JackFrost
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Mixon v. State 1952
MIXON v. STATE*-*April 1, 1952.
The law is clear that one may not provoke a difficulty and having done so act under the necessity produced by the difficulty, then kill his adversary and justify the homicide under the plea of self defense. Zimmerman clearly provoked a difficulty, by forcing Martin to run, then exiting his vehicle. According to Zimmerman, Martin attempted to communicate at least twice with Zimmerman, who failed to state his intentions or identify himself both times, further provoking a difficulty.
The prosecution will make the following argument:
Zimmerman profiled Martin and followed him in his car, causing Martin to run. After clearly attempting to put some distance between himself and the stranger following him, Zimmerman exited his vehicle armed with a gun. Zimmerman assumed Martin had committed or was about to commit a crime and was intent Martin should not get away. Martin was innocent of any wrongdoing, and was just walking home from 7/11. Zimmerman was unjustified in pursuing Martin and under the circumstances his conduct was threatening. This, the prosecution will argue, was sufficient to "initially provoke" the struggle, no matter who struck the first blow.
There is no credible evidence that Zimmerman either tried to escape from Martin or that he withdrew and clearly indicated his intent to withdraw from the altercation.
776.041 - - 2011 Florida Statutes - The Florida Senate
Matthews v. State 1937 - "In murder prosecution, defendant could not invoke defense that deceased was armed with a pistol and that defendant shot him in self-defense, where evidence showed that defendant was aggressor in bringing on difficulty and was not free from fault."
Bowman v. State 1934 - "Killing is not justifiable or excusable if necessitated by accused's acting wrongfully or without being reasonably free from fault in provoking difficulty."
Gaff v. State 1931 - "Accused, to successfully excuse homicide on ground of self-defense, must have been free from fault, or receded after having been aggressor."
Scholl v. State 1927 - "One interposing self-defense in prosecution for homicide must not have wrongfully occasioned necessity of killing."
Landrum v. State 1920 - "On a trial for murder, it is proper to charge that one cannot acquit himself of liability for the consequences of a personal difficulty on the ground of self-defense, unless he is reasonably free from fault in entering thereupon."
Stinson v. State 1918 - "Defendant cannot avail himself of defense of self-defense when he himself brought on the situation under the compulsion of which he strikes the blow or fires the shot which he claims was justified."
Barton v. State 1916 - "If one wrongfully occasions necessity for self-defense, though he may have reasonable ground to apprehend a felony, or serious personal injury, and there is imminent danger thereof, he cannot justify a killing on the ground of self-defense."
Barnhill v. State 1908 - "One who seeks and brings on an affray cannot plead self-defense."
Kennard v. State 1900 - "The aggressor in a difficulty, one not reasonably free from fault, cannot justify homicide committed in such difficulty on the ground of self-defense."
Mixon v. State 1952
MIXON v. STATE*-*April 1, 1952.
The appellant and the man he later admitted killing had an altercation while the appellant was sitting in his jeep, the other man standing at the side of the vehicle. The appellant drove to his home nearby where he procured a revolver, while his adversary continued along the highway, afoot. The appellant, accompanied by his wife and their young daughter, then drove in the same direction until he overtook his former antagonist when both stopped.
From this point on, the versions of the state and the defendant differed materially.
According to the witnesses for the state, the pedestrian stepped back from the car, then put his hands forward, advanced, and projected the upper part of his body into the car just as the gun fired. A witness quoted appellant's wife as asking appellant immediately afterward: "My Lord, why did you shoot this boy?"
The defendant's version, given by the defendant, his small son who was with him at the first meeting, and his wife and young daughter who were present at the shooting is an entirely different story. On the first occasion the deceased cursed the appellant and brandished a knife. The appellant drove to his home nearby where he left the boy and armed himself with a pistol. Then, with his wife and young daughter, he went in search of a deputy sheriff, taking the road along which the deceased was walking toward a fish camp a short distance away, where the road terminated. When the car overhauled the deceased, he jumped into the jeep waving a large fish knife, and beat the appellant's head against the steering wheel, whereupon the appellant shot him. Both husband and wife categorically denied the statement attributed to the wife.
The jury doubtless believed, as well they might have from the defendant's actions and the direction he eventually took, that when the first difficulty ended and the men separated, he went to his home, armed himself and deliberately began a pursuit of the deceased, instead of a search for a deputy sheriff. Nothing in the testimony indicates that an officer would likely have been found at the fish camp a short distance away where the road ended. They also were justified in believing that the deceased was not himself armed and had approached the jeep only for the purpose of disarming appellant when the appellant stopped and drew his gun. They must have given credence to the testimony that no fish knife was ever discovered at the scene, and that the victim's pocket knife was found closed in a pocket of the trousers he wore next to his body. On the day of the homicide it was extremely cold, and he was wearing two pairs of pants.
So we believe that there was abundant proof to support a judgment of the defendant's guilt of unlawful homicide.
The law is clear that one may not provoke a difficulty and having done so act under the necessity produced by the difficulty, then kill his adversary and justify the homicide under the plea of self defense. Zimmerman clearly provoked a difficulty, by forcing Martin to run, then exiting his vehicle. According to Zimmerman, Martin attempted to communicate at least twice with Zimmerman, who failed to state his intentions or identify himself both times, further provoking a difficulty.
The prosecution will make the following argument:
Zimmerman profiled Martin and followed him in his car, causing Martin to run. After clearly attempting to put some distance between himself and the stranger following him, Zimmerman exited his vehicle armed with a gun. Zimmerman assumed Martin had committed or was about to commit a crime and was intent Martin should not get away. Martin was innocent of any wrongdoing, and was just walking home from 7/11. Zimmerman was unjustified in pursuing Martin and under the circumstances his conduct was threatening. This, the prosecution will argue, was sufficient to "initially provoke" the struggle, no matter who struck the first blow.
There is no credible evidence that Zimmerman either tried to escape from Martin or that he withdrew and clearly indicated his intent to withdraw from the altercation.
776.041 - - 2011 Florida Statutes - The Florida Senate