8/4/20
“Of two competing theories, the simpler explanation” is to be preferred, wrote William of Ockham, an injunction that some Western analysts and military leaders seem to have forgotten. After Russia sent troops into Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, many in NATO convinced themselves that Moscow’s next target would be the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The more logical inference is that Russia has military ambitions in the Black Sea region — and that Western Alliance members should turn their focus thence. There is no indication that Moscow has any intention of invading the Baltics. Russia has always seen the Baltics as different from the rest of the former Soviet Union. In short, when the Kremlin looks at Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania it sees Europe, and it had always played by different rules in Europe than in its self-designated “near abroad”. Rather than fixate on the Baltics, where the threat is low and a deterrent force is in place, NATO should pay more attention to the Black Sea region. There are four main reasons the Black Sea region demands more attention. First, three of the six littoral states – Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey – are NATO members and two – Ukraine and Georgia – were promised membership in 2008. Next, an examination of Russian military activities in the last decade-plus leads to the conclusion that the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean is the area of greatest geopolitical importance for Russia.
Third, the increasing alignment between Russia and Turkey deserves immediate and serious attention from all NATO capitals. If Moscow is able to pull Ankara into a strategic partnership that distances it from NATO, the security of the Alliance and all its members would suffer significantly. Finally, the Black Sea is an emerging energy hub that could allow Europe to diversify its energy sources away from Russia. But Turkey is key here, as well. The Black Sea region needs more attention. As Ben Hodges — former U.S. Army-Europe commander — and his co-authors argue, NATO should use the Enhanced Forward Presence model it deployed in the Baltics as a model for its Black Sea presence. This would entail beefing up the forces assigned to NATO’s Multi-National Division-Southeast (MND-SE) in Romania, deploying integrated air and missile defenses, and increasing the air policing of the region, as NATO has done in the Baltics. As Hodges and his co-authors argue, balancing the Alliance’s posture between the Baltic and Black seas would eliminate any gaps or seams for Moscow to exploit.
