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What should we do in Afghanistan?

What should we do in Afghanistan?

  • Sit tight with 68,000 troops in theater

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Increase troops by 40,000

    Votes: 7 38.9%

  • Increase troops by 30,000

    Votes: 1 5.6%

  • Increase troops by 20,000

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Increase troops by 10,000

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Decrease troops by 34,000

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Get out.

    Votes: 10 55.6%
  • Total voters
    18
teamosil said:
You'll need to give me a bit more of a description. What's the spin of the book?
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Sure, from the web site for the book, here is the Publishers Weekly review:
Barnett, professor at the U.S. Naval War College, takes a global perspective that integrates political, economic and military elements in a model for the postâ€"September 11 world. Barnett argues that terrorism and globalization have combined to end the great-power model of war that has developed over 400 years, since the Thirty Years War. Instead, he divides the world along binary lines. An increasingly expanding "Functioning Core" of economically developed, politically stable states integrated into global systems is juxtaposed to a "Non-Integrating Gap," the most likely source of threats to U.S. and international security. The "gap" incorporates Andean South America, the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and much of southwest Asia. According to Barnett, these regions are dangerous because they are not yet integrated into globalism's "core." Until that process is complete, they will continue to lash out. Barnett calls for a division of the U.S. armed forces into two separate parts. One will be a quick-strike military, focused on suppressing hostile governments and nongovernment entities. The other will be administratively oriented and assume responsibility for facilitating the transition of "gap" systems into the "core." Barnett takes pains to deny that implementing the new policy will establish America either as a global policeman or an imperial power. Instead, he says the policy reflects that the U.S. is the source of, and model for, globalization. We cannot, he argues, abandon our creation without risking chaos. Barnett writes well, and one of the book's most compelling aspects is its description of the negotiating, infighting and backbiting required to get a hearing for unconventional ideas in the national security establishment. Unfortunately, marketing the concepts generates a certain tunnel vision. In particular, Barnett, like his intellectual models Thomas Friedman and Francis Fukuyama, tends to accept the universality of rational-actor models constructed on Western lines. There is little room in Barnett's structures for the apocalyptic religious enthusiasm that has been contemporary terrorism's driving wheel and that to date has been indifferent to economic and political factors. That makes his analytical structure incomplete and more useful as an intellectual exercise than as the guide to policy described in the book's promotional literature.
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teamosil said:
What I would do in both Iraq and Afganistan would be to add on two objectives- reconstruction and winning the hearts and minds.
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In Iraq, I think we have. We played our cards "all in". And reconstruction wise, well, let's just say as a very low-ranking officer, I was walking around Mosul with $50K in my cargo pocket paying out projects. We've given Iraqis reconstruction money; believe me. Just in my lowly little area of operations, I paid out hundreds of thousands for new schools, clinics, city council buildings, police stations, fire stations, etc. You name it. IN Baghdad, they got a lot more and spent a lot more. We've done a lot for the Iraqis. Not sure about AFG.

We give both of those lip service, but no real steps towards achieving them. To really reconstruct the countries means hundreds of billions of dollars in construction projects.
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The money isn't the issue. It's getting the civilians to theater. The military can't do it all. In Iraq, we didn't have as big of a problem. It appears that the civilian corps is less willing to come to AFG.
 
I vote we get out. Then after we leave we dust the poppy fields with radioactive fallout.
 
teamosil said:
I think we should increase troop levels with a major caveat. We should set up an intensive program to teach the Arabic. Maybe increase by 30k, but send 10k of them to a language camp for the first 6 months, then rotate them in and rotate another 10k troops out of the conflict into the language camp, and continue on with that until we have a large portion of the troops over there speaking the language. Also, I wouldn't give them any more troops until they come up with a clear plan for how we are going to get the country rebuilt asap. I'd do the same thing with Iraq. I'd rather spend twice as much to support actually rebuilding the infrastructure and get out in half the time than stick around militarily waiting for those buildings to rebuild themselves.
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This would be a very effective strategy. The military should standardize Pashtu for anyone deploying to Afghanistan.
 
Kansas,

It's not hard to acquire a working knowledge of any language, really. I learned Arabic fairly well in my seven month build up, and I was half-assing it; I picked up twice as much in Iraq simply by practicing the language.

If infantry units were forced to take language classes seriously they would walk away with a priceless tool.
 
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What should we do in Afghanistan?
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We should decimate the enemy and facilitate the creation of a functional government.
 
Ethereal said:
Kansas,

It's not hard to acquire a working knowledge of any language, really. I learned Arabic fairly well in my seven month build up, and I was half-assing it; I picked up twice as much in Iraq simply by practicing the language.

If infantry units were forced to take language classes seriously they would walk away with a priceless tool.
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I agree. We tried this at my battalion prior to deployment. It was hard to get the companies to give guys up to go to class. But I guess if it was mandatory, then it would be easier. We had a heck of a time getting an instructor, but we found one. Arabic instructors are easier to find; Pashto, Dari, probably not.

Just know that battalions have a lot on their plate in regards to pre-deployment training. Although I agree that HN language is vital, the Army doesn't apparently see it that way.

My train up was only six weeks and after living with the IA for a few months, I was good enough not to need a terp most of the time.

This isn't about WHAT we should do, it's about being realistic about it getting done. All the troops going through language training...sounds great. Actually doing it? A lot harder.
 
It doesn't take long to to learn how to say, "put your weapons down, or I'll blow your ****ing head off", in several different dialects.
 
apdst said:
It doesn't take long to to learn how to say, "put your weapons down, or I'll blow your ****ing head off", in several different dialects.
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Ha! If only it was that easy...
 
reefedjib said:
Keeping in mind the consequences of pulling out, yet having to deal with a corrupt government in Kabul if we stay, plus the ever present sanctuary in Pakistan, what should we do?
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Increase the troops to what ever is necessary. Leaving before the job is done basically means the lives of the troops and civilians who died would have been wasted for nothing.
 
since the US has wasted so much over the years of this (whatever it is). you now find that at least some of the Taliban will be back in power. i guess i can say that it turned out to be a waste of time as i have said from the beginning. maybe you could all chip in and buy a banner saying mission SNAFU. it seems fitting.

on a banner saying NOTHING ACCOMPLISHED. lol
 
apdst said:
It is, unless we complicate things with bull****. Remember, KISS. Learn it, know it, live it.
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Funny you mention that. The very "bull****" that you despise is exactly what the proposed 40K troop surge (which you advocate) will invoke...true COIN doctrine which is opposite of a heavy-handed approach.

So which is it? More "bull****" in AFG or not?

I'm confused by your stance on AFG.
 
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