them to doubt the earnestness of Hitler's intentions. The did not recognize Hitler's directives for a bluff even though they had a multiple of reasons to question the success of such an operation. As late as June the chiefs of all 3 services were convinced that it was hopeless...

...Sea Lion becomes a paradigm for the whole of the Second World War. based on a mere word from the Fuhrer a gigantic military bureaucracy was set in motion...

...Sea Lion is an classic example of how an omnipotent military machine can operate without any sort of intellectual corrective...."





Hitler was in charge and wanted everyone to know it...he ordered a plan in a month if this doesn't convince you that it was just bravado, then nothing will

Then there's the German reaction to it - both at the time and in post war interviews...no-one says Sea Lion was possible and several come right out and say it was a bluff.

Various writers have also come to the same conclusion.

The mindset of the Luftwaffe and of Hitler during the BoB shows that Sea Lion wasn't an objective...Hitler gave up on it after just three weeks of the BoB
 
On April 3, 1924, Matryona Necheporchukova (NAZDRACHEVA) was born.
One of 4 women-full recipients of the order of Glory and the only nurse among them.
She received the order of the first class for carrying 78 wounded soldiers and officers from the battlefield near the rivers Oder and Spree.

EUnzb_0XYAAhQoq.webp
 
April 17, 1945-execution of Dutch Communist Hanni Schaft
Shaft took part in attacks on Nazis,collaborators, and traitors.The Nazi who was supposed to carry out the sentence fired at Shaft at close range, but only wounded her.Shaft told him:"I'm a better shot than you»

EVxxJ-qXgAEjFSr.webp
 
"A retired Minnesota carpenter whom The Associated Press exposed as a former commander of a Nazi-led unit accused of war atrocities has died.
Michael Karkoc, whose family maintained that he was never a Nazi or committed any war crimes, lived quietly in Minneapolis for decades until AP's review of U.S. and Ukrainian records in 2013 uncovered his past and prompted investigations in Germany and Poland. Karkoc died Dec. 14, according to cemetery and public records. He was 100.
"


Minnesota man exposed as commander of Nazi-led unit dies - ABC News
 
Very sad to realize I'll be alive to see the last of the WWII veterans pass away.

Sad indeed. Of the 335 USS Arizona survivors, only 3 remain. They'll all be gone in a couple years.
 
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