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Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?[W:296, 650]

Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?


  • Total voters
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I heard someone make the argument that Obama doesn't believe the US has any rightful role in preventing or hindering Iran from developing and maintaining nuclear weapons. I don't know that that's true, and nobody but the President can answer to what he believes, so I'll ask what you believe. If Iran has the ability, does it have the "right" to nuclear weapons? (By "right", I mean the U.S. and other nations would not be unjustified in trying to prevent it.)

working on the poll
no, I don't believe they do. They have proven to be a problem to much of the world. And since we can go take them away, we absolutely should, no clearly theyonly have what they are permitted by the world.
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

Simpleχity;1064455366 said:
Any brokered deal must assure that the IAEA has unfettered access to all Iranian nuclear-related documents, data, and facilities. All IAEA inspection requests must also be immediately accommodated.

Agreed. We've been told that they will have historically unprecedented rigorous inspection verifications and monitoring.
Iran has nixed snap-inspections already...

Iran says no snap inspections of nuclear sites
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

Their deaths saved millions more. It was a good trade.

An immoral one. Showing lack of a moral code. And as noted, your assumption is also disputed.
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

The only "credible" historians are those that argue the justification of using nuclear weapons on civilian targets. Most likely somebody else will be justifying there use as well someday.

I keep forgetting.
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

That was war then. Total war and destruction. From what I recall more civilians died in WW2 than soldiers.

I'm sure that could be true, but doesn't make it moral or right, or even necessary.
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

I'm sure that could be true, but doesn't make it moral or right, or even necessary.
From both sides bombing cities to rubble to Japan being decimated with bombing.
Okinawa proved the point of high causalities if a land invasion of Japan was needed.
Many say the Japanese were ready to surrender. I disagree, they would have fought to the death for their Emperor.
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

I think the world should do what they can to prevent Iran from obtaining nukes. But does that mean they don't have the "right" to have them? Not at all.

Who is the Chairman of the Board who gets to decide who has the "right" to have nukes?

What gives America or Israel the "right" to have nukes? Or anyone for that matter?

I certainly understand Iran's DESIRE to have Nukes. A mean, let's face it. Iran's #1 and #2 enemy has nukes pointed their direction. If our enemies do not have "rights" to nukes, why should we? I mean, in the history of the world, nukes have only been dropped twice on a population if memory serves me correctly. And we did it both times. From an objective standpoint, we, technically, do not have any moral high ground to stand on. What gives us the "right" to determine who has the "right" to have nukes?

I will say this though. If we take the position that Iran should not have nukes, we should take the same position with Israel. But do we? I think not.
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

Who is the Chairman of the Board who gets to decide who has the "right" to have nukes?

What gives America or Israel the "right" to have nukes? Or anyone for that matter?

That is a good point. There is no one to determine whether they have to right to do it. So they have the right to do it.
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

Oh for crying out loud, you're a mess. Stop worrying about Iran.
I'm not "worrying about Iran" you silly boy__I'm addressing the subject of the thread; duh! :giggle1:

Pay attention to the fact that America is sinking. Do you think I read all that **** you typed, pff!
Yes; as a matter of fact I do normally assume that my post has been read anytime someone clicks Reply With Quote as a prerequisite to a response_

How else could anyone possibly hope to formulate a sensible rational reply?!

And the post in question is not exactly the Encyclopedia Britannica, Monty_

Anyone of average intelligence could digest its contents in a couple minutes; tops!

I'm beginning to suspect that the only arguments you have for your positions are 'noisy rants'! :2mad:

This would explain your lack of interest in reading the opinions of ideopolitical adversaries!

Have a nice day Monty__Empi~
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

I think the world should do what they can to prevent Iran from obtaining nukes. But does that mean they don't have the "right" to have them? Not at all.

Who is the Chairman of the Board who gets to decide who has the "right" to have nukes?

What gives America or Israel the "right" to have nukes? Or anyone for that matter?

I certainly understand Iran's DESIRE to have Nukes.
A mean, let's face it. Iran's #1 and #2 enemy has nukes pointed their direction. If our enemies do not have "rights" to nukes, why should we? I mean, in the history of the world, nukes have only been dropped twice on a population if memory serves me correctly. And we did it both times. From an objective standpoint, we, technically, do not have any moral high ground to stand on. What gives us the "right" to determine who has the "right" to have nukes?

I will say this though. If we take the position that Iran should not have nukes, we should take the same position with Israel. But do we? I think not.
You seriously don't know what gives the U.S. the right to forbid a nation access to a nuke?!

Prepare to be enlightened oh one of simple mind:

1st off; "nuke-regulating" in a violent world is a very expensive/thankless/dirty job that absolutely must be done!

And the United States is the big kid on the block and thankfully for the world it is also the good guy!

It is considered the "good guy" because, despite its enormous wealth and power, it has never shown the slightest inclination for world domination_

And it is also known as a nation to have strived throughout its history to improve the quality of life and human rights of all people; for which it has been tremendously successful as it continues to work towards that end!

Its goodness and greatness is also obvious by the fact that those that share these qualities consider the United States a friend but those known for hate, oppression, terrorism, and a desire for world domination all consider it to be an enemy!
(I'm sure mommy told you all about being judged by your friends)

The anti-nuclear proliferation policies of the United States are a selfless endeavor for all the world's benefit!

And "all the world's benefit" especially pertains to common everyday people living in nations forbidden the bomb!
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

An immoral one. Showing lack of a moral code. And as noted, your assumption is also disputed.

Let me know when you find a historian making that argument after 2010.
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

Moderator's Warning:
Folks, this thread has a specific topic. I'd suggest people get focused on it

Oh listen to you barking orders from the high horse of your powerful position as Global Moderator!

While we the foot soldiers of the American Dream, wade through the filth and muck of liberaldom!

You know nothing of the struggle of good-vs-evil down here in the dirty trenches of DebatePolitics!

Ooups; sorry Zyppy :giggle1: guess I'm justa slave to my urges__I swear; I can't take myself anywhere!


Hey; at least ya gotcha warning bumped! :neener X&O Empi~
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

From both sides bombing cities to rubble to Japan being decimated with bombing.
Okinawa proved the point of high causalities if a land invasion of Japan was needed.
Many say the Japanese were ready to surrender. I disagree, they would have fought to the death for their Emperor.

Dresden was wrong because ti was against civilians and not military. What the Germans did was wrong for the same reason. And so was dropping the bomb. Because we did it and / or they did it, doesn't make wrong right. And speculation doesn't justify it either, even if that speculation was correct. That war saw a lot of evil all around, and it is important that we call evil what it is, evil.
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

Let me know when you find a historian making that argument after 2010.

Wednesday 9th July 2014

Roy, 29, from Belgium, has a master's degree in the history of the Catholic Church; an advanced master's degree on the historical expansion, exchange and globalisation of the world, . . .

Roy: No, the US wasn’t justified. Even secretary of war Henry Lewis Stimson was not sure the bombs were needed to reduce the need of an invasion: “Japan had no allies; its navy was almost destroyed; its islands were under a naval blockade; and its cities were undergoing concentrated air attacks.”

The United States still had many industrial resources to use against Japan, and thus it was essentially defeated. Rear Admiral Toc****ane Takata concurred that B-29s “were the greatest single factor in forcing Japan's surrender”, while Prince Konoye already thought Japan was defeated on 14 February 1945 when he met emperor Hirohito.

A combination of thoroughly bombing blockading cities that were economically dependent on foreign sources for food and raw materials, and the threat of Soviet entry in the war, would have been enough.

http://www.historyextra.com/feature...ic-bombs-hiroshima-and-nagasaki-during-second

August 7, 2011

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa - a highly respected historian at the University of California, Santa Barbara - has marshaled compelling evidence that it was the Soviet entry into the Pacific conflict, not Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that forced Japan’s surrender. His interpretation could force a new accounting of the moral meaning of the atomic attack.

Why did Japan surrender? - The Boston Globe

May 30, 2013

Despite the existence of these three powerful objections, the traditional interpretation still retains a strong hold on many people’s thinking, particularly in the United States. There is real resistance to looking at the facts. But perhaps this should not be surprising. It is worth reminding ourselves how emotionally convenient the traditional explanation of Hiroshima is — both for Japan and the United States.

The Bomb Didn’t Beat Japan… Stalin Did | Foreign Policy
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

Wednesday 9th July 2014

Roy, 29, from Belgium, has a master's degree in the history of the Catholic Church; an advanced master's degree on the historical expansion, exchange and globalisation of the world, . . .

Roy: No, the US wasn’t justified. Even secretary of war Henry Lewis Stimson was not sure the bombs were needed to reduce the need of an invasion: “Japan had no allies; its navy was almost destroyed; its islands were under a naval blockade; and its cities were undergoing concentrated air attacks.”

The United States still had many industrial resources to use against Japan, and thus it was essentially defeated. Rear Admiral Toc****ane Takata concurred that B-29s “were the greatest single factor in forcing Japan's surrender”, while Prince Konoye already thought Japan was defeated on 14 February 1945 when he met emperor Hirohito.

A combination of thoroughly bombing blockading cities that were economically dependent on foreign sources for food and raw materials, and the threat of Soviet entry in the war, would have been enough.

Was the US justified in dropping atomic bombs on Japan's Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War? You debate | History Extra

August 7, 2011

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa - a highly respected historian at the University of California, Santa Barbara - has marshaled compelling evidence that it was the Soviet entry into the Pacific conflict, not Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that forced Japan’s surrender. His interpretation could force a new accounting of the moral meaning of the atomic attack.

Why did Japan surrender? - The Boston Globe

May 30, 2013

Despite the existence of these three powerful objections, the traditional interpretation still retains a strong hold on many people’s thinking, particularly in the United States. There is real resistance to looking at the facts. But perhaps this should not be surprising. It is worth reminding ourselves how emotionally convenient the traditional explanation of Hiroshima is — both for Japan and the United States.

The Bomb Didn’t Beat Japan… Stalin Did | Foreign Policy

Roy is simply an interested layman. His testimony doesn't matter. Your second link at least cited prominent historians, but it avoids discussion of Giangreco's work altogether -- not impressive. And it includes this:
". . . . But therein lies the weakness of the Hasegawa interpretation as well, Bernstein says. After a long war and in the space of a few days, the Japanese leadership was hit with two extraordinary events - Hiroshima and the Soviet invasion - and sorting out cause and effect, based on incomplete documentation, may prove impossible.


“When you look through all the evidence, I think it is hard to weigh one or the other more heavily,” Bernstein said. “The analysis is well intentioned, but more fine-grained than the evidence comfortably allows.”. . . ."

Your third link is inaccessible. The challenge stands: Produce a post-2010 refutation of Giangreco.
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

Roy is simply an interested layman. His testimony doesn't matter. Your second link at least cited prominent historians, but it avoids discussion of Giangreco's work altogether -- not impressive. And it includes this:
". . . . But therein lies the weakness of the Hasegawa interpretation as well, Bernstein says. After a long war and in the space of a few days, the Japanese leadership was hit with two extraordinary events - Hiroshima and the Soviet invasion - and sorting out cause and effect, based on incomplete documentation, may prove impossible.


“When you look through all the evidence, I think it is hard to weigh one or the other more heavily,” Bernstein said. “The analysis is well intentioned, but more fine-grained than the evidence comfortably allows.”. . . ."

Your third link is inaccessible. The challenge stands: Produce a post-2010 refutation of Giangreco.

But you miss the point, while you put high value on documents, there are many then and now who believed the estimates were wrong. That is wasn't necessary.

Consider that part A of the argument.

Part B is that killing civilians for political gain is terrorism by definition. We all seem to agree terrorism is wrong. Killing civilians in this manner is morally wrong, be it by Germans, Brits, Al Qeada or the US. These doesn't mean one is the other and alike in all things, but that an immoral act is an immoral act. And this was an immoral act.
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

But you miss the point, while you put high value on documents, there are many then and now who believed the estimates were wrong. That is wasn't necessary.

Consider that part A of the argument.

Part B is that killing civilians for political gain is terrorism by definition. We all seem to agree terrorism is wrong. Killing civilians in this manner is morally wrong, be it by Germans, Brits, Al Qeada or the US. These doesn't mean one is the other and alike in all things, but that an immoral act is an immoral act. And this was an immoral act.

It would be nice if that were universally acknowledged. There are more people today that acknowledge it than there use to be, and that's due in part to the advancements made in access to information. We use to have to wait forty years to find out the dirt, long after the culpable are dead and gone. Now, things are leaking in real time!!!!
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

But you miss the point, while you put high value on documents, there are many then and now who believed the estimates were wrong. That is wasn't necessary.

Consider that part A of the argument.

Part B is that killing civilians for political gain is terrorism by definition. We all seem to agree terrorism is wrong. Killing civilians in this manner is morally wrong, be it by Germans, Brits, Al Qeada or the US. These doesn't mean one is the other and alike in all things, but that an immoral act is an immoral act. And this was an immoral act.

One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. There is no universal standard regarding the killing of civilians in war.

The documents that are the foundation of Giangreco's argument were unavailable or overlooked before his work. It is likely the historians you cited never saw them until he referenced them.
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

Iran doesn't have a "right" to nuclear weapons. However, it sure as hell can call a lot of countries on their bull**** from now on when it comes to them. Including: The US, Britain, France and Israel.
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

Wednesday 9th July 2014

Roy, 29, from Belgium, has a master's degree in the history of the Catholic Church; an advanced master's degree on the historical expansion, exchange and globalisation of the world, . . .

Roy: No, the US wasn’t justified. Even secretary of war Henry Lewis Stimson was not sure the bombs were needed to reduce the need of an invasion: “Japan had no allies; its navy was almost destroyed; its islands were under a naval blockade; and its cities were undergoing concentrated air attacks.”

The United States still had many industrial resources to use against Japan, and thus it was essentially defeated. Rear Admiral Toc****ane Takata concurred that B-29s “were the greatest single factor in forcing Japan's surrender”, while Prince Konoye already thought Japan was defeated on 14 February 1945 when he met emperor Hirohito.

A combination of thoroughly bombing blockading cities that were economically dependent on foreign sources for food and raw materials, and the threat of Soviet entry in the war, would have been enough.

Was the US justified in dropping atomic bombs on Japan's Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War? You debate | History Extra

August 7, 2011

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa - a highly respected historian at the University of California, Santa Barbara - has marshaled compelling evidence that it was the Soviet entry into the Pacific conflict, not Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that forced Japan’s surrender. His interpretation could force a new accounting of the moral meaning of the atomic attack.

Why did Japan surrender? - The Boston Globe

May 30, 2013

Despite the existence of these three powerful objections, the traditional interpretation still retains a strong hold on many people’s thinking, particularly in the United States. There is real resistance to looking at the facts. But perhaps this should not be surprising. It is worth reminding ourselves how emotionally convenient the traditional explanation of Hiroshima is — both for Japan and the United States.

The Bomb Didn’t Beat Japan… Stalin Did | Foreign Policy
Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - World War II - HISTORY.com
"Japan, however, vowed to fight to the bitter end in the Pacific, despite clear indications (as early as 1944) that they had little chance of winning. In fact, between mid-April 1945 (when President Harry Truman took office) and mid-July, Japanese forces inflicted Allied casualties totaling nearly half those suffered in three full years of war in the Pacific, proving that Japan had become even more deadly when faced with defeat.

In late July, Japan’s militarist government rejected the Allied demand for surrender
put forth in the Potsdam Declaration, which threatened the Japanese with “prompt and utter destruction” if they refused.

On August 6, 1945, during World War II (1939-45), an American B-29 bomber dropped the world’s first deployed atomic bomb over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. The explosion wiped out 90 percent of the city and immediately killed 80,000 people; tens of thousands more would later die of radiation exposure. Three days later, a second B-29 dropped another A-bomb on Nagasaki, killing an estimated 40,000 people. Japan’s Emperor Hirohito announced his country’s unconditional surrender in World War II in a radio address on August 15, citing the devastating power of “a new and most cruel bomb.”"


What on earth could possibly be more persuasive than these surreal images of the total and utter destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki after a single bomb was detonated 2000 feet over each of them?!

Only a delusional ideologue would suggest that the primary factors for Japan's surrender was something other than the devastating results of Fat Man and Little Boy!
Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombing Picture 7.jpgriobamba-hiroshima.jpg

"General Douglas MacArthur and other top military commanders favored continuing the conventional bombing of Japan already in effect and following up with a massive invasion, codenamed “Operation Downfall.” They advised Truman that such an invasion would result in U.S. casualties of up to 1 million."

And regardless of the horror; the nuclear option was necessary to save an estimated 1 million Allied casualties!
 
Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

The findings of the Strategic Bombing Survey were politically motivated in order to insure greater grants to the USAF and the actual facts prove it to be as such:

Some historians see ancient Japanese warrior traditions as a major factor in the resistance in the Japanese military to the idea of surrender. According to one Air Force account,

"The Japanese code of bushido—'the way of the warrior'—was deeply ingrained. The concept of Yamato-damashii equipped each soldier with a strict code: never be captured, never break down, and never surrender. Surrender was dishonorable. Each soldier was trained to fight to the death and was expected to die before suffering dishonor. Defeated Japanese leaders preferred to take their own lives in the painful samurai ritual of seppuku (called hara kiri in the West). Warriors who surrendered were not deemed worthy of regard or respect."[23]

Japanese militarism was aggravated by the Great Depression, and had resulted in countless assassinations of reformers attempting to check military power, among them Takahashi Korekiyo, Saitō Makoto, and Inukai Tsuyoshi. This created an environment in which opposition to war was a much riskier endeavor.[51]

According to historian Richard B. Frank,

"The intercepts of Japanese Imperial Army and Navy messages disclosed without exception that Japan's armed forces were determined to fight a final Armageddon battle in the homeland against an Allied invasion. The Japanese called this strategy Ketsu Go (Operation Decisive). It was founded on the premise that American morale was brittle and could be shattered by heavy losses in the initial invasion. American politicians would then gladly negotiate an end to the war far more generous than unconditional surrender."[52]

The U.S. Department of Energy's history of the Manhattan Project lends some credence to these claims, saying that military leaders in Japan

"also hoped that if they could hold out until the ground invasion of Japan began, they would be able to inflict so many casualties on the Allies that Japan still might win some sort of negotiated settlement."[53]

While some members of the civilian leadership did use covert diplomatic channels to attempt peace negotiation, they could not negotiate surrender or even a cease-fire. Japan could legally enter into a peace agreement only with the unanimous support of the Japanese cabinet, and in the summer of 1945, the Japanese Supreme War Council, consisting of representatives of the Army, the Navy and the civilian government, could not reach a consensus on how to proceed.[51]

A political stalemate developed between the military and civilian leaders of Japan, the military increasingly determined to fight despite all costs and odds and the civilian leadership seeking a way to negotiate an end to the war. Further complicating the decision was the fact no cabinet could exist without the representative of the Imperial Japanese Army. This meant the Army or Navy could veto any decision by having its Minister resign, thus making them the most powerful posts on the SWC. In early August 1945, the cabinet was equally split between those who advocated an end to the war on one condition, the preservation of the kokutai, and those who insisted on three other conditions:[54]

Leave disarmament and demobilization to Imperial General Headquarters
No occupation of the Japanese Home Islands, Korea, or Formosa
Delegation to the Japanese government of the punishment of war criminals

The "hawks" consisted of General Korechika Anami, General Yoshijirō Umezu, and Admiral Soemu Toyoda and were led by Anami. The "doves" consisted of Prime Minister Kantarō Suzuki, Naval Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigenori Tōgō and were led by Togo.[51] Under special permission of Hirohito, the president of the Privy council, Hiranuma Kiichirō, was also a member of the imperial conference. For him, the preservation of the kokutai implied not only the Imperial institution but also the Emperor's reign.[55]
 

Japan had an example of unconditional surrender in the German Instrument of Surrender. On 26 July, Truman and other allied leaders - except the Soviet Union - issued The Potsdam Declaration outlining terms of surrender for Japan. The declaration stated, "The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." It was not accepted, though there is debate on Japan's intentions.[56] The Emperor, who was waiting for a Soviet reply to Japanese peace feelers, made no move to change the government position.[57] In the PBS documentary "Victory in the Pacific" (2005), broadcast in the "American Experience" series, historian Donald Miller argues, in the days after the declaration, the Emperor seemed more concerned with moving the Imperial Regalia of Japan to a secure location than with "the destruction of his country." This comment is based on declarations made by the Emperor to Kōichi Kido on 25 and 31 July 1945, when he ordered the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of Japan to protect "at all cost" the Imperial Regalia.[58]

It has sometimes been argued Japan would have surrendered if simply guaranteed the Emperor would be allowed to continue as formal head of state. However, Japanese diplomatic messages regarding a possible Soviet mediation—intercepted through Magic, and made available to Allied leaders—have been interpreted by some historians to mean, "the dominant militarists insisted on preservation of the old militaristic order in Japan, the one in which they ruled."[52] On 18 and 20 July 1945, Ambassador Sato cabled to Foreign Minister Togo, strongly advocating that Japan accept an unconditional surrender provided that the U.S. preserved the imperial house (keeping the emperor). On 21 July, in response, Togo rejected the advice, saying that Japan would not accept an unconditional surrender under any circumstance. Togo then said that, "Although it is apparent that there will be more casualties on both sides in case the war is prolonged, we will stand as united against the enemy if the enemy forcibly demands our unconditional surrender."[59][60][61][62][63] They also faced potential death sentences in trials for Japanese war crimes if they surrendered.[64] This was also what occurred in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and other tribunals.

History professor Robert James Maddox wrote:

Another myth that has attained wide attention is that at least several of Truman's top military advisers later informed him that using atomic bombs against Japan would be militarily unnecessary or immoral, or both. There is no persuasive evidence that any of them did so. None of the Joint Chiefs ever made such a claim, although one inventive author has tried to make it appear that Leahy did by braiding together several unrelated passages from the admiral's memoirs. Actually, two days after Hiroshima, Truman told aides that Leahy had 'said up to the last that it wouldn't go off.'
Neither MacArthur nor Nimitz ever communicated to Truman any change of mind about the need for invasion or expressed reservations about using the bombs. When first informed about their imminent use only days before Hiroshima, MacArthur responded with a lecture on the future of atomic warfare and even after Hiroshima strongly recommended that the invasion go forward. Nimitz, from whose jurisdiction the atomic strikes would be launched, was notified in early 1945. 'This sounds fine,' he told the courier, 'but this is only February. Can't we get one sooner?'
The best that can be said about Eisenhower's memory is that it had become flawed by the passage of time.
Notes made by one of Stimson's aides indicate that there was a discussion of atomic bombs, but there is no mention of any protest on Eisenhower's part.[65]
 

Maddox also wrote, "Even after both bombs had fallen and Russia entered the war, Japanese militants insisted on such lenient peace terms that moderates knew there was no sense even transmitting them to the United States. Hirohito had to intervene personally on two occasions during the next few days to induce hardliners to abandon their conditions."[65] "That they would have conceded defeat months earlier, before such calamities struck, is far-fetched to say the least."[66]

Some argue that the fact that after the triple shock of the Soviet intervention and two atomic bombs, the Japanese cabinet was still deadlocked and incapable of deciding upon a course of action is telling both of the power of the Army and naval factions in the cabinet, and of their unwillingness to even consider surrender. Even following the personal intervention of the emperor to break the deadlock in favour of surrender, there were no less than three separate coup attempts by senior Japanese officers to try to prevent the surrender and take the Emperor into 'protective custody'. Once these coup attempts had failed, senior leaders of the air force and Navy ordered bombing and kamikaze raids on the U.S. fleet (in which some Japanese generals personally participated) to try to derail any possibility of peace. It is clear from these accounts that while many in the civilian government knew the war could not be won, the power of the military in the Japanese government kept surrender from even being considered as a real option prior to the two atomic bombs.[67]

Another argument is that it was the Soviet declaration of war in the days between the bombings that caused the surrender. After the war, Admiral Soemu Toyoda said, "I believe the Russian participation in the war against Japan rather than the atom bombs did more to hasten the surrender."[68] Prime Minister Suzuki also declared that the entry of the USSR into the war made "the continuance of the war impossible."[69] Upon hearing news of the event from Foreign Minister Togo, Suzuki immediately said, "Let us end the war", and agreed to finally convene an emergency meeting of the Supreme Council with that aim. The official British history, The War Against Japan, also writes the Soviet declaration of war "brought home to all members of the Supreme Council the realization that the last hope of a negotiated peace had gone and there was no alternative but to accept the Allied terms sooner or later."

The "one condition" faction, led by Togo, seized on the bombing as decisive justification of surrender. Kōichi Kido, one of Emperor Hirohito's closest advisers, stated, "We of the peace party were assisted by the atomic bomb in our endeavor to end the war." Hisatsune Sakomizu, the chief Cabinet secretary in 1945, called the bombing "a golden opportunity given by heaven for Japan to end the war."[70]
“ Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.

Extract from Emperor Hirohito's "Gyokuon-hōsō" surrender speech, August 15, 1945


Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The assertions based on the civilian leaderships wish to surrender are completely irrelevant as the militarists were in firm control and prepared, willing, and planning on carrying out the war to the bitter end.
 
The assertion that the fall of Manchuria which by that time had already been completely cut off from the Japanese home islands, rather than the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki precipitated the surrender of Japan is laughable considering Operation Ketsu-Go:

The intent of Ketsu-Go was to inflict tremendous casualties on the American forces, thereby undermining the American people's will to continue the fight for Japan's unconditional surrender. This intent is clear in a boastful comment made by an IGHQ army staff officer in July 1945:

We will prepare 10,000 planes to meet the landing of the enemy. We will mobilize every aircraft possible, both training and "special attack" planes. We will smash one third of the enemy's war potential with this air force at sea. Another third will also be smashed at sea by our warships, human torpedoes and other special weapons. Furthermore, when the enemy actually lands, if we are ready to sacrifice a million men we will be able to inflict an equal number of casualties upon them. If the enemy loses a million men, then the public opinion in America will become inclined towards peace, and Japan will be able to gain peace with comparatively advantageous conditions.(11)

It is evident by this statement that in the summer of 1945 Japanese strategists identified the will of the American people as the U.S. strategic center of gravity and a critical vulnerability as the infliction of high casualties.(12)


OPERATION KETSU-GO
 
Nobody's reading all that.
 
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