Just as Congress made many previously (State jurisdiction) crimes like Murder (of a President or murder as a Hate Crime") federal offenses, I see no reason why crossing state borders with the intention of interfering with someone's First Amendment rights couldn't also be mnade a federal crime.
I'm not asking you to agree with me, but simply answering your question.
Actually, the
First Amendment itself precludes such an action.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
If a person speaks out loudly, boorishly, and disruptively, seeking to co-opt and frame public debate, while it is arguable that such a person intrudes upon the First Amendment rights of others, Congress is precluded from criminalizing that person's own First Amendment rights. The power of Congress to pass laws circumscribing free speech is itself greatly circumscribed.
The broadest justification* would be Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes "clear and present danger" rule, articulated in
Schenck v United States (
249 US 47):
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
Does mere shouting and unruly behavior rise to the level of a substantive evil that
Congress has the right and duty to prevent? Hardly. At worst it is disturbing the peace, and, as such, it is the duty of the state and the municipality to regulate. Congress lacks the competence to legislate a federal disturbing the peace standard.
If a person becomes unruly in a public setting, the local constabulary are already sufficiently endowed with legal recourse to contain the situation and remove the unruly person; there is no need to amplify their powers in this regard.
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*It should be noted that the "clear and present danger" rule of
Schenck was further circumscribed by
Whitney v People of the State of California (
274 US 357) and again by
Brandenburg v. Ohio (
395 US 444), which established a standard of "imminent lawless action" in place of a "clear and present danger."