We'll see. It has to pass the Bundestag, which will not necessarily fall into line just because Merkel tells them to.
Here there's an uncanny Greek-German similarity.
Where pissing off large parts of her own party, Merkel could pull it off against that faction. The two opposition parties (insignificant in their size but WTH) are in favor and the Social Dems she's in government coalition with (the junior partner so to speak) will lean more towards acceptance.
As with Tsipras who'll get the "establishment" of the past in support but not all of his own coalition government.
The 'macroeconomic damage' that Syriza may or may not have caused is as nothing to the macroeconomic destruction wreaked by austerity: mass unemployment, the collapse of GDP and the 70% increase of debt to GDP have nothing whatsoever to do with Syriza's policies or tactics.
We actually don't know the measure of GDP collapse that has been caused by the delay, nor to what extent the debt/GDP ratio is by now.
Everyone looks at the debt to GDP (rise in %-age).
One need see that the debt percentage of GDP (as known before this all came to the latest head) was largely due to the GDP itself plummeting. Where GDP fell in a constant recession of 5 years, one need also see that it fell most from 2008 to 2010, i.e. before Europe waded in.
The debt
peaked in 2011. In simple Euros. It hasn't been as high since, the 2012 programme and haircut having reduced it.
It's rise in the period 2012-2014 was, by comparison, a piece of cake compared to before and in Euros it's still not as high as 2011 (leaving aside that the current damage still requires measuring).
GDP growth was a yearly
minus 2008 to 2011 (peaking then at -8.9). Since then it's still minus but consistently less so (down to -3.9 in 2013 and the actual plus value of 0.8 in 2014).
It's papers in April 2010 had junk bond status, had it changed to the drachma by even then, that currency would have been non-convertible as in something to use for loo paper.