Part 1. Rawls position Based mainly on his work in 'A theory of justice'.
Rawls eminent work in 'A Theory of Justice' (1971) has led the way in providing a contemporary liberal egalitarian account for distributive justice. Rawls argued against the dominant utilitarian accounts of his period, suggesting: 'utilitarian accounts did not sufficiently cater for rights, constitutional or individual' (Martin 2003,p.499).
Rawls account proceeds from 'the original position' (Rawls 1999). This starting point for Rawls makes: "the way to think about justice is to ask what principles we would agree to in an initial situation of equality" (Sandel 2010,p.140). Thus, from the outset Rawls is clear on his intention for a commitment to some system of equality.
Following in a long line of social contract theorists Rawls implores: 'the parties to the contract are placed in the 'original position' behind a thick 'veil of ignorance' (Martin 2003,p.503). Moreover: 'they are instructed in their subsequent reasoning to ignore their own particular traits, their actual place in society, their gender; and to be unaware of their society's place in history' (Martin 2003,p.503). It is at this hypothetical meeting point, the parties are in-effect, unburdened with any prior knowledge that may influence their future society. With such a clean 'slate' so to speak, such fictional rational people would choose, arguably, what is best for society.
Rawls is mindful of the contention over what factors are best for society- as a whole- and agrees agents may hold disparate concepts of what is best and consequently are likely to: 'disagree on the conception of what constitutes the best form of society.' Acknowledging this criticism, Rawls counters by suggesting: 'in the original position people do not know their own conception of the good, and neither do they know their special psychological propensities' (Wolff 2006,p.155). But for Martin (2003) what the parties do know is 'they are deciding on principles of justice and primary goods, such as incomes, wealth and opportunities to individuals', making clear : 'individuals will have to live their entire life under such arrangements'.
To give a timely example, quite simply: 'what people should be asking is what in their 'selfish interest would they want, i.e. what wage differentials could be acceptable between city bankers and dustman' (Wolff, philosophy bites 07.48). A point that needs little further explanation! Other than to say, such disparity runs counter to a supportive interpretation of Rawls intentions. A different view might interpret this disparity in such a way; that as long as the dustman has 'sufficient' utility he is not necessarily being treated unjustly. The theses of 'sufficiency' will be covered shortly. Now Moving from Rawls hypothetical experiment, too Rawls formulated principles.
Rawls 'Two Principles of Justice' that he assumes would be agreed upon in the original position are as such: "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties similar with a scheme of liberties for others" (Rawls 1999,p.53) and 'social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both to everyone's advantage' [...] (p.53). From this, again-- it is critical to understand Rawls is not advocating some form of financial equality, rather, 'we treat people as equals not by removing all inequalities, but only those that disadvantage someone' (Kymlicka 2002,p.55). Kymlicka (2002) suggests this leaves Rawls theory at a unresolved juncture adding his principles are to be arranged in 'lexical order'
Rawls 'difference principle' is a broadly egalitarian principle. Broad in the sense it proscribes a " a general presumption in favour of an equal distribution of goods among all citizens" (Wolff 2006,p.158) and egalitarian in the sense that we remind ourselves Rawls position is anchored within a Western liberal democracy. Moreover, 'the difference principle asserts social inequalities are to be arranged so as to benefit those most worse off in society' (Wellman 2002,p.66). But to return to the dustman/banker example above '
nequalities of income and prestige are justified if there was fair competition in positions that yield those benefits' (Kymlicka 2002,p.57).
Within Rawls 'basic structure', It is not an unreasonable supposition to assume such positions are stacked in favour of those most able to take best advantage of such a loosely arranged 'basic structure', family economic support could be one example. Thus, 'fair competition' and it's bedfellow 'equality of opportunity' are highly contestable concepts.
So, how could inequalities tend to maximize the position of the worse off? As was clear above, Rawls does not advocate financial parity; In fact, he deters this, maintaining some personal 'incentive' is needed to make people more productive (Swift 2006). What Rawls assumes here is a society that needs some proportional reward for, So the dilemma remains on how society stands on the issue of: 'how to treat those who are 'brain surgeons' who would much rather be 'poets' (Swift 2006).
It should be clear here, Rawls made a good attempt at reconciling individual autonomy within the wider context and functions of society. I will follow up with Robert Nozick's refutation of Rawls mainly from 'Anarchy State and Utopia'. I feel, some of the above covers the left Libertarian position (if you believe there is such a position) on providing support for certain portions of society. For this reason, I say left Libertarianism is in-fact nothing more than what Rawls sets out, a liberal egalitarian position. I hope Rawls 'original position' needs no more explanation, if so look to Social contract - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Paul
