I really can't believe people still refuse to educate themselves about this subject.
From the ISG report that's been available for years:
Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions
were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that
which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion,
irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic
missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.
The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither
was there an identifi able group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants
understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent,
but fi rm, verbal comments and directions to them.
To implement its procurement efforts, Iraq under Saddam, created a network of Iraqi front companies, some
with close relationships to high-ranking foreign government offi cials. These foreign government offi cials, in
turn, worked through their respective ministries, state-run companies and ministry-sponsored front companies,
to procure illicit goods, services, and technologies for Iraq’s WMD-related, conventional arms, and/or
dual-use goods programs.
Saddam directed the Regime’s key ministries and governmental agencies to devise and implement strategies,
policies, and techniques to discredit the UN sanctions, harass UN personnel in Iraq, and discredit the US. At
the same time, according to reporting, he also wanted to obfuscate Iraq’s refusal to reveal the nature of its
WMD and WMD-related programs, their capabilities, and his intentions.
• Saddam used the IIS to undertake the most sensitive procurement missions. Consequently, the IIS facilitated
the import of UN sanctioned and dual-use goods into Iraq through countries like Syria, Jordan,
Belarus and Turkey.
Saddam used the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientifi c Research (MHESR) through its universities
and research programs to maintain, develop, and acquire expertise, to advance or preserve existent research
projects and developments, and to procure goods prohibited by UN SC sanctions.
Numerous ministries in Saddam’s Regime facilitated the smuggling of illicit goods through Iraq’s borders,
ports, and airports. The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and the Military Industiralization Commission (MIC),
however, were directly responsible for skirting UN monitoring and importing prohibited items for Saddam.
ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000
km and for a 1,000-km-range cruise missile, although none of these systems progressed to production and
only one reportedly passed the design phase. ISG assesses that these plans demonstrate Saddam’s continuing
desire—up to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—for a long-range delivery capability.
ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefi ngs, that Iraq at OIF probably
had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months.
ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003
a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for
intelligence operations.