Blockade.
A standoff blockade. USN and USAF in Air-Sea Battle positioning themselves out of easy range of the A2/AD capabilities of the PLA and its Navy and Air Force. Interdicting all shipping except the most humanitarian to include air flights to the China mainland.
U.S. Naval War College has worked this through again and again over the past 15 years. By 2013 they'd finally got it. Since then US armed forces can blockade the entire coast of CCP China, from Dalian and Shanghai in the North to Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Guangzhou(Canton) on the South China Sea, to include Hainan Island which is the head base of the PLA Navy South Fleet and most of its submarines.
China’s Seven Fears are as follows:
1.) America’s war plan is to blockade China:
https://hudson.org/research/11039-china-s-seven-fears-when-it-comes-to-america
The author Michael Pillsbury sittith in the Trump councils on CCP China and for a good reason. Pillsbury of the Hudson Institute of New York and Sydney knows the Boyz of Beijing and he knows 'em well, over decades of face to face contact.
Blockade is what CCP Dictators in Beijing most fear in an open conflict against the United States. The leaders of the East Asia region know it and the CCP Boyz in Beijing know it is their greatest vulnerability.
When politicians and some military planners look at war they like to say, well, by our ingenious plan this operation will be short, swift, decisive. That it wouldn't last long because we'll attack 'em, smash 'em and win before anyone knows what's going on. We know all too well that line of disastrous thinking.
Blockade is not included in this kind of contest, which is War By Standoff Blockade. With technology, missiles, assets in the air, on the ocean surface and below it, no navy worth its salt needs 500 ships and no Air Force needs all of its planes.
Blockading oil to CCP China via the Strait of Malacca shuts off ME oil supplies to the CCP mainland. CCP's extensive dependency on importing food does make an Air-Sea blockade more effective, hence more swift to conclude on terms favorable to the good guyz. (Only 4% of China's land remains arable.)
A combatant needs effective arrows in his quiver for when the guys with the battle axes and maces are not the main combatants....and preferably not the principal combatants. It's conflict or a contest of wills and resources in one way or another, hence Air-Sea Standoff Blockade of the entire coast of CCP China as the ultimate, or a blockade of specified areas in specified locales, such as in the South China Sea.....
One way in which it might do this would be through a blockade of Chinese maritime traffic by U.S. forces, with the explicit support of nations that control key international straits, including Indonesia and Malaysia. Though it would be costly and risky, a blockade could prove decisive. T.X. Hammes and Sean Mirski contend that in the right circumstances, particularly a limited war of long duration, blockade could be a war winning strategy.
At the same time, however, a blockade would not be without its pitfalls. It would take a long time to enact. It would have to balance interdiction of oil imports against economic exports. And a blockading nation would also need to consider how to “hold the line” to prevent China from achieving its goal while a blockade was taking effect.
Given its potential utility and also its possible downsides, decision makers and theater commanders must understand how a blockade of China would actually work and the precise conditions under which it holds promise. Regardless, the problem of blockade is less of military feasibility and more of political will and economic sacrifice.
https://warontherocks.com/2013/10/blockading-china-a-guide/
