With regard to Mr Garaudy’s convictions for disputing the existence of crimes against humanity, the Court referred to Article 17 (prohibition of abuse of rights), which was intended to prevent people from inferring from the Convention any right to engage in activities or perform acts aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. Thus, no one could rely on the Convention as a basis for engaging in any act that was contrary to its provisions. Having analysed the book concerned, the Court found that, as the domestic courts had shown, the applicant had adopted revisionist theories and systematically disputed the existence of the crimes against humanity which the Nazis had committed against the Jewish community. There could be no doubt that disputing the existence of clearly established historical events, such as the Holocaust, did not constitute historical research akin to a quest for the truth. The real purpose of such a work was to rehabilitate the National-Socialist regime and, as a consequence, to accuse the victims of the Holocaust of falsifying history. Disputing the existence of crimes against humanity was, therefore, one of the most severe forms of racial defamation and of incitement to hatred of Jews. The denial or rewriting of this type of historical fact undermined the values on which the fight against racism and anti-Semitism was based and constituted a serious threat to public order. It was incompatible with democracy and human rights and its proponents indisputably had designs that fell into the category of prohibited aims under Article 17 of the Convention. The Court found that, since the applicant’s book, taken as a whole, displayed a marked tendency to revisionism, it ran counter to the fundamental values of the Convention, namely justice and peace. The applicant had sought to deflect Article 10 of the Convention from its intended purpose by using his right to freedom of expression to fulfil ends that were contrary to the Convention. Consequently, the Court held that he could not rely on Article 10 and declared his complaint incompatible with the Convention.
As regards Mr Garaudy’s convictions for racial defamation and incitement to racial hatred, the Court found that they could constitute an interference with his right to freedom of expression. The interference was prescribed by the Act of 29 July 1881 and had at least two legitimate aims: "the prevention of disorder or crime" and "the protection of the reputation or rights of others". However, for the same reasons as those set out above and in view of the overall revisionist tone of the work, the Court had serious doubts as to whether the passages on which his convictions were based could qualify for protection under Article 10. While criticism of State policy, whether of Israel or any other State, indisputably came within that Article, the Court noted that the applicant had not confined himself to such criticism: his writings had a clear racist objective. However, the Court did not consider it necessary to decide that issue, as it found that the reasons given by the domestic courts for convicting the applicant were relevant and sufficient and the interference with his right to respect for his freedom of expression was "necessary in a democratic society", in accordance with Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court declared this complaint ill-founded.