Re: For Veterans and Military personnel only.
The trouble is there were more than two of you, and more than can be found on this site. The fact, and it is a fact, the Awakening happened outside the surge. It was not our plan. CP, and perhaps you, are trying to take credit for someone else's work.
Once again Boo, I will say that I side with CP. Further, I will show you where we executed our doctrine to the T. The surge provided the atmosphere to allow people such as Sheikh Satar to be brave enough to stand up to AQI. If not for the security provided by us, and especially the surge, he would not have been able to do that. Examples of the COIN doctrine are below. This manual was written before the surge, yet, is eerily similar to what happened in Anbar Province.
2-2.
The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful COIN operations. All efforts
focus on supporting the local populace and HN government. Political, social, and economic programs are
usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and
undermining an insurgency. COIN participants come from many backgrounds.
They may include military
personnel, diplomats, police, politicians, humanitarian aid workers, contractors, and local leaders. All must
make decisions and solve problems in a complex and extremely challenging environment.
2-3.
Controlling the level of violence is a key aspect of the struggle. A high level of violence often benefits
insurgents. The societal insecurity that violence brings discourages or precludes nonmilitary organizations,
particularly external agencies, from helping the local populace.
A more benign security environment
allows civilian agencies greater opportunity to provide their resources and expertise. It thereby relieves
military forces of this burden.
2-6. COIN is fought among the populace. Counterinsurgents take upon themselves responsibility for the
people’s well-being in all its manifestations. These include the following:
�� Security from insurgent intimidation and coercion, as well as from nonpolitical violence and
crime.
�� Provision for basic economic needs.
�� Provision of essential services, such as water, electricity, sanitation, and medical care.
�� Sustainment of key social and cultural institutions.
�� Other aspects that contribute to a society’s basic quality of life.
Effective COIN programs address all aspects of the local populace’s concerns in a unified fashion. Insurgents
succeed by maintaining turbulence and highlighting local grievances the COIN effort fails to address.
COIN forces succeed by eliminating turbulence and helping the host nation meet the populace’s basic needs.
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf
I could keep going and going posting portions of this manual. As CP said before, the policy to go into Iraq may have been wrong (I believe it was). But that doesn't mean we should lose too. You seem to be unwilling or unable to differentiate between the two. The surge was lauded by politicians, especially Dems. What I find especially funny is the fact that then Senator Obama railed against the surge yet used one of his own no more than 2 years later.
