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I'm going to bounce off someone else's comment in a more politically oriented forum to launch this, because what I was going to say doesn't really belong to the thread that started it. However, it does have some relation to politics because it is an oft-asserted claim regarding the constitution.
I have heard this said by many people. I see three categorical possibilities with regard to the existence of "human rights" or "natural rights", whatever you wish to call them:
1. They are not objectively real. To the extent they are real, they exist only because human beings agree as a group to act as if they are real. In the context of governments, this is the age-old proposition of "social contract" theory. (Locke, etc). The constitution is the embodiment of such a contract; we agree that in this country, we will act as if the right to "due process of the law" is a real thing. (In contrast to countries like North Korea, where there is no agreement that such a right should be respected and it is therefore not).
2. They are objectively real (non-religious). This proposes that rights are actually part of reality and that whether or not human beings respect them has no relation to whether or not they are in fact real. Therefore, something like the constitution notes the existence of those rights, but does not create them. Despite the objective reality of rights, the rights may be violated with impunity unless stopped by force. (ie, North Korea can starve millions to death for political reasons and "rights" cannot stop them...only an invasion and deposition of its government could).
3. They are objectively real (religious). This proposes that there exists a deity that has commanded that certain things must not happen to persons. These rights exist without regard to whether they are violated, and presumably violations will be punished in the afterlife (unless there is divine intervention).
I do not purport to discuss 3 because religious doctrine where there is an all-powerful deity by definition puts itself beyond proof or disproof.
Another post incoming.
the constitution does not bestow rights, it only recognizes rights of the people.
I have heard this said by many people. I see three categorical possibilities with regard to the existence of "human rights" or "natural rights", whatever you wish to call them:
1. They are not objectively real. To the extent they are real, they exist only because human beings agree as a group to act as if they are real. In the context of governments, this is the age-old proposition of "social contract" theory. (Locke, etc). The constitution is the embodiment of such a contract; we agree that in this country, we will act as if the right to "due process of the law" is a real thing. (In contrast to countries like North Korea, where there is no agreement that such a right should be respected and it is therefore not).
2. They are objectively real (non-religious). This proposes that rights are actually part of reality and that whether or not human beings respect them has no relation to whether or not they are in fact real. Therefore, something like the constitution notes the existence of those rights, but does not create them. Despite the objective reality of rights, the rights may be violated with impunity unless stopped by force. (ie, North Korea can starve millions to death for political reasons and "rights" cannot stop them...only an invasion and deposition of its government could).
3. They are objectively real (religious). This proposes that there exists a deity that has commanded that certain things must not happen to persons. These rights exist without regard to whether they are violated, and presumably violations will be punished in the afterlife (unless there is divine intervention).
I do not purport to discuss 3 because religious doctrine where there is an all-powerful deity by definition puts itself beyond proof or disproof.
Another post incoming.
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