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Because of their early success, the Germans assumed that their preconceived notions on the inferiority of the Soviets were true. This was, as it would turn out, completely untrue. For starters, Soviet reserves were far larger than what the Germans had expected. Because of their universal service conscription, there were 14,000,000 Soviet males with military training at the onset of the war. The Soviets had enough manpower to fill 800 divisions, not 200. The Germans, by comparison, had just 340,000 men in reserve back in the Third Reich.
Max Hastings, an author of several great works on both world wars, once described the Germans as very effective at fighting battles, but not so effective at waging wars. I find this to be a very apt description. The Germans had very good soldiers and officers but were crippled by various fundamental flaws. German generals prioritized operations over logistics and intelligence; the Abwehr was of questionable capability, the Luftwaffe lacked a strategic bomber that made their bombing campaigns ineffective, their tanks were either too light and weak or too complex and expensive (the Soviets were building more T-34s in a month than the Germans built Tiger tanks during the entire war), their cryptology was cracked and never rectified, and their war economy wasn't marred by corruption and inefficiency. German war production wasn't efficiently managed until 1944, at which point the Western Allies were bombing Germany daily, and the Red Army had routed the Germans in the East.
During 1944-1945 the Soviets had unleashed numerous strategic offensives that had thoroughly routed the Wehrmacht across the entire Eastern Front. The most devastating of these was Operation Bagration, the most successful operation of the war that annihilated German Army Group Center and wiped half a million German soldiers off the map. The Soviets had become extremely productive at their style of war, which emphasized the deep battle, deception, and the operational art.
By the time the Red Army reached Berlin, all of the former USSR was now a single unified state. Soviet war production was through the roof, producing tens of thousands of tanks, aircraft, trucks and artillery pieces. The Soviets had paid a high price for their struggle (27 million dead citizens and soldiers), but Nazi Germany was to suffer one of the worst defeats in all of history.
When the war ended, both the Soviets and Western Allies were in Germany. But the balance of power with regards to military forces was firmly in Soviet hands. They had more troops, tanks and aircraft in place. Had the W. Allies decided to try to push and go to war with the Soviets, it would've ended pretty badly for us. The Soviets could've shifted the 70th, 65th and 2nd Shock Armies to attack the British 2nd Army near Hamburg. Given the performance of the British Army during the war it's highly unlikely the British would've been able to hold back all three Soviet armies, even with the 1st Canadian Army backing them up.
The US 9th Army would've had to fend back attacks from the Soviet 49th, 61st, 47th, 3rd and 69th Armies, most likely reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tank Army and the 3rd Shock Army. The US 1st Army, further to the south, would have a relatively east task at first of stopping the Soviet 33rd Army, but reinforcements of the 8th Guards Army and 1st Guards Tank Army from Berlin, and a southern thrust from the 52nd, 28th and 3rd Guards Tank Army could've easily forced the 1st US Army to fall back.
Patton's Third Army is ****ed. He would have to face the 13th Army, 4th Guards Tank Army, 6th Guards Tank Army, plus 7th and 9th Guards Army. Even with the 7th US Army moving to reinforce, the Soviets could've just brought up the 53rd, 40th, 18th and 1st Guards Army, not to mention the 4th Guards Army would've likely moved to delay the 7th US Army's advance. And the Soviets still have the 52nd, 28th, 31st, 21st, 59th, 60th, and 38th Army in reserve.
On top of all this, the Soviets had repeatedly demonstrated a degree of operational capability that the Western Allies never achieved. Vast, sweeping strategic offensives by the US and British armies were uncommon by comparison to the Eastern Front, despite facing OB West, a German formation composed largely of reservists and undermanned SS forces. Given that strategic bombing would've proven ineffective against the highly mobile Soviet forces, and that atomic weaponry wouldn't be a factor until several months, later, the situation doesn't look good at all.
