• This is a political forum that is non-biased/non-partisan and treats every person's position on topics equally. This debate forum is not aligned to any political party. In today's politics, many ideas are split between and even within all the political parties. Often we find ourselves agreeing on one platform but some topics break our mold. We are here to discuss them in a civil political debate. If this is your first visit to our political forums, be sure to check out the RULES. Registering for debate politics is necessary before posting. Register today to participate - it's free!

If they needed to fend off war with RF, US military leaders worry they might not get there in time

Tangmo said:
No need to wait thx. Nato would not be ignoring their ground forces. It isn't a strategy. It is rather what is in your post from the moon thx anyway.
Click to expand...

Well let me put it simply, your air/sea doctrine seems to focus on attacking all of the soviet unions strengths and ignoring their weaknesses, granted the soviet union no longer exists, but russia for the most part still uses the same doctrine.

Sound doctrine is to exploit their weaknesses while avoiding going head on with their strong points, while leaving a fair amount of flexibility to counter their deception, things like russia would make an invasion of germany look imminent while actually focusing elsewhere, or making their weakpoints look strong while hiding their best assets altogether.

competant military advisors in nato also play for the variable of maskirovka, aka deception. The whole air sea battle focuses on where the russians will not be and puts little though on russian deception, to make you think they are going one way while are are really going the other, actual cold war strategists are aware of such plans and plan themselves accordingly.
 
Tangmo said:
No need to wait thx. Nato would not be ignoring their ground forces. It isn't a strategy. It is rather what is in your post from the moon thx anyway.
Click to expand...

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)

Inspired by the AirLand Battle concept, the United States Navy and Air Force are working on a new AirSea Battle doctrine

A version was codified in a 2009 Navy-Air Force classified memo which addressed "asymmetrical threats" in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf, which are seen as meaning China and Iran. The Pentagon has created a China Integration Team composed of U.S. Navy officers to apply AirSea Battle lessons to a potential conflict with China. In 2010 the Obama Administration declared that freedom of maritime navigation in the South China Sea, whose islands are claimed variously by China, Vietnam, Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, and the Philippines, is a U.S. national interest. The comment was seen as a response to a Chinese official stating the region was a "core interest" of Chinese sovereignty.
 
Jredbaron96 said:
You have the incredible ability to throw up a ton of words and yet say absolutely nothing of note or value.

The 8th Guards Army and 1st Guards Tank Army would've done nothing more than combine with Czechoslovakian forces to apply pressure against CENTAG without actually trying to rupture the defensive boundaries of the US VII Corps and the German II Corps.

The real battle would've been against NORTHAG, where the Soviets would've certainly established at least three fronts to attack NORTHAG, using Polish and East German divisions to shore up their own 3rd Shock Army, 20th Guards Army, and 2nd Guards Tank Army. They would've attacked against the German and Dutch I Corps, where they could collapse the corps boundaries by attacking on two axis of advance, opening up an advance into NATO's rear echelon and putting them on the Weser within 3 days.
Click to expand...


There are a lot of gaps of understanding being opened at the thread. It is a good revelation so I'm not complaining. Because it establishes there's a lot of work to be done by the armchair generals who haven't any formal education or relevant background in strategy and national security studies.

As to your post there's nothing really wrong with it. The NORTHAG, 2nd Guards, two axis of advance along three fronts to include Nato's rear echelon are stock and trade stuff. So the best aspect of the post is that it quits in the matter of the geographic and topographical gap in military planning and engagement. I'm pleased indeed that we've closed one gap of understanding over there.

You know of course Nato during the cold war and into the present wants first and foremost to stop the Russians before they reach the channel. The strategy sounds deceptively simple yet it means Nato would need to shut down your vaunted North Europe Plan of invasion that is so precious in Moscow. Shutting down the Russians before they can access the channel is number one at Nato and it is doable indeed. With that accomplished the US-led Nato can regain lost territories east to the Russian border. Nato can stop at the Russian border because why continue into a devastated Russia. Nato hasn't any need to extend offensive operations onto Russian soil although at that point it would be a Sunday drive through the countryside for 'em to do. Buy some souvenirs kind of thingy.

Indeed, while Putin, were he to invade Europe would be dancing a jig for the first two weeks, the next two weeks would be hell on wheels, wings and from hulls raging against him. He and his chum Trump could then retire to obscurity at a Black Sea dacha. It would be another real world instance of all's well that ends well. Close up the gaps so to speak.
 
Tangmo said:
There are a lot of gaps of understanding being opened at the thread. It is a good revelation so I'm not complaining. Because it establishes there's a lot of work to be done by the armchair generals who haven't any formal education or relevant background in strategy and national security studies.

As to your post there's nothing really wrong with it. The NORTHAG, 2nd Guards, two axis of advance along three fronts to include Nato's rear echelon are stock and trade stuff. So the best aspect of the post is that it quits in the matter of the geographic and topographical gap in military planning and engagement. I'm pleased indeed that we've closed one gap of understanding over there.

You know of course Nato during the cold war and into the present wants first and foremost to stop the Russians before they reach the channel. The strategy sounds deceptively simple yet it means Nato would need to shut down your vaunted North Europe Plan of invasion that is so precious in Moscow. Shutting down the Russians before they can access the channel is number one at Nato and it is doable indeed. With that accomplished the US-led Nato can regain lost territories east to the Russian border. Nato can stop at the Russian border because why continue into a devastated Russia. Nato hasn't any need to extend offensive operations onto Russian soil although at that point it would be a Sunday drive through the countryside for 'em to do. Buy some souvenirs kind of thingy.

Indeed, while Putin, were he to invade Europe would be dancing a jig for the first two weeks, the next two weeks would be hell on wheels, wings and from hulls raging against him. He and his chum Trump could then retire to obscurity at a Black Sea dacha. It would be another real world instance of all's well that ends well. Close up the gaps so to speak.
Click to expand...

Regurgitation is not understanding...
 
beerftw said:
Well let me put it simply, your air/sea doctrine seems to focus on attacking all of the soviet unions strengths and ignoring their weaknesses, granted the soviet union no longer exists, but russia for the most part still uses the same doctrine.

Sound doctrine is to exploit their weaknesses while avoiding going head on with their strong points, while leaving a fair amount of flexibility to counter their deception, things like russia would make an invasion of germany look imminent while actually focusing elsewhere, or making their weakpoints look strong while hiding their best assets altogether.

competant military advisors in nato also play for the variable of maskirovka, aka deception. The whole air sea battle focuses on where the russians will not be and puts little though on russian deception, to make you think they are going one way while are are really going the other, actual cold war strategists are aware of such plans and plan themselves accordingly.
Click to expand...


AirSea Battle isn't my doctrine thx anyway although I'd be proud as a pigeon to brand my name to it. SecDef Bob Gates got it going when he asked Navy and Air Force to devise ways to defeat Chinese and Russian -- to include Iran -- new Anti-Access and Area Denial weapons platforms that are designed to keep the US land air and sea forces away from their homeland, out of range and ineffective. It is also called A2/AD. AirSea Battle is now called the Joint Access Concept to the Global Commons after Army and Marines wrongly claimed ASB sounds like only Navy and AF doing it. As you and others who get hung up on buzzwords can see, I prefer ASB to the JAC-GC Pentagonese.

US armed forces commanders are pretty good at deception. For one thingy they learned a lot right here at home during the Indian Wars. Pershing outmaneuvered the Germans by showing up suddenly under their noses. Ike put Patton opposite Callas with rubber tanks and artillery pieces while the invasion force launched into Normandy. MacArthur landed suddenly at Inchon which put him right up Kim's arse. Gen. McCaffrey's "Left Hook" of Desert Storm while Gen. Schwarzkopf put decoy Marine forces off the coast of Kuwait wiped out 100 Iraqi divisions in a hundred hours and gave Saddam the Highway of Death back to Baghdad. It's the ancient art of deception in warfare and everyone has their ways about it.

Russian maskirovka btw isn't working too well as they've applied it to elections in the USA and to their boy Donald Trump. Putin hasn't engaged his vaunted S-500 air defense system in Syria either despite a lot of bluster about it. The Russian S-500 Nato designation is The Growler because it makes so much noise once the Russians crank it up. Tough to bear over there, we know.
 
Last edited:
Rogue Valley said:
Melania Trump (nee Knavs) is from Slovenia, which is nowhere near Latvia.

Geezuz lol.
Click to expand...

You know, you could have just politely corrected me on my mistake instead of laughing at me about it.
...that IS what "lol" means.
 
Tangmo said:
AirSea Battle isn't my doctrine thx anyway although I'd be proud as a pigeon to brand my name to it. SecDef Bob Gates got it going when he asked Navy and Air Force to devise ways to defeat Chinese and Russian -- to include Iran -- new Anti-Access and Area Denial weapons platforms that are designed to keep the US land air and sea forces away from their homeland, out of range and ineffective. It is also called A2/AD. AirSea Battle is now called the Joint Access Concept to the Global Commons after Army and Marines wrongly claimed ASB sounds like only Navy and AF doing it. As you and others who get hung up on buzzwords can see, I prefer ASB to the JAC-GC Pentagonese.

US armed forces commanders are pretty good at deception. For one thingy they learned a lot right here at home during the Indian Wars. Pershing outmaneuvered the Germans by showing up suddenly under their noses. Ike put Patton opposite Callas with rubber tanks and artillery pieces while the invasion force launched into Normandy. MacArthur landed suddenly at Inchon which put him right up Kim's arse. Gen. McCaffrey's "Left Hook" of Desert Storm while Gen. Schwarzkopf put decoy Marine forces off the coast of Kuwait wiped out 100 Iraqi divisions in a hundred hours and gave Saddam the Highway of Death back to Baghdad. It's the ancient art of deception in warfare and everyone has their ways about it.

Russian maskirovka btw isn't working too well as they've applied it to elections in the USA and to their boy Donald Trump. Putin hasn't engaged his vaunted S-500 air defense system in Syria either despite a lot of bluster about it. The Russian S-500 Nato designation is The Growler because it makes so much noise once the Russians crank it up. Tough to bear over there, we know.
Click to expand...

As already pointed out to you, jam-gc focuses on the pacific, a2/ad however seems to be a generic term thrown around nato and us forces, and many us and nato forces have complained because they try and push it off as a one size fits all strategy when in reality it is not, what would work against china will not work against russia or vice versa, different doctrines and military structures.

A2/ad is also a term long used, it literally means area denial, a known tactic going back long before even the middle ages, in modern times anti aircraft missile defenses, mines, anti shipping missiles etc cover the same purpose, and nearly every single military on earth has some form of a2/ad strategy. However the one you bring up would seem to be the most innefective strategy to halt russia, while another poster pointed out the strategy was geared towards iran/china where the strategy would make sense.

Putin has not engaged the s-500 because it is not ready, it has undergone successful testing however no matter how much any country promises some new weapon at a certain time, r&d reality slaps them on the face, it may have been successful in testing, but may have found numerous bugs in timing of software, parts that were prone to failure or whatever, other than parades you will not likely see them in action anywhere for atleast a few years other than in parades. They have delays with the t-14 armata as well, They claimed they were ready but they are still only ordering small numbers for test purposes, meaning they have to many bugs or flaws needed to be fixed before they become a main service tank.
 
beerftw said:
As already pointed out to you, jam-gc focuses on the pacific, a2/ad however seems to be a generic term thrown around nato and us forces, and many us and nato forces have complained because they try and push it off as a one size fits all strategy when in reality it is not, what would work against china will not work against russia or vice versa, different doctrines and military structures.

A2/ad is also a term long used, it literally means area denial, a known tactic going back long before even the middle ages, in modern times anti aircraft missile defenses, mines, anti shipping missiles etc cover the same purpose, and nearly every single military on earth has some form of a2/ad strategy. However the one you bring up would seem to be the most innefective strategy to halt russia, while another poster pointed out the strategy was geared towards iran/china where the strategy would make sense.

Putin has not engaged the s-500 because it is not ready, it has undergone successful testing however no matter how much any country promises some new weapon at a certain time, r&d reality slaps them on the face, it may have been successful in testing, but may have found numerous bugs in timing of software, parts that were prone to failure or whatever, other than parades you will not likely see them in action anywhere for atleast a few years other than in parades. They have delays with the t-14 armata as well, They claimed they were ready but they are still only ordering small numbers for test purposes, meaning they have to many bugs or flaws needed to be fixed before they become a main service tank.
Click to expand...


The first two paragraphs may be informative to some but it is old news here and in other quarters. This is true of the post itself in fact. It is old news also that governments conceal their newest and most deadly weapons to surprise the enemy if war does occur. AirSea Battle is super aggressive, i.e, it is designed to penetrate the enemy's defenses deep into its territory to destroy command, control, communications and military facilities. ASB is fifth generation warfare and it is a prelude to the 6GW the USA is developing.

So let's look at some actual news....


The Russian Way of War: Implications for the U.S. Army

United States Army War College
Carlyle Barracks Pennsylvania 2017

In Crimea, Donbass, Aleppo, and over the English Channel, Russia is using its still modernizing military to (re)gain territory, secure geopolitical access and influence, convey geopolitical strength domestically and internationally, and test the political resolve of others. While the Russians pose a real military threat to the United States and many European countries, the U.S. Army should ensure it prepares against Russian –- and not Soviet –- forces. This paper builds on tactical and operational analyses of how Russians approach war against a competing power to outline strategic implications for the U.S. Army. The paper concludes that understanding how Russians approach war, while keeping Russian successes and problems in context, will allow U.S. leaders to pursue military and political policies that maintain respect for this resurgent Russian power without overestimating Russia’s military and a resurgent and revanchist Russia, threatening imminently the Baltics and NATO’s and Europe’s resolve.

For instance, a 2016 U.S. Army War College report outlines ways Russia could undermine NATO, and then uses insights from a senior Lithuanian general to press for urgent NATO action in the Baltics: “'There is a race for the Baltics, the side which comes first with substantial forces will prevail. To prevent conflict, there must be strength and resolve.’ If NATO acts with determination, war can be averted and peace preserved. However, the window of opportunity for the Allies is closing.

http://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3381.pdf


If as we suspect Trump in his secret meeting with Putin in Helsinki gave the strictly confidential go-ahead to Putin taking unopposed military action against the Baltics in the same manner as he did in Ukraine, then we can expect the military commanders and civilian under secretaries in the Pentagon to assume command of the national security, defenses, sovereignty. Because it will have become one hundred percent certain Potus Trump will have abandoned the whole of it across the globe to include of course northeast Asia. And turned Europe over to Putin.
 
Last edited:
Tangmo said:
The first two paragraphs may be informative to some but it is old news here and in other quarters. This is true of the post itself in fact. It is old news also that governments conceal their newest and most deadly weapons to surprise the enemy if war does occur. AirSea Battle is super aggressive, i.e, it is designed to penetrate the enemy's defenses deep into its territory to destroy command, control, communications and military facilities. ASB is fifth generation warfare and it is a prelude to the 6GW the USA is developing.
Click to expand...

Constant use of an obsolete term suggests obsolete thinking.
 
Anyone who might try to impress or awe Americans with the Russian way of war needs to include the American way of war. US armed forces are currently in the Fifth Generation of Warfare moving toward the Sixth Generation of Warfare. The present, latter, generations of warfare are led by and defined by the United States. USA strategic adversaries and Their Fanboyz have to deal with the fact and the reality. We are referencing of course Russia, China, Iran, North Korea. Russia is the greatest adversary because of the Putin-Trump Fanboyz Putin has in the USA homeland, to include of course Potus himself first and foremost.

The Fourth Generation of Warfare which is insurgency aka terrorism is being dealt with and 4GW is being dealt with by US armed forces to the point we no longer need to be overly concerned about the our safety in the homeland. Now however the big powers are reasserting themselves. Hence 5GW and the developing 6GW. SecDef Mattis is for instance focused on the increased lethality of precision weapons of all kind.


Defining fifth generation warfare

When did 5GW actually start? Non-contact warfare suggests that you destroy a specific target without a human directly seeing it. If that is correct, then 5GW techniques started with long-range artillery and naval gunfire using rifled-barrel weapons. Or you could say the Norden bomb site might qualify. Or, you could also say that the German V-1 and V-2 buzz bombs over England started this generation of warfare. In a very broad sense, these are all good candidates.

To read Warfare Evolution Blog Part 1 click here, for Part 2 here, here for Part 3, for part 4 click here.

But let’s add one new requirement: precision accuracy. That would narrow it down to laser and GPS-guided weapons. In that case, we would only need to go back to 1968, when the first laser-guided bombs were dropped in Vietnam. Or to the Falkland Island dispute in 1982, when the Argentinians fired three French-made Cruise missiles and hit two British destroyers and another of their ships. But, the best example is the use of drones to deliver Hellfire missiles against specific human targets

So the trend is evident: more machines attacking our enemies from the skies, on the seas, and on the ground, with fewer soldiers directly involved in the fight. That means, of course, that our war machines have to get smarter. As Sun Tzu said in “The Art of War”: “The best victory is when the opponent surrenders of its own accord before there are any actual hostilities….it is best to win without fighting.” How can we force that event? By shrouding our enemies in a dense thick “fog of war”, even before battles begin. How is that done? By manipulating space and time so that our enemies realize that any battle plan is futile. That leads us to 6GW.

Defining fifth generation warfare - Military Embedded Systems



Because reading and writing are a unified task.
 
Last edited:
Tangmo said:
The first two paragraphs may be informative to some but it is old news here and in other quarters. This is true of the post itself in fact. It is old news also that governments conceal their newest and most deadly weapons to surprise the enemy if war does occur. AirSea Battle is super aggressive, i.e, it is designed to penetrate the enemy's defenses deep into its territory to destroy command, control, communications and military facilities. ASB is fifth generation warfare and it is a prelude to the 6GW the USA is developing.

So let's look at some actual news....


The Russian Way of War: Implications for the U.S. Army

United States Army War College
Carlyle Barracks Pennsylvania 2017


If as we suspect Trump in his secret meeting with Putin in Helsinki gave the strictly confidential go-ahead to Putin taking unopposed military action against the Baltics in the same manner as he did in Ukraine, then we can expect the military commanders and civilian under secretaries in the Pentagon to assume command of the national security, defenses, sovereignty. Because it will have become one hundred percent certain Potus Trump will have abandoned the whole of it across the globe to include of course northeast Asia. And turned Europe over to Putin.
Click to expand...

For air sea battle you might need to research the soviet and even now modern air defense systems, russias air defense around their military and comman infrastructure is so well guarded being aggressive would do nothing to shut down their command, it would lead to the biggest defeat for us and nato air military power. Keep in mind russia does not put them there in hopes of shooting down masses of aircraft, but rather in hopes no country would be stupid enough to do what you propose, it is a deterrent to keep other aircraft from doing what you claim is the strategy.

Now air defenses are not unstoppable, israel has shown that, however aggressive is not the correct term, infact it would be cautious, as even with missiles that are designed to destroy air defence batteries, they would need to fly low and launch them out of radar range for the enemy, doing such requires quite a lot of time especially given how modern and massive the russian airspace is defended atleast at any point of interest. The same would go with their navy, their navy would use subs and land launched aircraft for an offensive, and use their ships in a bottlenecked area supported by land launched aircraft, they would likely focus around the crimea area and the small opening in the baltic, making any aggressive movement impossible, they would defend the entry points by sea and deny any quick advance by air.


Second paragraph we need to project strength to deter, umm no, you need a good strategy to win, and the best strategy is not to get into that kind of war in the first place. However if such a war came about just projecting strength means little, it is how effective that strength is at achieving goals. A good example would be the war between yemen rebels and saudi/uae, the side with barefoot rebels with antique gear is pushing back and in the upper hand of the war, despite the saudis having the third largest military budget, the even exceeded russia. What they lacked is any military doctrine that is sufficient, trained soldiers since they mostly use mercenaries with the most expensive gear on earth, and worst of all they lack a coherent strategy, they pretty much charged in like having enough f-15's and abrahms tanks would make their enemy fall over, only to find they had no idea how to handle fightng them.


On your last paragraph, hahahahaha really? If putin invaded the baltic nato states there would be war whether trump wanted to approve of war or not, granted russia would easily take the baltics, they would not go unapposed in the baltics and they would be fighting other nato states even if they just stopped at the baltics, who would win is a roll of the dice but saying there would be no resistance is crazy, finland alone would give russia massive resistance, probably more then the rest of the baltic states combined, I hardly see that as unnapposed.
 
Due to all the text promoting erroneously the Russian way of war as superior to that of USA I must needs be brief -- certainly relatively so.

I said Putin replicate in the Baltics his approach in Ukraine -- I said nothing about Russia "invading" the Baltics. You are completely lost in these matters that are just plain and flat out above your pay grade.

The first paragraph of your post #137 ignores that the AirSea Battle doctrine of the US focuses on launching missiles and rockets. The precept of ASB is twofold: not to match or to shoot down every arrow shot by the Chinese or the Russians, but rather to penetrate their modern A2/AD defense platforms and systems to go deep into the enemy mainland. ASB destroys the enemy's remote centers of command, control, communications. With the enemy's 3C destroyed there will be no more arrows from 'em. ASB thus overcomes the obvious US military weakness of being deployed in offensive operations at China, at Russia, or at Iran or NK. Any one of 'em -- China and Russia in particular -- have thousands of A2/AD missiles to launch from their own territory while US forces positioned off their border have a limited number of missiles. Which brings us to your paragraph number two.

ASB is aggressive. I'm not referring to A2/AD systems that are or must be aggressive. You've got the idea backwards. Your paragraph talks wrong headedly that the A2/AD systems needn't be aggressive to succeed. While that can be true, that's not where we are in the discussion. ASB critics say the doctrine is too aggressive because ASB controls escalation. Most of us think controlling escalation in a conflict is a good idea. So if the enemy escalates as his A2/AD are degraded or destroyed the ASB launches even more lethal warheads transported at still greater speeds such as faster than 7 miles per second (it's classified but it's more like nine mps). If the enemy escalates to tactical nuclear warheads ASB is loaded for bear or becomes a dragonslayer.

You failed besides to address generational warfare. USA determines the modern generations of warfare, specifically, the extant 5GW, while US is developing 6GW to control space and time in battle. The 6GW timewarp is real and is it here yet no country is even close to the USA in 6GW. AirSea Battle has been a major stepping stone to 6GW. So methinks we ought to try ASB sometime. I'm sure we'd like it.
 
Tangmo said:
Due to all the text promoting erroneously the Russian way of war as superior to that of USA I must needs be brief -- certainly relatively so.

I said Putin replicate in the Baltics his approach in Ukraine -- I said nothing about Russia "invading" the Baltics. You are completely lost in these matters that are just plain and flat out above your pay grade.

The first paragraph of your post #137 ignores that the AirSea Battle doctrine of the US focuses on launching missiles and rockets. The precept of ASB is twofold: not to match or to shoot down every arrow shot by the Chinese or the Russians, but rather to penetrate their modern A2/AD defense platforms and systems to go deep into the enemy mainland. ASB destroys the enemy's remote centers of command, control, communications. With the enemy's 3C destroyed there will be no more arrows from 'em. ASB thus overcomes the obvious US military weakness of being deployed in offensive operations at China, at Russia, or at Iran or NK. Any one of 'em -- China and Russia in particular -- have thousands of A2/AD missiles to launch from their own territory while US forces positioned off their border have a limited number of missiles. Which brings us to your paragraph number two.

ASB is aggressive. I'm not referring to A2/AD systems that are or must be aggressive. You've got the idea backwards. Your paragraph talks wrong headedly that the A2/AD systems needn't be aggressive to succeed. While that can be true, that's not where we are in the discussion. ASB critics say the doctrine is too aggressive because ASB controls escalation. Most of us think controlling escalation in a conflict is a good idea. So if the enemy escalates as his A2/AD are degraded or destroyed the ASB launches even more lethal warheads transported at still greater speeds such as faster than 7 miles per second (it's classified but it's more like nine mps). If the enemy escalates to tactical nuclear warheads ASB is loaded for bear or becomes a dragonslayer.

You failed besides to address generational warfare. USA determines the modern generations of warfare, specifically, the extant 5GW, while US is developing 6GW to control space and time in battle. The 6GW timewarp is real and is it here yet no country is even close to the USA in 6GW. AirSea Battle has been a major stepping stone to 6GW. So methinks we ought to try ASB sometime. I'm sure we'd like it.
Click to expand...

Quack quack Air Sea Battle quack quack... Air Sea Battle quack quack quack... Quack quack. Quack quack Air Sea Battle.

Air Sea Battle was designed to address specific threat.

Air Sea Battle is an obsolete term.

Air Sea Battle has been updated. For years.
 
Tangmo said:
Due to all the text promoting erroneously the Russian way of war as superior to that of USA I must needs be brief -- certainly relatively so.

I said Putin replicate in the Baltics his approach in Ukraine -- I said nothing about Russia "invading" the Baltics. You are completely lost in these matters that are just plain and flat out above your pay grade.

The first paragraph of your post #137 ignores that the AirSea Battle doctrine of the US focuses on launching missiles and rockets. The precept of ASB is twofold: not to match or to shoot down every arrow shot by the Chinese or the Russians, but rather to penetrate their modern A2/AD defense platforms and systems to go deep into the enemy mainland. ASB destroys the enemy's remote centers of command, control, communications. With the enemy's 3C destroyed there will be no more arrows from 'em. ASB thus overcomes the obvious US military weakness of being deployed in offensive operations at China, at Russia, or at Iran or NK. Any one of 'em -- China and Russia in particular -- have thousands of A2/AD missiles to launch from their own territory while US forces positioned off their border have a limited number of missiles. Which brings us to your paragraph number two.

ASB is aggressive. I'm not referring to A2/AD systems that are or must be aggressive. You've got the idea backwards. Your paragraph talks wrong headedly that the A2/AD systems needn't be aggressive to succeed. While that can be true, that's not where we are in the discussion. ASB critics say the doctrine is too aggressive because ASB controls escalation. Most of us think controlling escalation in a conflict is a good idea. So if the enemy escalates as his A2/AD are degraded or destroyed the ASB launches even more lethal warheads transported at still greater speeds such as faster than 7 miles per second (it's classified but it's more like nine mps). If the enemy escalates to tactical nuclear warheads ASB is loaded for bear or becomes a dragonslayer.

You failed besides to address generational warfare. USA determines the modern generations of warfare, specifically, the extant 5GW, while US is developing 6GW to control space and time in battle. The 6GW timewarp is real and is it here yet no country is even close to the USA in 6GW. AirSea Battle has been a major stepping stone to 6GW. So methinks we ought to try ASB sometime. I'm sure we'd like it.
Click to expand...

Still parroting a doctrine designed for china and iran knowing fully well it is terrible against russia, and even supporting bigwigs who military commanders with experience call ignorant, knowing full well there is no one size fits all strategy, russia and china have vastly different doctrines and defenses, as does iran.

The people pushing air/sea battle as an ultimate doctrine are the same idiots pushing the f-35 to replace the f-15 f-22 f-16 a-10 etc, they want a one size fits all strategy and are too ignorant to look into history where it has utterly failed time and again. There is no one size fit's all strategy, every warzone is different, and the only way the us military can succeed is by being flexibl, and by having doctrine to cover every warzone, not this one size fits all bs you push. I will also note the big pusher of that doctrine has zero military experience other than serving with the airforce under the cia handling deliveries and top secret info.

You know what fledermaus has it right, air sea battle
air sea batlle
air sea battle
Looked under my bed yes tangmo said air sea battle.
 
Pentagon is currently engaged in its Third Offset Strategy.

The First Offset Strategy was nuclear deterrence from the 1950s to roughly the end of the Vietnam War. The Second Offset Strategy took us to Desert Storm in 1991. The Third Offset Strategy was activated during Potus Obama's second term. The Third Offset Strategy focuses on overcoming the enemy's Anti-Access and Area Denial technologies (A2/AD).

More however the TOS is designed to assure US military dominance to 2050. This shoots down in a fiery blaze the China and Russia Fanboyz who repeatedly and confidently assert that each of the two countries they admire and promote "take the long view." The anti-American Fanboyz think and believe they have something major in claiming the USA does not measure up in this respect. So the China-Russia Fanboyz against the United States are wrong, as usual and as is predictable.


“I believe we are on the cusp of a fundamental change in the character of war.”
—General Mark Milley,
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, October 1, 2016.


In this context, the awkward Pentagonese word offset means advantage. Hence, the USA Third Advantage Strategy...

.

The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for the U.S. Army

U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute, 2017

The Defense Innovation Initiative (DII), begun in November 2014 by former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, is intended to ensure U.S. military superiority throughout the 21st century. One sub-set of initiatives, the Third Offset, is focused on leap-ahead technologies and capabilities that may offset competitor parity in critical domains.

Rather than match an opponent in an unfavorable competition, changing the competition to more favorable footing enables the application of strengths to a problem that is otherwise either unwinnable or winnable only at unacceptable cost. An offset strategy consequently seeks to deliberately change an unattractive competition to one more advantageous for the implementer. In this way, an offset strategy is a type of competitive strategy that seeks to maintain advantage over potential adversaries over long periods of time while preserving peace where possible.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is moving forward with a broad set of innovation initiatives designed to effectively posture the U.S. military for the coming decades. The majority of effort will be grouped into six broad portfolios:

1. Anti-access and area denial [A2/AD];
2. Guided munitions;
3. Undersea warfare;
4. Cyber and electronic warfare;
5. Human-machine teaming; and,
6. Wargaming and concepts development.


A SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH OBSERVATIONS

*The Military Exploitation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Autonomous Systems Is Inevitable
*Early Adoption of Third Offset Capabilities Is Critical Because Potential Adversaries Will Develop and Field Capabilities without Constraint
*Significant Acquisition, Budget, and Cultural Inertia Exists Which Could Impact the Army’s Ability to Gain Advantages with Third Offset Technologies
*Leader Development for a Third Offset Environment Must Begin Now
*The Moral Considerations of Third Offset Capabilities Should be Addressed Before the Technology Matures
*The Third Offset May Create Unintended Risks by Lowering Risk Thresholds, Subsidizing Foreign Modernization Efforts, and Increasing the Risk of Nuclear War.


The implications of the Third Offset for the Army should not be dismissed. These technologies have the potential to change the character of conflict and they require deliberateness. They are coming, and in many cases are already here—it is inevitable. How the Army approaches the Third Offset over the upcoming few years will set the stage for the next 30 years.

https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1371


Writing predicated in reading, education, experience are a unified endeavor that are prerequisite.
 
Tangmo said:
Pentagon is currently engaged in its Third Offset Strategy.

The First Offset Strategy was nuclear deterrence from the 1950s to roughly the end of the Vietnam War. The Second Offset Strategy took us to Desert Storm in 1991. The Third Offset Strategy was activated during Potus Obama's second term. The Third Offset Strategy focuses on overcoming the enemy's Anti-Access and Area Denial technologies (A2/AD).

More however the TOS is designed to assure US military dominance to 2050. This shoots down in a fiery blaze the China and Russia Fanboyz who repeatedly and confidently assert that each of the two countries they admire and promote "take the long view." The anti-American Fanboyz think and believe they have something major in claiming the USA does not measure up in this respect. So the China-Russia Fanboyz against the United States are wrong, as usual and as is predictable.


“I believe we are on the cusp of a fundamental change in the character of war.”
—General Mark Milley,
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, October 1, 2016.


In this context, the awkward Pentagonese word offset means advantage. Hence, the USA Third Advantage Strategy...

.

The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for the U.S. Army

U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute, 2017

The Defense Innovation Initiative (DII), begun in November 2014 by former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, is intended to ensure U.S. military superiority throughout the 21st century. One sub-set of initiatives, the Third Offset, is focused on leap-ahead technologies and capabilities that may offset competitor parity in critical domains.

Rather than match an opponent in an unfavorable competition, changing the competition to more favorable footing enables the application of strengths to a problem that is otherwise either unwinnable or winnable only at unacceptable cost. An offset strategy consequently seeks to deliberately change an unattractive competition to one more advantageous for the implementer. In this way, an offset strategy is a type of competitive strategy that seeks to maintain advantage over potential adversaries over long periods of time while preserving peace where possible.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is moving forward with a broad set of innovation initiatives designed to effectively posture the U.S. military for the coming decades. The majority of effort will be grouped into six broad portfolios:

1. Anti-access and area denial [A2/AD];
2. Guided munitions;
3. Undersea warfare;
4. Cyber and electronic warfare;
5. Human-machine teaming; and,
6. Wargaming and concepts development.


A SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH OBSERVATIONS

*The Military Exploitation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Autonomous Systems Is Inevitable
*Early Adoption of Third Offset Capabilities Is Critical Because Potential Adversaries Will Develop and Field Capabilities without Constraint
*Significant Acquisition, Budget, and Cultural Inertia Exists Which Could Impact the Army’s Ability to Gain Advantages with Third Offset Technologies
*Leader Development for a Third Offset Environment Must Begin Now
*The Moral Considerations of Third Offset Capabilities Should be Addressed Before the Technology Matures
*The Third Offset May Create Unintended Risks by Lowering Risk Thresholds, Subsidizing Foreign Modernization Efforts, and Increasing the Risk of Nuclear War.


The implications of the Third Offset for the Army should not be dismissed. These technologies have the potential to change the character of conflict and they require deliberateness. They are coming, and in many cases are already here—it is inevitable. How the Army approaches the Third Offset over the upcoming few years will set the stage for the next 30 years.

https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1371


Writing predicated in reading, education, experience are a unified endeavor that are prerequisite.
Click to expand...

Regurgitating is not understanding.
 
dave8383 said:
The PAVN at Battle of Ia Drang fought without any conventional support. The TET offensive was largely a VC effort, and unconventional. The artillery at Khe Sanh I mentioned when I said they had some in the nortern sector of South Vietnam. Vietnam was decidedly not a conventional war until the end when the NVA controlled large sections of South Vietnam.
Click to expand...

Tet ended the VC as an effective fighting force. The NVA were up north along the Ho Chi Minh trail, but the destruction of the VC in SVN was the incentive to use the full strength of the NVA armies (which also included Chinese conscripts). American morale plummeted when Walter Cronkite announced the war was lost, and China and the NVA took full advantage of unrest at home in America.

It was time to leave. The war was executed wrong, planned poorly, and mismanagement caused unnecessary US casualties.
 
Given that I do not normally do hit and run cheap shot posts I offer another self-edited strategic thesis which is linked below for anyone interested in consuming it.

The statements are by Robert Martinage who is a senior fellow at the Pentagon Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessments and who was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which is to say 5GW. Martinage originates from a 4GW focus on special operations, irregular warfare, counter-terrorism, and security force assistance policy.



The Third Offset Strategy in Historical Context

direct-energy.jpg

The Sodium Guidestar at the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Starfire Optical Range resides on a 6,240 foot hilltop at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. The Army and Navy are developing their own laser weapons systems. Air Force photo.



The core problem is that adversaries that have developed reconnaissance-strike complexes [are] able to target the key nodes upon which our current conventional power projection model is based. The question is: how do we regain our advantage? My view is that we have enduring advantages in five areas: unmanned operations, extended-range air operations (with a focus on long-range capabilities), low-observable air operations, undersea warfare and complex systems engineering. We need to play to our strengths by building upon and leveraging those advantages.

If an adversary has a strong incentive to strike preventively in a crisis to gain an advantage that is clearly not a desirable strategic situation. And I think that increasingly may be the situation we find ourselves in because of our vulnerability in space, because of the vulnerability of close-in bases and ports, and because of the vulnerability of surface ships in nearby littoral waters. This is a situation that increases crisis instability. Right now, however, if we are faced with a serious crisis in the Western Pacific or Europe, we will surge forces into vulnerable forward bases. Instead of being stabilizing, reassuring allies, and deterring aggression, a surge deployment may actually incentivize an adversary to strike US forces preemptively to prevent them from being brought to bear.

While A2/AD networks are often thought about in terms of their impact on military forces, they could also be used to threaten or disrupt commercial traffic in heavily travelled sea-lanes, as well as in international airspace. Indeed, they could also be used to disrupt civilian communications through space and under the sea, as well as critical information-enabled civilian infrastructures.

NATO and other US allies and partners around the world will be integrated into this third offset strategy and will be part of the solution of how we can project power effectively around the world together. At the same, we need to remember that this is not a national defense strategy or a national security strategy. The objective of the “third” offset strategy is not to address every national security challenge that we and our allies face, but rather to restore the credibility of conventional U.S. power projection capability. There may be some challenges that are better suited to the skill sets of our allies, some that we address together, and others that are tackled primarily by US forces. There is a panoply of national security challenges out there. We need to look at what makes sense across the whole spectrum. (emphasis added)

The Third Offset Strategy in Historical Context | Small Wars Journal



To the contrary, Nato and other US allies and strategic partner nations around the world will NOT be integrated into the Third Offset Strategy if Putin-Trump and Their Fanboyz prevail in reducing or neutralizing the national security and defenses of the United States to include our national sovereignty. While Putin-Trump and Their Fanboyz attack our allies and befriend our adversaries USA national security is either degraded or neutralized. Nor is this an accident. Putin-Trump and Their Fanboyz want the USA to adopt Russia as their model of the nation-state to include the historical, traditional, conservative and right wing values of Eurasian societies, cultures, religion, civilizations, all of which are led by Vladimir Putin. Their zero-sum endgame is unacceptable in the Pentagon however.
 
Tangmo said:
Given that I do not normally do hit and run cheap shot posts I offer another self-edited strategic thesis which is linked below for anyone interested in consuming it.

The statements are by Robert Martinage who is a senior fellow at the Pentagon Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessments and who was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which is to say 5GW. Martinage originates from a 4GW focus on special operations, irregular warfare, counter-terrorism, and security force assistance policy.



The Third Offset Strategy in Historical Context

direct-energy.jpg

The Sodium Guidestar at the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Starfire Optical Range resides on a 6,240 foot hilltop at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. The Army and Navy are developing their own laser weapons systems. Air Force photo.



The core problem is that adversaries that have developed reconnaissance-strike complexes [are] able to target the key nodes upon which our current conventional power projection model is based. The question is: how do we regain our advantage? My view is that we have enduring advantages in five areas: unmanned operations, extended-range air operations (with a focus on long-range capabilities), low-observable air operations, undersea warfare and complex systems engineering. We need to play to our strengths by building upon and leveraging those advantages.

If an adversary has a strong incentive to strike preventively in a crisis to gain an advantage that is clearly not a desirable strategic situation. And I think that increasingly may be the situation we find ourselves in because of our vulnerability in space, because of the vulnerability of close-in bases and ports, and because of the vulnerability of surface ships in nearby littoral waters. This is a situation that increases crisis instability. Right now, however, if we are faced with a serious crisis in the Western Pacific or Europe, we will surge forces into vulnerable forward bases. Instead of being stabilizing, reassuring allies, and deterring aggression, a surge deployment may actually incentivize an adversary to strike US forces preemptively to prevent them from being brought to bear.

While A2/AD networks are often thought about in terms of their impact on military forces, they could also be used to threaten or disrupt commercial traffic in heavily travelled sea-lanes, as well as in international airspace. Indeed, they could also be used to disrupt civilian communications through space and under the sea, as well as critical information-enabled civilian infrastructures.

NATO and other US allies and partners around the world will be integrated into this third offset strategy and will be part of the solution of how we can project power effectively around the world together. At the same, we need to remember that this is not a national defense strategy or a national security strategy. The objective of the “third” offset strategy is not to address every national security challenge that we and our allies face, but rather to restore the credibility of conventional U.S. power projection capability. There may be some challenges that are better suited to the skill sets of our allies, some that we address together, and others that are tackled primarily by US forces. There is a panoply of national security challenges out there. We need to look at what makes sense across the whole spectrum. (emphasis added)

The Third Offset Strategy in Historical Context | Small Wars Journal



To the contrary, Nato and other US allies and strategic partner nations around the world will NOT be integrated into the Third Offset Strategy if Putin-Trump and Their Fanboyz prevail in reducing or neutralizing the national security and defenses of the United States to include our national sovereignty. While Putin-Trump and Their Fanboyz attack our allies and befriend our adversaries USA national security is either degraded or neutralized. Nor is this an accident. Putin-Trump and Their Fanboyz want the USA to adopt Russia as their model of the nation-state to include the historical, traditional, conservative and right wing values of Eurasian societies, cultures, religion, civilizations, all of which are led by Vladimir Putin. Their zero-sum endgame is unacceptable in the Pentagon however.
Click to expand...

Regurgitating is not understanding.

Again.
 
Trump was always going to do himself in on the issues of national security, defense, sovereignty. Indeed, the process of sticking a fork in Trump has now begun, inevitably and inexorably.

We have entered a new dimension of the Putin-Trump & Fanboyz uprising since Trump went to Brussels to wreck Nato, meet secretly with his boss Putin in Helsinki, then tried to hand over to Polonium Putin the former Ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul and Bill Browder who was central to generating the Magnitsky Act. This and more are unacceptable at the Pentagon. Pentagon for instance got on the horn to Nato allies to reassure 'em Trump was out of his tree in Brussels. And that Trump was going to be grabbing his own ***** in Hensinki. Indeed Pentagon military commanders and civilian under secretaries took the initiative to start dialing up Nato friends, partners and allies as soon as AF1 got off the ground over there.
 
chuckiechan said:
Tet ended the VC as an effective fighting force. The NVA were up north along the Ho Chi Minh trail, but the destruction of the VC in SVN was the incentive to use the full strength of the NVA armies (which also included Chinese conscripts). American morale plummeted when Walter Cronkite announced the war was lost, and China and the NVA took full advantage of unrest at home in America.

It was time to leave. The war was executed wrong, planned poorly, and mismanagement caused unnecessary US casualties.
Click to expand...

That's right, TET destroyed the VC. They did mount somewhat of a comeback down the road, but never returned to their pre TET strength. Connected to that in a way was My Lai . The VC unit purported to have been in that village complex, the reason for the US operation that turned ugly, had been mauled during TET, and what remained of them had fled up into the mountains to lick their wounds.
 
Fledermaus said:
What was there not to understand...

Rogue Valley vs. Pleasant Valley

When Valleys collide.

It is a play on a 1950s SciFi movie title.
Click to expand...

My bad....I Like it!
Thank you for the clarification.
+3 points.
These horrible headaches do not have me thinking clearly.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Back
Top Bottom