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Military Branches

Which branch and explain?


  • Total voters
    49
I'm glad to have someone of expertise to discuss this with.

I was recently chatting with two friends (both former Marines), and we were talking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (one served there, one was out of the service before it started, but was in First Gulf War) and we were actually thinking the other way. That further division would be better.

It was based on this. The overthrow of the Taliban and Saddam's regime were relatively simple compared to what followed. I suggested (and my father was Navy, so I'm familiar - but I didn't personally serve and probably couldn't have even if I wanted to) that we create a "Peace Force" and an "Anti-Insurgency Force" (you can call them what you like).

The "Peace Force" would be armed but would focus primarily on recovery of the occupied nation, but would be able to respond defensively to attack. The Anti-Insurgency Force would be a fast, mobile force that would squelch and hold regions in turmoil until the "Peace Force" would come in once security is established.

The reasoning behind this is that the invading force (the current branches) are trained to kill the enemy, which require a degree of dehumanization of the enemy. I think, psychologically, it would be very difficult with the absence of uniforms (and that's going to be just about any conflict we face from here on out) to think one way and then turn on a dime and try to win over hearts and minds once the enemy government is toppled.

Thoughts?

And I just want to say I've really appreciated most all of what you've posted - even if occasionally (though not often), we've disagreed.

I have been a proponent of permanent Peacekeeper units for some time. I think by having Peacekeeper military units it will keep the military prepared for occupying countries and provide institutional memory in the military for law enforcement in foreign nations.

I also wouldn't mind permanent Anti-Insurgency units for that same reason. However, I don't know how much insurgencies will flourish in future conflicts. Perhaps having a small unit for each branch would be enough, who can then train more numbers when they need to.

However, I don't think peacekeeping and anti-insurgency operations warrant separate military branches. Rather, I think peacekeeping should be handled much like how we handle special operations. That is, each branch of the military would have their own separate Peacekeeping units and those units will train and work together more through interservice cooperation than they do with other units of their same military branch.

If we're talking about adding more service branches, though, I would like some research done in the virtues of having a separate Cyberwarfare branch of the military that works with the other branches in developing attacks and defenses for cyberwarfare. I really think that's going to be a future arena in warfare and will eventually warrant it's own separate and independent service.
 
I have been a proponent of permanent Peacekeeper units for some time. I think by having Peacekeeper military units it will keep the military prepared for occupying countries and provide institutional memory in the military for law enforcement in foreign nations.

I also wouldn't mind permanent Anti-Insurgency units for that same reason. However, I don't know how much insurgencies will flourish in future conflicts. Perhaps having a small unit for each branch would be enough, who can then train more numbers when they need to.

However, I don't think peacekeeping and anti-insurgency operations warrant separate military branches. Rather, I think peacekeeping should be handled much like how we handle special operations. That is, each branch of the military would have their own separate Peacekeeping units and those units will train and work together more through interservice cooperation than they do with other units of their same military branch.

If we're talking about adding more service branches, though, I would like some research done in the virtues of having a separate Cyberwarfare branch of the military that works with the other branches in developing attacks and defenses for cyberwarfare. I really think that's going to be a future arena in warfare and will eventually warrant it's own separate and independent service.

Cool. However it's implemented, I think it's a good idea. And cyberwarfare isn't something I thought about. I know we have people trained in it, but you're right. It's probably something that's not being properly thought out.

I heard a retired General on NPR the other day, and I think he said the best thing I've heard about the military (and I'm paraphrasing): The problem with the contemporary military is that they're stuck fighting World War 2 every time a new conflict breaks out.

I'd never thought of it that way, but I think he's right. Our stategies are still based on old models. We need new thinkers (Patraeus is close, I think) to create strategies to match the present world instead of still thinking the way we did 60 years ago. It worked really well 60 years ago and helped free the world. It hasn't worked so well since.
 
If you are going to occupy other countries, dedicated anti-insurgency and peacekeeping forces seem to be a must (a better option would be to stop occupying other countries of course). Clearly the US military does perfectly fine in a conventional fight. We're fast, have a lot of firepower, gain air superiority quickly, have great battlefield information gathering capabilities, and highly trained soldiers. I'm not sure there is a military on Earth that could face the US in a conventional fight (even China). But we keep finding that we get struck sticking around in the countries we beat. That's all well and good when the populace is peaceful and the regime secure, but in the likely case that one or both of those things doesn't happen we need an entirely different skill set that at this point we're maybe OK at but could use a ton of improvement. A dedicated force would probably do a lot for that.
 
What the hell is the purpose of a thread like this?
 
Marines or Army. No need for two land forces.
 
It's impractical though.

Iraq proved once and for to the RMA and the Washington black holes that their ideas of winning wars was not correct. The Gulf War was an exception not to be repeated any time soon. Despite Rumsfeld's idiocy and his worthless "Shock and Awe" tactics, boots on the ground was needed to fight that war mile by mile.

When you attack a country that has severe internal problems to start with, you don't take out their military or police. Those must remain in place to keep the peace once the initial fight is over.

You just use smart bombs and cruise missles to take out their ability to wage war with anything larger than hand held weapons. That way they are at a minimum threat to us.
Then, meet with the military leaders and have them "govern" until a civilian govt can be formed, if that is even necessary.

Boots on the ground are just targets, especially in places like the middle east. They may hate each other, but one thing they will have in common, they hate occupiers more.
 
Marines or Army. No need for two land forces.

The Marines aren't land forces. They are a military force designed and equipped for amphibious operations and rapid deployment. They also have their own aviators, which includes those for fixed-wing aircraft.
 
The Marines aren't land forces. They are a military force designed and equipped for amphibious operations and rapid deployment. They also have their own aviators, which includes those for fixed-wing aircraft.

A marine is like any other service member, except with balls....
so says an old friend who was a marine aviator. He said Marines flew much closer to the ground than other aviators...
 
Police Departments enforce munipal law.
Sheriff's patrol the county.
A state couldn't function if the State Police weren't out there collecting taxes on the highways.
The FBI enforces federal law.

The DEA shouldn't exist, since the federal government doesn't have constitutional authority to regulate drugs.
The federal government does not have the athority to regulate alcohol or tobacco, either, per the Constitution. And fire arms are heavily over-regulated in defiance of the Second Amendment. Thus the BATF isn't necessary.

DHS should never have been created, since FBI already exists.

Border Patrol is a specialized task, but there's no reason the FBI couldn't absorb that.

Treasury directs the Secret Service to deal with counterfeiters and Presidential Security. Clearly both functions can fall under the FBI umbrella.

In general, there are too many bureaucracies and too many duplicated functions for efficiency or coherence in policy.

82 Americans died protecting their freedoms under the First and Second Amendment simply because the bureaucrats running the BATF wanted a high profile arrest just before their budget came under review by Congress.

DHS is prevented from acting in matters of border security, and hence it can't possibly be responsible for "homeland" (something wrong with the word "national"? Closet nazis refer to the "homeland"...) security.

DHS exists mainly because of a fundamental shift in the concept of terrorism. Prior to 9/11, terrorism in the US was mostly thought of as a criminal offense rather than acts of war. The various agencies that deal with criminal offenses are notoriously territorial and were not sharing information. Further, US intelligence agencies were separated by law from domestic activities, but had the brunt of information on terrorists and their activities. The formation of DHS allowed intelligence and law enforcement to communicate and has done quite well in thwarting terrorist activities in the US. By absorbing Border Patrol, TSA, the Coast Guard, and various other law enforcement agencies under one umbrella, it was able to increase collaboration and coordination not only in mitigating threats, but in investigating incidents and dealing with the resultant emergency conditions. An incident commander does not now need to waste time securing the cooperation of various agencies in order to deal with an emergency.
 
The Army has enough internal problems without adopting three other branches into the fold to belch on. Even Saddam Hussein's military was distinctly seperated on the grounds of basic mission. Consolidation is self defeating. If it had to happen it would have to be an entirely new unit void of the bad habits of the past.

Im not saying the Army should be the one.
Im saying we could go back to an Army/Navy combo.
It would be costly and difficult, but with the question proposed it would seem the only reasonable answer of any of them.

Personally I think things are fine the way they are.
 
A marine is like any other service member, except with balls....
so says an old friend who was a marine aviator. He said Marines flew much closer to the ground than other aviators...

Say what you will, but it takes balls to jump out of planes the way Army Paratroopers do.
 
I think its an illogical move because each branch is supposed to be a counter if another is stopped

1. Marines (shock troops) - something needed to be destroyed, captured or liberated yesterday

2. Army (ground and pound)

3. Air Force (death from above) - cant go through it, cant go under it, cant go around it so you must bomb it from the sky

4. Navy - when the enemy is dug in too deep its time to unleash the battleships and shell them like their is no tomorrow
 
Say what you will, but it takes balls to jump out of planes the way Army Paratroopers do.

Either having balls or not having brains, either way they are as good as Marines any day....
 
There might be a lot of money saved by combining forces but I think there is another way.

Admiral Rickover once had something to say on the issue of the officer to enlisted ratio. He compared the current ratio to that of our peak fighting strength of WWII.
He showed that we have too many officers performing tasks that enlisteds could do, too many officers sitting at desks given busy work, and too many officers doing even less than busy work....
Something could be said for the total number of service men and women, as well.
Of all the duty stations I served in, sea duty was the only type of duty where we might be short of personnel, and that was because you can only house so many people on a ship. Shore duty tended to be the opposite, too many people for the demands of the job.
 
If we were to consolidate our overall military strength to just one branch, which branch should it be and why?

My apologies for making this a U.S. poll question - feel free to start one that outlines military branches in other countries.

Army, mostly because I was in the army. I feel that at least the military ranks in general should be streamlined. Ranks in one branch are not the same as another another branch. For example a caption in the army is a o-3 while a capitain in the nay is a o-6 while in the army a O-6 is a Colonel while a sergeant in the army is a E-5 and and sergeant in the airforce is a E-4.
 
I think we agree on the use of a different strategy, where the boots are playing beat cop immediately after Baghdad fell. My difference with your statement is I don't think we needed MORE boots on the ground. I think the strategy change with the numbers we had committed would have been enough to effectively fight the insurgency and build local security forces to end the looting. I think we agree that we would be facing an insurgency, no matter what. But we didn't need more boots. At the height of the active insurgency/civil war we only needed 50,000 extra boots with the strategy change. Anbar Awakening helped of course.

I do think the looting would have happened no matter what and no matter how many boots we had on the ground. To many locations to protect and we didn't know which would get hit. Looting is evidently some sort of tradition over there and much of it was coordinated.

I would love to read such a post, if you have the time and energy to write one. Note that I think disbanding the Iraqi Army was necessary.

I emboldened the original sin. You never go in with "just enough." Did we invade Normandy with "just enough" as the wealth of our manpower sat elsewhere entirely useless? As it was, our lack of numbers facilitated the unnecessary future unrest. Not only that, but we were constantly wrapping around our own flanks because their was a lack of numbers to place as protection. It was only thanks to the professionalism of our military that Rumsfeld's "No Plan" wasn't a disaster. Army supply convoys would not have had to pretend to be soldiers (Jessica Lynch) had our numbers been what they should have been.

1) PLAN. The original plan had been developed since 1991. The living CENTCOM plan had been a working document that dealt with strategic locations, social disparities, and historical significances. It respected the invasion and the occupation. However, as General Zinni reports, the Rumsfeld coven decided to tell Congress that this military engineered plan was "old and stale." Instead, a room full of civilians with absolutely no military experience designed what was to be the "No Plan." In order to sell the invasion, troop numbers had to be lower, the price was going to be cheap, and promises of the Age of Aquarius in Baghdad as soon as the regime was toppled was delivered. In other words, the CENTCOM plan brought up to many probablilities that would make selling the war too difficult. CENTCOM planned for the worst, while Rumsfeld chose to plan for the best.

2) NUMBERS. There is no such thing as "just enough." If troops are deployed in sufficient numbers at the start of an occupation, it may be possible to draw them down in a matter of months. But stingy deployments that attempt to hold down the political costs at home guarantee that the enemy will not experience an enduring sense of defeat. It was decided by Washington that bypassing entire cities on the way to Baghdad would be best because it would save civilian lives and prevent the media their orgy of blood. However, the result of this was that great parts of the country never even saw an American tank or an American boot. They never felt defeated. The future bases for the insurgency came out of these cities and militias were formed around organized former Hussein loyalists. In the end, Washington sent more troops anyway. No enemy has ever been defeated before they felt defeated. How necessary would a surge have been if the numbers were there to begin with?

3) RULE OF LAW. This means immediate martial law. Washington politics were absolutely petrified of the prospect because martial law may have appeared inhumane and anti-civil rights. However, did anybody consider how inhumane it was to watch them slaughter each other as pockets of Iraq oppressed their own into submission where American boots were absent? Would itnot have been far more humane to gradually loosen martial law as organization appeared instead of giving the cities to terror? We lost our credibility in Baghdad almost immediately. None of them expected the greatest military in history and the greatest force for good to tolerate the looting and arson spree by criminal elements. We alienated the law-abiding citizens and spent the next 5 years gaining back respect and trust. Of course, we didn't have the numbers to stop any of it in the first place since we went in with "just enough."

4) CONTRACTORS. Our politicians were quick to point out the looting of the locals on their own cities, but absolutely criminal as they ignored the looting orgy of American contractors. Cheney lavished Iraq with innapropriate contracts. And he merely celebrated the Clinton vision of privatizing our military on every level. When people criticize Iraq because of the cost, this is where they should focus. It would have cost far less to employ Iraqis to fix the systems they knew better than anybody. It would have also employed countless youth who had nothing better to do than to join the local militia or insurgency. And how less likely is it that people will blow up whet they themselves fix or build? The local Sheikh should have been tasked to fix his water system with enough money to offer payroll to his people.

5) AUTHORITY. Instead of waiting 3 years to recognize that local leadership should have been designated instead of foregoing this important step because we were entirely focused on who the leaders were to be on the national level, we should have tapped into the Sheikhs as soon as possible. Without our recognition, they formed their own local securities (militias) that worked against our efforts. Without our immediate respect, they leaned towards those who at least pretended to offer it, Al-Queda. We would spend years developing a way to earn back their trust and as it stood it was mostly due to Al-Queda's ruthlessness to murder other Muslims that made it happen. Eventually, Al-Queda made us the good guys. Disbanding the Iraqi military was a must (as you agree) because the larger Shia population would not feel the change with the same old brutes and Al-Queda would have had a far easier time establishing themselves under a majority Sunni military. This was a necessary pain in the ass, but immediate re-forming of security forces came far too late (not enough trainers). Many of the disbanded merely sought the closest militia

6) BEAT COP. Without numbers, the Army was largely confined to bigger "cities" and all Iraqi civilian leadership was preached from within the protected Green Zone. And though the Marine Corps was strategically located throughout the Wild West all the way towards the Syrian border, there wasn't enough numbers to constantly be in every village or town. These were towns and villages used by Al-Queda and the insurgency to launch attacks that hadn't even seen an American boot until 2006 or the surge. Without the beat cops, neighborhoods were in the hands of the gangs and their law. The second Baghdad fell, we should have been in mulitple position to walk the beat, which means that they should have crossed the Kuwaiti border with or right behind the assault. Of course, this means that the assault would have had to go through the larger cities before occupiers rolled right in.

7) FIGHT. Too many times were out military actions confined to the political mood of Washington. Washington wanted us liked rather than feared and occupying a hostile foreign land must come from having defeated a people's will to fight. Resistance had to be crushed immediately. As it were, the bleeding hearts and an election year managed to convince the Bush administration that Fallujah wasn't worth it. After leaving Fallujah, the few Al-Queda agents and insurgents remaining managed to turn it into the terrorist capital of the world. IED factories were organized and the placegot flooded with our enemies from where to launch attacks. Of course, directly after the 2004 Presidential election the word was given to finish Fallujah (II). In order to beat the news cameras, the Marines rushed through and the death toll was high and the city was wrecked. It was the media, the average bleeding heart, and our politicians that facilitated the existence of Fallujah II. The toll in casualities and human rights would have been far lower in the end than what it was and we would have gained more respect.

8) DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE. This is a lesson we had already learned via Vietnam, but refused to heed. We didn't fight the Vietcong once. We fought him 9 separate times. Everytime 12 month veterans left, they were replaced with "green" troops who had to spend months learning lessons that had already been learned. But that was a draft war. We had no excuse come 2003. In a grand display of "supporting the troop" we told him that he wouldn't have to stay in Iraq for a prolonged period of time. We appeased mothers of America and told him that instead of fighting this war fora couple or three years, that he would merely have to disrupt his family repeatedly and deploy numerously. In the mean time, every six months or fourteen months, "green" troops and even veterans had to relearn an ever changing Iraq and tactics as the enemy changed annually.

The "Lessons Learned" in the Army and Marine Corps circuit all generally agree with the basics. Former intel officers and cultural experts also come to the same basic conclusions. We did not flood Germany or Japan with American contractors. We did not send the "bare minimum" of troops to accomplish a mission. We did not fight in accordance to the mood of reporters and political idealogues. We did not toss out military plans so that non-military civilians could have a chance to prove a radical theory of new war. We facilitated much of the blood shed and the struggle before we even left Kuwait. People complain that Iraq shouldn't have happened because it was soveriegn and cost too much. And of course, Bush's WMD angle left them with narrow vision and shallow excuses. After 10 years of starving out Iraqis and bombing them under a UN mission of containment, a man named Osama Bin Laden would use it as an excuse to drop planes on our soil. This deplorable containment mission had to end. But it should not have cost as much and it should not have come with such bloodshed. This is not to suggest that friction between the Sunni and the Shia wouldn't have happened. The reason we maintained Hussein's manucured throne after the Gulf War was out of fear of sectarian violence. Which leads me to absolutely scoff at the criminality of the same individuals who disregarded this inevitability 12 years later by tossing out the CENTCOM plan for theirs. But the highlights above would have gone a long way to ease a lot of the violence. It would have saved a lot of civilian and military lives. Allowed us to maintain respect in the eyes of the world. And allowed us to put this war behind us years ago. It all goes back to a need for more numbers right from the start.

Civilian mismanagement cost us respect, treasure, and blood. Can you imagine our White House with a lesser military to carry their safety nets?
 
Army, mostly because I was in the army. I feel that at least the military ranks in general should be streamlined. Ranks in one branch are not the same as another another branch. For example a caption in the army is a o-3 while a capitain in the nay is a o-6 while in the army a O-6 is a Colonel while a sergeant in the army is a E-5 and and sergeant in the airforce is a E-4.

E-4 is "Senior Airman" in the Airforce... not Sergeant.

My wife was an E-4 in the Airforce when she got out....

E-5 is in Air Force is a "Staff Sergeant"
 
I'm glad to have someone of expertise to discuss this with.

I was recently chatting with two friends (both former Marines), and we were talking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (one served there, one was out of the service before it started, but was in First Gulf War) and we were actually thinking the other way. That further division would be better.

It was based on this. The overthrow of the Taliban and Saddam's regime were relatively simple compared to what followed. I suggested (and my father was Navy, so I'm familiar - but I didn't personally serve and probably couldn't have even if I wanted to) that we create a "Peace Force" and an "Anti-Insurgency Force" (you can call them what you like).

The "Peace Force" would be armed but would focus primarily on recovery of the occupied nation, but would be able to respond defensively to attack. The Anti-Insurgency Force would be a fast, mobile force that would squelch and hold regions in turmoil until the "Peace Force" would come in once security is established.

The reasoning behind this is that the invading force (the current branches) are trained to kill the enemy, which require a degree of dehumanization of the enemy. I think, psychologically, it would be very difficult with the absence of uniforms (and that's going to be just about any conflict we face from here on out) to think one way and then turn on a dime and try to win over hearts and minds once the enemy government is toppled.

Thoughts?

This is a trap. Washington analysts and Army tacticians tend to make the same mistake. After every war, they tend to seek to re-organize the doctrinal military into something that is best for the last war. The Army spent an entire Cold War basing its military on the World War II model despite the Vietnams and the Beiruts. Throughout the 90s, the Army was focused on maintaining a military that can fight the Gulf Wars despite the Somalias, Haitis, Bosnias, and so on. When Iraq came around, the Marine Corps was chosen to lead the fight for a reason. It has a history of looking towards the next war and had been preparing for the urban people war of Iraq since Somalia.

The lesson here is that we have the tendency to prepare to fight the last war. The Iraqs are the future. We saw this with Somalia. No one is ballsy enough to face us in the open desert where collateral damage can't be used against us. The Army has recognized this finally. They have been experimenting with numbers over the last few years andhave been seeking ways to maintain a "big box" Army that is also capable of dealing with COIN and smaller wars. In other words, we have to become even more flexible than we already are. Fine tuning down to a "peace force" or an "anti-insurgency force" and so on cuffs us to strict focus. It's kind of a step backwards. The same Marine or soldier has to be able to feed Somalis, fight warlords, deal with insurgencies, topple dictators, rescue quake victims, referee genocides, perform crowd control, etc. Soldiers and Marines were thrown all over the world during the 90s into situations they were ill equipped and untrained for. They had to learn the hard way by being tossed into the fire. The Cold War was over and our thinkers were clueless as to what was next. They merely relied on a military, which was trained for the Cold War, to cover their for their inadequcies at diplomacy, by dropping it into one humanitarian mission or police action after another.

The same military that invaded Germany occupied Germany with success. They managed to do this because Germans were, and even more importantly felt, defeated. That was the mistake of Iraq. Not that our military couldn't switch from aggressor to occupier, but that they never felt defeated. No occupation can be successful if there is no base of control. As for dehumanizing the enemy, this has to do with proper education. Killing your enemy has nothing to do wtih dehumanizing anything. Ever been in a fist fight? Did you actually dehumanize him? See him less than human? Army National Guard Reservists in Abu-Ghraib dehumanized people, not an enemy. That band of unprofessional misfits had nothing to do with fighting anything.

On the professional level, many of our soldiers and Marines spent years not able to identify what our enemy was. Some still can't. All of our enemy is Muslim, yet the vast majority of Muslims are not our enemy.


And I just want to say I've really appreciated most all of what you've posted - even if occasionally (though not often), we've disagreed.

Well, I tend to work my way into have very bold opinions.
 
When you attack a country that has severe internal problems to start with, you don't take out their military or police. Those must remain in place to keep the peace once the initial fight is over.

Nothing tells a people that you are there to help them than telling them that the organized band of torturers and rapists in their town are still in charge.


You just use smart bombs and cruise missles to take out their ability to wage war with anything larger than hand held weapons. That way they are at a minimum threat to us.
Then, meet with the military leaders and have them "govern" until a civilian govt can be formed, if that is even necessary.

Boots on the ground are just targets, especially in places like the middle east. They may hate each other, but one thing they will have in common, they hate occupiers more.

This is a variation of Cold War prescription that is long dead. Instead of dropping in a handy dandy dictator to do our bidding we just turn to bombing them out and crossing our fingers? If the goal is regime change for the positive, boots on the ground is a demand. Otherwise we simply continue the cycle. After European colonialism and Cold War dictator support, a temporary occupation to place them on the path they want is necessary. Of course, I don't condone "nation building" across the world, but we made Iraq our business the moment we surrendered total victory during the Gulf War.

Suggesting that boots on the gound are mere targets is near sighted and extremely Washingtonian. Rumsfeld felt that technology alone would win our future wars. This is why he insisted that "Shock and Awe" would pave the path to the bare minimum of troops waltzing into Baghdad to a surrendering crowd and that democracy was merely a magical speech away. Iraq proved that after thousands of years of warfare across the globe, its nature can't be changed. Rumsfeld was wrong. It was the lack of boots on the ground that emboldened an enemy that convinced itself that it could win. Too many Iraqi civilians and our own military personnel gave their lives to prove this ideology wrong. Without a saturation of boots on the ground, they never felt defeated. Their will to fight was never threatened.
 
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Army, mostly because I was in the army. I feel that at least the military ranks in general should be streamlined. Ranks in one branch are not the same as another another branch. For example a caption in the army is a o-3 while a capitain in the nay is a o-6 while in the army a O-6 is a Colonel while a sergeant in the army is a E-5 and and sergeant in the airforce is a E-4.

While a Captain in the Army may be an O-3 and a Captain in the Navy is an O-6, an O-6 Navy Captain has about the same skills and amount of experience as an O-6 Army Colonel, even if it may be in different areas.

The name of the rank means very little. The level of the rank (O-1, O-2, O-3, etc.) is what's important.
 
A marine is like any other service member, except with balls....
so says an old friend who was a marine aviator. He said Marines flew much closer to the ground than other aviators...

This actually has everything to do with branch specializations. Marine aviators basically exist to support ground troops, therefore, they train to close proximity. Navy aviators train to support ground troops as well as dog fighting so their training leaves them with a less focus where Marine aviators cover. Of course, in terms of helicopter support, the Army Apache and the Marine Cobra were busy crossing branch lines to support ground troops all over.

The Air Force still has a job as unit level troop and equipment transportation and still has the lead as far as scorching the earth beyond what we get from the close air support. But basically they are clinging to a job since the end of the Cold War.
 
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The Air Force still has a job as unit level and equipment transportation and still has the lead as far as scorching the earth when needed. But basically clinging to a job since the end of the Cold War.

They should never have gotten to be A-10 aviators. Those should have been Marine and Army aviators providing XCAS missions IMO.
 
The Air Force still has a job as unit level and equipment transportation and still has the lead as far as scorching the earth when needed. But basically clinging to a job since the end of the Cold War.

They should never have gotten to be A-10 aviators. Those should have been Marine and Army aviators providing XCAS missions IMO.
 
Army, mostly because I was in the army. I feel that at least the military ranks in general should be streamlined. Ranks in one branch are not the same as another another branch. For example a caption in the army is a o-3 while a capitain in the nay is a o-6 while in the army a O-6 is a Colonel while a sergeant in the army is a E-5 and and sergeant in the airforce is a E-4.

There are traditional reasons for this. The term "captain" means a different level of responsibility between ground forces and ship forces.
 
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