In late 1980 and early 1981, the Fed once again tightened the money supply, allowing the federal funds rate to approach 20 percent. Despite this, long-run interest rates continued to rise. The ten-year Treasury bond rate increased from about 11 percent in October 1980 to more than 15 percent a year later, possibly because the market believed the Fed would back down from its tight policy when unemployment rose (Goodfriend, Marvin, and Robert G. King. “The Incredible Volcker Disinflation.” Journal of Monetary Economics 52, no. 5 (July 2005): 981-1015.). This time, however, Volcker was adamant that the Fed not back down: “We have set our course to restrain growth in money and credit. We mean to stick with it” (
Volcker 1981a).
The economy officially entered a recession in the third quarter of 1981, as high interest rates put pressure on sectors of the economy reliant on borrowing, like manufacturing and construction. Unemployment grew from 7.4 percent at the start of the recession to nearly 10 percent a year later. As the recession worsened, Volcker faced repeated calls from Congress to loosen monetary policy, but he maintained that failing to bring down long-run inflation expectations now would result in “more serious economic circumstances over a much longer period of time” (Monetary Policy Report 1982, 67).
Ultimately, this persistence paid off. By October 1982, inflation had fallen to 5 percent and long-run interest rates began to decline. The Fed allowed the federal funds rate to fall back to 9 percent, and unemployment declined quickly from the peak of nearly 11 percent at the end to 1982 to 8 percent one year later (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; Goodfriend and King 2005).