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A good article on Truman wrongly using nuclear weapons

Actually I cited 7 five star military officers

Five Army and four Navy officers received five stars (George C. Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Henry H. Arnold, Omar Bradley, William D. Leahy, Ernest J. King, Chester Nimitz, and William F. Halsey

There's only 9 5 star generals and admirals.
 
Five Army and four Navy officers received five stars (George C. Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Henry H. Arnold, Omar Bradley, William D. Leahy, Ernest J. King, Chester Nimitz, and William F. Halsey

There's only 9 5 star generals and admirals.

I can quote 7 against the bomb
 
I dont avoid it. I ascribe no meaning to it.

So you ascribe no meaning to the very words of Japan's leadership? That's very telling on why you're so wrong on this subject.
 
So you ascribe no meaning to the very words of Japan's leadership? That's very telling on why you're so wrong on this subject.

I ascribe no meaning to that speech. It certainly does not tell the whole story according to expert opinion


But you are welcome to your opinion
 
No, if you have 7, and there are 14, it means 7 were for dropping it, and 7 were against it.

The 7 for dropping the bomb were left out of your article.

Uh no. Only one said they were for it.
 
Uh no. Only one said they were for it.

It's a big issue, I'm sure they all had opinions. It's just that the opinions of those 7, 5 stars who were for the bomb didn't fit into your narrative.

Truman fired MacArthur, and I'm sure that weighed into MacArthur's opinion on Truman's dropping of the bomb.

Everyone wants to say something a little controversial to sell a book or get on the news.
 
It's a big issue, I'm sure they all had opinions. It's just that the opinions of those 7, 5 stars who were for the bomb didn't fit into your narrative.

Truman fired MacArthur, and I'm sure that weighed into MacArthur's opinion on Truman's dropping of the bomb.

Everyone wants to say something a little controversial to sell a book or get on the news.

Quote two that said they were for the bomb.
 
I don't know why you all are so obsessed about the decision making in the Japanese Government. Read all the tea leaves you like, but whatever secret deliberations that were going on in the Japanese leadership in July 1945, they wouldn't have mattered a damn on the decision whether or not to drop the bomb... because guess what? Hirohito didn't get a say on that call.

All that really matters is what the American assessment of Japanese intentions were... and according to the minutes of the June 18 meeting at the White House, that assessment was that the Japanese intended to keep on fighting to the bitter end. True, there was hopeful speculation that an anti-war faction might step up and push for peace... but essentially that's all it was - hopeful speculation. As far as the US military assessment goes, it was still full speed ahead on the invasion plans. When I put myself in President Truman's shoes, the only possibility I can see for ending the war without invading would have been to use the atomic bomb and hope that gave the Japanese anti-war lobby the impetus it needed to push for peace. It was the only game-changer which could have possibly have shaken up the dynamic both sides seemed to have been locked into.
 
I don't know why you all are so obsessed about the decision making in the Japanese Government. Read all the tea leaves you like, but whatever secret deliberations that were going on in the Japanese leadership in July 1945, they wouldn't have mattered a damn on the decision whether or not to drop the bomb... because guess what? Hirohito didn't get a say on that call.

All that really matters is what the American assessment of Japanese intentions were... and according to the minutes of the June 18 meeting at the White House, that assessment was that the Japanese intended to keep on fighting to the bitter end. True, there was hopeful speculation that an anti-war faction might step up and push for peace... but essentially that's all it was - hopeful speculation. As far as the US military assessment goes, it was still full speed ahead on the invasion plans. When I put myself in President Truman's shoes, the only possibility I can see for ending the war without invading would have been to use the atomic bomb and hope that gave the Japanese anti-war lobby the impetus it needed to push for peace. It was the only game-changer which could have possibly have shaken up the dynamic both sides seemed to have been locked into.

That assessment was made by truman and was not supported by military leaders.


Dropping the bombs was politics
 
Your expert does not explain what you mean by saving face. Stop hiding behind links and explain why you think the Emperor needed to save face by talking about the atom bomb and not the Soviet invasion.

Hell, his mysterious "experts" also believe that Japan was going to be bombed into oblivion by the Soviets. Never mind that as was proven they had almost no bombers to accomplish that feat. I even asked for the names of those "experts", and funny, was never given them.

We are simply dealing with somebody that has almost no grasp on reality, and the voices in his head keep telling him what to say. He proves nothing, gives the most absolutely flimsy of references, then ignores anything posted and insists he is right.

This thread has actually become a farce by this point, and all those even worth trying to have a conversation with all seem to have left.
 
Hell, his mysterious "experts" also believe that Japan was going to be bombed into oblivion by the Soviets. Never mind that as was proven they had almost no bombers to accomplish that feat. I even asked for the names of those "experts", and funny, was never given them.

We are simply dealing with somebody that has almost no grasp on reality, and the voices in his head keep telling him what to say. He proves nothing, gives the most absolutely flimsy of references, then ignores anything posted and insists he is right.

This thread has actually become a farce by this point, and all those even worth trying to have a conversation with all seem to have left.

What is mysterious about my experts when I post their names and can link to their argument? Lol


You have no evidence so your claims are dismissed
 
Seven weeks before Hiroshima


The President's chief of staff, William D. Leahy--the five-star admiral who presided over meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--noted in his diary seven weeks before the bombing of Hiroshima: “It is my opinion that at the present time a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provision for America's defense against future trans-Pacific aggression.”
 
I don't know why you all are so obsessed about the decision making in the Japanese Government. Read all the tea leaves you like, but whatever secret deliberations that were going on in the Japanese leadership in July 1945, they wouldn't have mattered a damn on the decision whether or not to drop the bomb... because guess what? Hirohito didn't get a say on that call.

All that really matters is what the American assessment of Japanese intentions were... and according to the minutes of the June 18 meeting at the White House, that assessment was that the Japanese intended to keep on fighting to the bitter end. True, there was hopeful speculation that an anti-war faction might step up and push for peace... but essentially that's all it was - hopeful speculation. As far as the US military assessment goes, it was still full speed ahead on the invasion plans. When I put myself in President Truman's shoes, the only possibility I can see for ending the war without invading would have been to use the atomic bomb and hope that gave the Japanese anti-war lobby the impetus it needed to push for peace. It was the only game-changer which could have possibly have shaken up the dynamic both sides seemed to have been locked into.


I want to make the point that the bombs didn't matter in the Japanese emperor's decision to surrender.

1. The a-bombs did terrible destruction, but the incendiary bombs we dropped, like on Tokyo, did the same scale of damage. The incendiary bombs just took longer.

2. Several cities had been fire bombed by that point. People were used to it.

3. Nagasaki was bombed August 9.

4. The Japanese surrendered September 6. That's like a month from the a-bombs to the surrender. The Japanese weren't all that impressed by the a-bombs. The bombs certainly didn't speed up their surrender.

5. Even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were nuked, the Japanese still would not surrender.

6. America sent the Japanese this note https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/1945-08-11a.html

7. This is the key phrase from the note: "The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people."

8. That told the emperor, he could keep his job.

9. Japan surrendered.
 
I want to make the point that the bombs didn't matter in the Japanese emperor's decision to surrender.

1. The a-bombs did terrible destruction, but the incendiary bombs we dropped, like on Tokyo, did the same scale of damage. The incendiary bombs just took longer.

2. Several cities had been fire bombed by that point. People were used to it.

3. Nagasaki was bombed August 9.

4. The Japanese surrendered September 6.

5. Even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were nuked, the Japanese still would not surrender.

6. America sent the Japanese this note https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/1945-08-11a.html

7. This is the key phrase from the note: "The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people."

8. That told the emperor, he could keep his job.

9. Japan surrendered.

Then dropping them was wrong
 
I want to make the point that the bombs didn't matter in the Japanese emperor's decision to surrender.

1. The a-bombs did terrible destruction, but the incendiary bombs we dropped, like on Tokyo, did the same scale of damage. The incendiary bombs just took longer.

2. Several cities had been fire bombed by that point. People were used to it.

3. Nagasaki was bombed August 9.

4. The Japanese surrendered September 6. That's like a month from the a-bombs to the surrender. The Japanese weren't all that impressed by the a-bombs. The bombs certainly didn't speed up their surrender.

5. Even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were nuked, the Japanese still would not surrender.

6. America sent the Japanese this note https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/1945-08-11a.html

7. This is the key phrase from the note: "The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people."

8. That told the emperor, he could keep his job.

9. Japan surrendered.

The Japanese Government essentially made the decision to surrender during the air-raid shelter session on August 10, the day after the Nagasaki bombing, when they decided to accede to the Potsdam declaration. However, the hard-liners still had to be mollified and the Kyujo attempted coup had to be dealt with before formal negotiations could be initiated - this was done on August 19, when a Japanese team flew to Manila to meet with MacArthur to discuss the terms of the surrender.
 
The Japanese Government essentially made the decision to surrender during the air-raid shelter session on August 10, the day after the Nagasaki bombing, when they decided to accede to the Potsdam declaration. However, the hard-liners still had to be mollified and the Kyujo attempted coup had to be dealt with before formal negotiations could be initiated - this was done on August 19, when a Japanese team flew to Manila to meet with MacArthur to discuss the terms of the surrender.

August 11, 1945

United States Department of State Bulletin.

August 11, 1945

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of August 10, and in reply to inform you that the President of the United States has directed me to send to you for transmission by your Government to the Japanese Government the following message on behalf of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China:

"With regard to the Japanese Government's message accepting the terms of the Potsdam proclamation but containing the statement, 'with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler,' our position is as follows:

"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.

"The Emperor will be required to authorize and ensure the signature by the Government of Japan and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, and shall issue his commands to all the Japanese military, naval and air authorities and to all the forces under their control wherever located to cease active operations and to surrender their arms, and to issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms.

"Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transports.

"The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

"The armed forces of the Allied Powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration are achieved."

Accept [etc.]

JAMES F. BYRNES
Secretary of State

MR. MAX GRÄSSLI
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland




The "Byrnes note" as this thing is called was sent August 11.

I think the a-bombings got the attention of the Japanese, but it wasn't like the Japanese surrendered the day after the bombing. The bombs didn't scare them into surrendering.

The Japanese seem pretty callous about their people dying.
 
August 11, 1945

United States Department of State Bulletin.

August 11, 1945

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of August 10, and in reply to inform you that the President of the United States has directed me to send to you for transmission by your Government to the Japanese Government the following message on behalf of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China:

"With regard to the Japanese Government's message accepting the terms of the Potsdam proclamation but containing the statement, 'with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler,' our position is as follows:

"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.

"The Emperor will be required to authorize and ensure the signature by the Government of Japan and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, and shall issue his commands to all the Japanese military, naval and air authorities and to all the forces under their control wherever located to cease active operations and to surrender their arms, and to issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms.

"Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transports.

"The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

"The armed forces of the Allied Powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration are achieved."

Accept [etc.]

JAMES F. BYRNES
Secretary of State

MR. MAX GRÄSSLI
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland




The "Byrnes note" as this thing is called was sent August 11.

I think the a-bombings got the attention of the Japanese, but it wasn't like the Japanese surrendered the day after the bombing. The bombs didn't scare them into surrendering.

The Japanese seem pretty callous about their people dying.

I don't know how you figure these things work, Swing, but it's not like you the leadership makes the decision to surrender and BAM, it's a done deal. There are a lot of moving parts that have to be aligned before you get to a signing ceremony on the deck of the Missouri.
 
I don't know how you figure these things work, Swing, but it's not like you the leadership makes the decision to surrender and BAM, it's a done deal. There are a lot of moving parts that have to be aligned before you get to a signing ceremony on the deck of the Missouri.

The argument to suggest that it was the bombs that caused the surrender seems to be getting weaker and weaker
 
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