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Most Gifted/Able/Intelligent Politician/diplomat in history

Intelligence is a largely indiscernible thing. Modern day politicians and political supporters generally go with "book smart" for this term but that is not the only definition. Street savvy can be intelligent, common sense can be intelligent, and sometimes wisdom and intelligence are also confused in the definition.

I would go with Abraham Lincoln, also JFK, Winston Churchill, Ronald Reagan, Mahatma Gandhi, Shakyamuni, and I have a great respect for Secretary General Ban Ki Moon of the UN.

Sorry. I'm never good at just picking one of anything.
 
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Intelligence is a largely indiscernible thing. Modern day politicians and political supporters generally go with "book smart" for this term but that is not the only definition. Street savvy can be intelligent, common sense can be intelligent, and sometimes wisdom and intelligence are also confused in the definition.

I would go with Abraham Lincoln, also JFK, Winston Churchill, Ronald Reagan, Mahatma Gandhi, Shakyamuni, and I have a great respect for Secretary General Ban Ki Moon of the UN.

Sorry. I'm never good at just picking one of anything.

You only have one nose.:mrgreen:
 
I forgot to mention George Kennan. His success in containing communism in Europe arguably won us the Cold War just as it began.
 
Truth, but unfortunate. Britain was saved largely through Chamberlain's actions.

Interesting comment. Not sure I've ever heard it before.

How so?

I'm not disputing it...I'm just interested in your reasoning.
 
Interesting comment. Not sure I've ever heard it before.

How so?

I'm not disputing it...I'm just interested in your reasoning.

Britain was utterly unprepared for war in 1938. The British Army was not mechanized, the RADAR network that would save it during the Battle of Britain was not in place, and Britain, like France, was still struggling out of the depression. Germany, while still lacking several key factors that made it such a devastating war machine when war broke out in September 1939, was still at least mobilized for war. The Munich Crisis was called that because that's what it was, a crisis. Hitler was threatening to invade Czechoslovakia and there was nothing Britain nor France could do to save it. The Czech fortifications were were in fact outdated and weak, and the Czech military was facing multiple threats on several fronts, and relied heavily on conscripts from ethnic minorities that didn't share the Czech loyalty to Czechoslovakia.

Had Hitler invaded, France and Britain couldn't have saved Czechoslovakia. They would've been forced to mobilize their woefully under prepared armed forces and most likely would've been defeated by the Germans, unless, ironically, the Soviets decided to intervene.

What gets ignored is that after Hitler seized the rest of Czechoslovakia, it was Chamberlain who set Britain on the war path. He ordered the rearmament programs, set up the RADAR systems, allied with Poland, and made Britain ready to face Nazi Germany. There was a reason Churchill mourned his death.

Now, I'm not saying he was the Most Gifted/Able/Intelligent Politician/diplomat in history, but his actions are very underrated and unfortunately ignored by most who just assume because he didn't do more to stop Hitler he was a bad politician.
 
Britain was utterly unprepared for war in 1938. The British Army was not mechanized, the RADAR network that would save it during the Battle of Britain was not in place, and Britain, like France, was still struggling out of the depression. Germany, while still lacking several key factors that made it such a devastating war machine when war broke out in September 1939, was still at least mobilized for war. The Munich Crisis was called that because that's what it was, a crisis. Hitler was threatening to invade Czechoslovakia and there was nothing Britain nor France could do to save it. The Czech fortifications were were in fact outdated and weak, and the Czech military was facing multiple threats on several fronts, and relied heavily on conscripts from ethnic minorities that didn't share the Czech loyalty to Czechoslovakia.

Had Hitler invaded, France and Britain couldn't have saved Czechoslovakia. They would've been forced to mobilize their woefully under prepared armed forces and most likely would've been defeated by the Germans, unless, ironically, the Soviets decided to intervene.

What gets ignored is that after Hitler seized the rest of Czechoslovakia, it was Chamberlain who set Britain on the war path. He ordered the rearmament programs, set up the RADAR systems, allied with Poland, and made Britain ready to face Nazi Germany. There was a reason Churchill mourned his death.

Now, I'm not saying he was the Most Gifted/Able/Intelligent Politician/diplomat in history, but his actions are very underrated and unfortunately ignored by most who just assume because he didn't do more to stop Hitler he was a bad politician.

I disagree, you like most people back then are vastly overestimating German military strength pre-ww2
In fact is Chamberlain had held tough the German generals would have removed Hitler before trying to invade Czechoslovakia
On 4 August 1938, a secret Army meeting was held. Beck read his lengthy report to the assembled officers. They all agreed something had to be done to prevent certain disaster. Beck hoped they would all resign together but no one resigned except Beck. However his replacement, General Franz Halder, sympathised with Beck and they both conspired with several top generals, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (Chief of German Intelligence), and Graf von Helldorf (Berlin's Police Chief) to arrest Hitler the moment he gave the invasion order. However, the plan would only work if Britain issued a strong warning and a letter to the effect that they would fight to preserve Czechoslovakia. This would help to convince the German people that certain defeat awaited Germany. Agents were therefore sent to England to tell Chamberlain that an attack on Czechoslovakia was planned, and of their intention to overthrow Hitler if this occurred. However, the proposal was rejected by the British Cabinet and no such letter was issued.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munich_Agreement

Chamberlain was totally bamboozled by Hitler.
 
I disagree, you like most people back then are vastly overestimating German military strength pre-ww2

No, I'm not. What I'm recognizing is how utterly unprepared Britain and France were. Had Germany gone to war instead, they would've conquered Czechoslovakia with ease. Britain and France were powerless to stop them. The Maginot Line wasn't even completed in 1938, and the French had the equivalent of only two brigades of armor, but lacked heavy guns. The 1938 Wehrmacht was definitely not the same beast it was in 1939, but it was still better than either Britain or France.


In fact is Chamberlain had held tough the German generals would have removed Hitler before trying to invade Czechoslovakia

No, they wouldn't have. To quote a man much smarter than I

"Beck was very isolated. The difficulty he had getting anyone else in the ranks of the German generals to support him (including Brauchitsch and Manstein) shows how unlikely a coup against Hitler actually was.

Ultimately, Beck's opposition shows just how lonely his position was, and how popular Hitler was with most of the German senior officers, not how the Wehrmacht was a short step away from revolt."
 
No, I'm not. What I'm recognizing is how utterly unprepared Britain and France were. Had Germany gone to war instead, they would've conquered Czechoslovakia with ease. Britain and France were powerless to stop them. The Maginot Line wasn't even completed in 1938, and the French had the equivalent of only two brigades of armor, but lacked heavy guns. The 1938 Wehrmacht was definitely not the same beast it was in 1939, but it was still better than either Britain or France.




No, they wouldn't have. To quote a man much smarter than I

"Beck was very isolated. The difficulty he had getting anyone else in the ranks of the German generals to support him (including Brauchitsch and Manstein) shows how unlikely a coup against Hitler actually was.

Ultimately, Beck's opposition shows just how lonely his position was, and how popular Hitler was with most of the German senior officers, not how the Wehrmacht was a short step away from revolt."

Wrong. The Germans were woefully unprepared in 1938.
 
No, I'm not. What I'm recognizing is how utterly unprepared Britain and France were. Had Germany gone to war instead, they would've conquered Czechoslovakia with ease.

Yes you are vastly overestimating German strength and Czech weakness.


Britain and France were powerless to stop them. The Maginot Line wasn't even completed in 1938, and the French had the equivalent of only two brigades of armor, but lacked heavy guns. The 1938 Wehrmacht was definitely not the same beast it was in 1939, but it was still better than either Britain or France.
Maginot line was irrelevant to France invading a defenceless Germany. By defenceless I mean all German troops in the east fighting Czechs. Just like what happened with Poland when Germany had the bonus of Czech war loot to use. yeah French didn't attack then either but that was a problem with the leadership not due to lack of forces.


No, they wouldn't have. To quote a man much smarter than I

"Beck was very isolated. The difficulty he had getting anyone else in the ranks of the German generals to support him (including Brauchitsch and Manstein) shows how unlikely a coup against Hitler actually was.

Ultimately, Beck's opposition shows just how lonely his position was, and how popular Hitler was with most of the German senior officers, not how the Wehrmacht was a short step away from revolt."

Disagree with you there completely.
If the English hadn't cave at very best Hitler would have had a divided and unenthusiastic Military at worst he would have been removed and no war.
Either way they didn't have the arms/armaments to win quickly against the Czechs and if France (which did have a large army) and the Brits who were building forces attacked it would have been bye bye Hitler and no WW2
 
Yes you are vastly overestimating German strength and Czech weakness.

Not really. The annexation of Austria had opened up the Czech southern flank to attack, and it's border defenses were never as good as claimed. Like almost all pre-war defenses they lacked depth, only 5km at their deepest, 100 meters as their narrowest. Key industrial areas were also very close to the border, so any fallback would also have crippled Czech war production. Even worse, in 1938 the fortifications weren't even complete, and they lacked heavy artillery. The line was manned largely by maneuverable-incapable defensive divisions, and lacked the essential ability for local and large scale counter attacks, which was proven in WWII to be required for a sufficient defensive line to be manned.

There was also the very real threat of Poland and Hungary taking the opportunity to seize their claims in the disputed border, stretching Czech forces even further.



Maginot line was irrelevant to France invading a defenceless Germany. By defenceless I mean all German troops in the east fighting Czechs. Just like what happened with Poland when Germany had the bonus of Czech war loot to use. yeah French didn't attack then either but that was a problem with the leadership not due to lack of forces.


Except the French didn't have any offensive plans. France was incapable of helping the Czechs because the French military hadn't drawn up any plans to attack Germany in a meaningful way. Public opinion in France was also extremely against another war in Germany, not hard to understand why given the million plus casualties the French had sustained. If the French government had pursued hostilities with Germany, they would've faced immense opposition from home, and would've struggled to meaningfully impacted the effort.



Disagree with you there completely.
If the English hadn't cave at very best Hitler would have had a divided and unenthusiastic Military at worst he would have been removed and no war.

Again, not really.


"For its part, the army tried to use its control of personnel assignments to affect the balance of power. Fritsch and Beck believed they could torpedo the War Ministry's ambitions [for war with Czechoslovakia, which they had been ordered to start planning in 1935] by filling key positions with officers who would defend the army's point of view. For example, in the late summer of 1935 Beck went to the chief of the Army Personnel Office, Lieutenant General Viktor von Schwedler, and said he needed an officer to be Reichenau's replacement as head of the Armed Forces Office. The officer should be a good administrator, Beck added, but not too bright, and someone who would not sell the army out. Schwedler said he could only think of one man: Brigadier General Wilhelm Keitel. Beck took the suggestion to Fritsch, who nominated Keitel to Blomberg. Blomberg accepted, and Keitel took up his post on October 1. However Keitel soon demonstrated that he believed just as firmly in the principle of centralized Wehrmacht command as Reichenau had, and he outdid Reichenau in loyalty to Hitler."

-Geoffrey P. Megargee, "Inside Hitler's High Command," p.34

And to show how serious a miscalculation this was:

"[Keitel] quickly became convinced of Hitler's genius as a political and military leader. 'At the bottom of my heart I was a loyal shield-bearer for Adolf Hitler,' he told Allied interrogators after the war, 'my personal convictions would have been National Socialist.' Moreover he fell completely under the spell of Hitler's personality, and his way of avoiding conflict was to agree loudly with everything the Fuhrer suggested."

-Megargee, p.41

Most of the Wehrmacht approved of what Hitler was doing in general, or at least wasn't willing to rock the boat given Hitler's popularity.

Either way they didn't have the arms/armaments to win quickly against the Czechs and if France (which did have a large army) and the Brits who were building forces attacked it would have been bye bye Hitler and no WW2

Britian didn't start major rearmament until after Munich. And what makes you so certain France was going to save the day? How would they have done so?
 
Wrong. The Germans were woefully unprepared in 1938.



And they were still better prepared for war than either France or Britain. They at least has Panzer divisions, (four in 1938), while the best the French could muster was two DLM on paper, in 1938 they were basically just two under strength brigades of light tanks, lacking most of their heavier equipment. The French lacked any kind of offensive doctrine going forward. Their contributions would've been the same as they were in 1940.
 
Yes you are vastly overestimating German strength and Czech weakness.



Maginot line was irrelevant to France invading a defenceless Germany. By defenceless I mean all German troops in the east fighting Czechs. Just like what happened with Poland when Germany had the bonus of Czech war loot to use. yeah French didn't attack then either but that was a problem with the leadership not due to lack of forces.




Disagree with you there completely.
If the English hadn't cave at very best Hitler would have had a divided and unenthusiastic Military at worst he would have been removed and no war.
Either way they didn't have the arms/armaments to win quickly against the Czechs and if France (which did have a large army) and the Brits who were building forces attacked it would have been bye bye Hitler and no WW2

Not to mention Britain wouldn't have been decimated by the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain led by Goering.
 
Not to mention Britain wouldn't have been decimated by the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain led by Goering.


The RAF wouldn't have performed very well at all. The RAF had only one operational Hurricane squadron (16 planes) at the time of Munich, as that type was also just entering service, and the RADAR network was not operational, severely limiting the RAF's defensive capability. Likewise, French production of the Moraine MS.406, a decent fighter and probably the best they could field, accounted to just 65 aircraft per year. In September of 1938 Germany had over 500 Messerschmitts (along with about 60 early model Bf.110s and a smattering of 300 or so older biplane fighters), while France had just a few dozen Moranes. Had war broken out, the French would've been forced to reply with outdated Dewoitine D.500s and D.501s, which had fixed landing gear and open cockpits. Even then the French fighter squadrons were badly outnumbered, with only about 300 Dewoitines in frontline service as of August 1938.
 
As the title says. Who do you see as one of the most intelligent and able and gifted politicians/diplomat in history? Why do you feel that way?

Personally for me it is Otto Von Bismarck. Without him, a unified Germany would not have happened. Granted...maybe no world wars...but had he remained in power there also would have been no wars. His political and diplomatic maneuvering essentially set Germany up as a powerful empire. His alliances essentially kept Germany on the receiving end of good fortune.

He even understood that Russia was the key to keeping a war out of Germany. The guy was a genius. Too bad the Kaiser was a damned fool

Benjamin Disraeli.

Countered Bismark, Germany got unified under Gladstone, without a war. Countered Russia without a war and gave the vote to all men.

All done just using his inteligence and ability to trick the other guy.

Obviously I would never buy a used car from him.....
 
And they were still better prepared for war than either France or Britain. They at least has Panzer divisions, (four in 1938), while the best the French could muster was two DLM on paper, in 1938 they were basically just two under strength brigades of light tanks, lacking most of their heavier equipment. The French lacked any kind of offensive doctrine going forward. Their contributions would've been the same as they were in 1940.

Not sure where you're getting your information, but you need better sources. German forces were inferior in 1938.

[h=3]Warhorse Simulations: History Papers: "Submit to a ...[/h]www.warhorsesim.com/papers/MunichCrisis.htm


In 1935, Italy had joined France in blocking a German threat to Austria, but this ..... Very little in the military situation in 1938, therefore, encouraged the British to ..... Stronge reported favorably on the state of Czech military readiness, but with ...
 
As the title says. Who do you see as one of the most intelligent and able and gifted politicians/diplomat in history? Why do you feel that way?

Personally for me it is Otto Von Bismarck. Without him, a unified Germany would not have happened. Granted...maybe no world wars...but had he remained in power there also would have been no wars. His political and diplomatic maneuvering essentially set Germany up as a powerful empire. His alliances essentially kept Germany on the receiving end of good fortune.

He even understood that Russia was the key to keeping a war out of Germany. The guy was a genius. Too bad the Kaiser was a damned fool

Otto von B? He was the guy that effectively laid the groundwork for WWI by uniting Germany.
 
Not sure where you're getting your information, but you need better sources. German forces were inferior in 1938.

Warhorse Simulations: History Papers: "Submit to a ...

Warhorse Simulations: History Papers: "Submit to a Humiliation"


In 1935, Italy had joined France in blocking a German threat to Austria, but this .....

Why did you stop the quote there? The rest of it clearly states " In 1935, Italy had joined France in blocking a German threat to Austria, but this time Mussolini remained indifferent."


Very little in the military situation in 1938, therefore, encouraged the British to .....

This quote doesn't even back up your own claim.

"The army itself was divided on the issue of a continental versus a colonial role. Its preoccupation with its Middle Eastern commitments may help to explain why it did not put up more of a fight over the Expeditionary Force. During the Abyssinian crisis in 1935, substantial numbers of men and tanks had been sent to Egypt and never recalled, and in 1936 the Palestinian rebellion had become acute -- by 1938 the equivalent of two divisions were stationed there and the General Staff feared that more would be necessary in the event of war.[39]

Very little in the military situation in 1938, therefore, encouraged the British to accept any additional obligations, particularly in Europe. British military planners believed that Britain's obligations far exceeded its actual strength, and that every effort must be made to avoid war. This was especially true with regard to Germany, because the British felt themselves to be most vulnerable to air attack. Budgetary constraints had forced the British to prioritize the RAF over the other services, the army especially, and by the end of 1937 it appeared financially, militarily and politically prudent to give up the idea of having a large Expeditionary Force available to fight on the continent."


Stronge reported favorably on the state of Czech military readiness, but with ...


Are you even reading your own source?

but with some reservations. He warned that the Czechs might not fight "if their defences are overrun or turned at the outset and their mobilization is interfered with." He also expressed concern with the extreme vulnerability of the frontier defenses to Sudeten-German sabotage. His general conclusion was that the Czechs would fight if France came to their assistance at once, but not otherwise. Stronge made it clear that the Czech General Staff did not hope to withstand Germany indefinitely; "it is merely a question as to whether they can offer any form of protracted resistance," which he believed was possible for any Czech forces which succeeded in withdrawing into Slovakia. He noted that the fortifications "possess definite delaying possibilities in the north to large forces and for some time. In the south delay would only be of a very temporary nature but possibly for a day or two."

Ignoring that Stronge was a product of British military thinking at the time that assumed future wars would be fought like WWI (Slow moving, defensive battles), his own estimates point out the flaws of the Czech defenses.

I've already pointed out that the defensive network of Czechoslovakia was not sound. They had little depth, hardly any maneuverability, and their heavy industries were focused too close to the border, meaning the inevitable withdrawal would cripple the Czech war effort. They also had to contend with a southern flank of Austria. Furthermore, the Czechoslovakian army replied heavily on conscripts drawn from minority ethnic groups that were not guaranteed to be loyal; Hungarians, Germans, Poles and Romanians.

Czech war plans relied on the idea that France would come to save the day. Yet France was unprepared for war in 1938 and on what basis is there to assume they would've done anything differently than in 1940?
 
Why did you stop the quote there? The rest of it clearly states " In 1935, Italy had joined France in blocking a German threat to Austria, but this time Mussolini remained indifferent."




This quote doesn't even back up your own claim.







Are you even reading your own source?



Ignoring that Stronge was a product of British military thinking at the time that assumed future wars would be fought like WWI (Slow moving, defensive battles), his own estimates point out the flaws of the Czech defenses.

I've already pointed out that the defensive network of Czechoslovakia was not sound. They had little depth, hardly any maneuverability, and their heavy industries were focused too close to the border, meaning the inevitable withdrawal would cripple the Czech war effort. They also had to contend with a southern flank of Austria. Furthermore, the Czechoslovakian army replied heavily on conscripts drawn from minority ethnic groups that were not guaranteed to be loyal; Hungarians, Germans, Poles and Romanians.

Czech war plans relied on the idea that France would come to save the day. Yet France was unprepared for war in 1938 and on what basis is there to assume they would've done anything differently than in 1940?

You well illustrate the danger of staking out a strong position without reading through to the end.

"A recent study of the probable course of a war in 1938 concluded: In terms of numbers of divisions, economic resources, industrial capacity, and naval forces, Germany would have faced overwhelming Allied superiority in 1938 . . . Even so, the war against Germany would not have been easy, nor would it have been quickly won.[SUP][99]"[/SUP]
 
You well illustrate the danger of staking out a strong position without reading through to the end.

"A recent study of the probable course of a war in 1938 concluded: In terms of numbers of divisions, economic resources, industrial capacity, and naval forces, Germany would have faced overwhelming Allied superiority in 1938 . . . Even so, the war against Germany would not have been easy, nor would it have been quickly won.[SUP][99]"[/SUP]

That's not even a quote from your source, that's a quote taken from another article penned by Williamson Murray. Murray however made the same conclusion that others have assumed; Czech fortifications would've been able to halt the Wehrmacht. I'm mentioned this several times by now that the Czech defensive lines were not as impenetrable as most assumed. Murray also neglects to discuss the very real possibility of Hungarian, Polish and Romanian intervention to settle long standing territorial disputes, and only briefly makes mention of the new potential threat on the Austrian border. The Czech war plans also assumed that the Germans would throw only a minor force against them and concentrate on the French. Hitler didn't plan to do that, just like he didn't do when he invaded Poland, and trust in French inaction, which was proven true.

I found Murray's piece to actually be rather lacking; it focuses almost entirely on the situation regarding the air forces and neglects the situation on the ground. He claims that the Germans did not have the mobile armored forces to ascertain decisive victories (Even though the Germans had four Panzer divisions in 1938, and the French none). He ignores the actual poor situation the Czechs were facing and assumes that the French, despite not doing so when war actually broke out, would somehow find the desire to go on the offensive.

Perhaps most fundamentally misleading though is his conclusion that your source cites; that economic and industrial superiority made victory inevitable. Yes, France and Britain were superior in that regard. Following the Munich Crisis, French and British armament production greatly outstripped Germany. Whereas in 1938 France had only produced 400 tanks, in 1939 production more than doubled to over 1,000 vehicles.

In fact, just as Britain and France were ramping up their industries, the German economy experienced a serious armaments slowdown in early 1939 due to a shortage of raw materials and resources which threatened to completely upset Hitler's plans. Hitler in particular was well aware of the numbers, and was explicit in stating several times that Germany's advantage (which had been gained by stealing several years march on the Allies with her early re-armament) would narrow the longer she waited.

In 1938, Germany had advantages in tanks, aircraft, and most fundamentally, doctrine (understanding how armored warfare should work). In 1939, Germany at best was equal footing, or in some cases, outnumbered. But we all know how the Battle of France turned out, so what on earth makes you think that in 1938 that an ever weaker France and Britain could've done any better?
 
That's not even a quote from your source, that's a quote taken from another article penned by Williamson Murray. Murray however made the same conclusion that others have assumed; Czech fortifications would've been able to halt the Wehrmacht. I'm mentioned this several times by now that the Czech defensive lines were not as impenetrable as most assumed. Murray also neglects to discuss the very real possibility of Hungarian, Polish and Romanian intervention to settle long standing territorial disputes, and only briefly makes mention of the new potential threat on the Austrian border. The Czech war plans also assumed that the Germans would throw only a minor force against them and concentrate on the French. Hitler didn't plan to do that, just like he didn't do when he invaded Poland, and trust in French inaction, which was proven true.

I found Murray's piece to actually be rather lacking; it focuses almost entirely on the situation regarding the air forces and neglects the situation on the ground. He claims that the Germans did not have the mobile armored forces to ascertain decisive victories (Even though the Germans had four Panzer divisions in 1938, and the French none). He ignores the actual poor situation the Czechs were facing and assumes that the French, despite not doing so when war actually broke out, would somehow find the desire to go on the offensive.

Perhaps most fundamentally misleading though is his conclusion that your source cites; that economic and industrial superiority made victory inevitable. Yes, France and Britain were superior in that regard. Following the Munich Crisis, French and British armament production greatly outstripped Germany. Whereas in 1938 France had only produced 400 tanks, in 1939 production more than doubled to over 1,000 vehicles.

In fact, just as Britain and France were ramping up their industries, the German economy experienced a serious armaments slowdown in early 1939 due to a shortage of raw materials and resources which threatened to completely upset Hitler's plans. Hitler in particular was well aware of the numbers, and was explicit in stating several times that Germany's advantage (which had been gained by stealing several years march on the Allies with her early re-armament) would narrow the longer she waited.

In 1938, Germany had advantages in tanks, aircraft, and most fundamentally, doctrine (understanding how armored warfare should work). In 1939, Germany at best was equal footing, or in some cases, outnumbered. But we all know how the Battle of France turned out, so what on earth makes you think that in 1938 that an ever weaker France and Britain could've done any better?

I have at no time said a word about Czech fortifications and they have no place in my argument. My point has been that the Germans got lucky in 1938 because their forces were inferior to the French and British at that time.
 
That's not even a quote from your source, that's a quote taken from another article penned by Williamson Murray. Murray however made the same conclusion that others have assumed; Czech fortifications would've been able to halt the Wehrmacht. I'm mentioned this several times by now that the Czech defensive lines were not as impenetrable as most assumed. Murray also neglects to discuss the very real possibility of Hungarian, Polish and Romanian intervention to settle long standing territorial disputes, and only briefly makes mention of the new potential threat on the Austrian border. The Czech war plans also assumed that the Germans would throw only a minor force against them and concentrate on the French. Hitler didn't plan to do that, just like he didn't do when he invaded Poland, and trust in French inaction, which was proven true.

I found Murray's piece to actually be rather lacking; it focuses almost entirely on the situation regarding the air forces and neglects the situation on the ground. He claims that the Germans did not have the mobile armored forces to ascertain decisive victories (Even though the Germans had four Panzer divisions in 1938, and the French none). He ignores the actual poor situation the Czechs were facing and assumes that the French, despite not doing so when war actually broke out, would somehow find the desire to go on the offensive.

Perhaps most fundamentally misleading though is his conclusion that your source cites; that economic and industrial superiority made victory inevitable. Yes, France and Britain were superior in that regard. Following the Munich Crisis, French and British armament production greatly outstripped Germany. Whereas in 1938 France had only produced 400 tanks, in 1939 production more than doubled to over 1,000 vehicles.

In fact, just as Britain and France were ramping up their industries, the German economy experienced a serious armaments slowdown in early 1939 due to a shortage of raw materials and resources which threatened to completely upset Hitler's plans. Hitler in particular was well aware of the numbers, and was explicit in stating several times that Germany's advantage (which had been gained by stealing several years march on the Allies with her early re-armament) would narrow the longer she waited.

In 1938, Germany had advantages in tanks, aircraft, and most fundamentally, doctrine (understanding how armored warfare should work). In 1939, Germany at best was equal footing, or in some cases, outnumbered. But we all know how the Battle of France turned out, so what on earth makes you think that in 1938 that an ever weaker France and Britain could've done any better?

[h=3]WWII Myths – German tank strength in the Battle of France ...[/h]chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/.../wwii-myths-german-tank-strength-in....


Nov 2, 2013 - At the time no one expected that the French forces would be defeated in such a short campaign. During the interwar period the French Army ...
 
That's not even a quote from your source, that's a quote taken from another article penned by Williamson Murray. Murray however made the same conclusion that others have assumed; Czech fortifications would've been able to halt the Wehrmacht. I'm mentioned this several times by now that the Czech defensive lines were not as impenetrable as most assumed. Murray also neglects to discuss the very real possibility of Hungarian, Polish and Romanian intervention to settle long standing territorial disputes, and only briefly makes mention of the new potential threat on the Austrian border. The Czech war plans also assumed that the Germans would throw only a minor force against them and concentrate on the French. Hitler didn't plan to do that, just like he didn't do when he invaded Poland, and trust in French inaction, which was proven true.

I found Murray's piece to actually be rather lacking; it focuses almost entirely on the situation regarding the air forces and neglects the situation on the ground. He claims that the Germans did not have the mobile armored forces to ascertain decisive victories (Even though the Germans had four Panzer divisions in 1938, and the French none). He ignores the actual poor situation the Czechs were facing and assumes that the French, despite not doing so when war actually broke out, would somehow find the desire to go on the offensive.

Perhaps most fundamentally misleading though is his conclusion that your source cites; that economic and industrial superiority made victory inevitable. Yes, France and Britain were superior in that regard. Following the Munich Crisis, French and British armament production greatly outstripped Germany. Whereas in 1938 France had only produced 400 tanks, in 1939 production more than doubled to over 1,000 vehicles.

In fact, just as Britain and France were ramping up their industries, the German economy experienced a serious armaments slowdown in early 1939 due to a shortage of raw materials and resources which threatened to completely upset Hitler's plans. Hitler in particular was well aware of the numbers, and was explicit in stating several times that Germany's advantage (which had been gained by stealing several years march on the Allies with her early re-armament) would narrow the longer she waited.

In 1938, Germany had advantages in tanks, aircraft, and most fundamentally, doctrine (understanding how armored warfare should work). In 1939, Germany at best was equal footing, or in some cases, outnumbered. But we all know how the Battle of France turned out, so what on earth makes you think that in 1938 that an ever weaker France and Britain could've done any better?

[h=2]General overview: French armored forces in 1939[/h] In 1939, the French armored force was most important of the Allies, as the USSR was formally a German ally at the time. A total force of nearly 5,800 tanks, many of which were based overseas, in operational reserve or second line (such as the obsolete FT). The fact that these tanks were designed to establish effective defensive tactics made them slow, poorly armed against other tanks, but very well protected. The B1 bis became legendary for a short time, a terror for German tank crews. At Stonne, one of these tanks destroyed as many as 15 Panzer IIIs and IVs. The Germans would not face such losses until they would encounter Soviet KV-1s and T-34s during Operation Barbarossa. The failure of French tanks was owed to obsolete tactical concepts, compromises which led to undermanned tanks and busy commanders, lack of air support and very poor communication aggravated by a rigid, scattered chain of command. In short, French armor could have prevailed if better commanded and with better coordination and supplies. The ensuing losses were an incredible waste of military might, reproduced almost to the letter by the USSR in the summer of 1941. There, once more, the biggest armored force in the world was put in jeopardy by similar tactics to those applied in the French campaign, applied on a larger scale, with limited but well-employed forces.



WW2 French tanks - Tanks Encyclopedia

www.[B]tanks[/B]-encyclopedia.com/ww2/france/ww2_French_Tanks.php


By September 1939, and even more in May 1940, the French armored forces surpassed the Wehrmacht in quantity and often in protection.
 
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