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http://www.cell.com/trends/cognitiv...m/retrieve/pii/S1364661316301528?showall=true
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/01/170125093823.htm
There are two popular arguments against substance dualism to which the above two studies are relevant.
Argument 1: If consciousness is not a manifestation of physical processes, why does it sometimes seem to go away--as, for instance, in deep sleep? If consciousness is a result of certain brain processes, then if those processes stop, consciousness stops. On the other hand, on a substance dualist theory, it doesn't seem to make sense that consciousness could simply stop and start again, since mental substance is, presumably, always present.
I think that's a pretty silly argument, but it turns out that consciousness doesn't stop and start as often as we thought; it just changes character in deep sleep.
Argument 2: If the substrate of consciousness is something other than the brain, why does it appear there are two consciousnesses when a brain is split via calostomy? The operation to separate the hemispheres of the cerebrum does not, presumably, also split whatever supposedly mental substance forms the substrate of the mind, so it's particularly curious that splitting the brain also seems to split consciousness.
Turns out, that's a story that was spun to the public by Michael Gazzaniga, himself a committed physicalist who wanted to use the evidence of callostomy to support his view. As it happens, the school I attended to get my first master's degree had a great neuroscience program, and I sorta "back-doored" my way into an FTP server that hosted (among other things) films of Sperry's and Gazzaniga's experiments with calostomy patients, and I knew, watching those films, that Gazzaniga was very selective in how he reported the results. He, no doubt, genuinely believed he was characterizing things correctly, but it seems pretty clear to me that the films support a bizarre form of dualism. Anyway, now, it turns out that new research shows what I've known since that time: splitting the cortex does not lead to split consciousness. It's pretty hard to figure out why splitting the brain would not split consciousness, on a materialist view.
Now, does any of this form definitive proof of dualism? Of course not. It'd be foolish to say that someone couldn't come up with a way to accommodate these data on a materialist view, though I suspect it'll be pretty difficult to do. The larger point is that materialists like to argue that the evidence univocally supports their view, these are a couple of examples to show that the materialist claim is not really true.
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/01/170125093823.htm
There are two popular arguments against substance dualism to which the above two studies are relevant.
Argument 1: If consciousness is not a manifestation of physical processes, why does it sometimes seem to go away--as, for instance, in deep sleep? If consciousness is a result of certain brain processes, then if those processes stop, consciousness stops. On the other hand, on a substance dualist theory, it doesn't seem to make sense that consciousness could simply stop and start again, since mental substance is, presumably, always present.
I think that's a pretty silly argument, but it turns out that consciousness doesn't stop and start as often as we thought; it just changes character in deep sleep.
Argument 2: If the substrate of consciousness is something other than the brain, why does it appear there are two consciousnesses when a brain is split via calostomy? The operation to separate the hemispheres of the cerebrum does not, presumably, also split whatever supposedly mental substance forms the substrate of the mind, so it's particularly curious that splitting the brain also seems to split consciousness.
Turns out, that's a story that was spun to the public by Michael Gazzaniga, himself a committed physicalist who wanted to use the evidence of callostomy to support his view. As it happens, the school I attended to get my first master's degree had a great neuroscience program, and I sorta "back-doored" my way into an FTP server that hosted (among other things) films of Sperry's and Gazzaniga's experiments with calostomy patients, and I knew, watching those films, that Gazzaniga was very selective in how he reported the results. He, no doubt, genuinely believed he was characterizing things correctly, but it seems pretty clear to me that the films support a bizarre form of dualism. Anyway, now, it turns out that new research shows what I've known since that time: splitting the cortex does not lead to split consciousness. It's pretty hard to figure out why splitting the brain would not split consciousness, on a materialist view.
Now, does any of this form definitive proof of dualism? Of course not. It'd be foolish to say that someone couldn't come up with a way to accommodate these data on a materialist view, though I suspect it'll be pretty difficult to do. The larger point is that materialists like to argue that the evidence univocally supports their view, these are a couple of examples to show that the materialist claim is not really true.
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