Cyber Tests Showed 'Nearly All' New Pentagon Weapons Vulnerable To Attack, GAO Says

Cyber Tests Showed 'Nearly All' New Pentagon Weapons Vulnerable To Attack, GAO Says

10/9/18
Passwords that took seconds to guess, or were never changed from their factory settings. Cyber vulnerabilities that were known, but never fixed. Those are two common problems plaguing some of the Department of Defense's newest weapons systems, according to the Government Accountability Office. The flaws are highlighted in a new GAO report, which found the Pentagon is "just beginning to grapple" with the scale of vulnerabilities in its weapons systems. Drawing data from cybersecurity tests conducted on Department of Defense weapons systems from 2012 to 2017, the report says that by using "relatively simple tools and techniques, testers were able to take control of systems and largely operate undetected" because of basic security vulnerabilities. The GAO says the problems were widespread: "DOD testers routinely found mission critical cyber vulnerabilities in nearly all weapon systems that were under development." When weapons program officials were asked about the weaknesses, the GAO says, they "believed their systems were secure and discounted some test results as unrealistic." The stakes are high. As the GAO notes, "DOD plans to spend about $1.66 trillion to develop its current portfolio of major weapon systems." That outlay also comes as the military has increased its use of computerized systems, automation and connectivity.

In several instances, simply scanning the weapons' computer systems caused parts of them to shut down. "One test had to be stopped due to safety concerns after the test team scanned the system," the GAO says. "This is a basic technique that most attackers would use and requires little knowledge or expertise." When problems were identified, they were often left unresolved. The GAO cites a test report in which only one of 20 vulnerabilities that were previously found had been addressed. When asked why all of the problems had not been fixed, "program officials said they had identified a solution, but for some reason it had not been implemented. They attributed it to contractor error," the GAO says. One issue facing the Pentagon, the GAO says, is the loss of key personnel who are lured by lucrative offers to work in the private sector after they've gained cybersecurity experience. In a recent hearing on the U.S. military's cyber readiness held by the Senate Armed Services Committee, officials acknowledged intense competition for engineers.

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Not good at all. Connected weapon systems are only as good as their cyber-security defenses.

Related: GAO | Weapon Systems Cybersecurity: DOD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of Vulnerabilities

It must be so hard for the MIC to fleece the taxpayers with all these distractions.

One way to crash some computers is as simple as trying to guess a password too many times. The system will then shut itself down as a self-defense and in doing so eliminates the system itself. It is not necessary to hack a system to disable it when you can get it to turn itself off.

Being able to hack military systems on the fly in a combat environment would be an epic challenge but not impossible, for it to be feasable there would have to be major holes in security. In reality trying to hack into a missile defense system or hack f-35 communications or anything else would be very unlikely as simple ew like jamming signals would be far more devastating, instant, and unblockable.

Rogue Valley said:

Not good at all. Connected weapon systems are only as good as their cyber-security defenses.

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The best solution is to simply cut all the cables in the first place.

Here is how you can tell the difference between different generations of equipment. Today, it is almost like they are creating aircraft to be converted into drones in the future. They have so many systems that talk to outside systems I wonder what the pilot is there for, and how they do not blaze in the skies with all the RF they must be throwing out.

I say we go back old-school. Stop making systems to communicate, other than very basic information to a higher echelon. Letting Brigade see the RADAR from a PATRIOT system is one thing, but there should never be any kind of capability allowing them to step in and "backseat drive" the system.

Far to much equipment to me seems to be designed with those kinds of features, and that is the wrong way to go for military equipment. There should be no way any systems can be hacked because they were never designed to ever accept anything from an outside source in the first place.

And any system that does should be (say a composite RADAR feed) should be completely and utter cut-off from any other systems in the equipment. It should never talk to navigation, fire control, or anything else. That way, at most they only hack that feed, and not the equipment itself.

But some egghead thought that integrating the composite feed with the navigation RADAR and GPS system might help the pilot, thereby compromising the entire aircraft, ship, or other equipment.

As a career IT individual I love things being interconnected. But more and more it is this interconnection that is making us vulnerable.

To get an idea, watch the remake of Battlestar Galactica. All of their highest tech stuff failed, because it was connected. The only equipment that did not was the old junk, which had none of this connection in its design.

Yes, it was obsolete. But it was not vulnerable to "hacking".

beerftw said:

Being able to hack military systems on the fly in a combat environment would be an epic challenge but not impossible, for it to be feasable there would have to be major holes in security. In reality trying to hack into a missile defense system or hack f-35 communications or anything else would be very unlikely as simple ew like jamming signals would be far more devastating, instant, and unblockable.

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Oh, it can be much more simple than that.

Part of the problem is that more and more systems are relying upon other systems to provide them data. The F-117 for example had no RADAR at all, but relied upon getting a feed from other sources to assist in targeting and navigation.

But it was only a 1-way feed. Today, they are designing such systems to be 2-way.

Which on paper sounds great. On paper, the F-16 pilot will be able to take RADAR information and share it with the F-18 pilot, to extend their range. But this 2-direction capability adds more security because it is bidirectional. It is much more vulnerable.

This is also why even though the original PATRIOT launchers from 1980 had the capability to link via encrypted RADIO, we always did it with fiberoptic cables. We know that if a "hot war" ever developed there would be no way to guarantee our radio communications, and cables are proof from such interception and digital manipulation.

To this day I have my Wi-Fi at home shut off, and rely upon hardwire links to my home computers. But as a joke, I have an old broken router hooked up to nothing I leave up, to give the hackers something to "break into".

As much as I am a technophile, I detest the way so many think the military should rush into the "newest gadgets" and ideas. Drones, automating all forms of operations between systems, I see it as a disaster in the making.

Oozlefinch said:

Oh, it can be much more simple than that.

Part of the problem is that more and more systems are relying upon other systems to provide them data. The F-117 for example had no RADAR at all, but relied upon getting a feed from other sources to assist in targeting and navigation.

But it was only a 1-way feed. Today, they are designing such systems to be 2-way.

Which on paper sounds great. On paper, the F-16 pilot will be able to take RADAR information and share it with the F-18 pilot, to extend their range. But this 2-direction capability adds more security because it is bidirectional. It is much more vulnerable.

This is also why even though the original PATRIOT launchers from 1980 had the capability to link via encrypted RADIO, we always did it with fiberoptic cables. We know that if a "hot war" ever developed there would be no way to guarantee our radio communications, and cables are proof from such interception and digital manipulation.

To this day I have my Wi-Fi at home shut off, and rely upon hardwire links to my home computers. But as a joke, I have an old broken router hooked up to nothing I leave up, to give the hackers something to "break into".

As much as I am a technophile, I detest the way so many think the military should rush into the "newest gadgets" and ideas. Drones, automating all forms of operations between systems, I see it as a disaster in the making.

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One thing I have always wondered is with digital or analog communications linking equipment, how long before america china and russia start making missiles that lock onto radio and digital guidance much like anti radiation missiles lock onto source of radar.

On patriots cables are a good idea. Russia has linked their missile defenses going back to the 1950's and I am sure it was a concern even then, radio could be jammed or they would need cables to transmit data. The russians still use radio on their newest systems like pantsir and torm2 but now they like to have part of the system in the open and part hidden, so the open system can tell the hidden system to fire without ever using it's own radar.

beerftw said:

One thing I have always wondered is with digital or analog communications linking equipment, how long before america china and russia start making missiles that lock onto radio and digital guidance much like anti radiation missiles lock onto source of radar.

On patriots cables are a good idea. Russia has linked their missile defenses going back to the 1950's and I am sure it was a concern even then, radio could be jammed or they would need cables to transmit data. The russians still use radio on their newest systems like pantsir and torm2 but now they like to have part of the system in the open and part hidden, so the open system can tell the hidden system to fire without ever using it's own radar.

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We are similar. In fact, PATRIOT was the first system designed from the onset to be operated remotely without cables. But the thing is, we never do that unless we absolutely have to. The radio linking is used as the back-up, in the event for some reason a cable fails and there is not enough time to run another one.

And this is also why I do not trust drones as much as so many in here do. I have a good idea the jamming capabilities of the Russians, and they are formidable. A pilot in the air or a tank crew on the ground can loose all coms, and still perform their mission. A drone which looses it's coms instantly becomes worthless.

And we have seen that in action in Syria. Many people are correct when they claim part of the Russian purpose in Syria was to test out new equipment. We saw that in 2014 when they jammed Ukrainian drones, and we saw this last April when they jammed our drones.

Heck, even Iran has been able to not only jam, but actually hijack one of our drones, causing it to crash in their own territory so they could analyze it.

"Radio Guidance" is a much more difficult thing, since modern weapons really do not use radio for that purpose. Even though the name still sticks, almost all such weapons actually use LASER to designate and target a target. While still attached to the vehicle it is paired to the frequency and skip rates of the targeting LASER. It then follows that light beam to the target, and no amount of signal interference will stop this from happening.

Unlike the older systems, once it is launched it stops communicating with the launch vehicle. It only "sees the light", and follows that light to the target. And that LASER source can be the launch vehicle itself, or from a remote designator based on land (we have been doing this with the COPPERHEAD for over 40 years now).

Radio is largely obsolete for any kind of weapon designation other than by drones (which have no choice). For manned systems, that technology was only used until LASER systems were perfected in the 1970's.

And the radios in such systems as SAM sites being used for detection is really not that much of an issue. When used as back-up, they are all used at a low power setting, because most of the equipment is rarely over 200 meters away. And for longer distance communications (like say different SAM batteries talking to the Battalion CP) they use microwave relays which are directional and line of sight to both extend the range, and reduce the amount of EM leakage.



The OE-349 Antenna Mast Group is a cool piece of equipment. In addition to the regular omnidirectional antennas you would expect to find on an "antenna truck", it has 2 100 foot masts, each housing 2 independent 4kw dish antennas. And they can be used for short range tropospheric communication (atmospheric skip) in addition to LOS. And each one maintains communications between all 4 firing batteries as well as the Battalion CP.

And because they are essentially directed microwave relays, the risks of their being intercepted and jammed is much lower. But they are in no way needed for a battery to operate, they are part of the C&C system for Battalion level and higher operations.

But all communication has been digital for decades. The last "analog" radio we regularly used was the PRC-77, which was largely retired after the Gulf War. But even it is still sometimes used for communications in vehicles and command posts, since the "Prick 77" has the capability to use digital signaling and cryptographic signaling when other modules are added. Most units still maintain them, as a backup in the event a modern CINCGARS radio fails.