Is there any reason to believe they would? Between 1989 and 2001 Iran's 'meddling' in Afghanistan was fairly low level, much less so than that of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Of course things might be different, but I fail to see what they might hope to gain.
If one examines past historical documents (primary or secondary sources), there is no credible evidence that the U.S. pursued a meaningful economic reconstruction/political development strategy in post-Soviet Afghanistan. Such an approach might have reduced the risk that the nation would have slid into a full-fledged failed state.
Increased risk of what in Pakistan? Increased risk of the regime falling in favour of a more extreme Islamist regime? I would say that that risk is increasing under the current situation.
In Pakistan, the U.S. erred in pushing the Musharraf government aside in favor of a regime that is no less legitimate, is probably at least as corrupt, and is far more inept. A better approach would have entailed the Musharraf government's pursuing a gradual but steady shift toward a more representative government. Once the political institutions necessary to support representative government were in place, then an elected government could have been chosen. But that's not what happened. As a consequence, anti-Western forces gained influence and Pakistan's military was demoralized to the extent that the military is now much less willing to run risks on behalf of U.S. interests. The country is now sliding toward failed state status.
Afghanistan's collapse into failed state status would only accelerate and intensify the trends now under way in nuclear-armed Pakistan. Such a development in Pakistan could be geopolitically more significant than the Iranian Revolution was.
Well, that's not an issue anyone but Americans need to worry about. Many of us would suggest that such a reduction may not be entirely unwelcome.
I strongly disagree. The lack of an effective response by the UN to events in Libya, not to mention past cases in Rwanda and Darfur, highlight the very real limits of attempting to rely on world organization for major international peace and security objectives. That approach is flawed. Given the widely-varying interests of the UN's member states, such impotence is to be expected. Not coincidentally, it was the difference of interests that previously led the League of Nations to suffer from similar impotence. Hence, if the U.S. seeks to safeguard its critical interests--and Central Asian stability is one of them--it needs to have the capacity to project power.
It's possible, but unlikely. China would only be interested if it had any knock-on consequences for the Uighur insurrection in Xinjiang.
That would be a real danger for China. Arms trafficking could dramatically increase to the Xinjiang Province.
The Indians might actually welcome it as anything which served to weaken the Pakistani regime and turn its attention from its eastern to western borders could benefit them.
But not if the price were ramped up instability in parts of Kashmir, not to mention along the lengthy Indo-Pakistan border. In addition, if nuclear arms fell into the hands of hostile elements willing to proliferate such weapons, it would also destabilize the region and undermine India's interests.
This may happen in any case. The Allies have failed to eliminate AQ or the Taliban despite overwhelming military superiority. I don't think that this situation could only arise if NATO withdrew.
An immediate withdrawal of NATO forces at a time when Afghanistan lacks the institutions for self-governance and security capabilities to maintain order would greatly increase the risks of such an outcome.
You mean alternative sources of authority to NATO troops?
Alternatives to the current approach. What could be done to mitigate the risks if NATO troops withdrew? Would such measures be effective? That's a necessary exercise that should be repeated on a regular basis.
Well, it looks as if I'll have to suggest what US goals might be, as no one seems to wish to state them:
- Eliminate the potential for terrorist groups to use Afghanistan as a logistical and training base.
- Maintain a strong military presence on Iran's eastern border for intimidation purposes.
- Maintain a strong military presence on Pakistan's western border to ensure they remain nominally Western-friendly.
IMO, the strong military presence should be part of maintaining a balance of power that reduces Iran's ability to project power into the region and allows for a capability to address developments in Pakistan were the country to slide further toward failed state status to the extent that its nuclear arms were at risk of being compromised.
This is all true, yet where was the pro-active involvement of the Allies when Karzai committed widespread electoral fraud? The Allies are inextricably linked in the minds of the world, not just Afghans, with the policies of Karzai who is seen as the puppet of the West. He seems to be attempting to distance himself from the Allies now, but the Allies cannot undermine his regime and at the same time ensure its survival.
That the NATO states ignored the massive fraud and suspect outcome of the election is in the past. The countries need to worry about today and tomorrow. If their interests are sufficiently important and alternatives for securing those interests are lacking, then they need to be willing to ignore Mr. Karzai's demands. In other words, they need to put their interests ahead of Mr. Karzai's wishes. Initially, there might be some public relations fallout, but in the end, if a better outcome is secured, that fallout will fade from memory.
Well that would presuppose an entirely new policy shift, one that will require the creation of an entirely new political and administrative infrastructure built under the hostile gaze of the current regime. It is a project of many years. Are you sure NATO has the political will to remain there another decade? Or longer?
I'm not wed to either the sunk cost or escalation of commitment falacies. If a strategic adjustment is needed, it should be pursued. IMO, it is needed. The Karzai regime is more part of the problem, than the solution. Moreover, my guess is that if the U.S./NATO continue to rely on the Karzai regime, prospects for a stay of another decade or longer are higher than they would be if the U.S./NATO de-emphasized Kabul.
Under a new approach, I believe Afghanistan’s tribal leaders should be charged with allocating resources that would be furnished for reconstruction, economic development, education, within their jurisdictions. Security operations should be coordinated with the tribal leaders. Local security forces would be developed and trained. Those forces should be charged with maintaining security in areas under the jurisdiction of each tribal leader. They should be developed with attention to maintaining a careful balance of power so that no local area would be in a position to try to gain preeminence at the expense of others. Only truly national issues--those that impact the entire country--should be financed through and coordinated with Kabul. Those efforts should immediately be focused on developing an adequate legal and constitutional framework, financial system, central army that would complement local security forces when needed (including a "balancing" role), but not serve as a substitute for them, and ultimately culminate in an election that would create a government that Afgans would widely view as legitimate.
In fact, in a welcome development, the U.S. has taken the first small steps in that direction. On December 17, 2010,
Business Week reported:
The Obama administration will rely more heavily on Pakistan and local power-brokers in Afghanistan as the U.S. seeks to turn “significant progress” in the war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban into long-term gains...
Karzai in the past has objected to U.S. ties with local leaders as an attempt to undermine his authority. The resulting emphasis by the U.S. on working with and through Karzai has worsened corruption, said Robert L. Grenier, CIA station chief in Islamabad from 1999 until 2002, at a Council on Foreign Relations forum in Washington yesterday.
In the light of my previous comments about your new regionalist strategy, it seems to me that there is no exit plan. NATO will remain for the forseeable future unable to extricate itself from its perceived role as backers of Karzai and yet certain that the Karzai regime will never be able to survive without their foreign backers. Your new, "Devolved Afghanistan" is a policy diametrically opposed to current policy, threatening to all current players in the regime and the two policies - current and new - cannot be conducted simultaneously. How do you think it could work?
It's threatening to the corrupt and, much more important to U.S. interests, inept and unreliable Karzai regime, only. However, a strategic shift would have a better chance to lead to a legtimate government that could enjoy broad-based support. Not surprisingly, the U.S. has finally taken the first tentative steps in that direction.
Mr. Karzai has been propped up for nearly a decade now. He remains viewed widely as illegitimate by Afghans. He is capable of exercising jurisdiction without NATO assistance over only a small part of the country. As a consequence, the current "exit strategy" is little more than a mirage.
Sound policy cannot rest on sentimentality alone. Just because the U.S./NATO states have invested in Mr. Karzai's regime is not sufficient grounds to continue an approach that quite frankly has generated insignificant returns based on the resources already deployed and enormous amount of time given to the regime to evolve into a competent government. Continued "investment" in the Karzai regime is little more than a de facto rationalization of the earlier experiment that has generated such minimal returns.
Instead, sentimentalities should be put aside--and Karzai's latest impulsive outburst makes it easier to justify doing just that--and the changes necessary to increase prospects for a better outcome should be pursued.
Finally, given Afghanistan's tribal structures, it makes eminent sense to build from the ground up starting with its tribal leaders. Moreover, unlike the Karzai regime, the tribal leaders are perceived broadly within their communities as legitimate and trustworthy. The greater trust and credibility these leaders command would offer a fresh starting point for the political strategy, and an effective political strategy would contribute to a better security environment. Now that the U.S. has moved modestly in that direction, it has developed working relationships that would enable it to move fairly quickly away from a Kabul-centric approach.