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Huh? How can their be properties outside formal causes?
I didn't say they were outside formal causes. If we go back to Aristotle's arguments, the formal cause follows from the final cause. A shift in perspective can alter the understanding of the final cause, and therefore alter the understanding of the formal causes. With my perspective, all of the formal causes that you are aware of will still follow. But more formal causes follow from my perspective that do not follow from yours.
As I said, it's about shifting your perspective. Perhaps thinking about the formal and final causes of a nice filet mignon steak can help illustrate what I am talking about. Then, think about the formal causes and final causes of the psoas major muscle of a cow.
As I said, it's a matter of perspective. A filet mignon steak is the exact same thing as a psoas major muscle, we just have a different perspective about it when we change the context in which we view it. Doesn't change the fact that it is the same thing.
The final cause of the steak is the final cause of the psoas major muscle, the formal causes of the muscle are the same as those of the steak.
Therein lies the heart of my point. If we alter the context in which a thing is viewed, we alter our assumptions about it.
Yes, but we might as well make sure we both have that view of nature correct. Some views of nature are fallacious in the way you seem to mean, others aren't necessarily.
A view of nature can't really be fallacious on it's own. It only can become fallacious when it is applied to a judgment of some sort.
This is because you hadn't yet given your argument for why it is circular. I presumed all along you simply just meant the so called naturalistic fallacy or something very similar. As I said near the beginning of the discussion this 'fallacy' is not a strict logical fallacy, as it relies on modern assumptions about reality, including the distinctions between is and ought, fact and value. Most modern ways of looking at these fall victim to it, but not a lot of a pre-modern ones. And by the way, if this 'fallacy' was true in these cases, of pre-modern views on nature and the good, it would be more or less visible immediately. This is not a full argument against it of course, but, unless you assumed all pre-moderns and non-Westerners were stupid, you'd expect a few to notice they'd fallen into this 'fallacy'.
The part is bold is a false dichotomy, in part, because of the unsupported assumption which I have underlined. Why do you assume it would be visible immediately? I've already explained why it doesn't fit either the false dichotomy or your assumption.
That being said, at the end of this post I will make a concession that could hypothetically end this discussion. I'm putting it at the end though because despite that concession, I am enjoying the discussion.
Unless you're trying to make rather out of place general skeptical points, I do not think this argument really helps you, as there was a lot of intellectual and rational thought involved in the areas of investigation I mentioned.
What assumptions are you operating under that lead you to these conclusions?
I think you are using the term strawman wrong, as we were just discussing what I might do. I think for me to put forward such a specific argument I would have to give such a full position, because the moment I had to defend it I would have to appeal to this full position.
I didn't use the term strawman wrong given the way that you answered the request. It would be like me asking you to type a post in a specific font and you responding by saying "I'm certainly not going to write a novel, so I will not fullfill your request." When answered as such, you certainly give the impression that the request was to write a novel.
Now, given your explanation of why you responded that way, it turns out to be simply a matter of omitting an important detail which was that you cannot present any such specific argument because you feel that it would also require you to put forth a general defense of the premise that you would require.
But there is a problem with that assumption.
My challenge was one where the only response I could give that was adequate to the task would be describing the circular reasoning by actually pointing out where the fallacy occurred. The only reason you would need to defend a premise, however, would be if it's veracity of said premise was in doubt.
That wouldn't relate to the validity of the logic (which is what I would be charged with finding a flaw in), but instead relates solely to the soundness of the logic. If believe that in order to defend it you would be required to appeal the full position, then you must also be aware of it having, at the very least, the appearance of circular reasoning.
If that is the case, then you have to ask yourself "why, exactly, does this argument give the appearance of circular reasoning".
If that is not the case, then you should feel free to step up to my challenge because it is already known that any such premise is of unknown veracity.
Either way, if you aren't willing to have your views challenged in a direct fashion, there's really no point in claiming they have any logical merit in this discussion. They might have merit, but nobody would have any way of knowing.
My concession: After reflecting on our discussion, I went back and looked up the naturalistic fallacy and I realized I had been using the term incorrectly. Because of my error of ignorance, I can see why you immediately jumped on the point about it being a dubious fallacy. For some reason, purely my own fault, I thought it was an appeal to nature fallacy when using a term other than nature in the same way that nature would be used in the appeal to nature fallacy (remember, this discussion started with regard to the term "normal", not "natural"). This error of mine has obviously has lead to confusion from the very start, all of which I take full blame for. After re-educating myself on the matter, I see now that the naturalistic fallacy is more of an ethical argument rather than a proper fallacy. This makes your initial comment to me about said fallacy 100% correct and my subsequent denials of that comment absolutely false.
That being said, I am enjoying our discussion about the nature of nature as it applies to good so I don't wish for it to stop simply because I pulled a moron maneuver early on. You do have my apologies for this error, however.
The reason I have to concede this point (aside from the fact that I was wrong) is because it also occurs to me that our philosophical positions are not very far apart (as I remember from our many previous discussions before you went awol for a while). My own position is not related to morality, however, so much as it relates to practical application of things. I don't use terms like "good" or "proper" or "moral" in my philosophy, since I don't think that they are appropriate for my perspective. "Effective" and "practical" are more accurate terms for similar (but not quite the same) concepts in my philosophy.
I say this because, as you may remember, my own de-centralist position is heavily influenced by what I consider to be the natural state of mankind as well as human nature. I believe nature and that which is natural can be used as an aspect of an argument, but that it cannot be considered the primary basis of an argument. Given what I now know about the naturalistic fallacy, people might view my own arguments as falling prey to it. This increases my need to admit to my error above even more than the usual "It's the right thing to do" stuff.