Think twice before asking God to help you

Intro: Years and years ago, I sat in a philosophy of ethics / human rights class, and the discussion focused on the cases for assisting others in need and limits on the duty to assist. The idea was to measure risk to rescuer and harm to the would-be rescuee. The basic starting question was: should there be a requirement that an individual who passes a baby drowning face down in a shall pool to rescue that baby, where there is no possibility of harm to the individual.

(Inversely, discussions about whether there is an objective difference between killing another individual, and merely letting them die).

The relation to deity's interference I am thinking of springs out of the difference for reality between (a) a mortal individual choosing to or not to intervene to save another, and (b) what it would mean for an omnipotent and omnipresent being to choose whether or not to intervene; and, ultimately, what that difference means for reality were a deity to intervene.

In the case of (a), the mortal individual is only aware of his past and present circumstances. The mortal's decision can only affect the present circumstances of the baby, and the future effects on everyone it will interact with if it is saved, or the effects on everyone were it to die. The mortal has only the power to determine those small slices of total reality.

In the case of (b), the deity is aware of all possible pasts, futures, and presents. Indeed, the deity is simultaneously present in them, while also existing infinitely outside of objective reality. It seems to me that this is a vastly different perspective: at every single point in reality or possible reality, the deity could choose to or not to intervene. It seems to me that there are two options here.

(b)(1). The deity chooses not to intervene at any point in reality or possible reality.

(b)(2). The deity chooses to intervene and save the baby.

It seems to me that only (b)(1) allows for free will. If the deity does not ever intervene, then those who are part of events truly shape those events. They are ultimately responsible for all of their choices.

It seems to me that in (b)(2), the deity faces a different choice than the mortal. The mortal, as I noted, only affects a given slice of reality in deciding whether or not to save the baby. The mortal isn't simultaneously before the baby, before one of Stalin's troikas, before the gates of Auschwitz, etc. But the deity is. Once the deity makes a choice to intervene just once in reality, is that deity not necessarily making a choice to intervene or not intervene at all other points in reality? The deity exists in them! The result, then, is that IF the deity intervenes but once, the deity's intervention fixes all of reality. If the deity chooses to save the baby, the deity necessarily decides whether or not a given person is exterminated, whether or not you recover from a disease, etc. The deity actually cannot help it because Its nature compels this.




So I would say: were there to be a deity, I would condemn that deity were it to intervene even once and even for the necessarily pure purpose it would act with. Its decision would fix reality. Its decision would mean my decisions are not entirely my own; my successes and failures not my own. We would essentially be pawns in someone else's cosmic game, allowed to succeed or fail at whim. And what sort of existence would that be, even if it felt free.





(Of course, I note, I am only going with the typical monotheistic definition of a truly omnipotent and omnipresent deity. The answer would obviously change if you're talking about something like Hinduism, with a whole chain of deities and super-human beings)





Query:

Is (b)(2) an impermissible a necessary limitation on a deity? Might it function as an argument against the existence of the monotheistic deity?

While I say it matters, would it really matter if I'm right and (b)(2) happens, where each of us has no way of truly knowing? Would it not, then, be a philosophical theory like that stating that all of reality might only exist in your mind - a theory that is theoretically possible but ultimately useless because it gets you no where, even if you accept it?

IMO, the Christian God knows our fate from before we're born. If it was that persons time to go, no amount of prayer would save it.

We as mortals wouldn't know either way but, as people of faith we would always try.

Mr Person said:

Its decision would fix reality. Its decision would mean my decisions are not entirely my own; my successes and failures not my own.

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That's a fairly standard position* within Reformed (Calvinist) Theology; which happens to be the dominant theology within protestant Christianity.

I'm not saying I agree with that theology, but that you're basically just arriving at Calvinism through philosophy rather than the bible. Which is to say that your view of a God who would do b(2) isn't at odds with Christianity but is actually in complete agreement with the dominant view on God's sovereignty.

Proverbs 16:9 “The heart of man plans his way, but the Lord establishes his steps.”
Psalm 115:3 “Our God is in the heavens; he does all that he pleases.”
Second Chronicles 20:6 “O Lord, God of our fathers, are you not God in heaven? You rule over all the kingdoms of the nations. In your hand are power and might, so that none is able to withstand you.”
Psalm 135:6 Whatever the LORD pleases, He does, In heaven and in earth, in the seas and in all deeps.
Romans 9:18 So then He has mercy on whom He desires, and He hardens whom He desires. You will say to me then, “Why does He still find fault? For who resists His will?” On the contrary, who are you, O man, who answers back to God? The thing molded will not say to the molder, “Why did you make me like this,” will it?


*To be fair, no Calvinist would accept your proposition in the exact way you worded it. They would reword it first in order to account for their version of free will (saying something like "my decisions are both entirely my own and entire God's"). But it would wind up being functionally identical to what you just said.

It could be possible that said baby is a future despot, but if the deity intervenes multiple times and prevents that, then all is well. If a god is likely to intervene, then why only intervene once?

Mr Person said:

Intro: Years and years ago, I sat in a philosophy of ethics / human rights class, and the discussion focused on the cases for assisting others in need and limits on the duty to assist. The idea was to measure risk to rescuer and harm to the would-be rescuee. The basic starting question was: should there be a requirement that an individual who passes a baby drowning face down in a shall pool to rescue that baby, where there is no possibility of harm to the individual.

(Inversely, discussions about whether there is an objective difference between killing another individual, and merely letting them die).

The relation to deity's interference I am thinking of springs out of the difference for reality between (a) a mortal individual choosing to or not to intervene to save another, and (b) what it would mean for an omnipotent and omnipresent being to choose whether or not to intervene; and, ultimately, what that difference means for reality were a deity to intervene.

In the case of (a), the mortal individual is only aware of his past and present circumstances. The mortal's decision can only affect the present circumstances of the baby, and the future effects on everyone it will interact with if it is saved, or the effects on everyone were it to die. The mortal has only the power to determine those small slices of total reality.

In the case of (b), the deity is aware of all possible pasts, futures, and presents. Indeed, the deity is simultaneously present in them, while also existing infinitely outside of objective reality. It seems to me that this is a vastly different perspective: at every single point in reality or possible reality, the deity could choose to or not to intervene. It seems to me that there are two options here.

(b)(1). The deity chooses not to intervene at any point in reality or possible reality.

(b)(2). The deity chooses to intervene and save the baby.

It seems to me that only (b)(1) allows for free will. If the deity does not ever intervene, then those who are part of events truly shape those events. They are ultimately responsible for all of their choices.

It seems to me that in (b)(2), the deity faces a different choice than the mortal. The mortal, as I noted, only affects a given slice of reality in deciding whether or not to save the baby. The mortal isn't simultaneously before the baby, before one of Stalin's troikas, before the gates of Auschwitz, etc. But the deity is. Once the deity makes a choice to intervene just once in reality, is that deity not necessarily making a choice to intervene or not intervene at all other points in reality? The deity exists in them! The result, then, is that IF the deity intervenes but once, the deity's intervention fixes all of reality. If the deity chooses to save the baby, the deity necessarily decides whether or not a given person is exterminated, whether or not you recover from a disease, etc. The deity actually cannot help it because Its nature compels this.




So I would say: were there to be a deity, I would condemn that deity were it to intervene even once and even for the necessarily pure purpose it would act with. Its decision would fix reality. Its decision would mean my decisions are not entirely my own; my successes and failures not my own. We would essentially be pawns in someone else's cosmic game, allowed to succeed or fail at whim. And what sort of existence would that be, even if it felt free.





(Of course, I note, I am only going with the typical monotheistic definition of a truly omnipotent and omnipresent deity. The answer would obviously change if you're talking about something like Hinduism, with a whole chain of deities and super-human beings)





Query:

Is (b)(2) an impermissible a necessary limitation on a deity? Might it function as an argument against the existence of the monotheistic deity?

While I say it matters, would it really matter if I'm right and (b)(2) happens, where each of us has no way of truly knowing? Would it not, then, be a philosophical theory like that stating that all of reality might only exist in your mind - a theory that is theoretically possible but ultimately useless because it gets you no where, even if you accept it?

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It gets you nowhere; maybe.

Mr Person said:

The relation to deity's interference I am thinking of springs out of the difference for reality between (a) a mortal individual choosing to or not to intervene to save another, and (b) what it would mean for an omnipotent and omnipresent being to choose whether or not to intervene; and, ultimately, what that difference means for reality were a deity to intervene.

Click to expand...

Said omnipotent entity is basically a Rorschach test. How you construct/think of the deity says more about you, than about its actual moral responsibilities.

At any rate, I think you're missing the true upshot of the thought experiment here, specifically theodicy. Namely: How can we classify an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent creator deity as benevolent, when evil exists?

Consider:

1) Jane makes a shirt, and gives it to Mike. She has no reasonable expectation that Mike will use this to a violent end. We do not hold Jane responsible for Mike's violent acts with the shirt.

2) Dave makes a large knife. His intention is for it to be used for a peaceful purpose, but he knows it can be used for a violent act. Even so, we generally do not hold Dave responsible; it's not like he came up with the idea of stabbing another human being.

3) God invents the entire universe. It doesn't just create metal and blood and bones, it invents rudimentary concept such as life, death, pain, suffering, ethics, and choice. Every possible choice a human can make was created by God; the very option to murder only exists because God created it. God had the option to create a universe without anything evil, and yet It has deliberately chosen not to do so. God still has the option to modify the universe so that evil no longer happens, or that humans no longer have the options to do evil (but still have free will).

A dog has free will. However, it cannot chose to write a poem; that is simply outside of its capabilities. God could modify humans easily so that they still have free will, but cannot even conceive of murder. And yet, here we are.

God deliberately chose this current state of affairs, knowing every single outcome of every single decision ever made by any human being, even before humans exist. There is no logically consistent way to exculpate the deity from the current state of affairs. It's impossible.

Attempts to resolve the problem of theodicy are, quite obviously, transparent apologetics. These theologians are not examining the world and drawing conclusions; they are jamming square pegs into round holes, because their theologies require that they conclude with the idea that "God must be omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent."

We could claim that this deity is not limited by human conceptions of logic, and an omnipotent being is capable of doing impossible things. The problem there is that the consequences of this assertion cannot be contained. E.g. if God can do the truly impossible, then why can't It be simultaneously evil and good, and declare itself to be benevolent? Surely that's impossible too, but we cannot restrict the deity to the possible. We cannot say "it is impossible for a benevolent deity to deliberately perform evil!" and expect that to restrict the powers of the Impossible God. Putting God beyond the realm of consistency is, to put it mildly, a Pyrrhic victory.

Of course, there's a more rational explanation, namely: God doesn't exist, and all these attempts are basically apologias. The goal is not to provide a rational explanation, but to bend logic and theological principles beyond the breaking point in order to construct the preferred conclusion.

While I say it matters, would it really matter if I'm right and (b)(2) happens, where each of us has no way of truly knowing?

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Ultimately, any theological claim is unfalsifiable. There is no possible way to know.

For example: Let's say that the omnipotent creator deity actually doesn't give a crap about humans, created a supernaturally powerful being with no ethical limitations, and set it upon the universe. This demiurge creates the earth, creates all the humans, and delights in the pain and suffering humans are put through. Any attempts by puny powerless humans to reach the omnipotent creator-deity fail miserably, because a) the Demiurge blocks it and b) the Creator-Deity doesn't give a crap about humans. The acts of the Demiurge are completely indistinguishable from all acts we traditionally attribute to "God." There is no way to disprove that this is the case, because it's an unfalsifiable situation. There are no facts, and no evidence, and no logical claims, that we can examine or invoke to prove that the Demiurge cannot exist.

We can say that theology is about understanding a religion. We may even find some powerful human truths that way. But theology doesn't tell us anything about the world.

It may be true that it makes no difference to the person who has no connection to the other person who needs to be saved, whether a baby or what have you.

I think that there is a third consideration, if you look at the question in terms of the effects on the group, instead of just the immediate individual, you will see a benefit in saving the baby. In other words, right action in terms of the overall survival of the species. That is very logical and driven by the survival instinct.

I find this quote by Epicurious actually says it best:

“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?”

Perhaps the deity intervenes by telling his followers to rescue the child. Miracles are all around us, but they are mundane and completely natural. Why do people expect such things to be supernatural?

Ancient Herald said:

I find this quote by Epicurious actually says it best:

“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?”

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We have free will. I would say that God is able, but not willing. That doesn't make God malevolent.

To really have this discussion we have to discuss what evil is. Speaking from Christianity'a stand point, it would be the drive of humans to sin. Now if you are a non theist you don't believe in sin. So when talking to a theist you and said theist likely have a vastly different notion of evil.

As a theist I can think of something you and I likely agree on. (assuming you are a non thesit of course). Evil comes from man, our nature to control things being the major motivation. But I only assume this.