That's a little better. You are groping for a proper epistemology, if a flawed one.
Still, there are clear problems with your claims. Firstly, metaphysics does usually start in some sense with experience. It just often starts with basic experiences and analyses them. Arguments about qualia, for example, start with our phenomenological experience of qualia, as well as our understanding of material things, and analyse whether qualia can be reduced to the material. There's a different kind of interaction with experience here, but it is wrong to say there isn't one.
Secondly, it is hard to see why not being empirically testable is enough to rule out philosophical claims. For a start, that claim, like your whole argument here, is not empirically testable, so it seems self-defesting. Also, the same forms of inference and reasoning (deductive, inductive) are used in philosophy and in natural science. You will really have to spell out your position in more depth, and avoid it being self-defeating.
