Well, maybe the CIA. Trump was correct in scoffing at American Intel organizations, but stupid for publicly doing it in front of cameras while entertaining Putin.
The fact that the CIA had a guy so high up in Moscow is actually shocking. It's one of their very few success stories. For the most part, the CIA's history is littered with failure because it lacked imagination, lacked proper analytical skills, and denied itself the ability to develop espionage techniques due to it's historical wish to be mostly only a clandestine service. For example:
- It never really created an espionage network inside the Soviet Union because its agents were either routinely caught and executed or they passed insignificant information for the paycheck. This failure reached its apex in the 1980s when America's spies inside the Soviet Union were all arrested, tried, imprisoned, and executed one after another. For years, James Angleton, chief of CIA Counterintelligence from 1954 to 1975, was convinced of a high ranking mole within the CIA. He became infamous in his counter-productive zeal to discover this mole, and in time after his resignation, counter-intelligence efforts were undertaken with far less enthusiasm and resulted in oversights. The reason America's spies within the Soviet Union were killed off in the 1980s is that Adrich Ames, a widely known agent for his documented drunkedness and ineptitude, had failed upward for seventeen years. In 1985, he was awarded for this by being promoted to chief of counterintelligence for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He was a double agent who wound up giving Moscow the names of hundreds of agents all over the world.
One of the CIA's biggest failures everywhere was its refusal to understand foreign countries and governments through the eyes of the average person on the street. For example:
- From 1956, much of the CIA's Intelligence on the Arab world was filtered through Israeli Intelligence. The Israeli perspective colored American perceptions at all levels.
- The CIA handed Nasser millions to buy his support and assured Eisenhower that he was bought. They were shocked when Nasser agreed to sell cotton to the Soviets and when he nationalized the Suez, something the Egyptian in the street had known for weeks. Then, Allen Dulles, the first civilian Director of Central Intelligence, assured Eisenhower that the rumor of a joint Israeli-UK-French military plan to attack Egypt was absurd. Israel lied to the CIA and the CIA took it at face value. So when it absolutely did happen days later, Eisenhower was caught off balance, which means that the CIA had failed in Jerusalem, Paris, and London.
- The CIA failed to understand the Islamic Revolution in Iran and instead chose to blame the KGB (who blamed the CIA, to be fair).
- By the late 1970s, the CIA knew of the economic troubles in Moscow, but failed to assess how that might turn into political trouble.
- The CIA failed to know that Gorbachev told the leader of Afghanistan in 1987 that he was going to start pulling his troops out. And when American citizens in the Washington streets began to hail Gorbachev as a hero who wanted to end the Cold War, the CIA was clueless because they could not grasp the concept.
- The CIA was surprised when the Berlin Wall came down.
- The CIA failed to truly recognize al-Qaeda as a threat after creating its most hardened warriors in Afghanistan.
But the biggest failure was how, overtime, the CIA directors began bow to political pressure and deliver Intel to the President that more fit his agenda, rather than the situation. For example:
- Despite knowing that
the second Gulf of Tonken "attack" was a mistake within hours, they provided Johnson the Intel he needed so that he could convince Congress to give him the power to escalate dramatically the conflict in Vietnam to defend U.S. troops.
- Despite having the evidence to the contrary, going back to 1998 when Clinton ordered strikes on Iraqi targets and the CIA could provide no WMD targets to the military, the CIA told Bush that they "could not know" if Hussein had WMD in 2002. This means that not only did the CIA not have a network inside Iraq over the entirety of the 1990s, but also preferred to rely upon the military to investigate in order to be able to provide anything at all.