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Euthyphro dilemma anyone?

Actually, that does NOT follow. Instead it must be:

1) If children ought to be happy healthy and productive,

2) Then I ought not torture them

(And there's also a hidden, implied premise 1.5: If I torture children, they will not be happy, healthy, productive).

That may seem like a subtle distinction, but it's not. Wanting or valuing healthy happy productive children isn't sufficient. Believing that children ought to be healthy and happy isn't enough. In order to derive the conclusion you're attempting to derive, it must actually be true that children ought to be healthy happy.

2 can only be objectively true IF 1 is objectively true. Objective ought-statements can only be derived from "pre-existing" objective ought-statements. If there are no such "pre-existing" objective ought-statements, then there are no objective ought-statements period. Put differently, there must be some objective values.

So I get what your saying, but I'm not convinced that one has to put it that way, maybe you could explain it again?

I mean to say that anyone ought to do anything is to say that there exists some desirable state of affairs that can be conditionally actualized through specific actions. Thus if I desire to raise my child to be a happy, healthy, well-adjusted adult, then it necessarily follows that we probably ought not torture him/her. Are we saying the same thing or do you think I'm still missing something?

You don't believe that this statement is sufficient?
 
So I get what your saying, but I'm not convinced that one has to put it that way, maybe you could explain it again?

I'm just pointing out that the If/then argument you presented doesn't technically follow.

Fleshed out a bit, here's essentially your argument that I quoted.

Premises (assumed to be true):
1)I want happy children.
2)If I torture my children, they will not be happy.

Conclusion (must be true if the premises are true):
3)Therefore, I ought not torture my children.

My point is that 3 doesn't actually follow 1 and 2 by any rule of propositional logic, strictly speaking. Your conclusion would actually be "Therefore, I do not want to torture my children."

The only way to conclude "I ought not torture my children", you would have to change premise 1 to "Children ought to be happy". Then your conclusion would be valid.

It's a seemingly small point (and we all make this mistake and casually say **** like "if you want to pass the test, you ought to study". It's not technically valid. It's only valid if "you ought to pass the test" or if "your desire to pass the test ought to be realized". But we don't say that because saying that to a person in a casual conversation would just be ****ing awkward :)) but it's important, I think, to distinguish between "oughts" and "wants". Just because you want X doesn't mean you ought to do X. A rapist wants to rape someone, but that doesn't mean he ought to do so. IMHO.

And it's also important because it's often that number 1 premise - the "ought" premise - that is the problematic one. How do we know "children ought to be happy"? That's probably not a very good example because most of us agree that it's true, but you get the idea.
 
I'm just pointing out that the If/then argument you presented doesn't technically follow.

Fleshed out a bit, here's essentially your argument that I quoted.

Premises (assumed to be true):
1)I want happy children.
2)If I torture my children, they will not be happy.

Conclusion (must be true if the premises are true):
3)Therefore, I ought not torture my children.

My point is that 3 doesn't actually follow 1 and 2 by any rule of propositional logic, strictly speaking. Your conclusion would actually be "Therefore, I do not want to torture my children."

The only way to conclude "I ought not torture my children", you would have to change premise 1 to "Children ought to be happy". Then your conclusion would be valid.

It's a seemingly small point (and we all make this mistake and casually say **** like "if you want to pass the test, you ought to study". It's not technically valid. It's only valid if "you ought to pass the test" or if "your desire to pass the test ought to be realized". But we don't say that because saying that to a person in a casual conversation would just be ****ing awkward :)) but it's important, I think, to distinguish between "oughts" and "wants". Just because you want X doesn't mean you ought to do X. A rapist wants to rape someone, but that doesn't mean he ought to do so. IMHO.

And it's also important because it's often that number 1 premise - the "ought" premise - that is the problematic one. How do we know "children ought to be happy"? That's probably not a very good example because most of us agree that it's true, but you get the idea.

I know that our positions and beliefs are similar, but I still don't understand your position with regard to this issue.

It is a meaningless statement to say that one ought do anything (#1) until we establish some desirable state of affairs that we wish to actualize. So to make the statement children ought be happy is empty until we define some value. In this case raising happy healthy children. It's only then that we can try to claim an ought, or actions that are constant with that value.

It's like saying "that is Mike's car" before we know who mike is. To assign ownership to a car we first have to know who owns it.

Thus,

If one values happy healthy children, it follows that one ought not torture them since torture is not conducive with the value of raising a happy healthy child. I still don't see why we have to express #1 in the form of an ought rather than a desire or a goal.

Now I'm not arguing because I necessary think you're wrong, perhaps it's my lack of knowledge of formal logic, let's see if we can work though this.
 
If god exists and there is an objective morality as is described in the bible then let me go on record to say that God is an awful arbitrator of morality (especially if morality is down to his nature, rather than his will). I do not want any part of Gods objective morality. I do not consider breaking the sabbath immoral, nor do I consider stoning for adultery a moral action.
 
Maybe your limited intelligence is only allowing you to believe there is a difference. And that a greater intelligence could wrap it's head around it and see that you are necessarily and absolutely wrong. After all we cannot even understand the universe, what makes you think you can understand this.

:roll:

At least you got the futility of trying to solve this problem or the God hypothesis as human beings. Was it Clarke that pointed out that for us it would all look like magic even though it were only technology? And as far as we understand the limits to our understanding of systems, we probably never will be able to get to the bottom of it in the sense of understanding.
 
You're sticking your toes in the pool to check the temp, but you just can't commit to jumping in. I understand, but until you do I can just agree to disagree.

-Cheers

I'm cool by that. And I don't think I will dip my self into the goo until the time comes.
 
I do not consider breaking the sabbath immoral, nor do I consider stoning for adultery a moral action.

Nor do I. That being said, I would be curious as to if you consider adultery immoral.
 
Nor do I. That being said, I would be curious as to if you consider adultery immoral.

I consider adultery immoral. I don't consider divorce immoral however.
 
I know that our positions and beliefs are similar, but I still don't understand your position with regard to this issue.

It is a meaningless statement to say that one ought do anything (#1) until we establish some desirable state of affairs that we wish to actualize. So to make the statement children ought be happy is empty until we define some value.

That's not true, though. It's not meaningless at all, you understand very well what is meant by the statement "children ought to be happy". If you're talking down the street and a stranger stops you and says "you ought to sign this petition", are you telling me you wouldn't understand what he meant? :confused: Of course not. You understand exactly what the stranger meant: he thinks you should sign some petition to legalize pot or whatever. Now you might ask questions like "Why?" or "Well, what is the petition for?". But you're not asking what the words he uttered meant - you're asking questions to try to ascertain whether you agree with his statement - whether you think it's true that it is in fact a petition you ought to sign.

In this case raising happy healthy children. It's only then that we can try to claim an ought, or actions that are constant with that value.

It's like saying "that is Mike's car" before we know who mike is. To assign ownership to a car we first have to know who owns it.

Thus,

If one values happy healthy children, it follows that one ought not torture them since torture is not conducive with the value of raising a happy healthy child.

I'm afraid not, though. Here are your premises.

1) I value happy children.
2) If I torture children they will not be happy.

These are your premises - statements you simply assert to be true. And I agree that they are true. Now, explain how - by which rules of logic - you can conclude the following given premises 1 and 2? Why does 3 necessarily have to be true given 1 and 2?

3) I ought not torture children.

It's a rhetorical question, the fact of the matter is that there are no rules of logic that allow you do so. 3 does not follow from 1 and 2. The only logical conclusion that can be deduced from 1 and 2 is "I do not value torturing children." That is different than "I ought not torture children". Those statements have different meanings. For example, a nihilist would have no problem admitting the former to be true (people can hold values), but he would dispute the latter.

I still don't see why we have to express #1 in the form of an ought rather than a desire or a goal.

It's because if you apply the rules of logic to a "want-statement" (in this case, "I want happy children") you will always get a conclusion in the form of another "want-statement" (in this case, the conclusion would be "I do not want to torture children"). There is no rule of logic that will take a "want-statement" and transform it into an "ought-statement". Taking a want-statement and "concluding" an ought-statement is faulty logic. 3 is not necessarily true given premises 1 and 2. It does not follow.

This, essentially, is the is-ought problem. No one knows how - or even if - ought statements can be derived from is-statements (and it's a problem for me too).
 
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At least you got the futility of trying to solve this problem or the God hypothesis as human beings. Was it Clarke that pointed out that for us it would all look like magic even though it were only technology? And as far as we understand the limits to our understanding of systems, we probably never will be able to get to the bottom of it in the sense of understanding.

No, I would say the futility is in paying any heed to such incomprehensibility. We can't do anything but try to comprehend the world around us. And the problem is that most people who invoke that, only invoke it when it's convenient for them, esp. when someone is challenging a belief they have about God. Then, suddenly, God is incomprehensible and an unknowable mystery. But then they will quickly turn around and tell you all the things they believe they know, that they comprehend, about the incomprehensible, unknowable God - that he is benevolent, Jesus was his son, the Bible is His word, etc etc. :roll: It's cognitive dissonance. No, the unknown isn't God, it's unknown.
 
That's not true, though. It's not meaningless at all, you understand very well what is meant by the statement "children ought to be happy". If you're talking down the street and a stranger stops you and says "you ought to sign this petition", are you telling me you wouldn't understand what he meant? :confused: Of course not. You understand exactly what the stranger meant: he thinks you should sign some petition to legalize pot or whatever. Now you might ask questions like "Why?" or "Well, what is the petition for?". But you're not asking what the words he uttered meant - you're asking questions to try to ascertain whether you agree with his statement - whether you think it's true that it is in fact a petition you ought to sign.

I never said I didn't understand the statement "children ought to be happy". I just said that the statement is meaningless [unless there was some reason to value the statement]. Instead of talking about children and torturing them, which is so obvious it can be difficult to ponder it objectively, let's take your example.

If I say to you, "you ought sign my petition". There is no grounds for you to believe this is true unless there is something that you value that will come of it by doing so. Clearly there are cases where signing would be "good" and others where signing would be "bad"

Now perhaps we are talking about two different things and I'm simply failing to grasp your point, but if you'll be patient and explain what you mean perhaps we can find out where the disconnect lay.

Moving on....

If I said, here is my petition I want you to sign, how do you decide what to do?

Even if I said I would shoot you if you didn't doesn't allow us to derive any sort of ought from these circumstances. Would you agree?

If you have terminal cancer and are suffering horribly, you may value death more than life, therefore you ought not sign and let me shoot you, but if you do value your life and signing the petition doesn't violate any values you feel outweigh the value of your life, then you ought sign.

So jumping back to the example using children, while I agree that one ought not torture children, it is because I value the life of children (more on this below).

Paraphrasing Sam Harris, values can be reduced to facts about the experiences of sentient creatures. Humans generally desire to be happy, healthy, productive people and given those values there are objectively right and wrong ways in which to proceed.

Now, perhaps this cannot be put into (modal?) logic. If that's the case, do you think that my statements form an untenable philosophical position?


I'm afraid not, though. Here are your premises.

1) I value happy children.
2) If I torture children they will not be happy.

These are your premises - statements you simply assert to be true. And I agree that they are true. Now, explain how - by which rules of logic - you can conclude the following given premises 1 and 2? Why does 3 necessarily have to be true given 1 and 2?

3) I ought not torture children.

It's a rhetorical question, the fact of the matter is that there are no rules of logic that allow you do so. 3 does not follow from 1 and 2. The only logical conclusion that can be deduced from 1 and 2 is "I do not value torturing children." That is different than "I ought not torture children". Those statements have different meanings. For example, a nihilist would have no problem admitting the former to be true (people can hold values), but he would dispute the latter.

It's because if you apply the rules of logic to a "want-statement" (in this case, "I want happy children") you will always get a conclusion in the form of another "want-statement" (in this case, the conclusion would be "I do not want to torture children"). There is no rule of logic that will take a "want-statement" and transform it into an "ought-statement". Taking a want-statement and "concluding" an ought-statement is faulty logic. 3 is not necessarily true given premises 1 and 2. It does not follow.

This, essentially, is the is-ought problem. No one knows how - or even if - ought statements can be derived from is-statements (and it's a problem for me too).

After writing the first half of my response (which I've decided to leave in) I went back, did some reading and thought on it for a while. If what you're saying is that, from a purely sterile point of view, that is, a position devoid of any sort of wants, desires and values, that one cannot elevate any position as superior to another, I am inclined to agree....

But so what? Show me someone, anyone capable of rational thought that does not hold values. It's like saying that birds have no ground upon which to choose flight over walking. I mean, using the logic you've employed, that's true. Yet birds that can fly do because there is value in flying that cannot be achieved by walking. In many cases failure to fly would cause a specie to go extinct. Similarly, falure to hold certain values might cause our species to go extinct.

Regardless of the culture you are from, not eating babies is a good idea. I mean failure to hold this value as a society is so detrimental as to guarantee their own extinction.

Can one say "we ought not go extinct"?

Again I will say that the vast majority of humans wish to be happy, healthy and cooperative and flourish. All societies hold these values as well, and clearly there are objectively right, and objectively wrong ways to accomplish and fail to accomplish these goals.


Thus the is-ought distinction isn't a problem once you can agree that all humans hold values. That healthy people by-and-large would rather be happy, and at the very least not suffer (at least by the unwanted actions of others).

I try to make as few basal assumptions as possible when formulating my ideas.

So far I have 2....

They are:

At least sometimes my senses are true.

Healthy people, at the very least, would rather not suffer (at the very least, without their consent), and the vast majority prefer to be happy.
 
No, I would say the futility is in paying any heed to such incomprehensibility. We can't do anything but try to comprehend the world around us. And the problem is that most people who invoke that, only invoke it when it's convenient for them, esp. when someone is challenging a belief they have about God. Then, suddenly, God is incomprehensible and an unknowable mystery. But then they will quickly turn around and tell you all the things they believe they know, that they comprehend, about the incomprehensible, unknowable God - that he is benevolent, Jesus was his son, the Bible is His word, etc etc. :roll: It's cognitive dissonance. No, the unknown isn't God, it's unknown.

Could be wrong, but I suspect that's not the answer he was expecting.....
 
I think people sometimes put the cart before the horse, or what I mean is, things that are good for us, truly good, (as hard as that may be to identify at times) we ascribe to God. Bad stuff, to the other guy.

So if things are bad, truly bad (...), we don't want those things to happen, unless good things come out of the bad thing, necessarily, in which case we must go through hell to get to heaven. Then we suffer, like Jonah, but strive to get through it.

So you see the problem, ultimatums and stuff, trying to identify something that is very complex and subtle through the use of simple icons. No wonder people get so easily confused.
 
This is an oldie but a goodie



Is god the arbiter of all that is good, in which case he could command murder and it would in fact be good (which makes morals arbitrary), or is god simply the messenger, in which case he is not the foundation of morality, but as I said, simply the messenger.

I asked Logicman to debate morality after he claimed that secular morals have no ground to stand on and I started with the Euthyphro Dilemma as a start. He replied with a link. Generally I don't debate links. Links are ok to provide evidence to back up the claim you're making, but if the best you can do is a link, you're really saying I don't know. Which is ok, I just find it odd that Logicman, being the staunch defender of Christianity that he is, wouldn't have an answer to this question. As far as links go, sum them up in your words, what you believe because I can't debate with a website and if I successfully render your position inferior, I don't want the response to shift the burden back to the creator of the website you linked.

So it is my assertion that "objective morality" or divine command ethics is totally useless as an ethical foundation and can be obliterated by my 10 year old when told that god commands "__________".

But we'll get to that.

Now I'd like to add that this is not an assault on Christianity. I recognize that Christians can be moral as Logicman was gracious enough to admit that non-Christians can also be moral. The debate is simply to see if there is grounds for holding one position over another based on god or secular ideals. Ironically, there is nothing that prevents a Christian form basing their morals on secular grounds and as a matter of fact, I'd argue that most Christians base their morals on sexual grounds without even realizing it.

Now I have to apologize as I'm away on work in the great state of Texas (very flat, insanely hot for the time of the year), so between Monday and Friday I will be a bit slower than usually in my responses.
Its remind me a class in Torah at school when we learned The Book of Genesis, it was about Sodom and Gomorrah. Long story short God wanted to destroy the city because the people there were evils and Abraham tried to convince God to change his mind due to the reason there are good people in the city who deserved to live, he made a very good argument against God, which basically says- you the greatest judge, the one that judging everyone on this planet refuses to do justice, in other words he tells god he is acting in an immoral way. Surprisingly God accepted the criticism and acted according to that.
So I guess there is an independent moral that has nothing to do with God.
 
It is a false dichotomy because there is a third option.


Good is based on God's nature.

God's own character gives the standard of what is good, then reveals that is good to us.
Telling a lie is wrong....because God cannot tell a lie. Period.
Not because He has to discover or learn it is wrong, or that He arbitrarily declared it to be wrong.

Those two options ignore the Biblical option that good is a revelation of the nature of God.


Titus 1:2
In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began;



To a Christian, there is no dilemma.

Neither of those 2 positions mentioned in Euthyphro’s dilemma represents Christian theology.



I'm sorry CSBrown, but I'm not really into Philosophy, unless a subject really interests me.


Well the bible quotes are claims. Can you show those claims are true? Is something Good because God said it is , or does God say it is good because it is good? How do you know what God said is Good, aside from 'a book says so'?
 
Well the bible quotes are claims. Can you show those claims are true? Is something Good because God said it is , or does God say it is good because it is good? How do you know what God said is Good, aside from 'a book says so'?

Your response is irrelevant.

Whether the Bible claims are being questioned to be true or not, is not an issue to a Christian.
The Bible is considered true by a Christian. Therefore....

To a Christian, there is no dilemma.

Anyway, I'm headed out again. I just thought I'd respond to you, is all.
 
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Your response is irrelevant.

Whether the Bible claims are being questioned to be true or not, is not an issue to a Christian.
The Bible is considered true by a Christian. Therefore....

To a Christian, there is no dilemma.

Anyway, I'm headed out again. I just thought I'd respond to you, is all.

This isn't the religion forum, and that is precisely relevant. People, and various religions can make all SORTS of claims. The question is.. can you show that your claims when it comes to objective morality is true??? If you can't, why should anybody believe you?

Why should I consider the bible, particularly the New Testament true?? "The bible is true because it says it is true"??? Circular reasoning doesn't work for me.

And, no matter what the bible says, it does not escape the logic of the dilemma.
 
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This isn't the religion forum, and that is precisely relevant. People, and various religions can make all SORTS of claims. The question is.. can you show that your claims when it comes to objective morality is true??? If you can't, why should anybody believe you?

Why should I consider the bible, particularly the New Testament true?? "The bible is true because it says it is true"??? Circular reasoning doesn't work for me.

And, no matter what the bible says, it does not escape the logic of the dilemma.


The Euthryphro dilemma invokes God (monotheistic religion). It is a religion issue!


Here is the dilemma:

Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?"

However, Christians believe that God IS good. That good is based on God's nature. That's the missing option.

Therefore, to a Christian, it's not a dilemma.


Are you a Christian?



To question whether the Bible is true or false is quite irrelevant. That's not the issue.


Okay, I'm really out of here. I'm starting to get a headache with all the repetition!
 
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The Euthryphro dilemma invokes God (monotheistic religion). It is a religion issue!


Here is the dilemma:



However, Christians believe that God IS good. That good is based on God's nature. That's the missing option.

Therefore, to a Christian, it's not a dilemma.


Are you a Christian?



To question whether the Bible is true or false is quite irrelevant. That's not the issue.


Okay, I'm really out of here. I'm starting to get a headache with all the repetition!

No, I am not a Christian. Your answer does not address the dilemma at all. It avoids it like the plague. Yes, Christians believe 'God is Good'. yet, their belief does not answer the question posed.

Let's look at the Christmas tsunami of a few years ago. Could God have prevented that, and the loss of life that ensued?
Yes or no?
 
The Euthryphro dilemma invokes God (monotheistic religion). It is a religion issue!


Here is the dilemma:



However, Christians believe that God IS good.

I would love to engage you in conversation on this, so it is in that vein that I ask this simple question, How do you know what is good?
 
I would love to engage you in conversation on this, so it is in that vein that I ask this simple question, How do you know what is good?

I simply stated a Christian belief based on the Scriptures. There's no question as to how we know our God is good.
It's faith-based.

I'm not into that kind of philosophical discussion right now. Sorry. Maybe someday...
 
I simply stated a Christian belief based on the Scriptures. There's no question as to how we know our God is good.
It's faith-based.

I'm not into that kind of philosophical discussion right now. Sorry. Maybe someday...
Such mental manipulations are like a void that one gets trapped in, never ending cycle of doubt due to the need for empirical truth. Humans are both rational and irrational, that is what makes us greater than the sum of parts.

In the end, one simply has to make a choice and go with it. Otherwise, you're going nowhere.
 
I never said I didn't understand the statement "children ought to be happy". I just said that the statement is meaningless [unless there was some reason to value the statement]. Instead of talking about children and torturing them, which is so obvious it can be difficult to ponder it objectively, let's take your example.

:confused: How can you understand speech - that is, how can you know what speech means - if it doesn't mean anything (ie, is meaningless)? Speech that is meaningless can never be understood.

If I say to you, "you ought sign my petition". There is no grounds for you to believe this is true unless there is something that you value that will come of it by doing so. Clearly there are cases where signing would be "good" and others where signing would be "bad"

Now perhaps we are talking about two different things and I'm simply failing to grasp your point, but if you'll be patient and explain what you mean perhaps we can find out where the disconnect lay.

If I said, here is my petition I want you to sign, how do you decide what to do?

Even if I said I would shoot you if you didn't doesn't allow us to derive any sort of ought from these circumstances. Would you agree?

If you have terminal cancer and are suffering horribly, you may value death more than life, therefore you ought not sign and let me shoot you, but if you do value your life and signing the petition doesn't violate any values you feel outweigh the value of your life, then you ought sign.

So jumping back to the example using children, while I agree that one ought not torture children, it is because I value the life of children (more on this below).

Our values, desires etc inform our beliefs about what ought to be. But the statement "the recruit believes X ought to happen" or "the recruit values X" is fundamentally different than the statement "X ought to happen". The former is a statement about the way things are (what the recruit's values are, what his beliefs are, the physical state of his brain). The latter is not a statement about the way things are; it's a statement about the way things ought to be.

And yes, we can draw conclusions about society's values, by studying evolution and considering consequences of actions, as you suggest. But that will only inform us of the way things are (that society values X, that society wants X to happen). It does not shed light on whether X actually ought to happen. Only that we believe it or value it.

You're making a leap going from "the_recruit values X" to "the_recruit ought to do X". It does not follow deductively, therefore it is an assumption.

Paraphrasing Sam Harris, values can be reduced to facts about the experiences of sentient creatures. Humans generally desire to be happy, healthy, productive people and given those values there are objectively right and wrong ways in which to proceed.

Now, perhaps this cannot be put into (modal?) logic. If that's the case, do you think that my statements form an untenable philosophical position?

Regarding Sam Harris and the Moral Landscape. You have to keep in mind the intention of his book. The book is essentially an argument against two groups: 1) the religious who claim a monopoly on objective morality and 2) secular skeptics who pooh-pooh the idea of objective morality. Against those two audiences the book works well.

But most philosophers don't even consider it a serious attempt at metaethics. More of a philosophy-lite for readers new to the subject. Sam Harris even includes a footnote where he explains his avoidance of engaging in "academic" philosophy because he simply finds it boring. Which is fine. Most people, I believe, probably find metaethics boring. However, simply choosing to avoid examining certain questions doesn't answer them. Harris never addresses the is-ought problem. He just ignores and sneaks in an assertion (that we ought to maximize well-being/human flourishing). Whether that assertion is true or not is besides the point. It's is-ought problem is a question of whether that assertion can ever be rigorously justified, whether it can ever be more than just an assumption.

After writing the first half of my response (which I've decided to leave in) I went back, did some reading and thought on it for a while. If what you're saying is that, from a purely sterile point of view, that is, a position devoid of any sort of wants, desires and values, that one cannot elevate any position as superior to another, I am inclined to agree....

Even in a world filled with wants and desires and values we cannot conclude that we ought to do X. The only thing we can do is assume that we ought to do X. But that is an assumption. It's not a truth that we can logically deduce from other known facts (even the known fact "we value X").

And this is not a small, technicality I'm pointing out. This is a big ****ing problem in moral philosophy. One of the primary reasons for investigating metaethics is to be able to settle moral disputes. When one person says "we ought to do X" and someone else says "no, we ought to do y". If these are simply assumptions being asserted, we cannot settle the dispute.

But so what? Show me someone, anyone capable of rational thought that does not hold values. It's like saying that birds have no ground upon which to choose flight over walking. I mean, using the logic you've employed, that's true. Yet birds that can fly do because there is value in flying that cannot be achieved by walking. In many cases failure to fly would cause a specie to go extinct. Similarly, falure to hold certain values might cause our species to go extinct.

Yes I agree that everybody holds values, holds beliefs that X ought to happen. Even nihilists. And, yes, this is undoubtedly a product of evolution. But that doesn't have any bearing on the question of whether any such beliefs are true.

Regardless of the culture you are from, not eating babies is a good idea. I mean failure to hold this value as a society is so detrimental as to guarantee their own extinction.

Can one say "we ought not go extinct"?

Again I will say that the vast majority of humans wish to be happy, healthy and cooperative and flourish. All societies hold these values as well, and clearly there are objectively right, and objectively wrong ways to accomplish and fail to accomplish these goals.

Thus the is-ought distinction isn't a problem once you can agree that all humans hold values. That healthy people by-and-large would rather be happy, and at the very least not suffer (at least by the unwanted actions of others).

I try to make as few basal assumptions as possible when formulating my ideas.

So far I have 2....

They are:

At least sometimes my senses are true.

Healthy people, at the very least, would rather not suffer (at the very least, without their consent), and the vast majority prefer to be happy.

But, again, the fact that humans hold values and want to be happy doesn't solve it. Why is it not the case that we ought to minimize happiness and maximize suffering? Why is not the case that we ought to do the exact opposite of our desires? Why is not the case that I ought to maximize my own happiness even if it comes at the detriment to others'? Why is it not the case that we ought to uphold certain rights/duties in spite of its effect on collective happiness? Your bridging of the is-ought problem by going from "all humans value being happy" to "we ought to maximize happiness" is just an assumption. An assumption that many people, myself included to some extent, would contest.
 
This is an oldie but a goodie



Is god the arbiter of all that is good, in which case he could command murder and it would in fact be good (which makes morals arbitrary), or is god simply the messenger, in which case he is not the foundation of morality, but as I said, simply the messenger.

I asked Logicman to debate morality after he claimed that secular morals have no ground to stand on and I started with the Euthyphro Dilemma as a start. He replied with a link. Generally I don't debate links. Links are ok to provide evidence to back up the claim you're making, but if the best you can do is a link, you're really saying I don't know. Which is ok, I just find it odd that Logicman, being the staunch defender of Christianity that he is, wouldn't have an answer to this question. As far as links go, sum them up in your words, what you believe because I can't debate with a website and if I successfully render your position inferior, I don't want the response to shift the burden back to the creator of the website you linked.

So it is my assertion that "objective morality" or divine command ethics is totally useless as an ethical foundation and can be obliterated by my 10 year old when told that god commands "__________".

But we'll get to that.

Now I'd like to add that this is not an assault on Christianity. I recognize that Christians can be moral as Logicman was gracious enough to admit that non-Christians can also be moral. The debate is simply to see if there is grounds for holding one position over another based on god or secular ideals. Ironically, there is nothing that prevents a Christian form basing their morals on secular grounds and as a matter of fact, I'd argue that most Christians base their morals on sexual grounds without even realizing it.

Now I have to apologize as I'm away on work in the great state of Texas (very flat, insanely hot for the time of the year), so between Monday and Friday I will be a bit slower than usually in my responses.

Please don't ask Logicman stuff, he's only gonna respond to links, and he doens't read them, and he cites scriptures that he hasn't read ...

Anyway.

WHen it comes to Euthyphro's dilemma.

God is held by his own morality which is inherent to himself ....

It isn't arbitrary, anymore than it's arbitrary that a mother loves her child even though she can't really help it.

So for example could God command murder and it be good? Not arbitrarily, he God commands someone to be killed it has to be consistant With his internal morality, so christians that say "God can do whatever he wants, whenever he wants" are simply wrong theologically ... God Cannot lie, for example.

God does not make morals arbitrarily nor is he the messanger for a seperate standard, he upholds the morality which is inherent in him ...

A mother who loves her child, expresses that love, but that love is part of her, she doesn't choose to arbitrarily, but nor is she forced by some outside force ... it's part of who she is.
 
"Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?"
Euthyphro dilemma - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

I dont think we have any idea what God would or wouldn't find moral. Or if God would find anything moral at all. Morality is defined by humans based on human needs.
 
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