For several reasons, however, the international role in Libya was limited and the majority of post-conflict reconstruction was left up to the Libyans themselves. First, because NATO adopted an airpowerheavy strategy, ground forces were limited to small numbers of special forces from Europe and the Gulf States. Precision airpower allowed NATO to avoid large numbers of civilian deaths, keep costs down, and ensure it was the rebels themselves who took the capital. The limited number of ground forces, however, also greatly reduced the extent of control and influence that NATO and its partners could exert after
Qaddafi was gone. The question was whether to deploy forces, not whether to withdraw them.
Second, in contrast with NATO operations in Afghanistan and U.S. coalition operations in Iraq, the impetus for the intervention in Libya came in large part from France and Britain. Although President
Obama supported the operation, he emphasized to his French and British counterparts that they would be expected to take the lead and bear as much of the cost as they could. The United States would
support the effort, but provide only those capabilities it “uniquely” possessed. This arrangement also set the stage for a much-reduced U.S. role after the war.
