Which forecasts? The only forecast was that American military would displace the Taliban regime and it did. There was no further forecast. Afghanistan was more or less put on the back burner.
I'm referring to repeated assessments that things would grow more stable following each new military strategy that was unveiled. Moreover, victory isn't just about temporarily driving a regime from power. It is also about maintaining stability following that outcome.
Quite frankly, the lack of post-regime planning in Iraq and Afghanistan raise very serious military leadership (vision) and doctrine (components of war planning) questions. That such planning did not take place or was ineffectual if it did in two medium-sized wars suggests that the matter is not mere coincidence.
Because, according to many Generals, what works in Iraq is bound to work in Afghanistan. This is not counter-insurgency it's much tougher than that.
I strongly agree.
We are not taking into consideration the amount of support that the ISI gives to the Taliban leadership; even ranking members in the Pakistan military are Pro-Taliban!
That is a real problem.
It's not the military's job to articulate. It's the military's job to eradicate.
My point is that the military needs to have a big-picture understanding of the conflict at hand. In the absence of such an understanding, they can lose sight of the importance of achieving the objectives set forth, fail to understand the nature of the threats/risks involved--and in Afghanistan, things are very complex and dynamic--fail to appreciate possible scenarios/developments that could emerge, etc. A very strong understanding of the history, the structure of Afghan society, and changes that have taken place in Afghanistan since the British and Soviet military efforts there are crucial to developing a coherent and credible military plan.
History suggested that a resurgence of Taliban attacks was all but certain. Afghanistan's domestic structure suggested that placing faith in a central government was a questionable proposition.
Instead, the planning rested on three badly flawed assumptions:
1. Regime change in Afghanistan could immediately lead to a stable, democratic, pluralistic society (neoconservative outlook that is overly idealistic)
2. A central government could readily gain legitimacy and take charge in Afghanistan
3. Modern technology rendered the need for sizable manpower and the historic experience of the British and Soviets obsolete
Contrary to what has become a sorry litany of excuses flowing from Afghanistan, I believe it is those three flawed assumptions that have done much to produce the present outcome. The outcome is as much a product of bad planning/poor understanding/wishful assumptions as it is anything that the Taliban have done.
Hopefully, given the stakes involved, the new strategy will cast aside those three assumptions and work with the Afghanistan that is, not the one that is wished for.
