This tells me the U.S. has strong potential allies in al Anbar, in the southern part of the territory the jihadists control, and also along the eastern edge of that territory, in Irbil and Iraqi Kurdistan. I would like to hear someone in this administration explain why this does not present a good opportunity for organizing local forces, trained and supported by the U.S., to drive back and eventually destroy the jihadists. A little is being done, gradually--but much more is needed, and quickly.
A recent L.A. Times article said a Kurdish force directed by U.S. special forces and backed by American heavy weapons may move to recapture Mosul this summer. It claimed progress has already been made in cutting the supply routes to that city from the west. I hope so--being at the extreme end of the jihadists' supply lines but near Irbil, it seems like a very good target. Losing control of Iraq's second-largest city would force the jihadists to pull back many miles to the west, and it would be a heavy blow to their presitige.
So troops on the ground will probably be needed to destroy these people. But can't much more be done from the air, even before that? Why are the people of Mosul, Raqqa, Ramadi, Tikrit, and other cities the jihadists control being allowed to give them safe haven while continuing to live fairly comfortable lives? Why do those cities still have electricity, working telephone, water, and sewer service, passable roads, and so on? Why are air and rail connections still in place? Why are the river bridges in Mosul, Raqqa, Tikrit, etc. still intact?
The U.S. could destroy any of those or other facilities from the air pretty easily. It might be done bit by bit, gradually increasing the price the inhabitants of those places had to pay for letting the jihadists shelter among them. As the misery of living in primitive conditions got worse week by week, and knowing that kicking the jihadists out by force was the only way to end it, more and more of the locals would be willing to risk that. And with an advantage in numbers of fifty or a hundred to one over the ISIS fighters in their midst, the risk of turning against them would hardly be unthinkable.
It's obvious the jihadists are mostly in or near cities in Syria and Iraq because they have so far been relatively safe there. Of course everyone sympathizes with the children who live in those cities, and with the many adults there who despise the jihadists. But many of the inhabitants are less sympathetic figures--some must be outright collaborators. That is the only sensible explanation for how so few jihadists can have controlled so many people.
A large crowd turned out in a square in Raqqa to cheer as they watched the Jordanian pilot being immolated, screaming, on a big screen that had been put up for the show. Those people can hardly have been the innocent, victimized Iraqis we've been told hate ISIS, but have been terrorized into submission. Whether collaborators or not, the inhabitants of these cities have to be forced to work together to drive the jihadists out, by making the alternative worse yet.
We should accept the unpleasant fact that getting at the jihadists may result in the deaths of many people in the cities they are in, some of whom will be innocent. Maybe the Syrians and Iraqis who let enemies of the U.S. live among them thought they could do it with impunity because Barack Obama is president--and maybe they were right. I hope not--letting ISIS keep its urban safe havens for another two years is an open invitation to another 9/11.