The mosque in question is in fact an expression and the argument is restricting it's place because of the perception that this particular imam may be doing so for improper reasons which is exactly a TPM argument.
You will never,
ever succeed with the argument that building the mosque is
expression. Ever. And if someone, somewhere bought into it, it's still trumped by the fact that it's absolutlely exercise of religion.
Yelling fire in a crowded theater is always illegal, if someone is injured then charges are legitimate. Sorry that is correct.
Not if there's no ordinance or law against it. And also not if the specific facts of the case don't satisfy the elements of whatever ordinance or law might exist. There are thousands of permutations which could come into play. Not the least of which being that a case where no one was harmed at all.
The Supreme Court never,
ever, declared that yelling "fire" in a crowded theater was illegal. Ever.
I get
that. The point is that the mosque is under scrutiny at the moment and there is a movement to restrict.
DUDE. The MOSQUE is NEVER under scrutiny. The LAW RESTRICTING THE MOSQUE would be. (Except that it wouldn't be, because the mosque isn't expression.)
You were saying it always does.
No problem, which is why I narrowed the definition to specifically those who the offense may pertain to.
That's not a time restriction. And if it were claimed as one -- "until the last one of those people is dead" -- it would
never hold up.
I meant the place argument as pertaining to the proximity argument. Something about the place argument not always being relevant.
It's not always relevant because there's not always a restriction on location. But for this, there is. Though I will say, if there were any part of a proposed restriction which would have any chance of succeeding, it's place. But probably not, considering there are buildings in between GZ and the mosque. (And, of course, that it doesn't apply to exercise of religion.)
Actually I could argue that it does. Saying the same things in different tones and with different intentions do fit the manner argument. It's all about the context.
Restrictions on intentions are not content-neutral and would fail as time/place/manner restrictions.
Well, she was negligent in that she specifically took actions which led to her injury.
There were some mitigating circumstances. However, McDonald's was also fully aware that it makes its coffee very, very, very hot, much hotter than most other places, that it was dangerously hot, and internal memoranda confirmed that they decided to keep it that hot anyway because they thought it enhanced the flavor. No one else's coffee would have caused the injuries the woman suffered (which also involved melting some of the nylon in her garments and having it stick to her skin; the coffee was just hot enough to that), and certainly not to the degree they were suffered.
However, because of mitigating circumstances, the judgment was lowered, but McDonald's was still liable and rightly so.
