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Libyan rebels urge west to assassinate Gaddafi as his forces near Benghazi

Oh my bad I misread. I still don't believe preemption is defense though, but that's my personal opinion.

You believe in concepts. Many do, but don't realize where that gets them. You believe in the concept of the UN, and thusly defend the illusion. The concept of how war is to be managed and therefore criticize all imperfection. The concept of right and wrong and therefore ignore the grey of reality and survival. Am I close? I do this when it comes to what the US is supposed to stand for versus it's Cold War behaviors.
 
You believe in concepts. Many do, but don't realize where that gets them. You believe in the concept of the UN, and thusly defend the illusion. The concept of how war is to be managed and therefore criticize all imperfection. The concept of right and wrong and therefore ignore the grey of reality and survival. Am I close? I do this when it comes to what the US is supposed to stand for versus it's Cold War behaviors.

I don't think I've mentioned the UN at all in this thread, and I pretty much agreed with your last post.
 
I don't think I've mentioned the UN at all in this thread, and I pretty much agreed with your last post.

No. It was just some random thoughts. The pre-emptive strike versus waiting to be attacked to justify a defense argument. It usually involves a belief in concept rather than reality. Historically, pre-emptive strikes have saved lives and shortened what would have been longer wars. An obvious threat should not be allowed to build. Germany should have been a no brainer the moment that build up started to be accompanied with rally cries of violence towards neighbors. The price of maintaining our "justice" was hundreds of millions of lives and trillions of dollars and decades to repair. Israel spared itself a much longer war by taking out Egypt's air force in the Suez pre-emptively. This notonly saved Israeli lives but also Egyptian lives (as well as any other Arab band wagon tag alongs in the region). And what will preserving our "justice" do for the Middle East and the rest of the world if Iran gets what it achieves? An Islamic nuclear tribal Cold War from Cairo to Islamabad and a lot of anxiety medication for the rest of us?

But the concept of pre-emptive strikes make us look or feel bad. It's the same as the word "invasion." No moral nation should ever "invade" another because we have been trained (educated) our entire lives to think of Hitler, Saddam Hussein, Genghis Khan, etc. when it comes to that word. We think of Nazi Germany when we think of aggressor and therefore think of that initial instigation of violence as the guilty party. This makes us uncomfortable with pre-emptive strikes. There's a difference between the concept of things and the reality of things. It's this confusion that had people more than willing to turn GITMO into a Gulag or a Concentration Camp in their heads.
 
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No. It was just some random thoughts. The pre-emptive strike versus waiting to be attacked to justify a defense argument. It usually involves a belief in concept rather than reality. Historically, pre-emptive strikes have saved lives and shortened what would have been longer wars. An obvious threat should not be allowed to build. Germany should have been a no brainer the moment that build up started to be accompanied with rally cries of violence towards neighbors. The price of maintaining our "justice" was hundreds of millions of lives and trillions of dollars and decades to repair. Israel spared itself a much longer war by taking out Egypt's air force in the Suez pre-emptively. And what will preserving our "justice" do for the Middle East and the rest of the world if Iran gets what it achieves? An Islamic nuclear tribal Cold War from Cairo to Islamabad and a lot of anxiety medication fot the rest of us?

Oh I wasn't talking about the morality of offense vs. defense, only that preemption would not be considered defense in a Clausewitzian sense...but I get the feeling you don't want to talk about concept and theory here.
 
Oh I wasn't talking about the morality of offense vs. defense, only that preemption would not be considered defense in a Clausewitzian sense...but I get the feeling you don't want to talk about concept and theory here.

I believe Clausewitz is over stated. "On War" summarized a lot of the theories that former great leaders in time already proved or stated (It's also a tough, tough read). His "War is politics by other means" idea is not just a cliche, but it is largely BS in our day and age. Today's politicians are not generals. Such cliches of old allow today's politicians a way of dismissing the fact that they failed to prevent war. And it assumes to give them a place in war so that they can reach in and screw up the military job just to try to salvage face or take credit for getting something right on the backs of others who don't fail.

I'm not big for theories. Unless in a mathematical or scientific capacity, they usually get in the way of progress. In my world, half cocked theories and hair brained schemes are deadly. Social theories are also deadly.
 
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I believe Clausewitz is over stated. "On War" summarized a lot of the theories that former great leaders in time already proved or stated (It's also a tough, tough read). His "War is politics by other means" idea is not just a cliche, but it is largely BS in our day and age. Today's politicians are not generals. Such cliches of old allow today's politicians a way of dismissing the fact that they failed to prevent war. And it assumes to give them a place in war so that they can reach in and screw up the military job just to try to salvage face or take credit for getting something right on the backs of others who don't fail.

I'm not big for theories. Unless in a mathematical or scientific capacity, they usually get in the way of progress. In my world, half cocked theories and hair brained schemes are deadly. Social theories are also deadly.

I respectfully disagree and find a lot of value in Clausewitz/On War. It's tough precisely because it's comprehensive, and "war is politics by other means" might be a cliche but it's also a truism. I respect your opinion, and I have mine so I'll just leave it at that.
 
I respectfully disagree and find a lot of value in Clausewitz/On War. It's tough precisely because it's comprehensive, and "war is politics by other means" might be a cliche but it's also a truism.


Of course there's a lot of value, but like so many war handbooks, it's classroom. At least Sun Tzu kept it simple. But either way, it's mostly common sense information.

And it's only a truism if the politicians are also the generals (like Clausewitz). They are not anymore. They are no longer kings or emperors marching across Europe on horses extending their national policies. War, in the 20th century, has largely been a sign of failure for politicians and diplomats. If Clausewitz could see the Rumsfelds, Clintons, Obamas, Carters, etc. of the day, he would fancy a different cliche.
 
Of course there's a lot of value, but like so many war handbooks, it's classroom. At least Sun Tzu kept it simple. But either way, it's mostly common sense information.

And it's only a truism if the politicians are also the generals (like Clausewitz). They are not anymore. They are no longer kings or emperors marching across Europe on horses extending their national policies. War, in the 20th century, has largely been a sign of failure for politicians and diplomats. If Clausewitz could see the Rumsfelds, Clintons, Obamas, Carters, etc. of the day, he would fancy a different cliche.

I believe that he would fancy the same cliche but criticize our election of people who aren't necessarily strategic thinkers. Politics and war are still as intertwined as ever. It really is different when you have civilian leadership of the military. The political leadership of Clausewitz's day wasn't perfect either, I think On War was in part tongue-in-cheek criticism of the older guard of generals and King Frederick William himself during his time period. God knows he was pretty damn pissed when the French occupied Prussia.
 
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Failing implies that the west actually tried to do something, which it didn't.

I would call that the failure. The ultimate failure of the West, since the Berlin Wall came down, has been to pretend that none of the European Colonial Frankenstein's monster nations of the third world - along with the American/Soviet Cold War prescrition to maintain "stability" in those said nations - is our problem. That some how, after three hundred years, none of these consequences is our responsibility. Sinceit set us up for a decade and a half of confusion and bewilderment, I would state that the biggest tactical blunder of Washington was them declaring "our wars over" in 1989. Short of installing a handy dandy dictator, we cannot prevent these people from rising up and demanding prosperity and opportunity (they were doing so in the beginning of European colonialism and again during the "Age of Independence"). But what we can do is take responsibility and help them transition into the future as peaceful and manageable as possible. That is the tactical route for long term security. If we do not, we encourage the 9/11s' and the countless terrorist organizations throughout the region. Thus far...we have failed because we pretend that after we have placed them into these situations that they are solely responsible for digging themselves out. We don't get that luxury.

The mass majority of all our terrorist problems stems from a lack of education, poverty, and religious brutal doctrine. Education and economic opportunity will subside the ease for which desparate people seek religious doctrine. And thusly ease the terrorist threat. The only thing that stands in the way is the Cold War left overs that continue to prevent the people their voice. If they don't get their voices heard through fair elections and honest representation, then "God" will supply it for them. And we all should know by now who Saayid Qutb named as God's enemy.
 
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Oh I wasn't talking about the morality of offense vs. defense, only that preemption would not be considered defense in a Clausewitzian sense...but I get the feeling you don't want to talk about concept and theory here.

Let's talk about reality: Defensive strategies are usually unsuccessful.
 
I respectfully disagree and find a lot of value in Clausewitz/On War. It's tough precisely because it's comprehensive, and "war is politics by other means" might be a cliche but it's also a truism. I respect your opinion, and I have mine so I'll just leave it at that.

The problem isn't with the interpretation, but with it's application. There's no way in hell that Clausewitz meant that politicians should be making decisions about tactics and strategy.
 
The problem isn't with the interpretation, but with it's application. There's no way in hell that Clausewitz meant that politicians should be making decisions about tactics and strategy.

It really depends on how politicians are chosen. I think his wish was for an improved education system that would produce a higher proportion of strategic thinkers that would then go on to hold political office. Politicians probably shouldn't be making decisions on tactics, but they sure as hell should have a say in strategy because strategy is a means to an end, with that end being a particular political objective.

But as for the quote, my personal interpretation is that he meant that politics and war are inherently inseparable, it's a fact of life. How a political system chooses to deal with that fact is it's own problem.
 
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As theories, concepts, and ideals have been introduced, I'll offer a few thoughts concerning possible lessons from the Libya uprising:

• Reliance on world organization (today the United Nations, in the post-WW I period the League of Nations) for maintaining international peace and security in the face of significant threats is futile. The body depends on the willingness of member states, with often widely diverging interests, to reach consensus. Hence in precisely the situations where consensus is most urgent e.g., addressing a major conflict, it is often most difficult to attain. Nations are rational actors. They will not cede their critical interests nor take risks/undertake sacrifices that are disproportionate to the interests they have at stake in a given issue.

Instead, the balance of power, even as some naïve and/or idealistic academics and policy makers argue that it is irrelevant or antiquated today, remains a crucial underpinning of peace and security. So long as would-be aggressors understand that they could not achieve their desired gains at an acceptable price, they can be deterred. So long as threats are credible and would-be aggressors believe those making the threats can and will deliver, those aggressors will be deterred. In contrast, so long as would-be aggressors conclude that their targets are weak, not credible, or reliant on the good will of others (UN or states with no significant interest in a possible conflict), they will be emboldened.

• Power matters. Early on in the Libyan revolution, when it was widely believed to be broad-based (ultimately time and facts revealed otherwise), the Gadhafi dictatorship put out feelers for its ceding power in exchange for immunity from prosecution and asset preservation. The anti-Gadhafi forces, calculating that the regime’s demise was inevitable, rejected those feelers. Today, they would almost surely leap at such an arrangement.

But it is too late. Now that the dictatorship has concluded that foreign military intervention is unlikely and it has made significant military progress (in large part because the revolution was a much narrower uprising than it first appeared), the balance of power has shifted dramatically. As a result, the dictatorship is demanding nothing short of its maximum positions. Hence, today’s call by the UN Secretary-General’s for an immediate ceasefire will either be ignored or rejected. The Arab League’s hollow no fly zone declaration will not be a factor. Instead, the regime will push to conclude the conflict completely on its terms. Whether it fully succeeds remains to be seen, but if it does, there will be a genuine danger that the higher the cost it bore, the greater will be its retribution against those who opposed it.

• Although ambiguity can facilitate diplomacy e.g., make it easier for parties to navigate differences, it can be destructive during crises. Although I believe the U.S. approach of refraining from direct military intervention in Libya is the right one given the lack of a compelling national interest, among other factors, the ambiguity created by mixed messages coming out of Washington has probably exacerbated things.

First, it has sowed expectations that the U.S. would ultimately intervene if things turned against the anti-Gadhafi forces. That almost certainly led to those forces taking a more rigid stance than would otherwise have been the case. The Arab League’s no fly zone declaration—hollow because none of the Arab League members are willing to commit, much less have committed even a single aircraft to enforcement—rests, in part, on the idea that its declaration would trigger U.S. intervention. Therefore, even as the Arab League possesses vastly superior air power compared to Gadhafi’s forces, it has chosen to delegate all the risk of its declaration to the U.S. and/or NATO. U.S. ambiguity has been interpreted as hesitation by the Gadhafi dictatorship. As a result, further U.S. efforts to deter the regime will likely be perceived as lacking credibility and they will be ignored. Had the initial U.S. position that the Gadhafi dictatorship step down been backed by arms deliveries to the anti-Gadhafi forces early on, the regime would have been left to worry that a lack of responsiveness on its part could lead to even greater U.S. efforts. Hence, in the face of credible U.S. commitment and calculations of further U.S. commitment, the regime might have chosen an alternative path.

• Nations with shared interests will join together if they perceive a threat. That the unrest in Bahrain increasingly appeared to pose a threat to many of the other Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) members, specifically the ability of their own governments to survive, led to a collective decision by those states to honor Bahrain’s call for help. That the move is incompatible with U.S. ideals or desires is irrelevant. The U.S. should have offered immediate mediation that would have been aimed at achieving a compromise that would address some of the protesters’ demands while assuring the survival of a reliable government. Given the large U.S. naval base in Manama, such an offer should have been a “no brainer.” It was not forthcoming. Bahrain’s government felt abandoned, and perhaps with justification. In the face of a situation over which it had lost control, Bahrain’s government acted rationally in appealing to other GCC members for help. The GCC members acted rationally to address a perceived threat to their own critical interests in reasserting a measure of certainty over the evolving chaos.
 
But as for the quote, my personal interpretation is that he meant that politics and war are inherently inseparable, it's a fact of life. How a political system chooses to deal with that fact is it's own problem.

I always saw it as simply stating that kings and kaisers have war at their disposal to enforce their policies. That war is simply another tool in the politician's tool box to reach his agenda. This is why I believe it to be outdated. We live in different times. We no longer live under monarchs and serve the political agenda of the "soveriegn." When people use the expression today, it let's our diplomats and politicians off the hook for their failures. This expression only works for dictators. Mubarak discovered that he didn't have this tool in his tool box anymore. Gaddafi had discovered that his tools are broken and unreliable. It's just a term that serves the past. It made sense to the situation of the monarch and dictator. It's just not that simple in democracies where people run governments and are supposed to find ways to avert war. Tripping into one or last resorting into one is a sure sign of their failure.
 
As theories, concepts, and ideals have been introduced, I'll offer a few thoughts concerning possible lessons from the Libya uprising:

• Reliance on world organization (today the United Nations, in the post-WW I period the League of Nations) for maintaining international peace and security in the face of significant threats is futile. The body depends on the willingness of member states, with often widely diverging interests, to reach consensus. Hence in precisely the situations where consensus is most urgent e.g., addressing a major conflict, it is often most difficult to attain. Nations are rational actors. They will not cede their critical interests nor take risks/undertake sacrifices that are disproportionate to the interests they have at stake in a given issue.

Instead, the balance of power, even as some naïve and/or idealistic academics and policy makers argue that it is irrelevant or antiquated today, remains a crucial underpinning of peace and security. So long as would-be aggressors understand that they could not achieve their desired gains at an acceptable price, they can be deterred. So long as threats are credible and would-be aggressors believe those making the threats can and will deliver, those aggressors will be deterred. In contrast, so long as would-be aggressors conclude that their targets are weak, not credible, or reliant on the good will of others (UN or states with no significant interest in a possible conflict), they will be emboldened.

• Power matters. Early on in the Libyan revolution, when it was widely believed to be broad-based (ultimately time and facts revealed otherwise), the Gadhafi dictatorship put out feelers for its ceding power in exchange for immunity from prosecution and asset preservation. The anti-Gadhafi forces, calculating that the regime’s demise was inevitable, rejected those feelers. Today, they would almost surely leap at such an arrangement.

But it is too late. Now that the dictatorship has concluded that foreign military intervention is unlikely and it has made significant military progress (in large part because the revolution was a much narrower uprising than it first appeared), the balance of power has shifted dramatically. As a result, the dictatorship is demanding nothing short of its maximum positions. Hence, today’s call by the UN Secretary-General’s for an immediate ceasefire will either be ignored or rejected. The Arab League’s hollow no fly zone declaration will not be a factor. Instead, the regime will push to conclude the conflict completely on its terms. Whether it fully succeeds remains to be seen, but if it does, there will be a genuine danger that the higher the cost it bore, the greater will be its retribution against those who opposed it.

• Although ambiguity can facilitate diplomacy e.g., make it easier for parties to navigate differences, it can be destructive during crises. Although I believe the U.S. approach of refraining from direct military intervention in Libya is the right one given the lack of a compelling national interest, among other factors, the ambiguity created by mixed messages coming out of Washington has probably exacerbated things.

First, it has sowed expectations that the U.S. would ultimately intervene if things turned against the anti-Gadhafi forces. That almost certainly led to those forces taking a more rigid stance than would otherwise have been the case. The Arab League’s no fly zone declaration—hollow because none of the Arab League members are willing to commit, much less have committed even a single aircraft to enforcement—rests, in part, on the idea that its declaration would trigger U.S. intervention. Therefore, even as the Arab League possesses vastly superior air power compared to Gadhafi’s forces, it has chosen to delegate all the risk of its declaration to the U.S. and/or NATO. U.S. ambiguity has been interpreted as hesitation by the Gadhafi dictatorship. As a result, further U.S. efforts to deter the regime will likely be perceived as lacking credibility and they will be ignored. Had the initial U.S. position that the Gadhafi dictatorship step down been backed by arms deliveries to the anti-Gadhafi forces early on, the regime would have been left to worry that a lack of responsiveness on its part could lead to even greater U.S. efforts. Hence, in the face of credible U.S. commitment and calculations of further U.S. commitment, the regime might have chosen an alternative path.

• Nations with shared interests will join together if they perceive a threat. That the unrest in Bahrain increasingly appeared to pose a threat to many of the other Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) members, specifically the ability of their own governments to survive, led to a collective decision by those states to honor Bahrain’s call for help. That the move is incompatible with U.S. ideals or desires is irrelevant. The U.S. should have offered immediate mediation that would have been aimed at achieving a compromise that would address some of the protesters’ demands while assuring the survival of a reliable government. Given the large U.S. naval base in Manama, such an offer should have been a “no brainer.” It was not forthcoming. Bahrain’s government felt abandoned, and perhaps with justification. In the face of a situation over which it had lost control, Bahrain’s government acted rationally in appealing to other GCC members for help. The GCC members acted rationally to address a perceived threat to their own critical interests in reasserting a measure of certainty over the evolving chaos.

Well stated. But there is significant national interest in Libya. It's the same interest that ties all of these nations together. Until we stop seeking tangible objects to make this problem simple, we will continue to encourage desperation and thusly religious terror. Despite some people's eagerness to remain simple, it is no longer about oil, cotton, computer chips, coffee beans, whatever. It's about the human soul. We are supposed to be the good guys. We are not Saayid Qutb's scapegoat to explain away his civilization's woes despite the ignorance of this civilization celebrating it. We are not God's enemy. We are not the ultimate reason their civilization fails. What we do do though is hinder their ability to dig themselves out. When it came to Mubarak, we simply waited until the power leaned away from him to declare our position. How safe and cowardly was that? When it comes to Libya, we sit and watch even as many of them have asked for help. How cowardly is that? When it came to the Shi'ite and the Kurd in Iraq (90s), we concerned ourselves with ensuring that the brutal Sunni maintained the throne for "stability's" sake. And in regards to Bahrain, the Sunni of Saudi Arabia have merely gone to ensure the continuation of a fellow Sunni tribesman over the Shia. It's never about the people. It's always about the Sunni tribe.

We can argue all day that we don't prevent them from changing to the better. After all, we would have done nothing to stop the uprisings in Egypt in the 1990s either. But we would have a hard time arguing that we helped them at this point. And if things go south in all these rebelling countries, the religious fallout will seek that traditional Sayyid Qutb medicine. We have a duty. It is in our national long term security interests to see them through their transition as peacefully as possible. After all, European colonialism and Cold War prescriptions didn't come without consequences. Throughout this history, these people have asked for democracy off and on. Where their leaders (and outside influence) has failed them, God has picked up the banner.
 
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I say let the Arab world sort out this mess.
 
This lack of reaction by the US, because of a vacillating, prevaricating and pusillanimous walking scumbag of a President will go down as a markerpost in the record of history. On one hand this aberration of a girlie-man takes full credit for the troop withdrawal committed to by Little Georgie-boy Bush in Iraq, the same guy who got us into Iraq whilst committing the same error that Bush did in continuing his propping up of the criminal Karzai in another nation-building venture that is NOW HIS and HIS ALONE. Nation-building in a land of primitive cave dwellers and tribal warlords committed to trafficking in hard drug raw material. A nation state barely existing as such with no concept of personal freedoms to be propped up as a venture in democracy. Sheer idiocy!

Enter Libya, a nation ruled by a quite literal madman, wherein a large segment of the people, likely inspired by what they saw in Egypt, revolted against the madman despot. If we truly believe all the pontificating we do about freedom we should have immediately announced that we would enforce a no-fly zone and started airlifting equipment of all sorts to the rebels to encourage them. Reagan tried to kill this nut knowing what a destabilizing force he could be. We should have finished the job. The useless UNindicted co-conspirators at the UN, stymied in any attempt to do anything constructive by that same old commie unity of Russia and China in the Security Council is hapless and hopeless and we should secede and evict the bastards from New York and level that building and replace it with a halfway house for homeless vets. Then we could start a treaty organization of democratic nations who would pledge and be willing to commit to a mutual defense of each other if any were to come under direct attack. That's how you deal with nations who think war is the way to go. That is the only type of world peace organization we should be a part of. A mutual defense pact with NO gray areas.
 
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Why should America shed any more blood for Muslims? They hate our guts and always will.
 
And in regards to Bahrain, the Sunni of Saudi Arabia have merely gone to ensure the continuation of a fellow Sunni tribesman over the Shia. It's never about the people. It's always about the Sunni tribe.

Unfortunately, in that region, tribal/ethnic/religious distinctions matter greatly Both the Shia and Sunni seek to dominate at the expense of the other. When it comes to political power, each views politics through a zero-sum prism: that one's gain can only be achieved at the other's expense. In proto-democratic Iraq, the country has shifted from a Sunni dictator to a government that is largely by, of, and for the Shia, frequently to the detriment of the country's Sunni and Kurdish minorities. Even if the present government in Bahrain were toppled, one would more than likely see a continuation of illiberal rule with the only major factor being a change in who holds power. There might also be a risk that the common factors that tie the Shia together could lead to Iran's gaining an opportunity in a Shia-led Bahrain to further project its growing regional power.

Tribal, ethnic, religious identities are so basic, that education and information cannot readily change the provincial worldviews that result from such identities. Instead, one has to rely on longer-term evolutionary developments. Hence, IMO, a U.S. offer to mediate a compromise that would accommodate the most basic needs of Bahrain's Shia majority population, but permit the current government to survive albeit with somewhat broader representation would have been constructive. Over time, a better coexistence experience among the country's two peoples could evolve. Perhaps, down the road, that might lead to an evolution whereby the royal family's power became more symbolic or, at least, narrower and a more representative government's authority grew larger. The U.S. took the worst possible course. It offered the Shia words but not substance. It offered no assurance whatsoever that Bahrain's government's reliability e.g., in hosting a major U.S. naval base, would be given consideration by the U.S. It left the Saudis to wonder anew whether the U.S. is a reliable partner. Not surprisingly, the GCC states made the logical decision to intervene in a fashion they viewed was appropriate given their interests. As a result, Bahrain's disaffected Shia may gain little and the underlying differences will likely fester. At the same time, Bahrain's government will have less incentive to offer some substantive concessions.
 
doctorhugo said:
Nation-building in a land of primitive cave dwellers and tribal warlords committed to trafficking in hard drug raw material. A nation state barely existing as such with no concept of personal freedoms to be propped up as a venture in democracy. Sheer idiocy!

Now...this really bothers me. And the fact that you cap the ignorance with a "idiocy" remark is really pitiful.

Afghanistan was a country that was modernizing in the mid-twentieth century.

In 1964, Afghanistan's King deliberately abandoned 200 years of autocratic rule and diminished his family's power in order to give his people democracy. He knew that absolute monarchy in the twentieth century would not ensure his nation's survival like a democracy would. Unfortunately, in 1965, among the many political parties, was The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. It was strongle influenced by that of the Soviet Communist Party. Other Socialilist political groups began to emerge.

During this phase, nations like the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union was channeling financial aid into the country. If you look at pictures of Afghanistan during this period, you will see a country you don't see on CNN. You will see modernization. There were thousands of enterprises underway. Major exports were cotton and fruit. There were two majopr discoveries in the 1960s. Natural gas was discovered in Shiberghan and iron ore in Bamiyan. Extensive traces of other mineral deposits were later discovered. There is a large sulphur deposit near Nangarhar. Coal is present and would later be mined in small quantities. There is also significant lead, manganese, marble, gypsum, barite, gold, beryl, and uranium deposits here and there. Until these mining operations could be brought into production, it was understood that agriculture had to be Afghanistan's primary economic prosperity for some time.

In the mean time, pictures of the past would show you schools full of women learning about medicine. It's most prominent leaders in the mid-1960s were four female deputies elected to the lower house of the parliament. Women were abandoning the veil. When President Kennedy visited he was surrounded by business suits. Pictures of the men in the surrounding area would be beardless and many without robes. Hell, as far back as the 1920s, you would see pictures of men in suits sitting on bicycles and cars. In the 1960s you would read about the news in a couple magazines that were emerging from the free press. You would hear about your political party or the global happenings from a radio station. They were modernizing.

Take a guess at what happened. Never mind, I'll help you. Three factors were crucial to Afghanistan's failure to modernize.

1) Due to the education system, few were engaged in the political processes. Most in the country couldn't read (over 80 percent still can't). It was largely up to the Pashtun and they were being influenced by the Soviets at the time. This meant that mass fair circulation of the press was not only hampered, but most couldn't read it anyway.

2) Those that were elected by those who were educated enough to know what they were doing were inflexible, which meant that they constantly sought ways to improve upon their power.

3) The reflexive panic of the King and his family whenever they or the system they devised came under fire meant that no coherent, legitimate opposition could develop. The only alternatives to not trusting the natural instability of democracy meant that autocracy or anarchy was always in the shadows.


The communist leaning political parties eventually gained strength and allowed the Soviet Union to gain influence. The West (America and Britian) was shoved out. The Soviet Union assumed to bank roll highways, irrigation systems, and other projects. The Soviet policy to "Russianize" Afghanistan took its toll on the tribes. Tribes in the north began to rebell against the communist parties in Afghanistan. Russian presence became more and more. The Soviets decided that invading into Afghanistan to help the struggling government was a good idea. It was a the last clear example of imperialism in history. During the years of warfare, the population radicalized, Islamic warriors traveled to find the latest jihad, agriculture fields were destroyed, irrigation systems were destroyed, social systems were destroyed. After we assisted the Mujahadeen to defeat the Soviets, we left. They turned on their own people and headed straight into a decade of civil war. Afghanistan led the world for amputees. Even more destruction ensued and the farmers of Afghanistan turned to poppy not only to feed their family, but to appease the Taliban's demands for financial support. The Taliban (means students - it's to show their conviction to learn true Islam) won at the end of the decade and two years later 3,000 Americans died across the Atlantic Ocean because of an international terrorist organization they harbored. Today, we can't burn the poppy fields because it means the death of their families when Taliban agents come to collect. It also means that without those irrigation systems and other systems that were destroyed, farmers only have poppy. Without it, we may as well usher them to the taliban so that they can pay them for digging holes to set IEDs for twenty bucks.

"Primitive cave dwellers?" "No concept of personal freedoms?" Assuming that democracy is something that entered their world only after we showed up to engineer them out of their mess is ignorant. What was that about "sheer idiocy?" Read a ****ing book, then vomit an educated opinion.
 
I say let the Arab world sort out this mess.

Sure, after Europeans created their nations completely unnaturally and we (along with the Soviets) maintained the dictator system of stability throughout the Cold War...let them clean up this mess. Not our problem. Why don't you just stick a knife in a guys gut and tell him to fix himself as he bleeds because its not your problem.
 
Why should America shed any more blood for Muslims? They hate our guts and always will.

Because, we have a chance to keep the bloodshed to a minimum. If we wait until things are blown totally out of proportion, there could be hundreds of thousands of American sons and daughters killed on faraway battlefields, vice a few thousand.
 
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