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‘Multiple failures’ by sailors standing watch contributed to deadly Navy collisions

Rogue Valley

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FULL TITLE: ‘Multiple failures’ by sailors standing watch contributed to deadly Navy collisions, investigation finds


By Dan Lamothe
November 1, 2017

1497909698442.jpg

The damaged guided missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald is berthed in Yokosuka, Japan,
in June after a deadly collision killed seven sailors.


The Navy has found that two ship collisions that combined to kill 17 sailors at sea were preventable and caused in part by “multiple failures” by service members who were standing watch the nights of the incidents, the service said Wednesday. The USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S. McCain, both guided-missile destroyers, suffered catastrophic collisions June 17 and Aug. 21, respectively. The Fitzgerald accident killed seven sailors off the southern coast of Japan, while the McCain collision killed 10 sailors near Singapore. Adm. John Richardson, the chief of naval operations, said Wednesday in a statement upon releasing the investigation results that the service must do better. “We are a Navy that learns from mistakes and the Navy is firmly committed to doing everything possible to prevent an accident like this from happening again,” Richardson said. “We must never allow an accident like this to take the lives of such magnificent young Sailors and inflict such painful grief on their families and the nation.”

The Fitzgerald collision was attributed to its watch teams disregarding established ways of contacting other ships and required safety precautions that were in place. The investigation found that at about 11 p.m. on June 16, the ship’s top two officers — Cmdr. Bryce Benson, the ship’s captain, and Cmdr. Sean Babbitt, the ship’s executive officer, left the ship’s bridge for the evening. The investigation faulted the officer of the deck, who was not named in the documents, for failing to maneuver as needed, sound the danger alarm on the ship, contact the MV ACX Crystal (a Philippine-flagged container ship) or call his own captain, as required. In the McCain collision, the ship’s captain, Cmdr. Alfredo J. Sanchez, and executive officer, Cmdr. Jessie L. Sanchez, were on the bridge, but confusion about how the ship’s steering work caused chaos. The investigation found that the McCain collision “resulted primarily from complacency, overconfidence and lack of procedural compliance.” It added that “with regard to procedures, no one on the Bridge watch team, to include the commanding officer and executive officer, were properly trained on how to correctly operate the ship control console during a steering casualty.” The two senior officers were removed from their positions last month.

Although the pace of Pacific US naval operations has been exhausting, procedural/maneuvering mistakes such as these are both inexcusable and deadly.
 
FULL TITLE: ‘Multiple failures’ by sailors standing watch contributed to deadly Navy collisions, investigation finds




Although the pace of Pacific US naval operations has been exhausting, procedural/maneuvering mistakes such as these are both inexcusable and deadly.

We need to demand that our leadership addresses these issues. It is inexcusable for our leadership to set unrealistic expectations because it will predictably result in preventable casualties.
 
We need to demand that our leadership addresses these issues. It is inexcusable for our leadership to set unrealistic expectations because it will predictably result in preventable casualties.
What were the unrealistic expectations, that caused these accidents?
 
We need to demand that our leadership addresses these issues. It is inexcusable for our leadership to set unrealistic expectations because it will predictably result in preventable casualties.

That is true but I don't think it applies here. Avoiding collisions is the most realistic expectation to have of the Navy.
 
That is true but I don't think it applies here. Avoiding collisions is the most realistic expectation to have of the Navy.

And if the crew can not do that then the boat needs to stay in its dock until they are trained, and they dont go on missions until they prove they can.

We know all that, we have been out on the seas a lot of years we humans, this we know how to do.

Except our leaders did not care.

This was negligence.
 
What were the unrealistic expectations, that caused these accidents?

That is true but I don't think it applies here. Avoiding collisions is the most realistic expectation to have of the Navy.

My understanding of the issue is that these collisions are the result of increasing pressure from leadership to engage in more deployments without increasing resources to match:

Government reports, congressional probes and internal concerns have all pointed to systemic problems related to long deployments, deferred maintenance and shortened training periods within the Navy's surface fleet that seem to have coalesced in the Pacific, specifically at the Japan-based 7th Fleet.
...
The Navy has been strained by fewer ships taking on more missions. A 2015 study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments found that deployed ships remained at a constant level of 100 between 1998 and 2014, even though the fleet shrank by about 20 percent.
...
"Fatigue has measurable negative effects on readiness, effectiveness and safety," Vice Adm. Thomas Rowden, commander of Naval Surface Force Pacific, told the fleet last year.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...se-questions-over-a-force-stretched-too-thin/

The unrealistic expectations i'm referring to is the forcing fewer ships to take on more missions. It is a basic failure of management, likely due to unrealistic expectations from the very top that middle management fails to question. Instead of pushing back on unrealistic expectations from leadership, middle management can fail to address the issue by passing the pressure on to the lowly grunts. The lowly grunts can then have issues with performance relating to the additional pressure and unrealistic expectations that have been passed along to them.
 
My understanding of the issue is that these collisions are the result of increasing pressure from leadership to engage in more deployments without increasing resources to match:



https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...se-questions-over-a-force-stretched-too-thin/

The unrealistic expectations i'm referring to is the forcing fewer ships to take on more missions. It is a basic failure of management, likely due to unrealistic expectations from the very top that middle management fails to question. Instead of pushing back on unrealistic expectations from leadership, middle management can fail to address the issue by passing the pressure on to the lowly grunts. The lowly grunts can then have issues with performance relating to the additional pressure and unrealistic expectations that have been passed along to them.

Yep, they flat out did not do the training because "We dont have time".

Something everyone knew was going to happen when the Navy got told to do more with less, when those giving the orders ignored the abilities of the Navy to both carry out those orders and keep itself in a state of good repair..... they decided that doing the orders came first, that it was JUST FINE AND DANDY if they caused the Navy to degrade.

Shades of the debacle in Iraq all over again, where those who knew better refused to speak.
 
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My understanding of the issue is that these collisions are the result of increasing pressure from leadership to engage in more deployments without increasing resources to match:



https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...se-questions-over-a-force-stretched-too-thin/

The unrealistic expectations i'm referring to is the forcing fewer ships to take on more missions. It is a basic failure of management, likely due to unrealistic expectations from the very top that middle management fails to question. Instead of pushing back on unrealistic expectations from leadership, middle management can fail to address the issue by passing the pressure on to the lowly grunts. The lowly grunts can then have issues with performance relating to the additional pressure and unrealistic expectations that have been passed along to them.
Were the ships not fully crewed?
If they were short staffed that is one thing, but that does not sound like the case.
 
Were the ships not fully crewed?
If they were short staffed that is one thing, but that does not sound like the case.

How do you define "fully crewed"? Does fatigue factor into this designation?
 
Were the ships not fully crewed?
If they were short staffed that is one thing, but that does not sound like the case.

The boats had all the bodies they were supposed to have, they however did not have all the trained crew members they were supposed to have, and the fleet commanders were very aware that the training had not happened, because the certifications were so often never done...certifications being the long held and long known to work military method of making crews prove that they know what they are doing.
 
How do you define "fully crewed"? Does fatigue factor into this designation?
On commercial ships a 12 hour on 12 hour off shift is common. I am not sure how the Navy does their shifts,
but a fully crewed ship should have enough personnel to all the duty stations manned at all times.
Was fatigue a factor in the outside observer not spotting an approaching container ship?
 
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The boats had all the bodies they were supposed to have, they however did not have all the trained crew members they were supposed to have, and the fleet commanders were very aware that the training had not happened, because the certifications were so often never done...certifications being the long held and long known to work military method of making crews prove that they know what they are doing.
In that respect it is a failure of leadership, and a failure to accurately convey information.
I am not sure what is the best way for the Navy to ensure sufficient training is in place for operations.
but it my world it helps to have people who understand and can do several jobs.
 
What training is needed to have crew recognize an impending collision? What about all the technology? FFS, cars now have “collision avoidance” capability!
 
And there was that sailor that went missing for 2 or 3 weeks and was searched for and then believed dead, fallen overboard.

Then they found him hiding. I think there were allegations of mental health issues but I never found any follow up.

That the Hell is going on in the navy? (Yes, I have read the posts up to this point. It's partly rhetorical.)
 
Already the Commander Naval Surface Forces and the Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet have been retired over this:

Pacific Fleet commander vows to fix Navy culture that triggered crashes - The San Diego Union-Tribune

"...fix Navy culture that triggered..."

It's refreshing to see the Navy owning the problem, thus placing itself into a position to fix what they consider an unacceptable trend, instead of dismissing it as yet another isolated incident that doesn't have a connection to a bigger issue. Right, braindrain? Without addressing the culture behind a trend, the "isolated" problems simply continue.
 
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"...fix Navy culture that triggered..."

It's refreshing to see the Navy owning the problem, thus placing itself into a position to fix what they consider an unacceptable trend, instead of dismissing it as yet another isolated incident that doesn't have a connection to a bigger issue. Right, braindrain? Without addressing the culture behind a trend, the "isolated" problems simply continue.

From the sound of it the way morale is crashing there was not a choice.
 
From the sound of it the way morale is crashing there was not a choice.

Well, I would think a smashed up ship in the eyes of the world was the eye opener. There is a bit of a trend that needs to be addressed and corrected. But morale is always low. There is always something they ask the troop to consider when judging it.

- "How's your pay?" Could be better = low morale.

- "How's deploying away from your family feel?" Sucks = low morale.

- "How's it feel to see a dead buddy?" Sucks = low morale.

- "How's it feel training and training for future wars during peacetime?" I joined for adventure = low morale.

I typically dismiss the "low morale" argument that politicians use to push an agenda at the troop's expense.
 
Well, I would think a smashed up ship in the eyes of the world was the eye opener. There is a bit of a trend that needs to be addressed and corrected. But morale is always low. There is always something they ask the troop to consider when judging it.

- "How's your pay?" Could be better = low morale.

- "How's deploying away from your family feel?" Sucks = low morale.

- "How's it feel to see a dead buddy?" Sucks = low morale.

- "How's it feel training and training for future wars during peacetime?" I joined for adventure = low morale.

I typically dismiss the "low morale" argument that politicians use to push an agenda at the troop's expense.

But when the Navy does not care if you are trained or not, decreasing your chances of staying alive, seems to me that we are entering mutiny territory and should take note:

GAO testimony released last week revealed that expired training certifications for the Navy's 11 cruisers and destroyers based in Japan had skyrocketed five-fold from 7% in January 2015 to 37% in June. Two-thirds of the certifications had been expired for at least five months.
Exclusive: US Navy ships in deadly collisions had dismal training records - CNNPolitics


"I personally made the assumption, and I have made the assumption for many, many years, that our forward-deployed Naval force in Japan was the most proficient, well-trained, most experienced force we had, because they're operating all the time," Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Moran told members of the House Armed Services Committee on Sept. 7. "It was a wrong assumption, in hindsight."
Navy Aims to Change 'Myopic' Culture with New Pacific Watchdog Group | Military.com

When the top commanders are this messed up surely the sailors are aware, surely they lose faith in their leaders, surely bad things always follow from that.
 
When the top commanders are this messed up surely the sailors are aware, surely they lose faith in their leaders, surely bad things always follow from that.

Oh, no argument here. I actually make this argument to the dismay of a couple posters who prefer to be blind.

But training certifications appear to be a matter of being lazy. They need to train on ships. They are on ships. This is where they are supposed to be keeping their certifications current. Therefore, they don't get to explain it away because of deployments. This would be like trying to explain away bad proficiency with the rifle because scores aren't being updated properly, despite spending most of your time on the range. Besides, most ship time is down time. There is no excuse.
 
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Oh, no argument here. I actually make this argument to the dismay of a couple posters who prefer to be blind.

But training certifications appear to be a matter of being lazy. They need to train on ships. They are on ships. This is where they are supposed to be keeping their certifications current. Therefore, they don't get to explain it away because of deployments. This would be like trying to explain away bad proficiency with the rifle because scores aren't being updated properly, despite spending most of your time on the range. Besides, most ship time is down time. There is no excuse.

Perhaps you are out of date:

A Government Accountability Office report released earlier this month said crew size reductions have left some sailors on ships working more than 100 hours a week, creating safety risks.
Navy Issues Guidance to Provide More Sleep for Sailors at Sea | Military.com
 

Apparently. I looked further into it. I didn't realize that the Navy has been downsizing by the thousands.

The majority of the cuts stem from shutting down an air wing and laying-up 11 cruisers, with the rest coming from speeding up training and changing how the Navy counts its billets, the chief of naval personnel said in an exclusive interview.

But it appears that the downsizing is moving faster than what can compliment the current readiness demand.
 
I know exactly how these collisions happened, and so do a few hundred thousand other sailors.
 
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