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Soviet ("Muscovite") vs. Nazi posters - amazing 100% similarity!

Invading other countries for the purpose of forcibly installing communist governments is counter to Soviet ideology.

The Marxist-Leninist ideology that guided the Soviet Union held that communist revolution wasn't just desired, it was inevitable. There was no need to export the revolution, because it would just happen by itself. They of course would support other communists across the world, as they did in Spain and China, and after WWII they elevated pre-existing communist parties in Eastern Europe to position's in power. Decades later they would go to war in Afghanistan to support the communist government there.

So invading other countries just for the purpose of installing communist government's is counter to what the Soviets believe, which is that they don't need to do that, because communist revolution will inevitably happen anyway. And they didn't. Finland and the Baltics had nothing to do with exporting communism. Putting communists in power in Eastern Europe was just the easiest way to ensure compliance.

Major cope alert.

The unbiased assessment, or the objective reality as the Soviets liked to call it, was that strategic concerns have always trumped moral quandaries. When faced with a dilemma of the two the strategic issues always take priority.

The UK flat out invaded Iceland during WWII after the Icelandic government refused to join the Allies. It was a completely illegal invasion by any definition, but of course no one really objected.

And I'm not going to defend the UK here. They were fine firebombing civilians. There's no innocent country in the entire war. But there are some that are far better than others.

I don't see how. The ability to meaningfully target Soviet industry and resources is beyond the capability of the IJA.

Is that true if the US continues to supply oil?

No, it really isn't.

German planning for the invasion had been finalized by June and German forces were being put in position months before the Pact was signed. I see no evidence to suggest the invasion was contingent on the MRP when it was being planned and prepared long before the negotiations were even underway, which didn't start until August 10-12th. The invasion had been laid out in April and final operational planning concluded on June 15th, with German troops mobilizing the week after.

Given how militaries plan ahead for lots of contingencies and scenarios, this isn't really convincing to me. Obviously they wanted to invade Poland, but having plans ahead of time doesn't mean that they're going to do it even without the pact.
 
Invading other countries for the purpose of forcibly installing communist governments is counter to Soviet ideology.

German planning for the invasion had been finalized by June and German forces were being put in position months before the Pact was signed. I see no evidence to suggest the invasion was contingent on the MRP when it was being planned and prepared long before the negotiations were even underway, which didn't start until August 10-12th. The invasion had been laid out in April and final operational planning concluded on June 15th, with German troops mobilizing the week after.

To the contrary, if the plans and German forces were in place months before Pact was finally negotiated and signed, then it would seem the invasion was contingent on the MRP. Why else would Hitler wait over the summer campaign season, and increasingly solicit Stalin, EXCEPT to insure a non-aggression pact?

While Soviet goals during this period is a matter of dispute, there is little debate over Germany's strategic goals. Hitler initiated a cool and calculated foreign policy quest for a pact with the USSR in the spring of 1939 (March-April) and from the outset pursued three goals: the assurance of raw materials from Russia (including food), the prevention of an Anglo-Soviet-French alliance, and Soviet neutrality in the event of a Polish-German war.

Soviet archives confirm that, at the very least, Stalin and Molotov were willing to cautiously listen and, after repeated and increasingly concrete German overtures, became more receptive to a deal. By the beginning of July the triple alliance work was mostly done - and from Stalin's perspective less favorable to the Soviet Union than hoped.

In July the German offers became direct and concrete , particularly when the evidence was accumulating that the crisis in German-Polish relations over Danzig was about to break into war. And Stalin wanted to know how Russia would be rewarded if they promised neutrality.

On August 2nd and 3rd the Germans informed Russians that all problems could be resolved and that they could first reach an economic agreement, then development of cultural and scientific cooperation. Germany promised that Berlin had no plans that ran counter to Soviet interests in Poland. On August 5 Germany offered a "secret protocol". Germany offered a deal: in return for Soviet disinterestedness in the fate of Danzig and former 'German Poland', Berlin would renounce any aspirations in the Ukraine and, in effect, would give the USSR a free hand in 'Russian Poland', Bessarabia and the Baltic States (except for Lithuania).

From Russia's perspective, the Germans were trying to move quickly because they were worried about Russia's negotiations with the British and French. Astakhov wrote: "For the sake of this they are now ready, I believe, to make the kind of declarations and gestures that would have been inconceivable six months ago. The Baltic, Bessarabia, Eastern Poland (not to speak of the Ukraine)-at the present time this is the minimum they would give up without much discussion in order to secure a promise from us not to intervene in their conflict with Poland."

On Aug 17th Molotov proposed a non-aggression pact between the two states, together with a 'special protocol'. On Aug 21 Hitler sent an urgent plea to Stalin, that in view of the the Polish-German crisis over Danzig Ribbentrop should visit Moscow in the next couple of days to sign a non-aggression pact and to negotiate the 'supplementary protocol'. Two hours later, in a letter to Hitler, Stalin replied, agreeing that Ribbentrop arrive in Moscow on August 23rd. The Nazi-Soviet pact of non-aggression, together with its 'Secret Additional Protocol', was signed within a few hours of Ribbentrop's arrival. The protocols divided North Eastern Europe into Soviet and German spheres of influence:

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the
Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania
shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR.. .

2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the
Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR shall be bounded
approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula and San.


Cont.
 
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Cont.

Germany invaded Poland on September 3rd, on September 7th Stalin ordered all comintern members to cease criticizing Germany, and on Sept 9th he cabled Berlin that Soviet forces would militarily occupy the Soviet "sphere of influence" in eastern Poland. What followed then was a Soviet war of expansion against Finland, and the invasions of the Baltic states, as well as the occupation of Northern Bukovina, Hertza, and Bessarabia.

It is plausible, even likely, that had the Soviets stuck with the triple alliance and let it be known from the outset that an invasion of Poland would have triggered Soviet support for Poland that Hitler would have been deterred. Clearly he was very intent on securing non-intervention and willing to give the Soviets a wide "sphere of influence" to do what they wished.
 
Cont.

Germany invaded Poland on September 3rd, on September 7th Stalin ordered all comintern members to cease criticizing Germany, and on Sept 9th he cabled Berlin that Soviet forces would militarily occupy the Soviet "sphere of influence" in eastern Poland. What followed then was a Soviet war of expansion against Finland, and the invasions of the Baltic states, as well as the occupation of Northern Bukovina, Hertza, and Bessarabia.

It is plausible, even likely, that had the Soviets stuck with the triple alliance and let it be known from the outset that an invasion of Poland would have triggered Soviet support for Poland that Hitler would have been deterred. Clearly he was very intent on securing non-intervention and willing to give the Soviets a wide "sphere of influence" to do what they wished.

You're obviously well versed on the subject. What are your opinions on Soviet desires and culpability in WWII?
 
I'm not trying the equate the war aims of France with that of Germany. Obviously France wasn't interested in conquering her neighbors, occupying them, and claiming them as her own. I'm just saying that they are a real threat. If you're Germany and trying to become independent of these nations that hate you, then it makes sense that you want to defend yourself from that. It doesn't justify invading France. By no means! I'm just saying that I'm not opposed in principle to defense spending in this context.

But they don't hate Germany. French and British attitudes towards Germany, especially in the 1930s up until after Munich were exceptionally forgiving. The actual threat posed by France to Germany is minimal. Poland would be seen as a bigger problem.
 
But they don't hate Germany. French and British attitudes towards Germany, especially in the 1930s up until after Munich were exceptionally forgiving. The actual threat posed by France to Germany is minimal. Poland would be seen as a bigger problem.

If you're a German after experiencing WWI and the Occupation of the Ruhr, how do you view the French? Wouldn't you think that they hate you?

Not a rhetorical question. How would Germans have viewed the French at this time?
 
To the contrary, if the plans and German forces were in place months before Pact was finally negotiated and signed, then it would seem the invasion was contingent on the MRP. Why else would Hitler wait over the summer campaign season, and increasingly solicit Stalin, EXCEPT to insure a non-aggression pact?

If the German invasion is contingent on Soviet collusion then why is the start date of August 25th kept throughout negotiations? The invasion's planned start date on the 25th was quite literally cancelled at the last minute, but this was two days after the MRP had been signed.

So why doesn't the invasion date change or remain vague until the MRP has been signed? The fact that the original date was planned and kept up until after the pact had been signed leads to only two possible conclusions:

A) Hitler is so confident of Soviet agreement that it isn't a concern, which begs the question as to why your writing implies Hitler was desperate to secure an agreement.

Or

B)The invasion is not dependent on the MRP.

Secondly, I find it hard to believe that the Germans were truly reliant on Soviet non-intervention given that German troops crossed the border with no clear indication as to what the Soviets actually planned to to.

"I. Ukrainian problem:
Reich foreign minister von Ribbentrop explained to me his views about possible resolution of German-Polish war right after the greetings. After this discussion happened in Keitel's cabinet and OKW chief submitted the following outcomes:
1. Fourth partition of Poland happens. Germany declares its own disinterest in polish lands beyond the line of rivers Narev - Visla - San. These lands are transferred to Soviet Union.
2. Rump Polish state formed at the remaining lands. This variant is favoured by Furher who wants to sign a peace with some Polish government.
3. Poland disintegrates. Lithuania gets the territory around Vilnus. Galicia and Polish Ukraine becomes independent (this required a settlement with Soviet Union). If this happened I must train Ukrainians in such way so Melnik's organization (OUN - Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) would rise in rebellion in Galician Ukraine with the goal of destruction of Poles and Jews.
Political expansion of this movement towards Soviet Ukraine (the idea of Great Ukraine) must be prevented without any doubt.


VII. Soviet Union position:
Colonel general Keitel and Reich's foreign minister von Ribbentrop expressed themselves on the matter of Soviet Union in such way: Russians, obviously, has not yet made a decision and do not know exactly what they should do. Apparently they want to attack Poland but constrain themselves for now. In any case, their behavior is unclear."

Das Amt Ausland-Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht", 2007,pages 129-132

This was on the 12th of September, almost two weeks after the invasion began and the German leadership still isn't certain as to what the Soviets are going to do. This doesn't strike me as confidence in their new found ally.
 
If you're a German after experiencing WWI and the Occupation of the Ruhr, how do you view the French? Wouldn't you think that they hate you?

Not a rhetorical question. How would Germans have viewed the French at this time?

The German people overall were not at all pleased with the idea of returning to war as evident by their reaction to the Czech crisis, and that didn't appear to change until after the success of the Wehrmacht between 1939-1940.

Besides, French actions towards Germany starting in the 1930s hardly gave the impression of disdain. Doing nothing to stop the militarization of the Ruhr, forgiving reparations and trying to secure trade agreements and deals doesn't come across as a nation bent on revenge. Germany, on the other hand...
 
Major cope alert.

You keep using that word and I don't think you really know how to.

And I'm not going to defend the UK here. They were fine firebombing civilians. There's no innocent country in the entire war. But there are some that are far better than others.

The reality is that every country on earth will always place strategic concerns over moral ones.

Is that true if the US continues to supply oil?

The IJA's problem isn't just a lack of supplies, it's an actual doctrinal issue that the IJA doesn't understand mechanized logistics very well.

Given how militaries plan ahead for lots of contingencies and scenarios, this isn't really convincing to me. Obviously they wanted to invade Poland, but having plans ahead of time doesn't mean that they're going to do it even without the pact.

Germany invaded Poland with no real idea as to what the Soviets planned or were going to do. The fact that their invasion date (originally supposed to be the 25th of August) remained consistent throughout the entire time, even when they were 7 days away without a Pact doesn't come across as a nation that is relying on Soviet agreement to go ahead and invade Poland.
 
It is plausible, even likely, that had the Soviets stuck with the triple alliance and let it be known from the outset that an invasion of Poland would have triggered Soviet support for Poland that Hitler would have been deterred.

Oh, you'll get no argument from me there. Had Stalin indicated overtly the USSR's willingness to come to Poland's aid against Germany and support both Britain and France, I doubt Germany goes ahead the way it did. The failure of the Soviets and the Western Allies to come to an agreement is major failure on their part.
 
The German people overall were not at all pleased with the idea of returning to war as evident by their reaction to the Czech crisis, and that didn't appear to change until after the success of the Wehrmacht between 1939-1940.

That's not what I asked. I asked what was the German view of France.

Besides, French actions towards Germany starting in the 1930s hardly gave the impression of disdain. Doing nothing to stop the militarization of the Ruhr, forgiving reparations and trying to secure trade agreements and deals doesn't come across as a nation bent on revenge. Germany, on the other hand...

Again that's not what I asked. I'll ask it again, "How would Germans have viewed the French at this time"?
 
That's not what I asked. I asked what was the German view of France.



Again that's not what I asked. I'll ask it again, "How would Germans have viewed the French at this time"?

Do you want an opinion poll? Sorry, but there is none.

Some people probably hated France. Some people liked them. Most were probably apathetic, as is often the case. Following the Locarno Treaty relations were probably pretty good. It's hard to believe most German people disliking France after the Munich Conference. We know most of the German leadership did not like France, but only a few took it as far as to say "We need to go to war with France."
 
Look at the picture and tell me where the substantial reduction is.

330px-US_Unemployment_1910-1960.gif


There's no real significant drop until WWII.



Then what do you make of this quote?

You're talking about the work during the war while I'm taking about the one before the war.



Do you know what I call going from 22% unemployment, to 14% unemployment temporarily, then back up to 17% unemployment nearly a decade later? Stagnation.

Sounds like
 
I never said it dropped because the US entered the war. It dropped because of the war and the US supplying arms to its allies....

No it didn't

US unemployment was already dropping. Certainly the war was a boom time for US industry, but it wasn't necessary to pull the US economy out of depression...it was already coming out.
The UK economy was coming out of depression by 1938

What is so hard to understand ?


...in 1940 unemployment was still above 14%....

But falling

US manufacturing output was rising


...my claim is that since the Red Army invaded Germany, occupied it, and never relinquished control, that there's a good possibility that they were always going to invade it.

The US relinquished control of Germany.


The USSR did indeed relinquish control of East Germany...have you not seen pictures of Germans breaking down the Berlin Wall ?

Besides this is irrelevant.

You cannot make a claim that the USSR always planned to invade Germany based on the political position it took in the post war period.
The USSR didn't occupy East Germany (and the rest of Eastern Europe) just because it could, it did so to create a protective buffer against Western invasion.

As I explained to you, the USSR actually withdrew from one Eastern European country (Romania) because the Romanian communist party had such an iron grip over the country, it wasn't felt necessary to station Soviet troops there to ensure it remained in the Soviet sphere of influence.


There is no evidence that I'm aware of that the USSR ever planned to invade Germany prior to the outbreak of war.

If what you say is true, then there should be a plan or two proving it...or at the very least a few memoirs from Red Army commanders. But there isn't.
Stalin never planned to invade the West.
Yes, after war was declared AND the USSR started to win it...Stalin wanted to grab control over as much land as possible.

When Stalin was congratulated by the British official, over the performance of his armed forces in taking Berlin, he remarked that Tsar Alexander had reached the Seine.
 
No it didn't

US unemployment was already dropping. Certainly the war was a boom time for US industry, but it wasn't necessary to pull the US economy out of depression...it was already coming out.
The UK economy was coming out of depression by 1938

What is so hard to understand ?




But falling

US manufacturing output was rising

The US had nearly a decade to get unemployment before 14%. It never did. My patience has limits. 1, 2, even 3 years? Sure. Nearly a decade? Sorry, your economic program just failed.





The USSR did indeed relinquish control of East Germany...have you not seen pictures of Germans breaking down the Berlin Wall ?

Besides this is irrelevant.

You cannot make a claim that the USSR always planned to invade Germany based on the political position it took in the post war period.
The USSR didn't occupy East Germany (and the rest of Eastern Europe) just because it could, it did so to create a protective buffer against Western invasion.

As I explained to you, the USSR actually withdrew from one Eastern European country (Romania) because the Romanian communist party had such an iron grip over the country, it wasn't felt necessary to station Soviet troops there to ensure it remained in the Soviet sphere of influence.


There is no evidence that I'm aware of that the USSR ever planned to invade Germany prior to the outbreak of war.

If what you say is true, then there should be a plan or two proving it...or at the very least a few memoirs from Red Army commanders. But there isn't.
Stalin never planned to invade the West.
Yes, after war was declared AND the USSR started to win it...Stalin wanted to grab control over as much land as possible.

When Stalin was congratulated by the British official, over the performance of his armed forces in taking Berlin, he remarked that Tsar Alexander had reached the Seine.

Did you really cite an action from 1989 to prove the intentions of the government of the 1940s? Do you think I'm a fool?

You're the one trying to convince me to look at what happened yet be convinced that I should believe that they never would have done what they did? It's an indefensible position.
 
If the German invasion is contingent on Soviet collusion then why is the start date of August 25th kept throughout negotiations? The invasion's planned start date on the 25th was quite literally cancelled at the last minute, but this was two days after the MRP had been signed.

So why doesn't the invasion date change or remain vague until the MRP has been signed? The fact that the original date was planned and kept up until after the pact had been signed leads to only two possible conclusions:

A) Hitler is so confident of Soviet agreement that it isn't a concern, which begs the question as to why your writing implies Hitler was desperate to secure an agreement.

Or

B)The invasion is not dependent on the MRP.


Or C) The invasion target date is not set in stone, and could be delayed or canceled if the diplomatic requirements were not attained in time (as demonstrated by Hitler's own quick decision to delay the date made on August 25, likely due to a new British Security Agreement with Poland).

To restate:

First, I am not arguing the Polish invasion was indisputably contingent to a signed pact, but I am arguing that the diplomatic outcomes (insured Soviet neutrality) in pursuit of negotiating the pact played a strong role in influencing Hitler's choice to make the final order to war on September 1st. There isn't any significant dispute from German records that Germany was the primary initiator and very determined suitor to form a temporary marriage of interests to Stalin's Soviet Union.

Second, presumably the attack date of August 26th was set at the time that Hitler gave a preparation order for an invasion July 31st. In any event, the August 26 date itself was of import only in that it was set at the end of the summer campaign season, and portended a closing window. As such this was not a sequential process, but of attaining necessary parallel diplomatic and military preconditions. With only 30 days left, Hitler ordered Ribbentrop to ratchet up offers to derail British & French efforts to secure an alliance, to obtain agreement on important raw materials, and to insure Soviet non-reaction to the invasion. Speed was of the essence (and Stalin knew that) and the draft treaties were already drawn up and shared before Ribbentrop arrived. In fact Hitler was so anxious for a treaty cabled Stalin (highly unorthodox) directly and gave Ribbentrop instructions to give in to additional Soviet demands if made at the last minute (Stalin demanded all of Latvia and got it).

Third, it is interesting that in spite of these accomplishments he still had moments of cold feet, such as his delay to September 1st (and the flurry of German demands and negotiations between then and September 1st).

Last, the fact that the Germans were unclear as to if and when the Soviets would occupy their spheres of influence is due to the fact that the Soviets never signaled till Sept 9th what they would do so - and that was in response to Hitler's encouragement to occupy the east of Poland (so as to eliminate the retreating poles).

So no, the Soviets were often secretive and could do the unexpected and that didn't make them reliable allies, or reliable suppliers of raw materials, but being reliable allies that was not the essential purpose of the pact. The essential purpose (for Hitler) was to secure neutrality and mutual advantage so as to preclude the possibility of serious Soviet assistance or outright military opposition.

In short, without sufficient assurances, such embodied in the MRP, Hitler may not have gambled. But he got what he thought he needed, and the rest is history.
 
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Or C) The invasion target date is not set in stone, and could be delayed or canceled if the diplomatic requirements were not attained in time (as demonstrated by Hitler's own quick decision to delay the date made on August 25, likely due to a new British Security Agreement with Poland).

It's interesting to note that according to Dennis Showalter and Harold C. Deutsch Hitler's cancelling was due primarily to the news from Mussolini that Italy would remain neutral in the event of a war with Poland. This both makes sense and is confusing, sensible in that Hitler's staunchest ally announcing his neutrality would give Hitler pause, confusing as to what Hitler expected his ally to actually do against Poland.

First, I am not arguing the Polish invasion was indisputably contingent to a signed pact...

....Soviet demands if made at the last minute (Stalin demanded all of Latvia and got it).

I find your dialogue to be very interesting but I would argue that given the flurry of diplomatic activity without mention of the possibility of delaying the invasion in the event of a Soviet fallout to be indicative of more or less the inevitability the invasion of Poland. While I don't doubt the idea that the invasion had been postponed had the Pact not been made, and possibly even stopped had the Soviets overtly declared their support for Poland's independence, given the lack of statements made that indicate the need to possibly postpone or halt the invasion if Soviet terms were not made would suggest that for Hitler at least, the invasion of Poland took priority over the importance of a Soviet agreement. This would make sense given Hitler's private admission that the invasion of Poland was actually for the purpose of seizing living space, which to Hitler was vital.

Last, the fact that the Germans were unclear as to if and when the Soviets would occupy their spheres of influence is due to the fact that the Soviets never signaled till Sept 9th what they would do so - and that was in response to Hitler's encouragement to occupy the east of Poland (so as to eliminate the retreating poles).

I'm curious for the justification of this, seeing as Hitler's preferred outcome of the conflict (at least as late as September 12th) was for what remained of Poland to form a rump state, almost certainly under German control.

So no, the Soviets were often secretive and could do the unexpected and that didn't make them reliable allies, or reliable suppliers of raw materials, but being reliable allies that was not the essential purpose of the pact. The essential purpose (for Hitler) was to secure neutrality and mutual advantage so as to preclude the possibility of serious Soviet assistance or outright military opposition.

In short, without sufficient assurances, such embodied in the MRP, Hitler may not have gambled. But he got what he thought he needed, and the rest is history.

I'm not doubting that had overt Soviet efforts been made to indicate that they would come to the assistance of Poland that Hitler might've yielded, but I'm also not convinced that the assurances of Soviet assistance of neutrality or support were equally vital. After all, Soviet-Polish relations at this point are poor, and everything we know of Stalin's actions between 1939 until June 22, 1941 all give the impression he was very determined to avoid conflict with Germany.

Absent any kind of clear Soviet intent to oppose Hitler's actions towards Poland however I find it difficult to believe the invasion would be halted or otherwise stopped.
 

In short, while I don't disagree with the notion that Hitler might've backed down had Stalin presented overtly his intention to support Poland and the Western Allies, given the unlikeliness of this happening I don't believe it's realistic to suggest the invasion of Poland was dependent on the signing of the MRP.

Certainly there was little reason to believe the Soviets would come to the aid of Poland out of good faith; Soviet-Polish relations were poor and up until 1938-1939 most of Poland's defensive planning was geared towards the Soviets.

In the issue of fairness it's not entirely surprising the Soviets and Western Allies weren't able to reach an agreement. The USSR in the 1930s and was viewed similar to how we view North Korea today, and given what happened to Czechoslovakia it's not shocking that Stalin didn't have much faith in French and British resolve. Their inaction after Fall Weiss, while somewhat justified, did little to validate it.

Stalin's foreign policy, and indeed for much of the Soviet Union's history, was predicated on avoiding costly conflicts after all. Despite smashing the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol the aftermath was not further campaigns in Manchuria but a non-aggression pact. Soviet support for the Communists in China ultimately never involved the full weight of Soviet intervention and ended in treaty. The Soviets, at the very least Stalin, seemed very intent on avoiding conflict with Germany. Given the state of the Red Army at the time, that doesn't seem too surprising.

Therefore given the circumstances of the time and factors at play, I see the only way that would've stopped Hitler from invading Poland to also be the least likely to occur.

And lastly, while I concur with you had an agreement between East and West been reached to save Poland, if there ever was a world leader driven/insane enough to plunge into war regardless of the imbalance of power against him, it would be Adolf Hitler. He did just that, after all.
 
There's no real significant drop until WWII.

Except there is.


Then what do you make of this quote?

You're talking about the work during the war while I'm taking about the one before the war.

Do you know what I call going from 22% unemployment, to 14% unemployment temporarily, then back up to 17% unemployment nearly a decade later? Stagnation.

And your solution is insanely short sighted policies that will only lead to further trouble down the road. Something you continue to refuse to acknowledge despite the wealth of information revealing just how bad Germany's economy was heading as a result of Nazi planning.

It's like stuffing your face full of fast food for every meal and then complaining when your health suffers. You can't finance an entire country on 90 day loans. Not forever.
 
Except there is.

Where is it on the graph I keep posting? Show us.


You're talking about the work during the war while I'm taking about the one before the war.

Tooze specifically "before the war started."

And your solution is insanely short sighted policies that will only lead to further trouble down the road. Something you continue to refuse to acknowledge despite the wealth of information revealing just how bad Germany's economy was heading as a result of Nazi planning.

It's like stuffing your face full of fast food for every meal and then complaining when your health suffers. You can't finance an entire country on 90 day loans. Not forever.

You actually can if you are the issuer of a currency.
 
It's interesting to note that according to Dennis Showalter and Harold C. Deutsch Hitler's cancelling was due primarily to the news from Mussolini that Italy would remain neutral in the event of a war with Poland. This both makes sense and is confusing, sensible in that Hitler's staunchest ally announcing his neutrality would give Hitler pause, confusing as to what Hitler expected his ally to actually do against Poland.
I've read different accounts as to the cause of the delay, which for some remain uncertain. However, both the Italian announcement and the British-Polish announcement of a firmer alliance for war likely prompted Hitler to desire some breathing space to consider these new developments.

... I would argue that given the flurry of diplomatic activity without mention of the possibility of delaying the invasion in the event of a Soviet fallout to be indicative of more or less the inevitability the invasion of Poland. ... that for Hitler at least, the invasion of Poland took priority over the importance of a Soviet agreement. ...Hitler's private admission that the invasion of Poland was actually for the purpose of seizing living space, which to Hitler was vital.
Frankly, the flurry of diplomatic activity by the German side is perplexing, especially so if the war was inevitable. Significant progress was made during those discussions, with Germany's demands being aggressive but much less than what they would attain by invasion. Whether it was last minute cold feet by Hitler to explore options, or a ruse to lull the allies into being unguarded (which it did) I am uncertain. But whatever the reason, the campaign season was at an end and choices had to be made.

I'm curious for the justification of this, seeing as Hitler's preferred outcome of the conflict (at least as late as September 12th) was for what remained of Poland to form a rump state, almost certainly under German control.
Geoffery Roberts in his article (and later expanded into a book) "The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany" gives the most detailed review that I have read. Normally I would have been very suspect of any thesis that suggested Stalin was less calculating, purposeful, and strategic on the fate of Poland than the Germans, but I admit that he has convinced me on many of his views. In his article (link below):

The foregoing evidence can also be read as demonstrating German anxiety about whether the Soviet Union would keep to its side of the partition bargain. However, and this is the third documentary clue, on 3 September Ribbentrop telegraphed the following instruction to Schulenburg:

We definitely expect to have beaten the Polish army decisively in a few weeks. We would then keep the territory that was fixed at Moscow as a German sphere of interest under military occupation. We would naturally, however. for military reasons, also have to proceed further against such Polish military forces as are at that time located in the Polish area belonging to the Russian sphere of interest. Please discuss this at once with Molotov and see if the Soviet Union does not consider it desirable for Russian forces to move at the proper time against Polish forces in the Russian sphere of interest and, for their part, to occupy this territory. In our estimation this would not only be a relief for us, but also, in the sense of the Moscow agreements, in the Soviet interest as well.

http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Roberts nazisovpact.pdf (Page 73 and 74)

Whatever Hitler's plans for the German portion of Poland, it suggests that Hitler's intent was to make the Soviet's complicit and useful in the short-term (just as a cynical Hitler invited Poland to take parts of Slovakia during the German invasion.).

I'm not doubting that had overt Soviet efforts been made to indicate that they would come to the assistance of Poland that Hitler might've yielded, but I'm also not convinced that the assurances of Soviet assistance of neutrality or support were equally vital. After all, Soviet-Polish relations at this point are poor, and everything we know of Stalin's actions between 1939 until June 22, 1941 all give the impression he was very determined to avoid conflict with Germany. Absent any kind of clear Soviet intent to oppose Hitler's actions towards Poland however I find it difficult to believe the invasion would be halted or otherwise stopped.

Cont.
 
Perhaps we are arriving at a near consensus. The importance of the pre-war diplomacy for Hitler was to reasonably assure himself that intervention or a declaration of war by the Soviets would not happen (at some point he convinced himself there would not be a shooting war with the UK and French). Hence, the pre-war diplomacy largely achieved that aim with or without a signed pact. Growing Soviet interest in hearing concrete proposals and willingness to discuss mutual advantage may have been more than enough to assure Hitler - that and the failure of the triple alliance.

Had Stalin remained an enigma and dismissed all German overtures as insincere, and make no assurances on how they might react, who knows.

In short, while I don't disagree with the notion that Hitler might've backed down had Stalin presented overtly his intention to support Poland and the Western Allies, given the unlikeliness of this happening I don't believe it's realistic to suggest the invasion of Poland was dependent on the signing of the MRP.

Certainly there was little reason to believe the Soviets would come to the aid of Poland out of good faith; Soviet-Polish relations were poor and up until 1938-1939 most of Poland's defensive planning was geared towards the Soviets.

In the issue of fairness it's not entirely surprising the Soviets and Western Allies weren't able to reach an agreement. The USSR in the 1930s and was viewed similar to how we view North Korea today, and given what happened to Czechoslovakia it's not shocking that Stalin didn't have much faith in French and British resolve. Their inaction after Fall Weiss, while somewhat justified, did little to validate it.

Stalin's foreign policy, and indeed for much of the Soviet Union's history, was predicated on avoiding costly conflicts after all. Despite smashing the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol the aftermath was not further campaigns in Manchuria but a non-aggression pact. Soviet support for the Communists in China ultimately never involved the full weight of Soviet intervention and ended in treaty. The Soviets, at the very least Stalin, seemed very intent on avoiding conflict with Germany. Given the state of the Red Army at the time, that doesn't seem too surprising.

Therefore given the circumstances of the time and factors at play, I see the only way that would've stopped Hitler from invading Poland to also be the least likely to occur.

And lastly, while I concur with you had an agreement between East and West been reached to save Poland, if there ever was a world leader driven/insane enough to plunge into war regardless of the imbalance of power against him, it would be Adolf Hitler. He did just that, after all.

I don't disagree with anything here. Had a saner dictator (say someone like the cautious Franko) taken control of Germany, one without the needless aspirations for "living room" and genocidal drives against Jews and Slavs, I am sure history would have been far different. A rearmed Germany, especially one that was united with Austria, would have been more than sufficient to deter Stalin from any future designs on Finland, the Baltics, or Romanian provinces.

And if the allies had responded to the occupation of the Rhineland, or the French launched an immediate offensive into the Heartland of Germany upon the invasion of Poland, WWII would have been averted.

Lessons learned.
 
Where is it on the graph I keep posting? Show us.

Look with your special eyes.

Tooze specifically "before the war started."

And he doesn't state the whole female work force was employed. But half a million women were taken out of the labor force by means of the marriage allowance paid by the Government to entice them away.

You actually can if you are the issuer of a currency.

Not forever. Because there comes a point when your currency will mean nothing, especially after people realize the gold reserves have been sold off and the government has been deficit spending to the tune of tens of billions of Marks, putting Germany hopelessly in debt and unable to actually pay for the imports she needs.
 
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