Currently, there are numerous trajectories along which Egypt could evolve. They include but are not limited to:
1. Evolution into a stable reasonably democratic state (ideal case).
2. Progress toward a reasonably democratic system of governance that fizzles over time and ultimately yields to renewed illiberal rule.
3. Military rule that evolves into a new round of illiberal rule.
4. Theocratic state (touted by some pundits, but not very likely in the near-term given the depth of secularist nationalism and also the role of the military)
Immediately, the transition will likely lead to a de-emphasis on foreign policy in Egypt. In other words, Egypt's foreign policy footprint will shrink temporarily as the country focuses on devising a framework for future elections and, more importantly, tries to lay a foundation for more democratic governance. Other regional state and non-state actors will likely vie to fill that temporary policy vacuum. There will likely be good continuity in Egypt's foreign relations. Things will remain relatively unchanged vis-a-vis the U.S. and also the Israel-Egypt peace treaty will remain intact.
Most likely, there will be elections anywhere from 6-18 months down the road, depending on how quickly a framework for transparent elections can be devised, electoral campaigns can be organized, etc. If at least some of the opposition figures such as Mohamed ElBaradei win significant political influence in the elections, one can expect a strong amount of continuity in Egypt's foreign relations. Indeed, in an op-ed published in
The New York Times, Dr. ElBaradei addressed the "chaos or worse" case some have been arguing would follow in a post-Mubarak era. He
wrote:
Many, particularly in the West, have bought the Mubarak regime’s fiction that a democratic Egypt will turn into chaos or a religious state, abrogate the fragile peace with Israel and become hostile to the West. But the people of Egypt — the grandmothers in veils who have dared to share Tahrir Square with army tanks, the jubilant young people who have risked their lives for their first taste of these new freedoms — are not so easily fooled.
Aside from creating a framework that produces progress toward more democratic governance--a task that will not be completed once elections are held, as democracy depends on laws and institutions, with elections being an important but not sole requirement of democratic governance--there will be some big challenges that confront Egypt's future government. None will be larger than enacting the economic reforms that will produce meaningful opportunities for Egypt's still rapidly growing and youthful population (median age is 24). Failure of that government to produce satisfactory outcomes over a few years could lead to disenchantment with the post-Mubarak system. It would be that disenchantment, more than political Islamist movements, that would pose perhaps the biggest threat to what would still be a very young democratic experience. That situation could lead to the second outcome sketched at the beginning of this message.
In the end, one should not automatically assume the worst. There is a big opportunity for a new course for Egypt. There are also risks. For now, the journey to a new political future is at its starting point.
