....
Does an individual right to keep and bear arms exist completely outside the need for a well regulated militia? Yes, I think that's undeniable.... but I also think you have to look outside of the 2nd Amendment to find it. If you marry the 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms with the 4th Amendment right to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects, there's a definite case that a 9th Amendment unenumerated right to keep and bear arms for self defense exists, and any laws inhibiting that would undoubtedly be subject to strict scrutiny.... so there's that, and it's completely outside of the context of the militia. The key here would be for the courts to find a way of distinguishing what constitutes a militia weapon and what constitutes a self-defense weapon and then applying the appropriate level of scrutiny.
I tend to follow friend
Cordelier's view that the right to keep and bear arms is really resident outside of the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment's acknowledgment was in the context of militias, and has to be read that way. Moreover, the treatment of firearms, and militias, by the States at the time the Amendment was drafted, has to play a role in its interpretation. In other contexts I've provided a good deal of that history, but it is immaterial to the current issue, I think.
I often found Justice Scalia's approach to legislative history to be opportunistic - he carefully avoids history that counters his conclusion and presents a very one-sided view of the record to reach it. That is why I have never found him the intellectual heavyweight his adherents describe. His arguments tend to be swiss-cheese like. Too many of his opinions require intellectual contortions to reach their ends to be persuasive.
Heller, in my view, is a good example. There is far more history that demonstrates
the expectation of government control over arms (and militias) than the limited history he recounts. Justice Stevens' dissent fills in much of the missing background.
But given my presumption that the right
does exist, whether in the Second Amendment or otherwise, the question then becomes how to balance the interests of the governments (federal, State and local) that may impact on that right. There, I think, a reasonable argument can be had on what level of scrutiny, and government intrusion, is appropriate to the ends. That same argument, then, is also appropriate more generally to the Commerce Clause.
I look at both this way: Does the effort by Congress (or a State or local jurisdiction) fall within the ambit of their authority? That, I think, is where many Commerce Clause arguments may falter. Although I have substantive disagreements with our friend
turtledude, I acknowledge that there are limitations on the federal authority over the State's purely parochial interests. Gun laws are something that I think, contrary to
Heller and
McDonald are clearly and historically within the States' ambit, and the 14th Amendment didn't change that. The federal government may also have an enforceable interest as well, whether that is resident in the Commerce Clause or one of its other enumerated powers. But enumerated powers have to be the touchstone for any discussion of federal authority within State boundaries, or without.