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The Philosophy of Spirit

No, "don't know" is the best you and science can say.

Feel free to talk gibberish then. Enjoy.

But expect others to point out that you are doing so no matter how big the words are.
 

Feel free to talk gibberish then. Enjoy.

But expect others to point out that you are doing so no matter how big the words are.
You're shameless! I won't bother quoting our exchanges to point up your bad faith. Get thee to B&S; you're out of your depth here.
 
You're shameless! I won't bother quoting our exchanges to point up your bad faith. Get thee to B&S; you're out of your depth here.

Your only safe space for anti-rational thinking is the theology/religious one.
 
Part VI. GERMAN IDEALISM
SECT. 3. Absolute Idealism - Hegelianism
Chap. I. Hegel - Conception and Method

In particular Hegel was impressed with the necessity of avoiding the extremes which the philosophy of Fichte and Schelling presented. In correcting the one-sided idealism into which Fichte fell Schelling exaggerated the other side. Therefore, Hegel, though in agreement for a time with Schelling, found it necessary to reaffirm that which both Fichte and Schelling had lost sight of—the absolute unity of the subject, the unity of self-consciousness. The two elements of knowledge which Kant had left unreconciled, and which Fichte and Schelling only succeeded in harmonizing by a suppression of one of the sides, Hegel seeks to bring into a higher synthesis.

What had been regarded as opposites,—mind and matter, spirit and nature, the intelligible and phenomenal world,—must be grasped in a unity of thought, and that not in an external way, but by bringing into distinct consciousness the meaning of their differences as necessary elements of reason. The ultimate principle of all knowledge is the unity of consciousness. In other words, the absolute is not mere substance, but subject, the consciousness to which all beings are to be referred and in which all things are to find their justification and explanation.
Hegel. Conception and Method. German Idealism.
 
Thread Questions

Is Spirit, or Mind, the ground of all reality?

Is what we call objective reality in all its myriad forms the objectification of Spirit?

What does "objectification of Spirit" mean?

Why is metaphysics, rather than physics, the proper study of reality?

Inspired by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) [/B]​

The last question is in error.

Metaphysics is arguably a branch of philosophy dealing with abstracts, and by definition those are fundamental concepts from questions that place our understandings in a condition where they are painfully difficult to apply them to a system of process (so physics and all other sciences are typically not available to work through these concepts.) Sometimes work in theoretical physics and quantum physics can work with some properties of these concepts but it becomes equally arguable what those systems of process are going to answer against the original philosophical questions being asked.

In that context, both works Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) and Science of Logic (1818) place offer concepts dealing with "Reason," "Spirit" and "Knowledge." Your questions on just spirit without the other concepts are also in error as Hegel was attempting to answer a few questions where all three were used to deal with how humanity goes from an perception of an "object" that then shapes knowledge against shaping the perception of an "object" to fit within the confines of our knowledge. To bridge those concepts Hegel used the idea of awareness and consciousness to explain our perceptions in answering these questions. Because of those questions Hegel (and others) ended up with "objective spirit" to deal with systems of belief shaping how we tend to look at objects from a knowledge perspective.

In that context spirit and mind (your question above) are not synonymous, just relational. Reality being grounded in perceptions of all things we interact with, including concepts and ideas that do not have physical properties as easy examples to gain knowledge from. In that context it was easy for Hegel and like-minded philosophers to bridge the gap between perceptions from things around us to perceptions from theological concepts. That is how he ended up at "objective spirit" where the definition of spirit ended up being an agent of all knowledge. Spirit became necessitated because knowledge became fundamental. "Unity of its relation to itself and to another" is a more complex explanation for enlightenment.

Reality then becomes argumentative as Hegel and others were attempting to explain reality including the experiences or knowledge from others ("world spirit") as allowed for from rational concepts (self,) sociological concepts (community or teachings,) and theological concepts (faith.)

To be fair there was a ton of idealism and metaphysical philosophy this period of German history, some more accepted than others. Hegel's work is still debated today (as it should, as philosophy demands by perpetually asking new questions.)
 
The last question is in error.

Metaphysics is arguably a branch of philosophy dealing with abstracts, and by definition those are fundamental concepts from questions that place our understandings in a condition where they are painfully difficult to apply them to a system of process (so physics and all other sciences are typically not available to work through these concepts.) Sometimes work in theoretical physics and quantum physics can work with some properties of these concepts but it becomes equally arguable what those systems of process are going to answer against the original philosophical questions being asked.

In that context, both works Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) and Science of Logic (1818) place offer concepts dealing with "Reason," "Spirit" and "Knowledge." Your questions on just spirit without the other concepts are also in error as Hegel was attempting to answer a few questions where all three were used to deal with how humanity goes from an perception of an "object" that then shapes knowledge against shaping the perception of an "object" to fit within the confines of our knowledge. To bridge those concepts Hegel used the idea of awareness and consciousness to explain our perceptions in answering these questions. Because of those questions Hegel (and others) ended up with "objective spirit" to deal with systems of belief shaping how we tend to look at objects from a knowledge perspective.

...
How can a question be in error?

Pointing out that metaphysical concepts are useless to physics is not an argument against metaphysics or for physics.

Hegel "inspired" the thread. The thread is not about Hegel.
 
How can a question be in error?

Pointing out that metaphysical concepts are useless to physics is not an argument against metaphysics or for physics.

Hegel "inspired" the thread. The thread is not about Hegel.

Because you run into problems severing out one aspect of Hegel's philosophical argument asking these questions ignoring all the other aspects, there was a chain of thought that took Hegel (and like minded philosophers and followers from the period) to his conclusions.

And I never really said that we were arguing against metaphysics or physics, I am only pointing out systems of process only go so far in dealing with metaphysical conversations. The most eloquent example of this is we have no systems of process (science) that validated Hegel's or any other German philosophers opinions from the period. It is not the intention of systems of process even if the swim lanes cross between what theoretical physics and quantum physics (as examples) will attempt to do in relation to what philosophy attempts to do.

The main point I am trying to make is plenty of people from the period took on the idea of explaining spirit within the confines of what they knew at the time, using everything from these metaphysical chains of thought to systems of belief, in some ways asking the age old questions philosophy has looked at ever since philosophy was a thing.

To your last question the concept of the spirit has to remain within philosophy as a means of discussion outside of systems of belief, but certainly outside of physics as that area of science is not looking to explain concepts originating from faith. The other issue is the term itself, spirit, is way overused with dozens of contexts. Spirit in terms of faith, spirit in terms of human capability under extreme conditions, spirit in terms of aptitude and attitude, etc. To that end Hegel was expanding on all these concepts to talk about "community spirit" and "world spirit" which not only changed the context of the discussion but perhaps also changed the questions we should be asking about source. None of which physics cares about, nor should it.
 
Because you run into problems severing out one aspect of Hegel's philosophical argument asking these questions ignoring all the other aspects, there was a chain of thought that took Hegel (and like minded philosophers and followers from the period) to his conclusions.

And I never really said that we were arguing against metaphysics or physics, I am only pointing out systems of process only go so far in dealing with metaphysical conversations. The most eloquent example of this is we have no systems of process (science) that validated Hegel's or any other German philosophers opinions from the period. It is not the intention of systems of process even if the swim lanes cross between what theoretical physics and quantum physics (as examples) will attempt to do in relation to what philosophy attempts to do.

The main point I am trying to make is plenty of people from the period took on the idea of explaining spirit within the confines of what they knew at the time, using everything from these metaphysical chains of thought to systems of belief, in some ways asking the age old questions philosophy has looked at ever since philosophy was a thing.

To your last question the concept of the spirit has to remain within philosophy as a means of discussion outside of systems of belief, but certainly outside of physics as that area of science is not looking to explain concepts originating from faith. The other issue is the term itself, spirit, is way overused with dozens of contexts. Spirit in terms of faith, spirit in terms of human capability under extreme conditions, spirit in terms of aptitude and attitude, etc. To that end Hegel was expanding on all these concepts to talk about "community spirit" and "world spirit" which not only changed the context of the discussion but perhaps also changed the questions we should be asking about source. None of which physics cares about, nor should it.
I think I agree with most of what you post here, although the relationship between philosophy and science was, I believe, rather closer in the past than you make out. The relativity/quantum generation of scientists were by and large philosophically minded and learned, unlike the generations that followed. As for philosophy today, the likes of Chalmers and Dennet hew closely to brain science in their philosophical work. But your point about regarding them as separate and distinct universes of discourse is well taken. At any rate this thread, as I conceived it, belongs in the philosophical universe of discourse, and my heuristic reference to quantum physics was perhaps ill-advised.
 
And so we return to the original insight offered by Bob at #2, omitting references to German Idealism on the advice of OrphanSlug:
...
As for the material world I feel fairly certain it exists, but that could be an illusion. A waking dream. Furthermore, if there is a material world out there, I can never truly know it. I can only know my mind's "interpretation" of it. When I experience the world the things that seem real are the colors, and the smells, and the sounds and the textures. But those are all illusions. There is no "color red" without consciousness to perceive the light waves as red. There is no sound or smell without a consciousness to perceive the waves as sound or the molecules as scents....

Thus are the objects of world subjective constructions, yes?
 
No, you are blinded by your faith in science and prevented thereby from recognizing that brain science has not accounted for mind at all, that mind continues to elude the best efforts of physical science, limited by its materialist assumptions, to understand it.

No you are just making crap up...again.
 
The nature of reality appears to be ineluctably mental.
Reductive Materialism is a bankrupt philosophical view.
The truth lies in the direction of objective idealism.
 
On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms
by Bernardo Kastrup

Abstract
Several alternatives vie today for recognition as the most plausible ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these ontologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by bearing phenomenal properties within their physical boundaries. The ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenalityin the first place. Unlike the other alternatives, however, idealism is often considered implausible today, particularly by analytic philosophers. A reason for this is the strong intuition that an objective world transcending phenomenality is a self-evident fact. Other arguments—such as the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function, the evidence for the existence of the universe before the origin of conscious life, etc.—are also often cited. In this essay, I will argue that these objections against the plausibility of idealism are false. As such, this essay seeks to show that idealism is an entirely plausible ontology.
https://philpapers.org/archive/KASOTP-3.pdf
 
The nature of reality appears to be ineluctably mental.
Reductive Materialism is a bankrupt philosophical view.
The truth lies in the direction of objective idealism.

How is reductive materialism bankrupt?
 
The nature of reality appears to be ineluctably mental.
Reductive Materialism is a bankrupt philosophical view.
The truth lies in the direction of objective idealism.

So why are you wasting your time using a physical means to post on a physical forum? Does the mental have physical restrictions?

All philosophical views are bankrupt. Not one of them is universally valid.
 
So why are you wasting your time using a physical means to post on a physical forum? Does the mental have physical restrictions?

All philosophical views are bankrupt. Not one of them is universally valid.
Your "physical means" and "physical forum" are in your mind. Get back to B&S where BS like yours flourishes under the misnomer "skepticism."
 
I'm not following. What's the dead end?
The dead end is the belief that reality reduces to the material without remainder. For that very belief does not reduce to the material without remainder.
Reductive material ignores the elephant in the room -- subjectivity -- from its initial materialist assumption right on through to its reductive materialist conclusion.
 
The dead end is the belief that reality reduces to the material without remainder. For that very belief does not reduce to the material without remainder.
Reductive material ignores the elephant in the room -- subjectivity -- from its initial materialist assumption right on through to its reductive materialist conclusion.

So ultimately it's all a remainder?
 
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