Radical
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It sounds to me like you need to start from the beginning. Do we exist?...Unfortunately, the only reality is that there is no way to prove that my senses are giving me accurate information about reality because I'm bound by those same senses to figure it out. I make the assumption that my senses are in fact sometimes accurate. From there everything else that I know to be true should be able to be shown to be true via evidence... So the idea that sets do in fact exist in this universe can be shown to be true via evidence, but I don't think that numbers transcend this universe to all other universes.
Or have I terribly over thought your question?
You didn't over think anything; this is exactly what I'm looking for. Sense realism is assumed by most people, and it looks like us two as well. Let's start there. Stuff exists. The stuff does other stuff. Then we try to make sense of it all. The institution of understanding reality we call "science" (it used to be called "philosophy"... no one likes us philosophers any more...). This is really all the background I need to begin my stuff about quantity. Through our senses and our scientific instruments, understand structures. Stuff doesn't just exist, but It's not just about the matter, but also the organization of such matter. The structure/organization/form is just as real as the matter itself is, and just as important, not simply for subjective understanding, but it's how the universe objectively operates.
I'll easily concede that our subjective understanding requires empirical experience. That's a no-brainer for me. But ontologically, not epistemologically, I think matter has form. Science readily accepts this. Carbon often "double bonds", it has "6" protons, etc. These are descriptions of the structure of Carbon. However, they aren't the matter itself, but nevertheless ontologically necessary. What is not readily accepted by the scientific community, and I think is a big mistake, is that the "structure" of something (like Carbon) is immaterial/non-physical. Therefore, I think physicalism should be immediately rejected by anyone and everyone that appreciates the scientific advances of the last 6000 years. It's not a dualism, but a proper conception of our empirical data.
Something doesn't follow, here... You seem to simply dismiss nominalism without actually dealing with the arguments in its favor (I am not, incidentally, a nominalist).
Oh, nominalism. I actually share a few sympathies with nominalists. Specifically, I deny the existence of "humanity". That is just a word for an artificial collection. The collection itself is not a real thing. The real things are the individuals within the artificial collection. That was some great stuff. However, I readily accept the existence of abstract objects, which a second strain of nominalism will also deny. My main objection to this kind of nominalism is science. Science constantly uses abstract objects in their descriptions of our physical universe. That sounds quite a bit like nominalism, ya? But the mistake is to simply call them names. The structure of Carbon (which is an abstract object) is exactly what gives it all of it's real qualities. Science isn't just making names, it's understanding reality. If abstract objects are non-existent, as this type of nominalist claims, then science does not understand reality at all, and we must retreat back to skepticism. This is extremely impractical, considering all the useful predictions science can make using abstract objects.
Conceiving abstract objects as real is not only pragmatic, but has lots of ontological weight as well. The real things out there seem to do real stuff, and we can predict the real stuff based on structure. To keep my theme running, Carbon is in group 14, right? Because of similar structure, all group 14 elements have very similar qualities (4 electrons in outside shell, double bonding is very common, etc). The reality of abstract objects, therefore, is as just as true as sense realism. I would deny there is a universal "group 14" that exists, but it's just a collection of the real existing things with very similar structures. Because of the similar structure, we can make pragmatic categories like "group 14" that help our understanding of reality.
Finally, what is this? You go from talk of numbers being empirical to number "particles." There's no obvious relationship there.
I was just making an example of empirical quantity. That's the only way I can conceive of quantity being physical. The other extreme is that "3" is a free-floating object that exists in a realm of forms. But I hate Plato with the passion of a thousand burning suns, so I instead limit quantity within the empirical world. The abstract object does not exist as an independent thing. That's bonkers.