Sometimes you guys EPITOMIZE the encyclopedia definition of FACE-PALM in your myopic defense of your ideological leader.
Several quick things:
1. Disagreement with General McChrystal's actions is not the same thing as having support for or commitment to President Obama's ideology.
2. Highlighting what apparently is an indication of a core leadership deficiency in subsequent information has nothing to do with President Obama. Professor Kotter's work on leadership, from which I drew one example (aligning/understanding who is relevant) stands on its academic merits. It is not a superficial political work.
3. I expressed my position on what is now the current strategy in Afghanistan here at DP prior to its development. I noted what I believed to be its central flaw (Kabul-centric nature) at the time it was announced. One can find two of the relevant links here:
http://www.debatepolitics.com/asia-...-supply-convoy-pakistan-2.html#post1058819040 . Therefore, it is rather absurd to characterize my positions as expressing support for my "ideological leader," especially as I do not believe the strategy in place is the right one.
You Just said "The Administration's responsibility is that it approved General McChrystal's strategy". Really? Thats BEING IN CHARGE?
In any organization, whether it is the CEO, the partner, or in the case of the U.S. Government, the President, the person who approves a strategy (not necessarily the same thing as the one who designs it) is accountable for his/her decisions and choices.
Is it a GOOD strategy? Is it working?
As noted earlier, and one can also reference the message to which I provided the hyperlink, I do not believe the current strategy is a good one. It rests on a foundation that undermines prospects for success. Moreover, early indications are that it is not working in a fashion required to meet the objectives set forth from the time it was implemented to July 2011. My argument, unlike that of those who have been describing the events as 'unanticipated,' is that the results are a direct consequence of the strategy's flaws. That General McChrystal said that it was taking longer than expected to gain the support of the tribal leaders is a direct result of the strategy's focusing on the Karzai regime at the expense of the tribal leaders. Delegating control over resource allocation, security decisions, and decision making to a provincial, corrupt, and incompetent regime that is widely viewed as illegitimate and has demonstrated a persistent preference for pursuing self-interest rather than addressing the needs of local areas, much less Afghanistan as a whole, is no way to win the support and trust of the tribal leaders. In short, the result is exactly what should have been expected.
Why is there animosity between the Afghan War commanders entire staff and the administration? Could there ACTUALLY be some fault in the administration that needs addressing???
Of course there is. Effective leaders would directly and privately raise concerns/objections, offer insights, provide suggestions in a proper fashion with the key players. They would not, I repeat not, go complaining through the media, much less in a fashion that puts those players in a negative light. They would not have their staffs making disparaging or worse remarks about the key players who are integral to ensuring that things get done, much less one of the players who had a correct read on the situation from the onset. They would make sure that they have good working relationships with key players, not have an all but non-functional relationship with some of those players. That is not leadership. Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened.
There is nothing magical or novel about notions that leaders need to be able to work effectively with those who are relevant or that they must inspire and nurture confidence and trust. That General McChrystal apparently lacked such basic insight is not the President's personal shortcoming. The President might have his own shortcomings, and he bears a degree of responsibility for having chosen General McChrystal for a task for which he appears increasingly to have been unprepared, but General McChrystal's lack of adequate leadership ability is the general's own issue.
In fact, the situation appears to have been a classic case of asking what amounted to an organization's top salesperson (special operations commander in the general's case) to take charge of its marketing operations (military operations in Afghanistan, in this case). The skill sets for success in each area have some overlap, but there are significant differences as well. In the former, one needs to be able to powerfully promote the attributes of a product or service to a customer's needs (address narrow and specific objectives related to special forces missions and work with a relatively small number of highly-trained operatives). In the latter, one needs to be able to relate a much broader range of activities to the organization's mission, goals, and objectives (the overarching strategy in Afghanistan, large numbers of troops, military and civilian leaders, etc.). The general was clearly outstanding with his special operations work. Unfortunately, he was not outstanding when it came to leadership, otherwise there would have been no
Rolling Stone piece and his relationships with, among others, Amb. Eikenberry and Richard Holbrooke would have been rock solid.
Oh...we SEE the pattern. Obama is in charge of the gulf oil spill...has been since DAY ONE...OK...so its in its THIRD ****ING MONTH and its still gushing 60 THOUSAND barrels of oil a DAY...but they are IN CHARGE and giving BP what they want...And they are in charge of the budget. And spending. And unemployment. And the housing crisis.
That the President may have his own issues, challenges, and problems to address and may not be handling all of the issues in the most effective fashion, is an entirely separate matter from General McChrystal's issues. Addressing the general's apparent deficits does not mean that the President is anything close to perfect or effective.
