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Epistemic Responsibility

VINLO

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Can you have epistemically responsible religious beliefs?

I think we need a new criteria for epistemically responsible beliefs in religion. W.K. Clifford’s overly rigid criteria for responsible belief and William James’ overly permissive criteria for responsible belief leave us no middle ground.

Clifford’s version of epistemic responsibility (“it is wrong always, and, everywhere for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”) is too unyielding an expectation for human beings in a world of uncertainty. While he was right that there is no such thing as a private belief, I do not find it realistic to demand all beliefs (religious or otherwise) be supported by “sufficient” evidence. Who decides what is sufficient and when? In the case of a forced option like religion where the supporting evidence for the spectrum of certainty-driven beliefs (atheism included) all end up being circumstantial at best, agnosticism is the only epistemically responsible option in Clifford’s world.

Unfortunately, we then lose out on the opportunity to access the many benefits that I think only religion can provide.

Meanwhile, James’ Live, Forced, & Momentous criteria allow too much room for personally and socially destructive nonsense like anti-vaxxers and suicide bombers, so that’s not particularly helpful either.

What are we left with?
 
The pomposity around evidence really rears its ugly head here. It's not about evidence vs. no evidence, it's the standard of evidence in question. For most devout religious people, the evidence is generated from faithful witness and observation. This was the tradition for centuries in Europe, reinforced with scripture. You can't just act like what billions of people are doing is not real by waving your hand and dismissing it as non-evidentiary. You don't get out of it that easy, even if the current hegemonic epistemology is that of rationality in some areas, you don't get to pretend it's above subjectification. To me this demonstrates a lack of understanding of what epistemology is, possibly due to a mono-epistemological world view. Something as simple as learning other languages and cultures shows that there is not one way of seeing reality. People who have a multicultural understanding can switch between epistemologies at will, and each one seems as concrete as any other while you're immersed in it.

I don't see how you can talk about epistemology, which is highly varied, yet simultaneously talk about the limited epistemology of secular agnosticism. Why don't you (or Clifford) just own the fact that you have a certain standard of evidence that, when not met, creates an immoral or unethical standard for you?

The anti-vax piece is a nice little bait tossed in. Vaccines gave my son autism, probably due to sub-clinical meningitis. I have my masters degree in biology so I am well trained in science. You may feign being part of the school of rationality, but I can tell you're not actually a scientist. If you were, you'd be part of scientific circles like I am, who argue about everything all the time. The level of disagreement is vast, despite our similar training. That's because the school of rationality is not immune to epistemology. Scientists themselves are steeped in their cultures and individual realities. Logocentricists love to act like they are the supreme object authority, but actually they are just one epistemology among many, and it disturbs them greatly to have this pointed out.

There is no epistemological responsibility. I don't need your permission to see the world a certain way; but even if I did, my way of seeing may not be entirely within my control. What is within my control is to engage in practices that enhance the common trust - social contracts if you will - and it's there that responsibilities play out. If I want to relate across commonly agreed reality with other people in a way that alienates me, deprives me of enjoyment or even inflicts harm, then I will suffer.

Your question is actually a social one, not an epistemological one. For all you know, each individual person has a slightly varied epistemology, despite the outward appearance of coherent culture. Just because we all play the role doesn't mean it holds equal meaning for everyone.
 
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No such thing as private belief, Cliff ol' boy?
Last night I dreamed I walked along a moonlight beach with Kristi.
I do believe this, that I dreamed this dream last night.
That's about as private as a belief can be, yes?
 
No such thing as private belief, Cliff ol' boy?
Last night I dreamed I walked along a moonlight beach with Kristi.
I do believe this, that I dreamed this dream last night.
That's about as private as a belief can be, yes?

Good to talk with you again, Angel.

It seems logically consistent that no belief can be wholly private, because every belief affects your behavior, thinking, and decisions. That effect may be non-zero (in the case of believing you had a dream, or that a certain burger joint is terrible) or it may be spectacularly life-altering (in the case of believing in a God who wants the infidels dead.)

The main thrust of epistemic responsibility seems to me to be Effect, rather than Truth. While the effect of beliefs can sometimes be obvious, predicting which beliefs are going to have an effect, or what they will affect, or when, is not easy. And while certain categories of belief will drastically affect my behavior in the world, even apparently "innocuous" beliefs have the potential to become impactful. This is the core of the argument of no "private" belief: there is no quarantine that stops a private belief from bleeding into the world.

To use an example in the same category as yours, I once had a series of dreams about fighting with my mother. I believed that I had these dreams. For a short period of time, my belief that these dreams happened had an effect on the way I interacted with my mother. She and I don't have a particularly good relationship, and the emotional intensity of my belief that I had those dreams created an impact-- I found myself a bit more testy with her than usual. The arguments in my dreams (which were really just me playing out things I actually wanted to say to her) perched at the forefront of my consciousness around her. I never told her about these dreams. I don't think I told anyone. If I have a belief and tell nobody and yet it still bleeds into my perception of the world and consequently modifies my behavior, then I don't see how any system can quarantine a private belief.

If beliefs can't really be quarantined, then how are they truly private? There's no such thing as a "private fart" in a crowded elevator.
 
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It's not about evidence vs. no evidence, it's the standard of evidence in question.

I agree. Clifford accuses theists of having beliefs with "no" evidence, and I think he's wrong. That said, the types of evidence considered acceptable for a belief and the amount of evidence required are salient questions. Saying "you don't have enough evidence to believe X" or "X requires Y evidence to justify, which you do not have" are legitimate criticisms of any held belief. I don't think those criticism are (or should be) the chief concern of epistemic responsibility, though. They are Clifford's solution to the concern of epistemic impact: only believe True things.

Clifford's solution is useful in some cases, but in other cases problematic.

You can't just act like what billions of people are doing is not real by waving your hand and dismissing it as non-evidentiary.

Well, I'm not. Evidence is not the same as good evidence, which is not the same as sufficient evidence. What evidence is "sufficient"? What evidence is "good?" The inability to answer those questions fairly seems the major problem with Clifford's paradigm, and why I seek a new one.

You don't get out of it that easy, even if the current hegemonic epistemology is that of rationality in some areas, you don't get to pretend it's above subjectification. To me this demonstrates a lack of understanding of what epistemology is, possibly due to a mono-epistemological world view. Something as simple as learning other languages and cultures shows that there is not one way of seeing reality. People who have a multicultural understanding can switch between epistemologies at will, and each one seems as concrete as any other while you're immersed in it.

True. None of this eliminates responsibility, though.

I don't see how you can talk about epistemology, which is highly varied, yet simultaneously talk about the limited epistemology of secular agnosticism. Why don't you (or Clifford) just own the fact that you have a certain standard of evidence that, when not met, creates an immoral or unethical standard for you?

I approach this topic through the door of secular agnosticism because A) it seems to be the only epistemology that I've found that even concerns itself with the idea of epistemic responsibility and B) Clifford's standard of evidence has too high of an opportunity cost, which offends my pragmatic nature. I stated as much in my original post.

The anti-vax piece is a nice little bait tossed in.

It actually wasn't meant to be. I included that as an example because I'm assuming statistical likelihood of agreement on the part of my audience. Regardless of what you believe about whether or not vaccines do cause autism, anti-vaxxers are a small minority both among the public and among scientists. It seemed a safe bet to include as a point of agreement in my argument.

Note that I'm not arguing majority consensus equals rightness. I just didn't seriously anticipate anyone taking issue with that point, a miscalculation on my part.

Vaccines gave my son autism, probably due to sub-clinical meningitis. I have my masters degree in biology so I am well trained in science. You may feign being part of the school of rationality, but I can tell you're not actually a scientist.

I'm sorry about your son. You're right, I'm not a scientist-- but I don't think having a master's degree is a necessary condition to form a responsible opinion on this topic. We're not talking about quantum mechanics, here. I have no doubt that the issue gets logarithmically complex the more knowledge about it you have, but your appeal to your own authority as a scientist is insufficient to convince me that A) being a scientist offers better protection from irresponsible, irrational belief or B) your belief about autism is by default closer to the truth than mine (or other scientists) by virtue of your education.

"I'm a scientist" is a poor justification. I don't think you would accept that as an explanation from someone else, so why would you expect me to buy it?

If you were, you'd be part of scientific circles like I am, who argue about everything all the time. The level of disagreement is vast, despite our similar training.

Not sure what your argument is here? Regardless, I don't want this to become a discussion about the veracity of your belief in the relationship between vaccines and autism.

(cont.)
 
There is no epistemological responsibility. I don't need your permission to see the world a certain way;

Of course you don't need my permission. That doesn't eliminate responsibility. You don't need my permission to drive without a seatbelt, either.

but even if I did, my way of seeing may not be entirely within my control.

Great point. This certainly impacts the level of epistemic responsibility we can reasonably hold people to, but it still doesn't eliminate responsibility.

If I want to relate across commonly agreed reality with other people in a way that alienates me, deprives me of enjoyment or even inflicts harm, then I will suffer.

And others will probably suffer too. The means by which you acquire beliefs about reality seem an effective place to seat responsibility for the way those beliefs affect society.

Your question is actually a social one, not an epistemological one. For all you know, each individual person has a slightly varied epistemology, despite the outward appearance of coherent culture. Just because we all play the role doesn't mean it holds equal meaning for everyone.

Epistemic responsibility's concern is social effect, but it is still an inherently epistemic question. I think you are right to suggest that each person has a slightly varied epistemology; that does not mean we should not question or guide it for maximum positive impact.
 
Good to talk with you again, Angel....
Yes, nice having you back.

I haven't read Clifford, and frankly had to google "epistemic responsibility," which is also called "intellectual responsibility" in the entry I read.
I would like to understand the concept better before replying to your "private belief" post.
Is "epistemic responsibility" simply coterminous with epistemic justification?
 
Yes, nice having you back.

I haven't read Clifford, and frankly had to google "epistemic responsibility," which is also called "intellectual responsibility" in the entry I read.

"Intellectual Responsibility" is tied up with so much other garbage and meaning that I don't want to use it here. I think people like Noam Chomsky and Sam Harris are partly to blame for that. Intellectual responsibility is often labeled as a mandate for 'intellectuals' to seek and destroy false beliefs. That is not at all what I am referring to.

I would like to understand the concept better before replying to your "private belief" post.
Is "epistemic responsibility" simply coterminous with epistemic justification?

No, I don't think so. They are closely related though, at least insofar as I understand them. The following are my definitions:

Epistemic justification: understanding and categorizing methods of justification for beliefs.
Epistemic responsibility: beliefs have potential for enormous personal and social impact, both good and bad; therefore, the epistemic justification we use for beliefs carries some moral responsibility.

I believe that a system of epistemic justification that permits holding socially and personally corrosive beliefs that are not necessitated by preponderance of evidence is a moral hazard.

For example: if you are siting at your desk, the preponderance of sensory data you have offers powerful certainty in the belief of you sitting at a desk. The belief might be wrong-- you might be a brain in a vat-- but the preponderance of available evidence is so intense, any sane person who ends up sitting at that desk is going to feel the same pull towards certainty. I'm sure a philosopher could rationalize his/her way out of that sensation of certainty if he/she wanted to, but the evidence of its veracity is going to be the same, and just as compelling, for most anyone. The deeper you dig into the available evidence of you at your desk, the stronger that certainty would become. I don't think it would be fair to hold you (or anyone) morally responsible for believing you are at a desk.

However, as the preponderance of evidence for a belief wanes, moral responsibility increases. A Christian who states that they just "have faith" that the Bible is the divine word of God carries far greater epistemic responsibility than the person who sits at a desk and says "I believe I am sitting at a desk."

--

As with our conversation about morality, this is the first time I am articulating ideas about this and so I apologize if I am repetitive or unclear. The main reason I come here is to iron my own beliefs by having other people test them.
 
"Intellectual Responsibility" is tied up with so much other garbage and meaning that I don't want to use it here. I think people like Noam Chomsky and Sam Harris are partly to blame for that. Intellectual responsibility is often labeled as a mandate for 'intellectuals' to seek and destroy false beliefs. That is not at all what I am referring to.



No, I don't think so. They are closely related though, at least insofar as I understand them. The following are my definitions:

Epistemic justification: understanding and categorizing methods of justification for beliefs.
Epistemic responsibility: beliefs have potential for enormous personal and social impact, both good and bad; therefore, the epistemic justification we use for beliefs carries some moral responsibility.

I believe that a system of epistemic justification that permits holding socially and personally corrosive beliefs that are not necessitated by preponderance of evidence is a moral hazard.

For example: if you are siting at your desk, the preponderance of sensory data you have offers powerful certainty in the belief of you sitting at a desk. The belief might be wrong-- you might be a brain in a vat-- but the preponderance of available evidence is so intense, any sane person who ends up sitting at that desk is going to feel the same pull towards certainty. I'm sure a philosopher could rationalize his/her way out of that sensation of certainty if he/she wanted to, but the evidence of its veracity is going to be the same, and just as compelling, for most anyone. The deeper you dig into the available evidence of you at your desk, the stronger that certainty would become. I don't think it would be fair to hold you (or anyone) morally responsible for believing you are at a desk.

However, as the preponderance of evidence for a belief wanes, moral responsibility increases. A Christian who states that they just "have faith" that the Bible is the divine word of God carries far greater epistemic responsibility than the person who sits at a desk and says "I believe I am sitting at a desk."

--

As with our conversation about morality, this is the first time I am articulating ideas about this and so I apologize if I am repetitive or unclear. The main reason I come here is to iron my own beliefs by having other people test them.
Interesting calculus.
Epistemic responsibility is inversely proportional to epistemic justification?
Is that the idea?
Moreover, epistemic responsibility is a moral responsibility?

In simple non-philosophical terms, the stronger the reasons to believe the weaker the moral responsibility for those beliefs?
And the other way around: the weaker the reasons to believe, the stronger the moral responsibility?

Do I begin to understand the concept?
 
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Interesting calculus.
Epistemic responsibility is inversely proportional to epistemic justification?
Is that the idea?
Moreover, epistemic responsibility is a moral responsibility?

In simple non-philosophical terms, the stronger the reasons to believe the weaker the moral responsibility for those beliefs?
And the other way around: the weaker the reasons to believe, the stronger the moral responsibility?

Do I begin to understand the concept?

Yeah, I think that's a good summation of what I just said. Although your description just brought forth a potential error in my paradigm: wouldn't it also follow that the greater the evidence to hold a belief, the greater moral responsibility is generated when that belief is not held?

I don't know if that's in opposition to, or in alignment with, the paradigm I've created here.
 
Can you have epistemically responsible religious beliefs?

I think we need a new criteria for epistemically responsible beliefs in religion. W.K. Clifford’s overly rigid criteria for responsible belief and William James’ overly permissive criteria for responsible belief leave us no middle ground.

Clifford’s version of epistemic responsibility (“it is wrong always, and, everywhere for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”) is too unyielding an expectation for human beings in a world of uncertainty. While he was right that there is no such thing as a private belief, I do not find it realistic to demand all beliefs (religious or otherwise) be supported by “sufficient” evidence. Who decides what is sufficient and when? In the case of a forced option like religion where the supporting evidence for the spectrum of certainty-driven beliefs (atheism included) all end up being circumstantial at best, agnosticism is the only epistemically responsible option in Clifford’s world.

Unfortunately, we then lose out on the opportunity to access the many benefits that I think only religion can provide.

Meanwhile, James’ Live, Forced, & Momentous criteria allow too much room for personally and socially destructive nonsense like anti-vaxxers and suicide bombers, so that’s not particularly helpful either.

What are we left with?


I think the answer is better science education.

And by that, I don't just mean force feeding kids a bunch of science facts and information. I mean getting them to start thinking like a scientist does. It is a particular kind of mindset that is at the same time both very open minded, and yet also highly critical. I think if you don't have the mindset, it's impossible to explain it philosophically.
 
I think the answer is better science education.

And by that, I don't just mean force feeding kids a bunch of science facts and information. I mean getting them to start thinking like a scientist does. It is a particular kind of mindset that is at the same time both very open minded, and yet also highly critical. I think if you don't have the mindset, it's impossible to explain it philosophically.

I think what you're describing is more "critical thinking" than "science education". But I agree wholeheartedly.

Still, critical thinking doesn't really do much to bridge the gap between evidence-focused beliefs in the empirical sense and evidence-focused beliefs in the religious or experiential sense. And the failure to offer a safe bridge into faith without it turning into blind faith that causes people to blow up buildings is a failure of both Clifford and James' paradigms.
 
I think what you're describing is more "critical thinking" than "science education". But I agree wholeheartedly.

Still, critical thinking doesn't really do much to bridge the gap between evidence-focused beliefs in the empirical sense and evidence-focused beliefs in the religious or experiential sense. And the failure to offer a safe bridge into faith without it turning into blind faith that causes people to blow up buildings is a failure of both Clifford and James' paradigms.

Not sure why there necessarily Has to be a “safe bridge into Faith”. There are many other reasonable substitutes for Hope and a vision for a better future. It’s like trying to find a way to continue to believe in Santa, just because kids who believe in Santa look like they’re happier.
 
I think what you're describing is more "critical thinking" than "science education". But I agree wholeheartedly.

Still, critical thinking doesn't really do much to bridge the gap between evidence-focused beliefs in the empirical sense and evidence-focused beliefs in the religious or experiential sense. And the failure to offer a safe bridge into faith without it turning into blind faith that causes people to blow up buildings is a failure of both Clifford and James' paradigms.

No, I really do think that there is great value in the particular style and manner of critical thinking that science fosters that is not as present in other fields.
 
Not sure why there necessarily Has to be a “safe bridge into Faith”. There are many other reasonable substitutes for Hope and a vision for a better future. It’s like trying to find a way to continue to believe in Santa, just because kids who believe in Santa look like they’re happier.

This is an excessively reductionist approach to the value of religion.

For all of the insistence that "there are alternatives to religion", I so rarely see examples of that practically working in peoples' lives. Atheists seem to not experience the need for connection to the divine or cosmic spiritual meaning on a scale or in a way that most religious people do, and so the advice of finding a "reasonable substitute for Hope and Vision" outside of religion is kind of like offering a gluten-free vegan 'nilla wafer to someone who is desperately craving a giant chocolate cookie and a glass of milk. You're sort of missing the point entirely when you offer your substitution.

People don't have profound, life-altering spiritual experiences with Santa Claus. But if they did, I imagine they'd be at a painful loss to integrate that experience into the rest of their lives as just a random glitch in the brain. Profound spiritual experience is easy to dismiss right up until you have it. Whatever the actual source of those experiences-- be it a divine entity reaching out or just a stray neuron in a meaningless universe-- people need something with strong explanatory power to integrate those experiences into their life, and I have never once seen a really good alternative to religion. I just haven't seen it.

The chief criticism of religious belief is what it can do to individuals and societies on an epistemic level. People don't blow themselves up in car bombs for the Great Vacuum of Nothing, after all. But if the primary criticism of religion is its potential for harm, why is there so little effort given on the part of atheists to address the harm and preserve the good?

If a belief isn't actually harming anyone, who cares if it's true? Moreover, if the belief is actually doing great good both individually and socially, why expend any energy trying to swap it out for a less satisfying vegan gluten-free 'nilla wafer alternative?
 
This is an excessively reductionist approach to the value of religion.

For all of the insistence that "there are alternatives to religion", I so rarely see examples of that practically working in peoples' lives. Atheists seem to not experience the need for connection to the divine or cosmic spiritual meaning on a scale or in a way that most religious people do, and so the advice of finding a "reasonable substitute for Hope and Vision" outside of religion is kind of like offering a gluten-free vegan 'nilla wafer to someone who is desperately craving a giant chocolate cookie and a glass of milk. You're sort of missing the point entirely when you offer your substitution.

People don't have profound, life-altering spiritual experiences with Santa Claus. But if they did, I imagine they'd be at a painful loss to integrate that experience into the rest of their lives as just a random glitch in the brain. Profound spiritual experience is easy to dismiss right up until you have it. Whatever the actual source of those experiences-- be it a divine entity reaching out or just a stray neuron in a meaningless universe-- people need something with strong explanatory power to integrate those experiences into their life, and I have never once seen a really good alternative to religion. I just haven't seen it.

The chief criticism of religious belief is what it can do to individuals and societies on an epistemic level. People don't blow themselves up in car bombs for the Great Vacuum of Nothing, after all. But if the primary criticism of religion is its potential for harm, why is there so little effort given on the part of atheists to address the harm and preserve the good?

If a belief isn't actually harming anyone, who cares if it's true? Moreover, if the belief is actually doing great good both individually and socially, why expend any energy trying to swap it out for a less satisfying vegan gluten-free 'nilla wafer alternative?


But that is exactly the problem. When you relax your epistemic standards to that degree, there can be some side effects- some very serious.

”Those who can make you believe absurdities, can make you commit atrocities.”
-Voltaire

As far as atheist substitutions, there are certainly some attempts in that direction.



This non-alcoholic gluten free variety may not be as strong as theism, but then again it doesn’t have quite leave you with the serious hangover either. The question is are you really after the truth, or just things to make you feel good? Because you have to realize these are very distinct and not necessarily related things. Part of your frustration may just be arising from this urge to merge the two, thinking there must be a way. There is no such guarantee. You may just have to decide what it is you’re exactly after.
 
Yeah, I think that's a good summation of what I just said. Although your description just brought forth a potential error in my paradigm: wouldn't it also follow that the greater the evidence to hold a belief, the greater moral responsibility is generated when that belief is not held?

I don't know if that's in opposition to, or in alignment with, the paradigm I've created here.
If your paradigm means to connect theoretical reason with practical reason, thereby giving a moral dimension to belief, perhaps virtue ethics is the means.
 
If your paradigm means to connect theoretical reason with practical reason, thereby giving a moral dimension to belief, perhaps virtue ethics is the means.

I will look into that, thanks.
 
But that is exactly the problem. When you relax your epistemic standards to that degree, there can be some side effects- some very serious.

Absolutely. But I see that as a function of an overly permissive epistemology. I am beginning to think there may be a way to have an epistemology that simultaneously accommodates theism and also limits the catastrophic harm such accommodation often perpetuates.

I might be wrong. I haven't really found a whole lot of conversation about responsible "permissive" epistemology, though. I expected to find something like it in the topic of epistemic responsibility but have found only extremes on either end.

As far as atheist substitutions, there are certainly some attempts in that direction.

They tend to be pretty lame. Although I've recently stumbled across a sort of "religion" that utilizes a series of pretty stout axioms that I think even an atheist could permit:

Faith is AT LEAST a way to contextualize the human need for spirituality and find meaning in the face of mortality. EVEN IF this is all faith is, spiritual practice can be beneficial to cognition, emotional states, and culture.

God is AT LEAST the natural forces that created and sustain the Universe as experienced via a psychosocial model in human brains that naturally emerges from innate biases. EVEN IF that is a comprehensive definition for God, the pursuit of this personal, subjective experience can provide meaning, peace, and empathy for others.

Prayer is AT LEAST a form of meditation that encourages the development of healthy brain tissue, lowers stress, and can connect us to God. EVEN IF that is a comprehensive definition of prayer, the health and psychological benefits of prayer justify the discipline.

Sin is AT LEAST volitional action or inaction that violates one's own understanding of what is moral. Sin comes from the divergent impulses between our lower and higher brain functions and our evolution-driven tendency to do things that serve ourselves and our tribe. EVEN IF this is all sin is, it is destructive and threatens human flourishing.

The afterlife is AT LEAST the persistence of our physical matter in the ongoing life cycle on Earth, the memes we pass on to others with our lives, and the model of our unique neurological signature in the brains of those who knew us. EVEN IF this is all the afterlife is, the consequences of our actions persist beyond our death and our ethical considerations must consider a timeline beyond our death.

Salvation is AT LEAST the means by which humanity overcomes sin to produce human flourishing. EVEN IF this is all salvation is, spiritual and religious actions and beliefs that promote salvation are good for humankind.

There are a few additional axioms regarding Christianity specifically (as a bridge for a skeptic to engage with that particular religion), but I think they are less necessary as a foundation for an epistemically responsible religion. I think one could probably stop at the above axioms and still get quite a lot of the standard benefits of religion.

The question is are you really after the truth, or just things to make you feel good?

I believe there are aspects of reality where the truth is inaccessible to us, either because of the limits on our ability to perceive it, or on our ability to comprehend it, or both. When it comes to things like the existence of God or the total nature of reality, those aren't things we can discover the "right" answer to. If there is a God, something about reality means science will never let you see it. If there is nothing like God, only a Laplacian Demon- level of knowledge would let you prove it.

Yet experiences in religion offer unique benefits that I haven't really observed anywhere else, and for all the vehement insistence on the part of the New Atheist that religion is fundamentally a bad thing, that isn't what I've discovered science has to say about its value.

So if at least some of the foundational truth claims of religion are untestable, and believing them has personal and social benefits that are testable and verified, and don't seem to come easily (or at all) from most other substitutions, why not look for a responsible way to carry those beliefs?

Again, the fundamental criticism of religion is its harm. Imagine a world where religion caused no interference to science, did not instigate self-destructive social contracts or exert any more evil pressure on the world than any other generally "good" human institution, while simultaneously driving millions of people to be better in all the ways that would matter most to a humanist...

Even if it turned out they were all wrong, what would be the point of undermining the institution?
 
Absolutely. But I see that as a function of an overly permissive epistemology. I am beginning to think there may be a way to have an epistemology that simultaneously accommodates theism and also limits the catastrophic harm such accommodation often perpetuates.

They tend to be pretty lame. Although I've recently stumbled across a sort of "religion" that utilizes a series of pretty stout axioms that I think even an atheist could permit:

Faith is AT LEAST a way to contextualize the human need for spirituality and find meaning in the face of mortality. EVEN IF this is all faith is, spiritual practice can be beneficial to cognition, emotional states, and culture.

God is AT LEAST the natural forces that created and sustain the Universe as experienced via a psychosocial model in human brains that naturally emerges from innate biases. EVEN IF that is a comprehensive definition for God, the pursuit of this personal, subjective experience can provide meaning, peace, and empathy for others.

Prayer is AT LEAST a form of meditation that encourages the development of healthy brain tissue, lowers stress, and can connect us to God. EVEN IF that is a comprehensive definition of prayer, the health and psychological benefits of prayer justify the discipline.

Sin is AT LEAST volitional action or inaction that violates one's own understanding of what is moral. Sin comes from the divergent impulses between our lower and higher brain functions and our evolution-driven tendency to do things that serve ourselves and our tribe. EVEN IF this is all sin is, it is destructive and threatens human flourishing.

The afterlife is AT LEAST the persistence of our physical matter in the ongoing life cycle on Earth, the memes we pass on to others with our lives, and the model of our unique neurological signature in the brains of those who knew us. EVEN IF this is all the afterlife is, the consequences of our actions persist beyond our death and our ethical considerations must consider a timeline beyond our death.

Salvation is AT LEAST the means by which humanity overcomes sin to produce human flourishing. EVEN IF this is all salvation is, spiritual and religious actions and beliefs that promote salvation are good for humankind.

There are a few additional axioms regarding Christianity specifically (as a bridge for a skeptic to engage with that particular religion), but I think they are less necessary as a foundation for an epistemically responsible religion. I think one could probably stop at the above axioms and still get quite a lot of the standard benefits of religion.



I believe there are aspects of reality where the truth is inaccessible to us, either because of the limits on our ability to perceive it, or on our ability to comprehend it, or both. When it comes to things like the existence of God or the total nature of reality, those aren't things we can discover the "right" answer to. If there is a God, something about reality means science will never let you see it. If there is nothing like God, only a Laplacian Demon- level of knowledge would let you prove it.

Yet experiences in religion offer unique benefits that I haven't really observed anywhere else, and for all the vehement insistence on the part of the New Atheist that religion is fundamentally a bad thing, that isn't what I've discovered science has to say about its value.

So if at least some of the foundational truth claims of religion are untestable, and believing them has personal and social benefits that are testable and verified, and don't seem to come easily (or at all) from most other substitutions, why not look for a responsible way to carry those beliefs?

Again, the fundamental criticism of religion is its harm. Imagine a world where religion caused no interference to science, did not instigate self-destructive social contracts or exert any more evil pressure on the world than any other generally "good" human institution, while simultaneously driving millions of people to be better in all the ways that would matter most to a humanist...

Even if it turned out they were all wrong, what would be the point of undermining the institution?

You have made an interesting list of definitions. But it sounds like you are just trying to redefine words in a little more abstract manner to have them make sense in a more secular world and within a more physicalist paradigm. If that's all you're doing, it sounds to me like you're pretty much there already. It's a little like when we found out "heaven" was not just a physical place above the visible sky, we redefined it to have a more abstract meaning.
 
You have made an interesting list of definitions. But it sounds like you are just trying to redefine words in a little more abstract manner to have them make sense in a more secular world and within a more physicalist paradigm. If that's all you're doing, it sounds to me like you're pretty much there already. It's a little like when we found out "heaven" was not just a physical place above the visible sky, we redefined it to have a more abstract meaning.

To be clear, I am not credited with those axioms-- they are the invention of Mike McHargue, who created them as a scaffold for him to re-enter Christianity from atheism. Honestly he's barely a Christian by the standard Evangelical definition. He's closer to an igtheist mystic in the Christian tradition with a heavy, heavy lean towards physicalist explanations for the experiential components of his belief. (A very different kind of "Christian".)

I find these axioms an excellent start point for an epistemically responsible theism. Developing such a theism/religion necessitates more than just physicalist redefinition of terms, though. These offer a kind of bedrock for belief with a built-in anti-dogmatic, anti-doctrinal failsafe: uncertainty.

Dogma, doctrine, and orthodoxy are the moral virus in the veins of religion. Igtheistic uncertainty is the vaccine. Are you really going to blow yourself up in a plane if you're uncertain that you'll go to a virgin-laden paradise? Are you really going to torture gay people if you're uncertain that God has forbidden their homosexuality?

Perhaps less virulent of an example, are you even going to make any effort to levy others into your beliefs if you make no claim to any exact nature of God beyond "it feels like God might be X, with no supposition that he is anything MORE than Axiom 2..."?
 
To be clear, I am not credited with those axioms-- they are the invention of Mike McHargue, who created them as a scaffold for him to re-enter Christianity from atheism. Honestly he's barely a Christian by the standard Evangelical definition. He's closer to an igtheist mystic in the Christian tradition with a heavy, heavy lean towards physicalist explanations for the experiential components of his belief. (A very different kind of "Christian".)

I find these axioms an excellent start point for an epistemically responsible theism. Developing such a theism/religion necessitates more than just physicalist redefinition of terms, though. These offer a kind of bedrock for belief with a built-in anti-dogmatic, anti-doctrinal failsafe: uncertainty.

Dogma, doctrine, and orthodoxy are the moral virus in the veins of religion. Igtheistic uncertainty is the vaccine. Are you really going to blow yourself up in a plane if you're uncertain that you'll go to a virgin-laden paradise? Are you really going to torture gay people if you're uncertain that God has forbidden their homosexuality?

Perhaps less virulent of an example, are you even going to make any effort to levy others into your beliefs if you make no claim to any exact nature of God beyond "it feels like God might be X, with no supposition that he is anything MORE than Axiom 2..."?

Hmmm.

I don’t know. Maybe. I guess personally I just don’t have the religious bug, so it just seems like extreme mental gymnastics to try to make something stick that just doesn’t want to stick. I guess if you want to make it work that badly, this is one way to think about it.


But I think it’s a sort of optical illusion. God to me just seems Like a sort of personification or apotheosis of the ultimate platonic ideals (or should I say Plotinus’ The One). It’s a convergence of ideas and ideals taken to their abstract extreme and then personified and deified and given some hypothetical external existence. I don’t see any use in that.
 
If your paradigm means to connect theoretical reason with practical reason, thereby giving a moral dimension to belief, perhaps virtue ethics is the means.

I will look into that, thanks.
On second thought a consequentialist ethics might be more to your point.
Maybe I am on the wrong scent in starting with morality. Maybe we start with belief and try to abstract some principle from those beliefs that lend themselves to analysis in terms of right and wrong or good and bad.
 
Hmmm.

I don’t know. Maybe. I guess personally I just don’t have the religious bug, so it just seems like extreme mental gymnastics to try to make something stick that just doesn’t want to stick. I guess if you want to make it work that badly, this is one way to think about it.

I can certainly appreciate how someone without the "religious bug" as you put it finds this all unnecessary and excessively difficult. You might be right. But like it or not, humans have a strong disposition to believe in the 'supernatural' and assign some sort of agency to cosmic forces. Whether the need to believe is from divine calling on our heart or just a glitchy byproduct of an unprecedented level of brain complexity, the need is real for most people.

We also now live in a world of science and rationalism, so what has worked for the last 30,000 years to satisfy this bizarre need for cosmic meaning and connection just doesn't work for many people anymore. Several thousands of years of attempting to meet the need for god has produced some of the greatest art, acts of love and cooperation humanity has ever seen. That same process of meeting the need for god has also produced some of humanity's darkest evils. But the god need isn't going anywhere, so I see humanity's next great philosophical task as purifying its myriad epistemologies of the cancer that leads to things like the Inquisition or McCarthyism.

But I think it’s a sort of optical illusion. God to me just seems Like a sort of personification or apotheosis of the ultimate platonic ideals (or should I say Plotinus’ The One).

Seeing Plotinus' The One as God seems pretty spiritual to me. You've already extended beyond McHargue's axioms, so congratulations. If that's as far as you get and that's all you need, you're already closer to the center of the Dawkins scale, which is where I think we should all be.

It’s a convergence of ideas and ideals taken to their abstract extreme and then personified and deified and given some hypothetical external existence. I don’t see any use in that.

Perfectly understandable that you don't see use in it. A lot of people don't. A lot of people do.

There's a massive amount of wiggle room in the "personified and deified" God, too. These days I'm leaning more heavily to the concept of a Plotinusian 'The One' God but on an infinite order of magnitude; as vast and incomprehensible as a 3D object in 2D Flatland. If I want to engage with it (and I do) I need it to wear a face I can experience. That face is personification and deification. Did I put the face on it, or is it wearing the face for me?

I don't think it matters.
 
Maybe we start with belief and try to abstract some principle from those beliefs that lend themselves to analysis in terms of right and wrong or good and bad.

This feels closer to what I'm getting at, but I need more clarification. What do you mean by an abstracted principle from belief that lends itself to moral analysis?
 
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