I'm referring to repeated assessments that things would grow more stable following each new military strategy that was unveiled. Moreover, victory isn't just about temporarily driving a regime from power. It is also about maintaining stability following that outcome.
That seems almost contradictory; stability, repeated assessments, new military strategy. I find that many reports from all sides are myopic at best. It seems that the administrations and military leadership denotes victory as an event to put on a calendar and create a ceremony for.
I agree, true victory cannot be temporary. However, I think the victory we invaded Afghanistan for, is no-longer the true victory; the true victory mutated into building a sturdy table from rotten wood.
Quite frankly, the lack of post-regime planning in Iraq and Afghanistan raise very serious military leadership (vision) and doctrine (components of war planning) questions. That such planning did not take place or was ineffectual if it did in two medium-sized wars suggests that the matter is not mere coincidence.
We could spend decades pointing out and debating the many failures of the previous American regimes, in regards to Afghanistan; as we've missed warnings starting from the retreat of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of Civil War, that our patronage and blessings will come back to haunt us.
The reality is that we're fighting the very same war from a very different side.
Problems are only answers, backwards. It's solvable.
My point is that the military needs to have a big-picture understanding of the conflict at hand. In the absence of such an understanding, they can lose sight of the importance of achieving the objectives set forth, fail to understand the nature of the threats/risks involved--and in Afghanistan, things are very complex and dynamic--fail to appreciate possible scenarios/developments that could emerge, etc. A very strong understanding of the history, the structure of Afghan society, and changes that have taken place in Afghanistan since the British and Soviet military efforts there are crucial to developing a coherent and credible military plan.
Not just the "History" of Afghanistan, but the "Histories" of Afghanistan. Kabul witnessed a coup in early 80's/ late 70's, but the majority of Afghanistan didn't give it a second thought until things started getting heated (and their coffers started filling with American wealth).
History suggested that a resurgence of Taliban attacks was all but certain. Afghanistan's domestic structure suggested that placing faith in a central government was a questionable proposition.
I still feel that we, including the academic and researchers, still have a fairly poor understand "Taliban". We are reaching for the pragmatic facets of the term, without really understanding the extent of the pragmatism. Sometimes the situation appears as an A.Q. and Mullah Omar Inc. hostage situation; sometimes the situation appears as legions of Pro-AQ warriors, ready to fight and die.
It also appears that many FATA and Afghani tribesmen call A.Q. "foreigners", and (if I am not mistaken) Pakistan's military gets results about dead A.Q. operatives from tribesmen who reports me amount of "foreigners" killed in the battle. We have a habit of grouping people together in our minds, and it turns into real problems on the battlefield.
Instead, the planning rested on three badly flawed assumptions:
1. Regime change in Afghanistan could immediately lead to a stable, democratic, pluralistic society (neoconservative outlook that is overly idealistic)
2. A central government could readily gain legitimacy and take charge in Afghanistan
3. Modern technology rendered the need for sizable manpower and the historic experience of the British and Soviets obsolete
There's another mountainous region that at one point faced a very similar problem (ethnic diversity, mountainous region, powerful states on their flanks). The Nation-State of Switzerland, might be able to teach us how to deal with the situation.
Contrary to what has become a sorry litany of excuses flowing from Afghanistan, I believe it is those three flawed assumptions that have done much to produce the present outcome. The outcome is as much a product of bad planning/poor understanding/wishful assumptions as it is anything that the Taliban have done.
Poor Planning, Wishful Assumptions. Don't forget that similar circumstances built the United States; It was the extent of circumstance and allies that allowed our bunch of rebels/forefathers to succeed.
But I wouldn't put too much weight on this comparison, you'll liable to fall.
Hopefully, given the stakes involved, the new strategy will cast aside those three assumptions and work with the Afghanistan that is, not the one that is wished for.
It's true. We have to be realistic. No more Star Wars.